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Summary 
 
Even today there are many, and often incompatible, perspectives 
on how to approach Derrida, caused in no small measure by the 
polyfaceted, and no less massive, body of work that he produced. 
In this dissertation we will suggest a way toward consensus, by 
means of the “law” which Derrida tells us impelled his corpus 
since his first student work of 1954. We will begin from that 
earliest work, and follow Derrida’s progress in close reading 
through key texts up to Of Grammatology of 1967. In so doing, we 
will assess how Derrida proceeds. Rather than applying a 
“structuralism”, we will suggest a cumulative progress toward a 
“system”, as Derrida evolves better ways to further his concerns. 
Hence rather than merely explaining an evolution, we will seek to 
demonstrate it. By our final chapter we will have suggested how 
différance and the trace evolved from 1954, and also to some 
degree how they are worked out. In doing so, we hope to provide 
a way to settle at least some of the issues that remain contentious 
in Derrida study. Moreover, this approach ought to permit 
assessment of Derrida’s progress in terms of his own aims, and 
even to predict how he will “improve” his system. We hope the 
progress and outcome will provide a starting point for a 
collaborative project to develop a “logic” to apply across 
Derrida’s oeuvre, and to those disciplines that his work has 
influenced.  
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Introduction 
It is probably fair to say that treating Derrida’s work as 
“systematic” remains a contentious approach. This debate has a 
long history, which we will summarise before explaining why we 
believe an approach such as ours is novel, timeous and beneficial.1  
The first exposure of Derrida’s work to the English-speaking 
community occurred in 1966 with the reading of his paper 
“Structure, Sign and Play” at Johns Hopkins University (Howells 
1998, 35). As more of his work began to be published, Derrida’s 
approach was associated with antipathy to structuralism, which 
school had proposed “constant laws of abstract structure” behind 
the “variations in the surface phenomena” of human life (ODP 
365). To be sure, Derrida’s critiques of the “structural linguistics” 
of Saussure and the tradition of linguistics developed from him, 
the “structural anthropology” of Levi-Strauss and Rousset’s 
structuralist approach to literary criticism were indeed prominent 
(cf. OG 107-140, FS 3-30).2 
                                                 
1 We employ the formal “we” to refer to ourselves (the author of this 
dissertation) for reasons we explain in our “Note on Methodology” (our page 
49). 
2 Derrida since 1963 had emphasised the necessity to begin from Rousset’s 
structural approach to “literature”, but then “solicit” – appeal to and undo – its 
supports (FeS 487, FS 7). In 1966 he first mentioned the advantage in Lèvi-
Strauss’ “structural anthropology”, explaining that “Structures” nevertheless 
must be “menaced” (NCW 3-4). We will address Derrida’s critique of 
Saussure’s supposedly “structural” linguistics in some detail (although Derrida 
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Derrida approach was thus associated with “post-structuralism”, 
along with such writers as Foucault, Lacan, and Barthes (cf. Said 
1972) – despite Derrida’s frequent disagreement with or omission 
of these thinkers in his works.3 Critics of this school deemed that 
it took a  
skeptical stance, in particular by refusing any 
concepts of objectivity, reality and truth. (ODP 
295) 
We will explain that Derrida rather began with objectivity and 
reality as his basal concerns, since 1954 and his address to 
Husserl, that a desire for truth was at least a first impetus in his 
development, and that above all he avoided refusing any of these 
traditional concerns. 
Nevertheless, with such ascription to Derrida of wariness of 
structure and the refusal of truth arose a resistance to reading his 
work “systematically”. That Derrida frequently, from 1965, 
                                                                                                        
prefers “model” to explain its static aspects, and “system” for its overall 
progress (DLG 1030, 1041, P 3)).  
3 The famous picture of the “Post-Structuralist Tea Party” portrayed all four 
together. Said in 1972 aligned Derrida with Barthes and Foucault. Derrida’s 
footnote in “Positions” of 1968, explained his reasons for attempting to avoid 
mention of Lacan to that juncture (P 107-113, fn. 44), and his interactions with 
Foucault in the 1960s were primarily critical (cf. CeH 1963). For a summary of 
the Foucault-Derrida engagements see Phillippou (2004). For an analysis 
suggesting that Derrida’s and Lacan’s bases are nevertheless compatible, see 
Hurst (2008b). In “Of Grammatology” of 1966 Derrida mentioned Barthes in 
one paragraph, supporting Barthes’ reading of Saussure (DLG 28; Barthes 
1964, 4).  
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explained his progress by the word “system”, and that in 1968 he 
noted that his approach allowed for “systematic and regulated 
transitions” (P 28) was not yet emphasised.4  
Instead, following from this alignment by readers of Derrida with 
critique of structuralists – and Saussure in particular – Derrida’s 
work in the 1970s was addressed primarily for its linguistic and 
literary-theoretical relevance. Leavey and Allison (in Derrida, 
1978b, 186-193) list over one hundred and eighty articles 
published about Derrida to that date; the vast majority had to do 
with writing, language, discourse theory or structuralism, with 
only one (Allison, 1974) explicitly devoted to Derrida as a 
phenomenologist.5  
The climate in those years thus encouraged a consensus that 
Derrida was only an advocate of a “play” (jeu) of language. As 
Norris summarised by 1987, many readers had often deemed this 
interpretation made Derrida a sort of  
                                                 
4 Derrida also writes that “différance”, as a culmination of these systematic 
transitions, “develops the most legitimate principled exigencies of 
‘structuralism’” (P 28). We will progress as far as “différance” to seek to develop 
these systematic transitions. 
5 With the exception of Allison’s accomplished “Translator’s Introduction” to 
Speech and Phenomena (1973), the address to Derrida’s approach to Husserl and 
philosophy seems to be confined to the 1960s, in France (cf. Deguy 1963, 
Schérer 1968, Benoist, 1969). As to English articles, that of Smith – the only 
listed English article on Derrida in the 1960s to deal with Husserl alone – is 
made up of three short pages of Smith’s own commentary (Smith, 1967, 120-
123), the rest translating an extract from “Speech and Phenomena”.  
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mischievous latter-day Sophist, bent upon 
reducing every discipline of thought to a 
species of rhetorical play (Norris 1987, 21).  
Indeed, that the word “play” in French (jeu) also refers to a game,6 
which has structured rules from the first, was underemphasised 
by those readers. So too was that Derrida had emphasised that 
even play must be addressed “rigorously” (OG 50, DlGb 73-74, 
cf. DLG 27).  
To be sure, caveats against deeming Derrida’s approach to be a 
kind of play in which “anything goes” had arisen since at least 
1983 (Culler 1983, 110).
7
 Yet treating Derrida as an advocate of 
play in at least some form was still incommensurate with 
considering that his work could be explained by its “systematic 
and regulated transitions” (P 28) – or as we put it, explained 
“systematically”.8  
                                                 
6 Spivak, the translator of Of Grammatology, translated jeu as “play” or “game” 
where requisite (cf. OG 50, DLGb 73-74). 
7 Culler had noted by 1983 that he discerned “no reason to believe, as is 
sometimes suggested, that deconstruction makes interpretation the process of 
free association in which anything goes” (Culler 1983, 110).  
8 For example, the critiques of Derrida by some “analytic” philosophers, such 
as Searle and Ayer, are well known (and explained by Culler (1983, 110-129), 
and Norris (1987, 172-193)). 
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The difficulty of staggered dates of publication 
Thus, to begin to justify how a systematic approach could hold, 
we note a mundane but nevertheless massive reason why Derrida 
was adopted in that fashion in earlier years – his works were 
published or re-published in a very irregular order. Derrida’s first 
long work (the 1954 student thesis The Problem of Genesis in 
Husserl’s Philosophy) was only published in French in 1990, and in 
English in 2003. His next work, the speech “Genesis and 
Structure and Phenomenology” of 1959, also on Husserl, was 
published in 1965.9 
 Derrida’s first long published work, the “Introduction” to his 
translation of Husserl’s “The Origin of Geometry” was published 
in France in 1962. That is, Derrida’s first nine years of study led 
to three works that dealt only with Husserl. Yet this order was 
obscured even in France.10  
Derrida’s first article on structuralism (“Force and Signification”) 
had been published in 1963, seven years after Derrida’s thesis on 
                                                 
9 Henceforth, we will follow the convention of translating titles of works to the 
English, even when we are addressing the French version. However, the 
abbreviation listed thereafter will be that of the French work. 
10 Nor was Husserl’s the exclusive influence, of course. The “Curriculum 
Vitae” in Jacques Derrida, published in 1993, explained that in 1947-48 Derrida 
had thought that he must write “‘literature’ rather”, and that he had first read 
Kierkegaard and Heidegger in 1948 (as “awed reading”) (JD 329). In “The 
Time of a Thesis: Punctuations”, Derrida explained that in 1957 he had 
registered a doctoral dissertation in which he had planned to relate 
transcendental phenomenology to “a new theory of literature” (ToaT, 37). 
Even in 1957 the broader linguistic influences were involved in his interest in 
phenomenology. 
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Husserl. But this progress was made more inscrutable in that 
during the early 1960s Derrida had published a slew of articles 
(Leavey, in IOG 182-183) that were collated into two books 
published in France in 1967. Most were collected into Writing and 
Difference, while the articles “Of Grammatology” and “Nature, 
Culture, Writing” of 1966 were expanded into Of Grammatology. 
The difficulty arose in that these articles were published with 
amendments by Derrida, seeming to make his work much more 
of a piece, thus obscuring his progress during the 1960s (for 
instance, the word “Différance” was added to “Violence and 
Metaphysics” (1964) in an emendation of 1967, and Derrida only 
developed “différance” in 1965 (DLG 46, (866)).11 The year 1967 
also brought two more works on Husserl, “Speech and 
Phenomena” and “Form and Meaning”, along with the article 
“The Linguistics of Rousseau”, and the interview 
“Implications”.12 
But – even without proceeding to consider those works by 
Derrida that appeared in France soon afterward – the transition 
to English was even more convoluted. “Speech and Phenomena” 
and “Form and Meaning” were translated into English in a book 
of 1973, including the important essay “Différance” of 1968. That 
                                                 
11 Whether “différance ” is a word has been an issue of some debate (cf. Gasché, 
1994, 6), we will develop the systematic sense of “word” as we proceed. 
12 The article “From Restricted to General Economy” of 1967 was included in 
the French version of Writing and Difference of that year. 
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is, Derrida’s most famous short essay was one of the first to 
appear in English, and was taken as fundamental. However, 
Derrida had noted at the outset of the essay that it was a collation 
of concerns that he had assembled to that juncture (i.e. since 
1962) (D 1968 41, D 131). Few of those works were even 
available, and “Différance” was from early on taken to be the 
touchstone of Derrida’s overall progress.  
Thereafter, Of Grammatology was published in English in 1976, 
with much impact. Its first chapter situated Derrida’s approach in 
relation to philosophy, but its next two chapters considered the 
relation of “writing” to Saussure’s linguistics, then several 
linguists who had been influenced by Saussure, and several 
historians of writing. The argument in Of Grammatology then 
progressed to assess the structuralist anthropology of Lèvi-
Strauss, and Rousseau. The heavy emphasis on différance in the 
first two chapters confirmed the seeming centrality of this “word” 
to Derrida’s approach.  
Most confusingly, Derrida’s earliest published work of 1962 on 
Husserl was published in English only in 1978. Moreover, the 
collection of articles from the 1960s, Writing and Difference, was 
also published in that year. “Implications” (the interview in which 
Derrida summarises the order of his progress through the 1960s) 
was only published in Positions in 1981. That is, of the writers who 
had published on Derrida by 1978, none yet had access to the 
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order of Derrida’s progress or his summaries, to ascertain his 
overall concerns and whether they had evolved in some fashion.  
Rather, of the seventeen of Derrida’s works from the 1960s that 
had been published in English by 1978, all were involved in at 
least some fashion with writing, language, metaphor or 
structuralism. As it seemed to readers in English, Of Grammatology 
and four of the chapters (formerly articles) in Writing and Difference 
were heavily orientated towards Derrida’s concerns with writing.13 
Even the works that sought to set aside consideration of language 
per se revolved deeply around metaphor (“La Parole Soufflée”, 
“The Theatre of Cruelty”, “From Restricted to General 
Economy”).14 Derrida’s work was even inseparable from 
signification and language when interrogating Levinas’ ethics 
(“Violence and Metaphysics”). Tellingly, the two long works on 
Husserl’s phenomenology (the “Introduction” of 1962, and 
“Speech and Phenomena”) also consider the relations of writing, 
language and signification during the course of their argument.  
The core concern was made still more obvious by the subsequent 
publication in English of Dissemination (1981), “The Pit and the 
                                                 
13 One chapter in Writing and Difference critically assessed structuralism in 
relation to literary language, and a second was aimed at the “post-structuralist” 
Foucault. The at least partly linguistic or literary-theoretical chapters are 
“Edmund Jabès and the Question of the Book”, “Freud and the Scene of 
Writing”, and “Structure, Sign and Play”. As noted, “Force and Signification” 
is an address to Rousset’s structuralism, also in relation to literary writing.  
14 “La Parole Soufflée”, despite its title, was never concerned with spoken 
linguistics, but rather Derrida’s approach to Artaud’s philosophy of theatre (cf. 
Artaud, 1977). 
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Pyramid” and “White Mythology” (1982), all of which aligned the 
thinkers they addressed to some degree via signification and 
metaphor. There was more than enough support to continue with 
the canon of reading Derrida as a thinker insisting upon a play of 
language first, rather than beginning from the coherence of a 
system.  
The turn to deconstructionism 
Thus instead of progressing toward more systematic relations, 
most readers retreated from it. Taking its cue from Derrida’s 
penchant for assessing the works of others in order to tease out 
their presuppositions, interest in reading Derrida shifted toward 
the famous method of “deconstruction” which came to 
prominence after its mention in Of Grammatology in 1967.15 As 
Gasché explained, 
deconstruction is said to represent the 
moment where, in a text, the argument begins 
to undermine itself (Gasché 1994, 26).  
Moreover, following Derrida’s liberally-translated phrase “There 
is nothing outside of the text [Il n’y a pas de hors-texte]” (DLGb 
                                                 
15 The term “deconstruction” had first been employed in the first article “Of 
Grammatology” of 1965 (DLG 1023). 
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227, OG 158), everything was deemed amenable to being treated 
as a “text”.16 Interpretation of deconstruction in approach to 
“texts” was applied to multiple fields. No longer confined to 
reading of Derrida’s work, but having gained the status of a 
method of reading, deconstruction evolved to 
“deconstructionism”, which took as its presupposition the belief 
that any text could be made to undermine itself. 
As Poole put it on the back cover of the 1997 version of Of 
Grammatology, that work 
is the tool-kit for anyone who wants to empty 
the ‘presence’ out of any text he has taken a 
dislike to. A handy arsenal of deconstructive 
tools are to be found in these pages, and the 
technique, once learned, is as simple and as 
destructive as leaving a bomb in a brown 
paper bag outside (or inside) a pub. (Poole, 
1976)  
                                                 
16 The quotation is mentioned by Gasché, who includes Hirsch’s note of 1983 
that Derrida’s phrase is “the element that has appealed to some of the experts 
about texts – literary critics” (Hirsch 1983, in Gasché 1986, 279). The usual 
translation of “There is nothing outside of the text” allows for a reference to 
nothing, rather than a negation or step (pas). 
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Gasché, however, had warned of such an approach that it  
represents nothing less than an extraordinary 
blurring and toning-down of the critical 
implications of this philosopher’s work. 
(Gasché 1994, 25) 
For our purposes, we note that a belief that any “text” can be 
emptied of its “presence”, that no absolute truth is possible but 
only a play of language, and also that Derrida inspired this 
approach, engenders a resistance to seeking such absolute truth in 
Derrida’s work above all. It seems to go against everything 
Derrida argued for. Yet in 1995 Derrida had explained his  
incomprehension with regard to what happens 
in the United States […] within American 
deconstructionism (DP 77). 
At the very least, Derrida was wary of the “consensual euphoria” 
by a “community of complacent deconstructionists” (PS 17) that 
deemed any text is amenable to “deconstruction”.  
Even so, we note, nor does our broad summary comment in any 
fashion upon the contributions of particular thinkers associated 
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with that movement. Nor do we in any fashion suggest that 
Derrida set these interests aside (we will develop some of them as 
we proceed). We merely note that there might be more to find in 
Derrida’s approach than a simplified sort of deconstructionism.  
The advent of systematic approach  
To that end, an alternative had begun to emerge in 1986, in the 
works of Rodolphe Gasché and Irene Harvey. Gasché took it that 
Derrida’s work needed to be reclaimed for philosophy (although 
he made this claim too strongly, deeming that Derrida can only be 
approached philosophically (Gasché 1986, 2)).17 Derrida’s 
approach, for Gasché, arose from the tradition of Hegel, Husserl 
and Heidegger, and developed the “form” of a “certain system” 
(Gasché 1986, 239).  
Gasché thus opted for the opposite extreme to deconstructionism 
– an exceedingly systematic explanation. As Caputo put it,  
in the binary pair of systems/fragment, 
Gasché does not side with the devalorised 
                                                 
17 Gasché explained his belief that Derrida can “be adequately understood only 
if approached philosophically – that is, shown to be engaged in a constant 
debate with the major philosophical themes from a primarily philosophical 
perspective” (Gasché 1986, 2). 
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member, ‘fragment’, but with its more 
prestigious partner, system. (Caputo 1987, 251)  
As Gasché broached the possibility of a “form” of a “certain” 
“system”, we will side with Gasché. We do so, however, rather 
than because we think opting for “fragment” is incorrect, but in 
that we will begin from Derrida’s first work of 1954. As had the 
deconstructionists, Gasché opted for a fixed system rather than 
assessing whether Derrida’s approach might have changed. 
Just so, Harvey – in a book which, Caputo tells us, evolved from 
a thesis supervised by Derrida (Caputo 1987, 255) – begins with a 
critique of deconstructionist readings, and argues that Derrida’s 
work must be assessed for its philosophical bases. Harvey finds 
the core of Derrida’s reading in a comparison between Husserl 
and Saussure (Harvey 1986, 37-90). We agree that this interaction 
is important. However, Harvey in 1986 was also not yet able to 
take the path from Derrida’s earliest work upon Husserl to 
Saussure, to assess how Derrida’s relations might progress.  
Moreover, Derrida continued to publish prolifically, and the 
1990s brought further change. First, Derrida’s calls for some kind 
of ordered approach to his work began to be hard to ignore, as he 
began to refer overtly to a strange “logic” permeating his oeuvre 
(cf. AP 24, A 16, K 89).  
 - 29 - 
Second, Derrida emphasised that – the word “logic” 
notwithstanding – nor should his approach be constricted to any 
one discipline (DP 81). Indeed, Derrida’s interests even by 1967 
had been varied, but by the 1990s he had engaged in detail with a 
thoroughly eclectic range of disciplines (for example, literary 
studies, epistemology, phenomenology, linguistics, ethics, religion, 
literary criticism, philosophy of science, psychoanalysis, politics, 
and jurisprudence).18  
Thus while Gasché’s next book of 1994 was also notable in that it 
continued to develop Derrida’s systematic progress via the 
relations of difference from Derrida’s earlier years, it did not yet 
seek to develop a “logic” more amenable to adoption by multiple 
disciplines. Moreover, systematic approach of Gasché’s sort to 
any of Derrida’s work was still rare. 
                                                 
18 As to the philosophical works, for example, “Ousia and Gramme: Note on a 
Note from Being and Time” stands out (OaG 29-67). As to the seemingly 
entirely “literary”, the “Envois” to The Postcard has been a topic of discussion 
(cf. Critchley in DP 28). As to the political, The Politics of Friendship, first of 
1994, is important. The later approaches to Levinas’s ethics (“At This Very 
Moment, Here I Am” (1987) and Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (1997) are well 
known. Religion was addressed in The Gift of Death (1992). As to the 
epistemological, Derrida published The Archaeology of the Frivolous in 1973, 
addressing Maine de Biran and Condillac. As to the linguistic, the “The Pit and 
the Pyramid” (1966) and “White Mythology” (1971) were published in Margins 
of Philosophy of 1982. Both of the latter retained an important place for Hegel’s 
theory of signification. The engagement with the performative aspects of 
language developed by Austin began from “Signature, Event, Context” (1971). 
The historical explanations of writing were also developed in, for example, 
“Scribble” (1978), in which Derrida developed the address to Warburton he 
had begun in 1966 in “Of Grammatology” (cf. DLG 43). The earlier 
psychoanalytic approaches were concerned with Freud (cf. “Freud and the 
Scene of Writing”, 1966). “Force of Law” (1990) contributed to the philosophy 
of law. By this summary of titles, we have merely touched upon the expanse of 
Derrida’s concerns and publications.  
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However, return to a basis in philosophy while allowing cross-
disciplinary approach had begun to occur in 1992. Simon 
Critchley argued that Derrida addresses any text via a “clôtural” 
reading (Critchley 1992, 26-27), which applies two moments of 
reading to a text: the first rigorously analysing the text in line with 
prevailing interpretations, the second undoing the secure sense of 
the first. While by then a familiar theme in literary theory, this 
approach was situated within the philosophical tradition 
(including the work of Husserl). That said, Critchley was 
concerned with following Derrida’s development into “ethics”. 
The inability to affirm absolute truth was re-cast as a “non-
totalisable relation”, and deconstruction was deemed to follow 
the imperative to avoid the “consensus” which Critchley too 
associated with a “community of complacent deconstructionists” 
(Critchley 1992, 254). Although this imperative needed to be 
heeded “in the name of philosophy” (Critchley 1992, 254, Critchley’s 
emphasis), Critchley’s concern was not yet to approach Derrida’s 
work in a systematic fashion.  
By contrast, Cornell in 1992 had developed a sort of ethics that 
was less concerned with double reading, and more amenable to 
systematic application in multiple disciplines. Cornell suggested 
that Derrida’s “philosophy of the limit” rejected that the progress 
to a “last word” to the limits of “truth” or “justice” can be 
completed, for the latter excludes consideration of other 
“challengers”. By this insistence upon retaining multiple traditions 
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(thus avoidance of an absolute truth) Cornell re-formulated 
Derrida’s “Post-Modern” heritage as an ethics interrelated with a 
philosophy of law (Cornell 1992, 10-11).19 Even so, the approach 
was merely amenable to such systematic assessment, and had not 
yet developed relations that might be applicable to any field.  
However, at least one suggestion for a basal “plural logic” 
occurred in 2004, in the work of Hurst (also 2008b). For Hurst, 
Derrida’s refusal of choice proceeded via a constructive moment 
(“economy”) at the centre of Derrida’s structure (inside), and an 
entwined deconstructive moment of “aneconomy” outside. Such 
an approach began to unite philosophy, double movement and a 
broader applicability. To do so, Hurst drew together 
commonalities from several of Derrida’s works first published in 
1967, and four of the thirteen works that Derrida mentioned in 
his explanation of the “plural logic”.20 While a helpful 
                                                 
19 “Post-modernism” is often treated as a variant of “post-structuralism” taken 
up by literary theory (with both of which Derrida has been aligned, as we 
explained) and in turn influencing philosophy. It is said to develop from an 
aversion to naïve acceptance of an absolute truth, which naivete is said (very 
broadly) to have held since the Enlightenment. Grenz puts it: “Modernity has 
been under attack at least since Friedrich Nietzsche (1844 to 1900) lobbed the 
first volley against it late in the nineteenth century, but the full-scale frontal 
assault did not begin until the 1970s. The immediate intellectual impulse for 
the dismantling of the Enlightenment project came from the rise of 
deconstruction as a literary theory, which influenced a new movement in 
philosophy” (Grenz 5). 
20 In addressing Derrida’s “plural logic” Hurst’s article of 2004, in which the 
plural logic is discussed in the most depth, refers only to the last two works 
that Derrida mentions, and only the last features heavily, in an analysis of the 
gift. In the book of 2008, only the last four are mentioned, and Given Time is 
the only featured work in the chapter on Derrida’s plural logic (2008b: 107-
111). As to elements from the earlier work, and those later works that she does 
address, it seems to us that Hurst takes the notions of the lack of presence and 
substitution of signs from “Speech and Phenomena” and “Différance”) those of 
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contribution, the approach had not yet addressed Derrida’s 
development from Husserl. Hurst rather situated Derrida’s 
progress primarily in the Kantian tradition, to which Husserl was 
seen as a successor (Hurst 2004, 253). There was still not yet 
consideration of Derrida’s development prior to 1967, nor a way 
to address Derrida’s overall oeuvre.  
The turn back to phenomenology  
However, a parallel area of enquiry had emerged from 1990 with 
the publication in France of Derrida’s student work of 1954. By 
this publication the extent and longevity of Derrida’s early 
fascination with Husserl was made more obvious. Hence 
Christina Howells, for instance, began her survey of Derrida’s 
progress from this first student work, also explaining that Derrida 
engaged in more detail with phenomenology than with post-
structuralism (Howells 1998, 6-52, cf. 29). In the 1990s discussion 
of Derrida’s relation to Husserl grew more widespread.21  
Even so, it was only in 2003 that the first systematic address to 
Derrida’s work from 1954 to 1967 emerged, in the book of 
Leonard Lawlor. However, while following Derrida progress via 
                                                                                                        
“spacing” and “temporising” from “Différance ” and Of Grammatology; the 
“centre” from “Structure, Sign and Play”, economy and aneconomy from 
Archive Fever; the aporias of justice and law from “Force of Law”, the aporia of 
the gift from Given Time, and the Venn-like system of three aporias from 
Aporias (cf. Galetti, 2009 for a summary). 
21 For instance, White in 1987 wrote a response to Derrida’s reading of 
“Speech and Phenomena” (White, 1987). Bernet wrote on Derrida’s 
“Introduction” of 1962 (Bernet, 1989). 
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Husserl, Lawlor developed this “system of totality” in Derrida’s 
work from 1962 via Hyppolite’s rendition of Hegel (Lawlor 2002, 
90-155). To the extent that he sought external inspiration, Lawlor 
de-emphasised Derrida’s concerns and transitions.22 Thus even 
though a sort of beginning had been established from Derrida’s 
first student work, and a greater confidence instilled in a kind of 
logical approach,23 there were still lacunae impeding an overall 
systematic approach to Derrida’s oeuvre. 
Some earlier impediments to assessment  
First, there was not yet a way to proceed via Derrida’s interests 
from his earliest years. This prevented a demonstration of 
Derrida’s transitions across the years in accordance with those 
concerns. Second, each approach still sought to explain Derrida’s 
progress, not yet to demonstrate its evolution. They had not yet 
developed a way to extend from summary to a basis that could 
hold Derrida accountable to his aims, or predict how Derrida 
ought to improve his progress (by his standards, rather than ours). 
Third, there was no way for the various systematic readings to 
find a consensus. For instance, Lawlor’s situation of Derrida 
                                                 
22 Thus Lawlor never emphasises how Derrida also diverges from Hegel (for 
instance, at the last, Derrida opts for difference rather than absolute position). 
23 Hobson (who translated Derrida’s student work) published both on 
Derrida’s relation with Husserl (Hobson 1998, 43-53), and with a sympathetic 
cast toward a sort of “logic” from Derrida’s work on aesthetics in “The 
Double Session” of 1970, published in Dissemination. Hobson notes that 
Derrida calls the logic a “machine” which “illustrates the logical relation 
between different conceptions of representation and suggests a dialectical 
pattern for their generation out of each other through opposition.” (Hobson 
2004, 54). 
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primarily in Hyppolite’s rendition of Hegel in 1962 is often in 
accordance with Gasché’s reading (cf. Gasché 1986, 27, 34), but 
incompatible with Hurst’s situation of Derrida’s progress in Kant. 
Just so, Harvey’s explanation of Derrida’s primary influence as 
developing from the nexus of Husserl and Saussure is 
incompatible with any of these.  
To be sure, none of these systematic readers confine Derrida to 
only those primary thinkers. However, the approaches are 
incompatible to the extent that each reader claims a primary 
paternity, which implies a primary position by which to consider 
the influences upon Derrida. This difficulty is still widespread. 
Even in the past decade, Derrida’s principal source of inspiration 
has been attributed to Rousseau, Nietszche, Blanchot, Heidegger, 
Freud and Levinas.24 No way yet holds for these readers to avoid 
incompatibility in the frameworks by which they read Derrida, or 
to progress in terms of a shared basis.  
It is important to note that any or multiple such influences on 
Derrida may well hold, but seeking influential progenitors 
searches “outside” Derrida, and to that extent proceeds by 
contrast rather than demonstration. Such readings remain crucial, 
                                                 
24 Hart (2007, 419) deems that Derrida was Kantian after 1970. For Ferraris 
(2001, 134), Derrida’s heroes are Rousseau and Nietszche. Michaud (2002, 69) 
suggests that Blanchot’s influence was pivotal from 1967. Mikics (2009) takes 
Derrida as drawn to Heidegger, Freud and Nietszche. Equation with Levinas is 
common (cf. Critchley 1992, Cornell 1992). 
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of course (both as a scholarly method, and in that Derrida was 
continually absorbent of the work of thinkers as he progressed). 
However, to the extent that they no longer follow Derrida’s 
transitions, they preclude opportunity to unify Derrida’s multiple 
concerns, and his oeuvre, via the kind of “logic” or “system” that 
he seems to have called for.  
Toward commonality in approach 
Nevertheless, so much commonality can be discerned amongst 
the systematic readers (Gasché, Harvey, Lawlor, Hurst, etc.) that 
such a shared basis seems feasible. Parameters for a shared system 
emerge by common factor, even though not yet by design. All 
insist upon Derrida’s avoidance of a final choice between the 
limits of inside and outside, and upon the inability to arrive at an 
absolute truth (even though such approach is never excluded). 
Each reader notes that “conditions of possibility turn into 
conditions of impossibility”, which we will have begun – but only 
begun – to explain in our Conclusion.  
Yet nor should the systematic commonalities above be privileged 
in advance as “philosophical” concerns. It is worth noting that 
Gasché records that in 1982 Derrida put it that 
all of the problems worked out in the 
Introduction to The Origin of Geometry [on 
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Husserl] have continued to organise the work I 
have subsequently attempted in connection 
with philosophical, literary and even non-
discursive corpora (ToaT 39, in Gasché 1986, 
4). 
Thus for Gasché, Derrida can only be approached 
philosophically. Yet Hillis Miller finds a quote in that very work 
which argues exactly the opposite: 
[F]or I have to remind you, somewhat bluntly 
and simply, that my most constant interest, 
coming even before my philosophical interest, 
if this is possible, has been directed towards 
literature, towards that writing which is called 
literature. (ToaT 37, in Hillis Miller 2002, 58) 
Hillis Miller counters that “[L]iterature is everywhere in Jacques 
Derrida’s writing” (Hillis Miller 2002, 58, 61). 
It seems that help would need to come from a position that 
allows for both such approaches. As Derrida noted in 1995, in 
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explaining the variation in styles between The Post Card and Of 
Grammatology (and also how Of Grammatology is the necessary 
precursor to Glas), 
I would like to insist on this because it is a 
recurrent accusation and, given the constraints 
of time and context, I will have to speak a little 
brutally: I have never tried to confuse literature 
and philosophy or to reduce philosophy to 
literature. I am very attentive to the difference 
of space, of history, of historical rites, of logic, 
of rhetoric, protocols and argumentation (DP 
79). 
It seems that address to difference, space, history, logic, rhetoric, 
argumentation and protocols; might allow bases common to 
Derrida’s approach, rather than particular to the disciplines in 
question. This allows the first inkling of a way forward. The issue 
is where to begin.  
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Toward a law that guides Derrida’s oeuvre 
We suggest we have found a locus to begin to augment all of the 
above issues, address their common difficulties, and at least make 
it possible to unify them in a systematic rendition of Derrida’s 
work; without privileging any approach in advance.  
In the 1990 preface to his student work of 1954 (The Problem of 
Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy), Derrida tells us that the work 
refers to a sort of law [and] since then, even in its 
literal formulation, this law will not have stopped 
commanding everything we have tried to 
prove (PG xiv, PdG vi, Derrida’s emphasis). 
Derrida tells us that the question which governs this progress “is 
already” how the origin of everything can be a complication (we will 
begin with this in our first chapter). We take it at least to be 
possible that such a “law” applies. To be sure, it would be pre-
emptive to suggest what it “is”, and we allow for it merely in the 
fashion that Derrida authorises it: such a law would impel everything 
that Derrida seeks to prove from 1954 to at least 1990.  
Moreover, Derrida writes that in 1954 this “law”  
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imposes its logic from one end of the book to 
the other (PG xv, PdG vii). 
It follows that developing a “logic” from the “law” as it applies in 
1954 could provide some bases to apply across Derrida’s oeuvre. 
Such a law could provide a basis for readers simply because it 
arose from the first. That is, until an earlier work by Derrida is 
unearthed, it would permit a beginning from Derrida’s earliest 
work, rather than thirteen years after Derrida’s first philosophical 
works (i.e. in 1967), as all systematic readings besides Lawlor’s 
have done so far. It could then allow for both a progressive 
approach, insofar as it arose from the first, and a single basis 
insofar as it is common to Derrida’s oeuvre.  
That is, it is at least possible that such a beginning could encourage 
unity while also permitting diversity. Instead of finding 
insuperable divisions amongst Derrida’s tones and styles as he 
develops, readers could ask why such changes develop relative to 
Derrida’s central concern (the “law”). Nor would this preclude 
divergent kinds of readings, even by those seeking Derrida’s 
primary influence and comparative approach. Readers could also 
ask why an external influence is relevant to Derrida’s progress at 
that juncture. Crucially, then, instead of seeking “outside” for 
Derrida’s inspiration, it would be Derrida’s concerns that are 
followed from the first. Such an approach can proceed by seeking 
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relations that are common to Derrida’s works in the multiple 
disciplines that he addressed (what these might be must still be 
assessed, but we will come to deem them “basic”).  
We thus make broader claims for such a kind of approach. First, it 
can allow what Derrida often calls “rigour”, in a way that is 
shared by multiple and even diverse disciplines. An impediment 
to alignment along these lines thus far, we suggest, may have been 
that each discipline retains its protocols and methodology by 
which to assess whether an approach is “rigorous”.25 Following 
this law, “rigour” could arise from demonstration of transitions 
that are basic to these disciplines.  
It seems to us that availing ourselves of such an approach is 
opportune. It is probably fair to say that the association of 
Derrida’s work with a lack of “rigour” has not yet been 
outweighed by the calls of a few. That this situation persists, we 
suggest, might have been stimulated by the lack of a way to assess 
Derrida’s rigour. Put more broadly, there might not yet have been 
a way to demonstrate this logic – for Derrida’s work in multiple 
disciplines, and for this strand of Continental thought. As Caputo 
wrote in 1987, referring to the “red flag” that the name “Derrida” 
raises, at the sight of which many philosophers charge, 
                                                 
25 The mere word “rigour” is non-transferable across disciplines. As Sprinker 
noted in response to Gasché, literary theory can be rigorous too (Sprinker, 
1990, 1226 ff.). 
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[T]he time has come to show with some 
patience that Derrida is engaged in a critical 
project which is deeply in accordance with the 
critique of metaphysics which has marked 
continental philosophy throughout this 
century, [and] which began with Husserl 
(Caputo 1987, 258). 
We propose to begin this task, patiently, starting from Derrida’s 
engagement with Husserl.  
However, we go further than Caputo has above. If the approach 
is “deeper” and more “basic” even than a critique of metaphysics, 
then it can span multiple concerns and interests, even when these 
seem unrelated to metaphysics. We emphasise, however, that we 
only “begin” such a task. Indeed, rather than beginning with a 
wider scope our approach will require close demonstration of this 
law and any resultant “logic”. In our dissertation we will follow 
Derrida’s progress through key works of 1954, 1962, 1964, 1965, 
1966 and up to 1967, in order to work out the “logic” as it 
becomes a certain system. 
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Note on methodology 
As our approach is somewhat atypical relative to many 
dissertations, and to many readings of Derrida, we will need to 
preface our approach in a little detail. First, in order to allow 
accessibility, we will seek to explain at least every major relation, 
and to make each obvious when it is employed thereafter. Our 
aim is that these basic relations be “there” for the readership. 
Sufficiently interested readers from any discipline ought to be able 
to start from our first chapter, and by our final chapter have some 
confidence in their grasp of the issues, and even the facility to 
employ the basics of our reasoning.  
To facilitate this aim, we will begin to address the “law” via the 
most basic relations (demanding a solution, inside, outside, yes, no, 
and so on). It is helpful that Derrida’s first work will make these 
bases overt. Our demonstration seeks to begin in this fashion, in 
order to develop the more complicated reasoning as Derrida goes 
along. Our basic maxim will thus be to avoid anachronism.  
Examples of our linguistic relations 
This aim came to affect our employment of language in increasing 
measure. Derrida from at least 1962 begins to express the 
transitions of Husserl’s logic via language (which attempt Derrida 
first attributes to Husserl). To that end, we think our glossary is 
helpful in explaining the common logical terms by which Derrida 
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does so. We seek to avoid mentioning these words until they 
come to signal these logical relations (the notable words to which 
this maxim will apply are “not”, “can”, “cannot”, “must”, “never”, “in 
general”, “in particular” (cf. our glossary)). Our aim has been to 
provide a measure of assurance that when such words are 
employed, they can be assessed as an ordered transition. 
On occasion, thus, a slightly unusual idiomatic or syntactic 
formulation will also express a logical (or systematic) relation; 
where the “not” must occur in a sentence, for instance, influences 
its logical sense. Even so, the requirements of a dissertation 
prohibit us from writing as Derrida does. We must conform to 
what we take as relatively standard idiomatic parameters, yet relay 
an approach that develops from a tradition of language and logic 
that has developed its own conventions.  
To situate this, “logic” in our dissertation will have the sense that 
Husserl and Derrida allot to it: an application of whole-part and 
very basic predicative relations sedimented in consciousness. It 
will never be treated as a symbolic language; thus nor will it attain 
the rigour of such formulations. Nor would Derrida claim this. In 
1962 he sets aside such an ideal to opt for “formal implication” 
(IOG 56)). Nor will it be a categorical logic even in a classical 
fashion, for Husserl was a progenitor of a novel sort of whole-
part relations (cf. Smith et. al., 1982)), and Derrida first develops 
his approach by critical engagement with Husserl. However, it 
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will very much come to be relayed by language, which for Husserl 
will share a basic form with logic – a consciousness of the object. 
Our general form of approach 
In turn, we sought to align our approach with these conventions. 
For example, the words “Derrida” and “I” will come to signal 
instances of a general form of progress toward an object. As we 
will explain, intentionality takes the pure form of a 
“consciousness of something”. The logical form of predication 
corresponds to this progress. Consciousness thus takes positions 
upon the intentional object, and anything can become an 
intentional object. Anything can become a “content”. Hence any 
content can come to posit of itself, and notably the ego. “I 
am…”, for instance, is already the result of a prior positing of an 
“I”. By “Violence and Metaphysics” of 1964, “I” will come to be 
overtly employed in transcendental subjectivity in this fashion – 
as a certain active and particular positing of the Ego, and “me” 
will refer to its object (itself).  
As even these are instances of a more basic intentional and logical 
form, expressed in language, then even the impersonal and formal 
“one” (as in “One does…” etc.). will signal the unitary instance of 
constitution, in either signification or logic, without yet even the 
content of an ego. Thus in the evolution to transcendental 
subjectivity the “distance” from Derrida and the form of the 
proposition will become far less obvious (although Derrida’s 
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concern will only begin to evolve to the author in particular, such 
as himself, from “Of Grammatology”).  
For instance, from Chapter Three “Derrida can” and “a subject 
can” will each be particular instances of the form “it is possible 
that one can”. This is quite easy to comprehend: the reader can 
merely take it that “Derrida” is proceeding in such a fashion, but 
the more basic form should be accessible should a reader seek 
further explanation. 
In turn, as anything can become an intentional object any content 
can arise in this first position, even inanimate objects. Derrida’s 
employment of prosopopeia in the style of Hegel and Husserl will 
be frequent. For instance, that Discourse “can only […] negate 
itself to affirm itself” (VeM 446, VM 130 (566)), will be one such 
prosopopeia. We have employed these where required; however, 
we avoided doing so habitually. Again, we have sought to 
conform to such bases while nevertheless offering the reader a 
conventional “narrative progression”.  
Some requirements of our language 
As to this narration, following from the employment of “I” and 
“me” above, we refer to ourselves (the author of this dissertation) 
by the impersonal singular form “we”. This sustains a critical 
distance from Derrida, which is a requirement of a dissertation. A 
resultant critical language (the language we employ in the 
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positions we take upon Derrida) is inevitable. Owing to the exigencies 
of a dissertation, this language will not be made thematic or an object of 
critique. We will thus seek to lessen its influence, and note two 
major issues. First, we will opt for common or habitual terms in our 
language and sorts of explanation. Second, our transitions will even 
come to be predictable. A reader need take little notice of these, 
except for noting that we seek to minimise the impact of our 
language, to allow Derrida’s progress and terms to emerge more 
obviously. We have provided a short “Summary of some 
common terms” after our glossary, below. 
Nevertheless, we will provide an introduction to these common 
terms by which to assess our progress. Notably, terms or 
constructions such as “rather than”, “avoids”, and “it is important 
to” will be ours (for instance, these avert confusion with negative 
constructions such as “Derrida does not”). As we develop, some 
terms will come to be employed frequently, such as the 
connectives “thus”, and “hence”, which signal an implication 
following from a previous necessity. 
We will seek to avoid incautious employment of “metaphors of 
light” – metaphors that imply the constituting and the naïve 
availability of an object in front of a subject (such as “observe 
that”), except in those cases where these relations are to be 
emphasised. We will also seek to avoid metaphors of writing 
(such as, “we will sketch”, “describe”, “illustrate” and so on) 
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except when Derrida employs them. Instead of these, we have 
opted for the habitual “note that…”. Accordingly, “or”, “of”, 
“in” and even “here”, “there” and so on will come to have 
“logical” senses, which was a feature of Husserl’s writing that 
Derrida will develop.26 Just so, and just as we have been required 
to employ a conservative and critical language, it is required of a 
dissertation to maintain a stable approach to critical position in 
space, and a natural sense of temporality (and history). Our 
references to the time in which Derrida develops and his 
evolution ought to be taken in this fashion. We make no 
theoretical commitment to this convention, although we have 
sought to make a virtue of necessity. Rather than supposing in 
advance that these will come to be undone, we seek to work out 
how this occurs.  
Indeed, as we seek to avoid anachronism, our language will be 
employed in incrementally more systematic fashion, as Derrida 
develops. Most notable is the verb “is”. In 1962, in accordance 
with Husserl’s “S is P”, Derrida will employ “is” to signal the 
application of a characteristic to an object. However, he will do so 
from a hypothetical position that seeks to avoid determination. By 
1966, “is” will signal the structure and movement of a trace in its 
                                                 
26 For example, “There”, for Husserl, will signal an other in transcendental 
subjectivity that is there for me, while I am merely “Here” (CM §54). 
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difference from itself in the system, and by 1967 it will signal an 
identity insofar as it is in relation to its non-identity.  
The conditional tense will also develop a systematic sense. 
Although we employ the simpler future and past tenses to refer to 
our own and Derrida’s development, Derrida will come to 
employ the conditional “would” to avoid affirming the possibility 
of the object he refers to. That is, “would” will develop as a 
version of the conditional “If”… The latter (along with “as if”, 
the necessary condition “only if”, and the subjunctive “if it were”) 
will be kept for Husserl and Derrida alone in our progress.  
However, nor ought the reader to worry about these relations; we 
will seek to make them obvious as they develop. To that end, we 
will italicise sentences quite often to emphasise turning points, as 
above. We also italicise selected words frequently to emphasise 
the transition that is evolving at that juncture, although there are 
too many to italicise in every case.  
As to this evolution, Derrida from 1962 will proceed by ongoing 
implication. As such progressions are incremental, a number in 
brackets – such as (49) – will refer to a page or segment in our 
dissertation where a relation had been explained.27 Nor ought 
                                                 
27 These terms ought also to be taken as Derrida’s. We have sought to avoid 
employing terms that are strongly associated with major thinkers in this canon, 
except where Derrida employs them. For instance, the word “project” (projet) is 
often employed to translate Heidegger’s “Entwurf” (cf. BT 145-151, SZ 155-
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these references to detain the reader, and nor are they obligatory 
in order to follow the argument. Overall, we have sought to allow 
for a comfortable and sequential reading; the references are merely 
provided should the reader require orientation. They might also 
be helpful should closer demonstration be required to audiences 
at a later stage.  
Next, it ought to be helpful to note that this “logic” will be visual. 
Even temporal durations are visualised and objectified as formal 
spaces. It will also be difficult to avoid visualising relations to a 
“beyond” in this fashion, even though it will be necessary to try 
to avoid such a visualisation. The progress will proceed by means 
of whole-part relations and address to objects, which align with 
the form of thought (or intentionality). We will come to call these 
(following Derrida) the levels and directions. Derrida will develop 
his approach from these basic relations, and should the words 
seem complicated, it might be helpful to look for shapes and 
movements (that is, forms). We would very much like to say that 
“beneath” the words there will be a form developing – but even 
our employment of these terms will be guides. Words such as 
“forward”, “backward”, “underneath” etc. are spatiotemporal 
(rather than metaphorical), and after 1962, they will no longer be 
taken naively by Derrida. They will be placed “in parentheses”, 
                                                                                                        
162), but Derrida also employs it to refer to Husserl and Saussure (cf. IOG 
104, DLG 1039). Nor could we avoid all such terms; we have merely tried to 
consider the major cases. 
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reduced and “noematic” (which relations we will explain as we 
develop). However, a “level” is never quite of the same order as 
“forward” or “beneath”, and is indeed deemed by Derrida to be a 
metaphor (IOG 98-99). It will be a common metaphor in 
expressing whole-part logic; which in turn is visualised spatially.  
Metaphor and our approach 
This approach to metaphor also requires a (brief) explanation. In 
particular, to permit a more obviously ordered approach in our 
language, we will attempt to minimise confusion arising from 
incautious employment of metaphors. That is, we will seek to 
employ as few as possible. We will also seek to avoid insensitivity 
to etymology. The latter will be crucial for Derrida as he develops, 
and possibly even more important than metaphor in these years, 
insofar as words have a history, are parts of language in general, 
and arise from the origin. As a result, we will seek to control our 
employment of metaphor. By no means do we suppose we succeed 
in this aim. No approach, probably, leads toward 
acknowledgment of the futility of such attempt more rapidly than 
paying attention to connotation and etymology. Any systematic 
approach must contend with the dispersion of what one wants to 
say, for language in general is deeply related to metaphor. The 
Chambers Dictionary defines metaphor as  
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a figure of speech by which a thing is spoken 
of as being that which it only resembles (CD 
931). 
Derrida might have enquired into the omission of writing from 
this definition, and a “figure” is nevertheless spatial. Even so, by 
this definition most words are metaphors insofar as they seek to 
name the object itself, visualised “in front of” consciousness; and 
every such metaphor would not yet absolutely name its referent. 
It is easy – although hasty – to suppose from such a situation that 
metaphors to some degree refer to metaphors. Moreover, each of 
these words retains its etymology, backwards and forwards from 
history. Adding metonymy and synechdoche would include 
whole-part relations, and it is easy to note that these accord with 
levels and directions. That is, it is tempting to suspect that the 
tropes of language allow conformity with Husserl’s intentionality.  
Derrida will seek to take none of these relations for granted. 
Hence this is not yet the place for a theory of metaphor, as 
Derrida’s development via Husserl will be much more detailed. We 
merely note that we suspect metaphor can evolve in accordance 
with the form of thought, and that we will develop the progress 
as far as Derrida’s engagement with Saussure. That is, we still seek 
to avoid anachronism, and begin to develop metaphor as Derrida 
does.  
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To be sure, even in “Force and Signification” of 1963, in address 
to Rousset’s structuralist approach to literature, Derrida had 
begun to employ a more metaphorical style. In the texts that we 
assess, Derrida will take those thinkers that he addresses at their 
word, for it is they who seek to implement or rely on ordered 
relations of language.  
However, nor will Derrida be without preference. He will begin 
from a comparison of Husserl’s ideal of a “scientific” and 
univocal language (where each word would have only one fixed 
and determinate sense), and what he takes as James Joyce’s aim of 
equivocity in Ulysses. Derrida will opt for Husserl’s approach, for 
an important reason. He will argue that any employment of 
language begins from a first univocal moment (IOG 102, 103), 
even should the speaker or writer want it to hold equivocally. By 
1967 his approach will have evolved.  
The attempt at controlled employment of metaphor and etymology 
will thus come to have a crucial role as we proceed. It is just these 
relations that we will assess as we develop until as they become 
difficulties. We will follow crucial texts insofar as they develop 
Derrida’s systematic progress into différance, the trace and his more 
mature understanding of their relations in 1967. 
It is well known that Derrida seems to become critical – it would 
be anachronism to assume that he does – of such a project very 
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soon after 1967 (cf. in “White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text 
of Philosophy” (1971)). But this is less of a critical warning than a 
telos. We seek to assess how the relation will hold by that juncture.  
That is, as Derrida was concerned with linguistic relations from 
his earliest published work, following from his reading of Husserl, 
there may never have been a “linguistic turn” in Derrida’s work at 
least. There may merely have been an evolution in how language 
was employed. We will try to assess this evolution. By our final 
chapter, we will suggest that we have begun to explain to some 
degree how such a progress occurred for Derrida.  
Thus we go further, to suggest that only by attempting to engage 
with these relations can this progress be worked out. Only by such 
a progress can “différance”, the trace etc. be developed as it occurs in 
these works over the years. In beginning from Derrida’s opting for 
Husserl’s project over Joyce’s at first, we will explain how very few 
words that Derrida employs will be intended as a mere synonym 
for another. Even the metaphors of writing and speech that 
Derrida will develop in his address to Saussure in “Of 
Grammatology” will never simply be indistinguishable. When 
Derrida writes “inscription” rather than “mark”, or “imprint”, 
there will be a systematic impetus for this, as each retains its 
individual etymologies and applicability. Any perfectly 
substitutable metaphor would be a word without boundaries, and 
thus be without limits. As invariant, it would be an absolute, a 
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difficulty that Derrida will never cease to address. The necessity, 
and inescapability, of a telos of univocity will hold in beginning 
from Husserl’s ideal science expressed in language, and will 
evolve at least into Derrida’s grammatology. What will be at issue 
is how to reveal, via the relations of language as logic, what is 
common to and thus never appears entirely in either language or 
logic. It is the necessity of this “deciphering” of Derrida’s work 
(cf. DLG 43) that will apply in increasing measure.  
Hence it might be that such a project is less an “option” in 
approach to Derrida’s “law” than the only option by which to 
address it in beginning from Derrida’s first work. Thus nor do we 
take an apologist stance. It is in the service of those who argue 
against rigour (just as much as for rigour) that we undertake this 
task. In support of those who resist logic, we will begin with logic; 
to assess how – or whether – logic can be cast into the crucible of 
its own critique. Hence we ask for some dispensation from a 
broader audience to undertake our task.  
We believe that accepting this methodology without apology but 
by appeal to a future consensus has not yet been discerned as an 
opportunity. For instance, Gasché employed the word 
“admittedly” to explain that he allotted more prominence to 
philosophical works (Gasché 1986, 4). This justified Caputo’s 
inference that Gasché’s opting for a static “system” over 
“fragment” is a personal choice or idiosyncrasy (Caputo 1987, 251 
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(25)). Just so, Lawlor suggests that his progress – which evolves in 
language, as does ours – is a “sort of narrative” (Lawlor 2002, 7). 
Yet Lawlor’s approach is much more logical than he seems willing 
to admit. We seek to further the goal of all of these thinkers: 
beginning from the “law” allows us to ask how it remains a 
commonality in Derrida’s work – even should that then require 
the setting aside of structure, and however it works itself out in 
the protocols of particular disciplines.  
Issues particular to our dissertation 
The next obvious consideration is that of translation, which 
difficulties will apply to us as much as to every reader of Derrida. 
As to how we approach the French works, we sought to learn 
French to read Derrida. It surprised us to find that beginning 
from the English several years ago and then turning to the French 
texts was helpful to our approach. We were able to discover at 
least some difficulties endemic to English readings of Derrida and 
related French thinkers, and to begin to rectify these (and 
doubtless we have not yet discovered many more).  
In our reading of Derrida’s work of 1954, and as he has not yet 
begun to implement language in his approach, we will take 
Hobson’s English translation as our standard. We will usually 
employ Leavey’s translations of Derrida’s “Introduction” in 1962, 
although we will re-translate some paragraphs from Derrida’s 
final pages as these will require closer reading. We can align with 
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both of these translations in the main as neither of these works 
(Derrida’s earliest) were re-published with amendments in the 
French.  
However, when a work has been re-published with amendments, 
and in order to follow Derrida’s evolution, it has been a sine qua 
non to work from the initial text. On several occasions only the 
later version has been translated into English. Thus in the French 
articles “Violence and Metaphysics” of 1964 and “Of 
Grammatology” of 1965 and 1966 we will work only from the 
French versions. As attentiveness to the employment of language 
and to Derrida’s later amendments will be crucial, we will thus 
need to proceed via close reading. These translations will be our 
own, although we will align with the English versions wherever 
feasible. Wherever relevant, we will thus reference the comparable 
page number in the later English version when no translation of 
that French version is yet available. Where our translation has 
diverged from the English in a fashion pertinent to our progress, 
we will note the divergence in a footnote, or employ the 
convention “([French reference], cf. [English reference])”.  
Just so, we have preferred to work from the French version of 
the thinkers we addressed en route (notably, Levinas and Saussure), 
while taking the English as a guide. As to German works, our 
German is far less reliable than a translator’s. We usually followed 
the English texts, and cross-checked them against the German 
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versions upon issues pertinent to our argument. The notable 
exception is that of Husserl’s Third Logical Investigation, which 
we assessed more closely in the German, as it is crucial to our 
logical relations (only the 1913 version is published in the English 
cf. LU 227-295). Overall, as to writers besides Derrida, in some 
cases we have been unable to work from the original language, in 
French or German, simply as the works are unavailable in South 
Africa.28 
Next, in accordance with our avoidance of anachronism, we note 
that we will proceed by engagement (in descending order of 
extent) with Husserl, Saussure, Levinas, and only briefly with 
Hegel. The omission of Heidegger from this list deserves 
comment. We have done so merely as he features relatively little 
in the arguments we address. Heidegger is referred to only once 
in 1954 (in a footnote upon negation that also addresses Hegel 
(PdG 196, fn. 47, PG 206 fn. 47)). Nor is Heidegger overtly 
named in Derrida’s “Introduction” 1962. In the section that we 
will address in “Violence and Metaphysics” of 1964, he is referred 
to only in one sentence (in a mention of Identity and Difference 
(530)). As our aim is to follow Derrida’s concerns via the 
systematic transitions of the law, rather than seeking external 
inspiration by contrast, we will touch upon Heidegger mainly in 
our footnotes. Nor is this a de-privilege of Heidegger per se. Our 
                                                 
28 Notably, the work of Hjelmslev was addressed only in English.  
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methodological requirement will apply to every thinker addressed 
in our progress besides Derrida. We will follow Derrida’s 
evolution to the extent that he was never dependent even upon 
Husserl. This will hold even when Derrida in 1954 takes 
phenomenology as the only possible way to proceed in 
philosophy. It will hold to the extent that Derrida seeks to make 
phenomenology address his concerns and his law. Should the 
“law” and its “logic” indeed extend across Derrida’s oeuvre, its 
relations will be more basic than any of the thinkers’ works that 
Derrida addresses, yet common to all.  
 
Guide to our chapters 
Our chapters will develop toward a “system” in a cumulative 
sequence, from Derrida’s work in 1954 up to 1967. We hope that 
these summaries provide orientations, but obviously the detail is 
better followed across our chapters.  
Summary of Chapter One 
Our first chapter will address Derrida’s student work of 1954, The 
Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Phenomenology, to begin from Derrida’s 
“law”. The latter will arise as a demand to question how the origin 
of everything can be an “a priori synthesis”. The term “synthesis” 
refers to a mutual implication of relations at an origin already 
prior to, thus not yet a part, of thought. Derrida will ask how the 
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origin of everything can start with a complication (i.e. also a “co-
implication”).  
In 1954, Derrida’s demand will be for just such absolute 
knowledge of the origin of the intentional object. He will thus 
demand a bivalent solution (either true or false), or a knowledge 
without limitation. The difficulty will be that, as each object 
already appears to be known, it does not yet appear absolutely in 
a synthesis. The demand for absolute determination will as yet fall 
short. To this basis we will add the implicit borders of the outside 
and the inside which Derrida will be applying, along with 
“directions” by which Derrida seeks to determine the object.  
We will summarise some basic relations in Husserl, as proceeding 
via the logical form “S is P”, which accords with the form of 
intentionality. In this form, the logical subject (“S”, or the object) 
will be predicated of (by a predicate “P”), to determine it as true 
or false, which form of judgment is deemed by Husserl to be 
“apophansis”. Husserl will proceed via a “reduction”, which no 
longer posits of a natural “outside” to the object. Derrida will test 
each of Husserl’s published works in accordance with his 
demand, by means of his directions. 
These will allow for a small and definable group of directions as 
what we deem “joints”. Derrida will take hypothetical positions 
from one direction to another, such as from the inside to its 
outside, outside to its outside, and so on. The “problem” will 
begin to emerge in that in each case both the separation from and 
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the undeniable connection to the origin are not yet affirmed or 
denied as true or false. 
We will then explain the joints in terms of “forward and 
backward”, in consciousness of the object as a basic proposition 
predicating of the object (forward), to determine the origin 
(backward). These directions will also hold when the goal (telos) is 
the ideal of a determined Science, and the necessity to determine 
temporality in consciousness. The latter will be “irreducible” to a 
spatial moment, in that temporality only appears as a form. Each 
direction will still be problematic. The “complication” of relations 
at a problematic origin will develop an early version of 
“contamination” which thus far prevents a simple solution. 
However, Derrida’s outcome in 1954 will need to develop in 
accordance with his criteria. To arrive at an absolute solution, he 
will still verify (absolutely affirm) the truth of the problem, 
instead of leaving it problematic.  
Summary of Chapter Two 
Our second chapter will summarise Husserl’s “logic” by adding 
consideration of whole-part levels to the directions from our first 
chapter. These levels and directions will accord with the pure 
form of intentionality, as “consciousness of something”. The 
highest level will be eidetic (the level of Ideas, and their 
categories, which will include Whole, Part, Object and 
Something), which predicate of the eidetic object in general. The 
middle (or lower) level will be that which predicates of grades of 
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specificity by which consciousness addresses an ideal object. The 
lowest will be that ideal object that must be determined as true. 
The latter in turn thus can be false, as contingent. These relations 
will be those of formal ontology. In turn, the formal ontological 
levels and directions will correspond to subordinate “material 
ontology”, which will allow for material content. 
As essences already hold, they will be deemed to hold “behind”, 
as also a priori. As the ideal object must be determined as an 
essence, these levels will also be goals “in front”. Such levels will 
merely be hierarchies of necessity and possibility required to 
determine the object. The levels and directions will allow for the 
necessity and possibility of determining the object as true. This 
object would be determined as the pure and essential “Fact”, 
which would be true at all times and places. As invariant, this 
would meet Derrida’s goal of the “absolute”. To determine the 
Fact, however, will require a material content. To do so, a real 
fact must be able to be affirmed as the same in infinitum. 
First, however, an object must be able to begin to be constituted. 
We will assess the relations of this constituting moment in 
Husserl to develop the requirements of a right and ground to 
begin constituting objectivity as true. The latter must occur of 
originary evidence in accordance with the original (i.e., essential) 
region of consciousness. To assess what would found all of these, 
we will develop the Idea in the Kantian sense and summarise its 
requirements. The approach will develop three parameters with 
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which Derrida would need to accord: intentionality (i.e. levels and 
directions), Husserl’s reduction, and the a priori (i.e. also 
essential) relations of originary ground and right.  
In turn, these will devolve to four criteria (conditions) by which 
Husserl’s relations would answer Derrida’s demand from 1954. 
Upon “this side” as originary, an absolute ground will be required 
(from behind, for essential reasons) for the possibility of ideal 
Objectivity. At the “objective” side, a subject must affirm the 
ideal object as the same, without possibility of error (forward), in 
space, time, as an intentional object or a real fact.  
Summary of Chapter Three 
Our third chapter begins from the mid-parts of Derrida’s work of 
1962, his “Introduction” to Husserl’s The Origin of Geometry. 
Derrida will apply his demand for an absolute solution from 1954 
to Husserl. He will develop the questions and then address the 
issues in the order that we developed them in Chapter Two. To 
prepare, he will first rapidly retract from “exact” scientific 
approach to enquire into the foundation of propositions prior to 
their truth or falsity. Such propositions will merely have a value as 
“open”. The telos of the truth-sense of the open will be deemed 
the “opening”. Derrida’s question will be how to open a way back 
to the origin, which he will call “passage”. He will then begin 
from geometry as a material ontology to work “backward” 
through its essential foundations. He will do so by address to a 
material object here and an origin in history. From these he will 
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work out three basic sorts of “reduction” from worldly content, 
as a teleology that seeks to address pure and essential relations. By 
this regression he will arrive at the questions from our previous 
chapter as conditions for determining any object, including the 
origin of geometry. He will then develop the levels and directions 
by means of Husserl’s language in general. Derrida will arrive at 
an overall reduction and a progress that will thereafter proceed as 
pure and a priori phenomenology. In so doing he will set aside 
negation; speech and writing will not yet allow for an absolute 
ground of possibility or absolute fact. Language in general will 
nevertheless take “the positive value of univocity” as its version 
of the telos as absolute, but the production of a univocal moment 
will pass to “open” relation. As that which must found essential 
relations, and permit production of content (from behind), then 
permit a progress to address objects as the same, while remaining 
inaccessible itself, “absolute univocity” will rather imply an a 
priori “opening” prior to constituting. This will develop a 
circularity that will be deemed “analogous” to the Idea in the 
Kantian sense. Speech, which by its essence never appears but 
undoubtedly (i.e. “certainly”) produces speech, will also be aligned 
with the Idea in the Kantian sense. The relations of this circularity 
that returns to an origin will develop “passage”. Derrida will also 
seek to determine the origin of thought in history. This will imply 
a “double necessity” that asks how, but also why, there must have 
been an origin.  
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Derrida will then directly address the four requirements in terms 
of the parameters from our previous chapter, beginning from the 
Idea in the Kantian sense. He will work out that pure 
phenomenology cannot ground itself via space and time. Even so, 
positing of space will nevertheless continue. This in turn will 
necessitate the circularity, and the radical philosopher will adopt 
the responsibility to continue seeking an answer (response) to the 
question. Second, intentionality will not yet determine the object, 
although also allowing for the circularity. Derrida’s final 
argument, address to God, will aim “beyond” in a strong version 
of the absolute without any sort of constraint. This too will imply 
the circularity. At the last, a “supertemporality” will also be 
deemed “analogous” to the progress. The overall analogous 
relations will be generalised as returning to the circularity as a 
formal and essential passage prior to content. Derrida will let go 
of his demand for a simple absolute from 1954, in a retraction to 
the essential Absolute as “Passage”.  
Summary of Chapter Four 
Our fourth chapter continues to follow the final pages of the 
“Introduction” as Derrida goes on to work out the relations of 
the “différant”. These will be the first relations of deferral and 
Difference in his oeuvre. After arriving at the Absolute as Passage, 
Derrida will re-constitute the demand for the absolute in the 
Absolute as pure phenomenology. The double necessity will 
evolve to a pure phenomenology asking “why” of sense, and to 
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ontology in a non-Husserlian sense, which seeks to ask “what” of 
the Fact. The latter will allow only a metaphysical possibility that 
continues to seek its object in space and external to itself, thus 
implying opening. Ontology and its metaphysical possibility will 
keep only a right to the necessity of opening a question, without 
yet constituting an external object or a possibility of response.  
That pure phenomenology accepts the responsibility to ask “why” 
will allow it the possibility of avoiding the opening; only it will 
keep the pure possibility (the responsibility) that it can open the 
question as a response. In turn, pure phenomenology will again 
ask “why” of the “what”. This relation of pure phenomenology 
and objectual ontology, neither of which yet constitute an external 
object, will imply that pure phenomenology arises as a delay. 
However, the originary moment will nevertheless be produced as 
an impossible Difference. This will develop the first moment of 
the “différant”. However, the progress will still be developing. It 
will not yet allow for a direction back to me (it will be 
“unidirectional”), and will have suppressed negation. 
Summary of Chapter Five 
Our fifth chapter turns to Derrida’s articles “Violence and 
Metaphysics” of 1964. We will first summarise how Levinas 
rejects Husserl’s objectifying intentionality to develop his 
preferred relations of the other, the Other, autrui and Autrui. The 
latter two have no English equivalents. We will suggest how these 
develop a necessary sequence ways by which the absolute must be 
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attained in an ethics. To explain some of these relations in this 
sequence: Autrui as “You” both on high and intimately as a “you” 
will first bring me into relation to myself without objectification, 
opposition or negation (thus as non-violence). This will develop 
an obligation and Desire for Autrui, which will develop to 
“autrui”, as the instability of the sign “Autrui” (Thou, you) and 
“others”. The relations of language too will arise with Autrui, 
which only then allow me to speak of division from the body of 
“the other” as a body in the world, by which to continue the 
obligation to go “beyond” (par-delà) to “the Other”. The latter 
relations of division will be deemed the Same, which will allow 
for a formal logic that Levinas will also align with Husserl.  
This progress via bodies will encounter the face, which will 
appear only insofar as it withholds itself, again requiring me to go 
“beyond” (au delà) to autrui. The latter will resist the logic of the 
Same and return me to obligation to go to the “beyond” as 
Autrui, in a sort of ruptured circularity, which Levinas will deem 
both an “absurd structure” (of Autrui and autrui) as prior to logic, 
and the “logical structure” in the Same. This will be called 
“dissymmetry”. 
Derrida will accept Levinas’ criteria of a desire for the absolute 
other, which will accord with his demand for absolute solution 
since 1954. He will thus accept the telos of ethics as without 
oppression and negation, to avoid instilling borders or limits. As 
oppression and negation are sorts of violence, he will accept the 
 - 67 - 
telos of avoidance of violence. However, he will opt for Husserl’s 
intentionality as Derrida had developed it since 1962. Derrida and 
Levinas will be incompatible from that juncture, as Derrida 
defends how selected relations developed from his reading of 
Husserl in 1962 could be more “ethical” than Levinas’ approach. 
For Derrida, intentionality as the indefinite opening will be 
deemed a first basis of the “respect” that addresses the absolute 
other (Autrui) without a violence of negation. He will set aside 
autrui until later in the argument. He will then re-interpret the 
approach to the other, the Other and Autrui according to the 
levels, directions and circularity of Husserl’s pure logic.  
To do so, Derrida will develop his passage into two directions via 
Husserl’s “appresentative transposition”. This will still be without 
negation and its relation to the same (for what is the same as 
something is also not something). The two movements will seek 
to determine the finite other as infinite other, and the Other as 
Other, thus as absolutely other. Derrida will develop a progress to 
Autrui that seeks to address it only in its form of Ego, thus as 
what I can never be. To that extent it will have been respected 
even though it must have been encountered in me. The directions 
will arrive at a logical absurdity in the necessity of thinking the 
other and the Other together. This will result in a positive 
“economy”, the name for a return to the circularity of the inside 
in order to develop the relation to an irreducible “beyond”. At 
that juncture, having arrived at absurdity, Derrida will set 
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Husserl’s formal logic and respect aside. In setting Husserl aside, 
he will allow for negation and an ethics of violence. 
Summary of Chapter Six 
Our sixth chapter will continue to follow “Violence and 
Metaphysics” as Derrida evolves a negative moment to each of 
the two directions and economy. Allowing negation will develop 
the two directions to include the relations of the same, hence the 
movement of the Same and the Other. These will be mediated by 
the eteron, which has the sense both of “other in general” and 
difference. Derrida will develop the eteron in general as a condition 
even for autrui.  
However, these movements will then imply contradiction in the 
origin of thought, speech, and predication (the logos). Derrida 
will retreat from this implication to avoid “worst violence” and its 
threat of nihilism. He will rather work out his best ethical 
arguments of that year as ethical nonviolence and least possible 
violence. We will note how Derrida then defends the necessity of 
least possible violence as Hegel’s sort of “war”, and briefly 
explain how Derrida diverges from Hegel.  
Nor will Derrida have given up on avoiding violence. The articles 
“Violence and Metaphysics” of 1964 will evolve the outcomes 
from 1962, to the necessity of the Absolute as the radical 
philosopher heeding the responsibility to ask “why finitude?”. At 
the last, Derrida will devolve the responsibility for finite 
appearing to God in this subjective a priori. He will not yet have 
 - 69 - 
met his demand that thought exceed the inside to determine the 
beyond. Moreover, he will not yet have implemented the trace, 
which Levinas had developed just prior to “Violence and 
Metaphysics”, and which would no longer confine the finite 
philosopher to an “inside”.  
Summary of Chapter Seven 
Our seventh chapter addresses selected relations of Ferdinand de 
Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics (1916). Saussure will seek to 
restore the natural privilege of speech over writing. The latter 
must exist solely to “represent”, “figure” or “image” speech, as a 
phonetic writing. The progress will be teleological. We will then 
develop Saussure’s “system” from his whole-part relations, and 
his employment of directions. Saussure will begin by studying 
speech as psychological, and thus its acts of production of speech 
as psycho-physical. The part-whole relations of the signifier, 
signified and sign will then be aligned with that of speech, the 
tongue (langue), and language in general respectively.  
In this teleology the lowest level of individual acts of speech will 
thus need to proceed as moments of signifiers in a linguistics of 
speech. Its goal will be the unity of speech in the tongue, as 
Saussure’s preferred linguistics in general. This determination of 
linguistics in general would develop the laws of a semiology that 
studies a field of signs at the highest level. To restore speech, the 
lowest and most interior level must proceed (forward) in order to 
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determine linguistics as the tongue (upward), to develop the ideal 
progress of semiology (beyond).  
At the lowest level, Saussure will then base the “parallel” of the 
form of speech and the signifier upon the necessity of an idea as a 
sound. He will devolve to the formal relations of the signifier as 
an acoustic image. The latter in turn will be comprised of a 
“psychic imprint”, the form by which the imprint upon a psyche 
allows for hearing and speech. The imprint in turn will comprise 
of formal chains of articulatory movements and acoustic 
impressions. Saussure will unite these chains into the complex 
unity of a phoneme as his elemental basis. At this lowest level, 
each phoneme will “correspond” to a written sign.  
Saussure will then turn “inside” to address how the formal 
relations of signification at the most interior can realise a 
semiology. He will develop a progress that proceeds by means of 
coverage and value rather than truth or falsity, and in which 
chains of signifiers will need to proceed by means of what each is 
not in relation to other signifiers. To do so while remaining 
internal alone, the relation of signifier to signified will need to 
remain arbitrary. 
We will then summarise some difficulties for Saussure. First, he 
begins from an ostensible psychology yet retreats to formalism. 
Second, he will seek to exclude writing from psychology, yet 
requires a relation to a corresponding form of writing at the most 
interior only as formal. This might well allow for how the most 
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elemental relations of speech can be addressed by a phonetic 
writing, but whether it is psycho-physical or formal will not yet be 
established. Third, his approach will seem to not yet allow even 
for a formal relation of temporality. Fourth, he will seem to allow 
the relations of difference, negation to phonemes too. The latter 
will also be deemed material. It will not yet be obvious whether 
the chains of difference etc. are formal or psycho-physical. 
Summary of Chapter Eight 
Our Chapter Eight is preparatory, and turns to the first of the 
articles “Of Grammatology”, of 1965. We will note that 
Saussure’s progress aligns – very basically – with Derrida’s in 
earlier years. Derrida will be discerning an opportunity, in that 
these might be the sorts of fashions by which any address to 
borders (metaphysics) proceeds. We will then summarise how 
Derrida will proceed in our next three chapters. He will begin 
from address to Saussure’s difficulties, but diverge in increasing 
measure to work out the implications in accordance with various 
levels of his teloi. Rather than a structuralism, however, Derrida 
will start from alignment with Saussure, to “risk” an outcome by 
the reading.  
As to this first article, we will note that Derrida’s approach 
proceeds in levels (or “parallels”), each of which aligns with a 
level of his telos. However, levels will be metaphors for “parallel” 
relations conforming by means of a system that has not yet 
appeared itself. Derrida will have worked out by 1966 that 
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particular and general relations are separable merely by 
abstraction, as chains of traces as metaphor. At the upper level 
Derrida will prepare to begin with Saussure’s telos of a psycho-
physical progress to semiology. These relations will be aligned 
with the general telos of several thinkers in the history of 
metaphysics who had privileged speech, as a phonocentrism. Yet 
attaining the telos of speech would be a relation without 
separation (presence). Thus writing and speech will be instances 
of a more basic form, appearing also in the progress from one to 
other, difference, etc.  
Yet more basically, Derrida will be preparing to further his 
demand from earlier years: to assess how thought can go 
“beyond” its particular moments to determine the absolute. 
Derrida will concede that his progress from earlier years, and that 
of a history of metaphysics, thus far seems to allow only a 
moment at the “inside”, which does not yet permit a trace. He 
will be seeking to protect metaphysics against this difficulty – or 
rather, the demand will continue for absolute solution – and the 
necessity will arise to develop such a trace.  
To do so, at a higher level, Derrida will work out what sorts of 
writing align with the levels of essential relations of speech. This 
will develop the necessity to assess the conditions of a science of 
semiology should it need to include writing to its field, as a 
grammatology. In our next chapter Derrida will begin from 
Saussure’s teloi and his difficulties to work out the necessities of 
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including writing to speech. This implication of a grammatology 
will develop the trace to protect metaphysics in general. In so 
doing, Derrida will have begun to redress his concerns since 1954. 
Summary of Chapter Nine 
In Chapter Nine, we will assess the first part of the second article 
“Of Grammatology” of 1966. Derrida’s rigorous assessment will 
begin. He will work out the “instituted trace”, and the necessity of 
grammatology in a long and progressive argument. To prepare for 
it, we will explain that he will begin by accepting Saussure’s telos 
of semiology, and its levels of generality. At the lowest level, 
Derrida thus begins from a telos of accepting a psycho-physical 
speech as a linguistics without “contamination” by writing. This 
will also require a writing existing only to figure speech (phonetic 
writing). Derrida will take the latter condition as his premise, and 
assess whether it is possible. To do so, he will begin from the 
necessity of the arbitrariness of the sign, and work out the 
necessity of an instituted moment of writing. He will apply the 
levels of writing, including the particular concepts of the graphie 
(the essential and originary concept of what originally founds 
graphic relations), and the phone (the essential relation of voice 
and sound). The difficulty will be that natural symbols 
nevertheless retain motivated relations to the outside.  
Each of these will be developed into the main argument, which 
will first work out that it is necessary to broaden the field of 
semiology in general to grammatology. Second, it will arrive at the 
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necessity of contradiction of the phoneme and grapheme at the 
lowest level. However, an instituted moment will hold despite 
contradiction of the psycho-physical progress, developing the first 
basis of an instituted trace. As arbitrariness in psychology leads to 
the necessity of contradiction, this will also imply the appearing in 
a difference as such, the first mention of a transcendental 
approach, and the admission of temporality, each of which from 
this juncture will be related to Derrida’s progress. 
Summary of Chapter Ten 
In Chapter Ten, we continue with Derrida’s second article “Of 
Grammatology” of 1966, as he progresses from difference as 
such in the instituted trace to work out “différance” as the 
culmination of his article. Derrida will have included an instituted 
moment of writing, and thus the necessity of substituting 
Derrida’s “grammatology” for semiology. The parallel relations of 
writing and difference as such will devolve via two “ways” to an 
originary and temporalising synthesis, this will necessitate a pure 
(originary) trace as moment of difference. The trace will, in effect, 
have arisen from what never appears in temporising and is held in 
“reserve”. In the evolution of the two ways, the signifier will be 
retracted to its formal constituents, and Derrida will proceed by 
means of the most interior relations of articulation as chains of 
appearing toward the appearance as a “psychic image”. These 
relations will be paralleled by those of chains of difference, and a 
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trace as irreducible to these relations, which will nevertheless 
mark its impossibility to permit the chains.  
To these implications, the necessity of substitution of metaphors 
of writing (such as the mark) and speech will be added to the 
chains, and we will summarise how the “death of the subject” 
ought to be taken as a particular moment of a “system” as 
movement. It will thus be an instance of what is held in reserve, 
thus of death as the resource for living rather than actual death. 
At the last, Derrida will include protention (from a direction 
“forward”) in address to Leroi-Gourhan. As protention is pure 
and does not yet necessitate difference, this will imply a deferral. 
Derrida in 1966 will first have worked out the relations of différance 
and the trace in a sequential progress.  
We will note several difficulties. Forward, as a protention without 
difference implies a différance without necessity of difference, this 
does not yet permit either difference or a trace. From “behind”, 
the trace will appear only in effect. It will be deemed anterior to 
writing and the movement of different signifiers. Most 
importantly, it will only mark the impossibility of its appearing in 
the possible relations of difference, and the progress of 
metaphors of speech and writing from one to other. It will be 
severed from relation forward. Moreover, logically (in a “logic of 
identity”), it would also be contradictory. Derrida will avoid 
conceding the latter, which by his measure of 1964 would stifle 
the origin and preclude his system.  
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Summary of Chapter Eleven 
Our Chapter Eleven follows some of the amendments to the 
book Of Grammatology of 1967. Derrida will systematically redress 
each of the difficulties from 1966. The “archi-trace” will be added 
and conceded as contradictory within the “logic of identity” from 
the first. It will be contradictory “in” this logic only in a reciprocal 
relation by which it is contradictory, and thus no longer in, the logic. 
Instead of seeking to bridge the gap from a trace appearing 
merely “in effect”, Derrida will develop a contortion of a 
“pathway”. The latter will proceed further backward to the archi-
trace in order to proceed forward. Thus Derrida will proceed by 
an instability, as both proceeding in a conditional fashion as to 
what is not yet admitted as possible, as ultra-transcendental, and 
proceeding in a phenomenological fashion, as pre-critical. This 
will imply that différance progress in two parts, as formation of 
form (thus irreducible to form (behind)), and as the being-
imprinted of the formal imprint. The latter will be the telos of the 
chains of articulated differences (forward).  
However, Derrida will no longer settle the trace directly into the 
articulatory chains. Having developed the instability above, he will 
rather begin to develop an “enigmatic” way for the trace to 
proceed. He will work out how the trace avoids determination as 
to its possibility, but retains the possibility of appearing via 
spacing in general. The progress of articulation will rather occur 
by means of the hinge, which in its formation of form will be 
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irreducible, but which directions will allow for chains of writing 
or speech. The latter can thus continue as living moments 
progressing as chains toward the passive imprint. This approach 
will not yet be without difficulty, as Derrida will need to privilege 
retention to retain the possibility of the trace at the constituted 
side of the imprint. Nevertheless, the amendments will settle the 
mark of impossibility in the hinge, rather than the trace. However, 
the hinge will no longer make the chains of differences 
contradictory. The enigmatic inscription of the trace to the 
elemental chain will in turn permit the chains of appearing. 
Derrida will have developed toward the more mature relations of 
the trace, différance etc., in a progression from his address to the 
“law” of 1954. 
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Glossary of common terms 
This glossary summarises some terms and relations that will be 
employed by Derrida in a systematic fashion, or which we employ 
to explain Derrida’s progress. 
 
absolute (l’absolu) – as it will progress in Derrida’s argument: 
without limitation, invariant in all times and places, as absolute 
and indubitable ground for all knowledge, and as invariant and 
thus without limit, border or difference 
across (à travers) – toward the object, whether forward or 
backward  
affirmation (affirmation) – an act that determines a synthetic 
proposition (i.e. a proposition having content) is true 
all (tout) – a relation of multiple parts constituted together, but not 
yet a whole 
already (déja) – holding in the originary moment (“behind”), and 
thus in becoming an appearing object (forward) 
an other (un autre) – a particular instance of an other in general (cf. 
also “other”) 
as (comme) – when italicised, signals an appearing as such 
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“as if” – the positing of a conditional that that allows for doubt as 
to whether the conditional or its content is possible, or whether it 
can be true 
as such (comme telle/tel) – what appears taken as a part of a general 
relation, rather than a content to which existence is ascribed; thus 
what appears in the way and manner of its appearing 
at once (à la fois) – pertaining to two or more particular objects 
which must be thought as one object, in a unity without division, 
difference or opposition (thus as absolute) 
at the same time (au même temps) – the necessity of thinking two or 
more objects in their progress from one to the other, in temporal 
moments that are the same (rather than in time itself) 
Autrui – (untranslated), the “You”, as necessarily beyond and 
prior to division and relation to the other (l’autre) and Other 
(l’autre). Also the “you” as intimate to interiority in a secrecy prior 
to division, and has the ambiguous sense of “Others” 
autrui – (untranslated), the undeniable appearing of Autrui which 
resists singularisation, as also having the sense of “others” 
backward (en arrière) – regression through particular conditions or 
acts evidently given by the object in general (forward) 
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becoming (devenir) – the positive moment of movement, following 
from certainty and “coming down from” (devenir) or deriving from 
the higher level 
behind (derrière) – what must have occurred to permit or allow a 
further moment; also signalled by “already” 
beyond (au déla) – further than the furthest forward (or furthest 
upward), without direction; arising from a movement to the 
object without mediating relation 
beyond (par-delà) – a beyond without direction nevertheless 
passing via (par) a relation with exteriority, a less extreme form of 
a beyond; employed in our address to Levinas 
can (peut) – the signification of possibility, in language correlative 
to logic 
cannot (ne … peut) – signals correlative impossibility of at least 
three sorts: first, essential (further behind and a priori), which 
precludes the sense of originary possibility; second, negation of 
possibility of what was first essentially possible (forward); third, 
by 1964, an impossibility anterior to essential relations 
certain (certain/e) – undoubted, as based upon evidence of what 
must have and does occur, prior to positing or constituting of the 
object as a telos “forward” 
 - 81 - 
complement (or non-relation) – formed by affixing a negative 
prefix (non-) to a predicate, resulting in a positive predicate as all 
that is not the predicate. Can also be explained spatially, as all 
“around” the object, without particular negation or opposition to 
any particular thing, nor bound to the relations of generality 
which would merely relate it to everything, cf. “instability” 
conditional – see “if” and “as if” 
conditional tense – a verbal employment of the conditional form, 
as a correlative way to avoid positing of the possibility of the 
object 
Difference (Différence) – in 1962 and 1964, the essential relation of 
difference, no longer capitalised from 1965 
difference (différence) – at the interior of thought, the division of 
one particular content from another without opposition; will hold 
at each level by 1966 
direction (direction, sens) – a level addressed for its movement from 
one content to another, also signalled by the word “sense” 
each (chaque) – refers to a particular, along with “this” 
ego (ego) – an instance of the subject made object 
Ego (Ego) – the essential ego (already behind, or further forward) 
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etc. (etc.) – movement from one to the other that leaves a moment 
over (from et caetera). 
every (tous les) – applying in general to each 
exteriority (extériorité) – the relation from the inside to its beyond 
by referring to the inside 
first direction (la direction initiale) – progress toward the object; by 
1964, our term for explanation of movement from one to the 
other in infinitum, forward (upon the inside) 
forward (avant) – a progress to the object, whether spatially “in 
front” of the subject, or merely next in the sequence of 
necessities, in order to determine the partial object as essential 
and then absolute (as the whole) 
found (fond) – the act by which a whole instantiates certain 
content to a part 
from… to (de… à) – signals a moment of passage from a posited 
content to an other 
further – our term for the second degree of a direction or level 
furthest – our term for the third and essential degree of a 
direction or level 
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general (générale) – the predicating of generality of an eidetic 
object, holding at the highest level of essence without reference to 
material content 
hence – signals an implication, rather than merely the next 
sentence in a narrative, as does “thus” 
henceforth (dès lors) – our term for a relation that will continue to 
hold from that juncture in our progress and Derrida’s  
higher (supérieur) – forward or upward 
how (comment) – signals explanation of a progress which occurs 
from transition to transition, rather than positing of why or what 
 I (Je, je) – the essential or particular “I”, thus in the upper or 
lower case respectively, that signal an instance of a living moment 
of the ego as positive and subject 
ideal object – the nexus (across, forward) of an intentional object 
in which the formal and essential relations (forward, upward) hold 
already 
ideal Objectivity – the characteristic or predicate of being (not yet 
in an existential sense of this word) an ideal object, although not 
yet a positing, thinking or signifying of that ideal object  
identity (identité) – the synthesis of content in thought, in 
accordance with formal law, as affirmation that an object is itself 
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if (si) – signals a conditional, which avoids doxic positing of the 
possibility of its object (the antecedent); thus employed to address 
the irreducible or beyond (idea etc.), cf. also “as if” 
 in (dans) – at the inside, but will develop to have the sense of no 
longer outside, and by 1967 will be in a reciprocal relation to an 
outside as a non-relation 
inside (dedans, à l’intérieur) – opposite to the outside, on this side of 
a limit, whether of an ontological object or a judgment (which 
latter is also an object)  
instability – signals a nexus of circularity in which one sense of a 
relation passes to another, and returns to the first sense (in the 
two directions), a more basic form than what Derrida calls the 
“ambiguity” (ambiguité) of the two senses of a word  
instability (of a prefix) – prefixes such as dis-, un-, in-, de- etc., 
which can express either negation or a complement, and result in 
a circularity “in” that word 
imply (impliquer) – to necessitate, following from a prior necessity 
irreducible – what cannot be included within reduced or pure 
relations, thus for essential reasons cannot even appear as 
essential; will come to be related to multiple terms – the Idea in 
the Kantian sense, temporalising, Speech, irreducible difference, 
archi-writing, and archi-trace  
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is (est) – from 1962, the moment of positive predicating of an 
object, rather than an affirmation of identity. By 1965, the 
progress of predicating of what becomes itself only when it then 
becomes different from itself and returns to its originary source. 
By 1967, in relation to the pure trace as différance , refers to what is 
itself at the origin only in reciprocal relation with a non-origin 
its other – otherness from one to the other without external 
distance or opposition from one to itself 
level (niveau) – a metaphor for the static visualisation of particular 
directions in their necessary progress toward a whole 
logic – Husserl’s intentional logic, as ordered relations of 
direction and levels in accordance with a priori and essential law 
moment (moment) – a part which cannot be varied without 
affecting other parts 
movement (mouvement) – the sequential progress from positing one 
particular content of an object in general to positing another such 
content, without necessarily entailing convergence upon an 
external object; begins only after an a priori structure 
must (il faut, doit) – the correlative term for necessity; as Derrida 
proceeds in a teleology, “must” signifies what must still occur of 
necessity, rather than what does or has 
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myself - the name for an instance of a living moment of the ego 
as its object 
never (jamais) – signals the preclusion of something occurring for 
a priori and essential reasons (at the highest level) 
no longer (ne sont plus) – refers to that which has proceeded from 
a prior or originary instance but is not yet determined 
non-relation (non-) – cf. “complement”. 
not (ne … pas) – a correlative moment signifying negation 
not (non pas) – a strong “not!” that avoids negation of what is 
predicated (n’est… pas). Also an instability between predicative 
negation (pas) and a non-relation (non)  
not yet – what must not or has not yet been determined  
of (des) – signals the genitive (internal) relation with the 
intentional object, and thus the possibility of passage to the object 
and its hierarchical relation (as “consciousness of something”) 
one (l’un) – a unitary and impersonal instance of positing of a 
particular object, as not yet an other 
open (ouvert) – as a noun, a constituted and passive content 
implying that no values of truth and falsity have yet been 
constituted, besides the prior truth-sense and value of itself.  
 - 87 - 
to open (s’ouvrir) – to constitute the value of the open, and the 
possibility of a solution (a response) to the question 
opening (ouverture) – in 1962, the constituted content implying a 
moment prior to the ground, value, and possibility of response to 
the questioning of open relation  
opening (ouvrant) – by 1967, a participle of the verb “to open”, the 
constituting of value by irreducible relations such as 
temporalising, before that value must be erased 
opposition – two contents in one object that are related solely 
over against one another 
or, either/or – the inclusive and exclusive disjunct respectively. In 
1954, when orientated to a demand for an absolute answer, “or” 
signals the exclusive disjunct in correlative language: either true or 
false but never both. Upon developing his “problem”, “or” will 
evolve to an inclusive disjunct: one or other, or both, and then to 
an instability, as either inclusive or exclusive, without 
determination, yet permitting continuation (both/and)  
origin (l’origine) – the origin as particular object, which must be 
determined, essentially holds as original or originary 
original (original) – predicate of the origin of the ideal object 
(forward) which already holds essentially (“behind”)  
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originary (originaire) – the part of the essential relation of the 
original to which content is instilled, holding behind, rather than 
further behind, and not yet a moment of becoming 
the other, or other (l’autre or autre) – the predication of a 
substantive object without opposition to the subject, or the 
predication of the object as separate from the subject. That is, 
“other” can have the sense of both an adjective (e.g. other ego) 
and a noun (e.g. other ego)  
the Other or Other (l’Autre or Autre) – as for “other”, either the 
name for an essence or an adjective. A pure but possible essence 
at the highest level which, by its essence, must be outside essence. 
Not yet the “irreducible” or “beyond” of the “Other as Other” or 
the absolute other, that must merely be supposed 
outside (dehors) – on the far side of a limit or border, whether of 
an object or a judgment (which latter is also an object) 
permit (permet) – make possible 
positing (postuler, Setzung) – the doxic (believing) act of beginning 
to constitute and (in logic) to predicate of the object 
problem – the inability to (as yet) absolutely affirm or deny that a 
predication of an object is true or false, or that the object is 
determined as what it is or is not  
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second direction – our term for the necessity of exceeding the 
first direction to determine an object (such as the other) at higher 
levels 
sense (sens) – Husserl’s Sinn, signals the instability between the 
sensible appearing and the relation that this appearing instils in 
consciousness as an object; thus also signals direction 
signify (signifie) – commonly employed in French as to “mean” in 
language, and usually translated in this way; Derrida will employ it 
even when not yet referring to the constitution of a sign. In 
address to Saussure, “signify” does evolve to imply the 
constituting moment of a signifier 
signified (signifié) – the concept, as telos of the unity of one or 
more finite and particular conditions (signifiers), with what must 
hold (outside, forward, or behind), signifieds (concepts) remain 
originary or teloi, as what are certain but not yet wholly 
determined 
signifier (signifiant) – the form of sound which movement will 
parallel that of speech, and also the unitary moment of one and 
other upon the inside (or lowest level); its formal parts are the 
“acoustic image” (above) devolving to the phoneme; by 1965, it 
will be aligned with writing as well as speech 
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specific (spécifique) – a part of the general, holding at grades of 
higher levels than the particular content predicated of in the ideal 
object 
structure (structure) – a priori and essential relations that already 
hold but arise as movement, in a system that remains certain but 
has not yet appeared  
supposing – a subjunctive conditional, which does not yet 
concede the possibility of its object, thus retains a relation of 
doubt cf. also “as if” 
system (système) – that which certainly instantiates content to a 
structure, which structure and content then enter the movement, 
without yet appearing itself 
then (puis) – the next implication in accordance with a prior 
necessity in a sequence (from behind) 
this (plus a noun) (cette) – signifies a particular 
thus (donc) – also translated as “therefore”, or “hence”, signals an 
implication that follows from a prior necessity  
thought – consciousness of something, which formal parts are 
those of positing and signifying (or speech) 
thus – “hence”, above  
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to (à) – the dative moment of moving toward and applying a 
predicate 
together (ensemble) – pertaining to two or more particular objects 
which must be thought alongside one another as one object 
transcendental – an approach that avoids naïve or uncritical 
approach to objects, thus rather considers only the essential and a 
priori relations of appearing without reference to external 
existence 
underneath (en dessous, sous) – the name for the lower level that 
does not yet appear except as content (including the content of a 
name); also refers to a foundational relation “from behind” 
upper case – signals an essential relation rather than a particular 
object 
what…? (qu’est ce que…?) – signals a question, demand or thought 
that seeks to constitute its object 
why…? (pourquoi…?) – signals a question that avoids constituting 
an object 
word (mot) – a unit of language in general that can be addressed as 
an object  
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Summary of some of our common terms 
The following collates a few of the common terms and phrases 
which we have habitually employed in our explanation of Derrida.  
 
above – notes a relation that we developed earlier in our progress 
address, approach – explains that which we examine in Derrida 
without suggesting we as yet determine or “reach” it 
allow – to not yet impede occurring, whether possible or not  
also – a moment by which Derrida aligns with a relation of an 
earlier thinker, explained by us previously 
and so on – employed rather than “etc.”, which latter is mobilised 
in the play of the Same 
as yet, thus far – employed to avoid determining an outcome in 
our progress, along with “no longer” and “not yet”. Such issues 
should rather remain open 
below – refers to a relation that we must yet explain in our 
dissertation 
deems – employed rather than “writes”, “says”, “signifies”, and so 
on. Signals Derrida’s or our explanation of a term, object or 
relation, without yet referring to such logic or signification 
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demonstrate – explaining via ordered implications 
diverges from – employed rather than difference, contrast, 
distinction, division, separation, or opposition, each of which 
terms have systematic application  
evolution, progression, development – signals Derrida’s 
procedure as we will explain it 
explain – employed rather than “metaphors of light” or writing 
such as “describe”, “show”, “illustrate” and so on; also employed 
to avoid affirmations such as “prove”, “assert”, “confirm”, 
“determine” and so on  
holds – employed to avoid suggesting any logical determination 
or necessity, but rather what Derrida’s progress implies  
indeed – signals when an evolution occurs that we had noted 
would occur, as Derrida progresses across the years 
note that – employed rather than “observe that”, and related 
“metaphors of light” 
preclude – to exclude, for essential reasons, from essential 
relation 
rather than – employed in preference to negative constructions 
such as “It is not”, “Derrida is not”, “neither” and so on 
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signals – employed to refer to what a term is intended to convey, 
rather than signification in the fashion of the thinkers we address 
to do so (or “in order to”) – refers to the progress of a prior 
necessity in particular cases, also signals that Derrida is continuing 
to follow his overall demand and teleology 
we – signals ourselves, the writer of this dissertation, rather than 
“I”, or “me”, which are employed systematically by Derrida  
will, did (the simple future and past tense) – our noting what will 
or did occur in a natural sense of time 
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Chapter One: The Basic Law of Derrida’s 
Oeuvre (The Problem of Genesis, 1954) 
This chapter addresses Derrida’s first student essay, The Problem of 
Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy of 1954 (henceforth, “1954”). Our 
assessment in this chapter is less concerned with Husserl than 
with what occurs even at this juncture in Derrida’s progress. For 
this student Derrida is preoccupied with his “law”, what he seeks 
to “prove”, and what impedes his proof (the complication of 
origin). Hence we will summarise the basic relations of Derrida’s 
approach. By the end of our chapter, this will have been 
developed as a “problem” of origin, and Derrida’s approach will 
have arrived at an early basis of “contamination”. This basis will 
be common to Derrida’s approach in later years. 
Part One: the basic relations of Derrida’s “law”  
Derrida sets out the “law” which he claimed to impel 
“everything” “he tried to prove” across his oeuvre thus: 
[T]he question that governs the whole 
trajectory [of his oeuvre] is already: ‘How can 
the originarity of a foundation be an a priori 
synthesis? How can everything start with a 
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complication?’ (PG xv, PdG vii, quoting PG 
xxv, PdG 12) 
The criterion that Derrida will apply as to what would be an 
acceptable answer is important. He tells us in 1990 that what 
seemed “most curious” in his question of 1954 is that it seeks to 
“answer” (répondre) a concern for “knowledge” (PG xiv, PdG vi, 
Derrida’s emphasis). That is, and this might be shocking, 
Derrida’s oeuvre begins from wanting an answer to the question of 
knowledge. As Derrida will take it from Husserl, “knowledge” 
would be “proven” of an object in consciousness. Such a 
knowledge would be a synthesis, the act that unites objects in 
consciousness. As what allows knowledge must already have held 
prior to his knowing it, it would hold “a priori”, and thus as an 
“origin” to thought. Knowing the object in accordance with the 
law would be an a priori synthesis. In this chapter, we assess 
whether a “logic” holds “from one end of [Derrida’s] book to the 
other” (PG xv, PdG vii) in 1954, as Derrida seeks to answer this 
question but arrives at a complication of the origin.  
The basic relations of Derrida’s progress 
We thus introduce the interrelated bases of Derrida’s approach, 
which first instances are italicised. As Derrida is referring to 
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himself by this question, we deem what he wants to be a “demand” 
(cf. GaS 157, ED 233).29 Crucially, Derrida demands “absolute” 
knowledge (cf. PG 137, PdG 225). The “absolute” thus far is 
better taken in a simple fashion, as a knowledge without qualms 
or insecurity, and thus without any limitation.30 Hence, as he seeks 
to “prove” such knowledge, Derrida sets bivalent limits from the 
first: only true and false are offered as options, and only one of 
these would be acceptable. Thus the limits apply to an object 
reasoned about as an either/or option: either it is absolutely 
known or not. The “problem” will be that the origin of the object is not yet 
known as either true or false, leaving the demand for absolute solution unmet. 
The primary difficulty in solving the problem – as Lawlor also 
argues – is that any intended object is “always already” (henceforth 
“already”) there to be found (cf. PG xxv, PdG 13). Thus the 
problem is interrelated with presence.31 The difficulty of attaining 
                                                 
29 We opt for the word “demand” as “to question” in French is “demander”, 
which has a (much weaker) everyday sense of demanding an answer. The 
question will develop in importance, and will always demand an answer. 
“Demander” arises from the old French “demander” (“demand”, the root of 
the English “demand”), which in turn derived from from the Latin “de” and 
“mandare” (to order) (CDWH 159). After encountering Levinas, Derrida will 
also call this “desire”.  
30 A more “logical” definition would be that of Husserl’s absolute as an object: 
“an absolute [...] has no aspects which might present themselves now in this 
way, and now in that” (I §44). This invariant absolute is not yet the kind of 
absolute that Derrida requires. In 1954, he demands a truth without limitation. 
That is, he will never merely seek an invariant relation. He will evolve to align 
with Husserl to assess an objective relation without limits in 1962, but this will be 
closer to his quotation, in 1962, of Husserl’s (atypical) “absolute which is 
situated beyond the world, beyond man, it is the absolute Logos, the absolute truth” 
(Husserl, E III, 4 60, in Diemer 39, IOG 146 fn. 177, Derrida’s emphases last). 
We will follow this demand as it impels his progress.  
31 By 1954, the issue of a “problem of origin” was no longer new in the 
criticism on Husserl. Eugen Fink in his “The problem of phenomenology in 
the work of Edmund Husserl”, had deemed it to be Husserl’s primary 
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“presence”, which develops in Derrida’s work from 1965 (707), 
was important even from this earliest work.32 For a thought of an 
object  
will always have to be already there, in front of a 
passive consciousness whose presence remains 
accessory or accidental (PG 21, PdG 62, our 
emphases).  
We will return to this passivity. As Derrida explains, in order to 
deem that what is presented has a unity of sense (Sinn), one must 
“suppose” – that is, as we will explain, hypothesise – an implicit 
conditional (“If… then”) concerning its “presence” (PG 21, PdG 
62).33 Derrida’s demand is for absolute solution (affirmation) of 
this supposition.  
                                                                                                        
difficulty. Fink notes: “Husserl is guided by a projection of ‘originality’ which is 
itself ‘problematic’ in his search for original knowledge” (Fink 1981, 38). This 
“problem” is that “[A] senseful reference back to perception lies in the 
intentional sense of memory [whether] […] we note it or not.” (Fink 1981, 39). 
Derrida refers to Fink in his student work, although never to this article. 
Derrida’s concern in 1954 is to assess whether this problem can be overcome, 
via a survey of Husserl’s published work. 
32 From 1965, Derrida will take “presence” to be the telos of speech without 
distance or separation (DLG 1027). In 1954, Derrida still takes “presence” in 
its conventional sense of what is visualised in space before the reader, as 
known.  
33 Derrida writes: “In order to give a ‘unity of sense’ to this [original] genesis 
and to its objective product, it has to be supposed present, and autonomous, 
before the multiplicity of acts of consciousness” (PG 21, PdG 62). 
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Next, we add the criteria of the “inside” and “outside”, nearly 
ubiquitous in systematic readings of Derrida (35). The “already” 
implies that what is already given is not yet absolutely itself. It is 
not yet absolutely known. That is, its relations are not yet known 
“inside”. Oppositely, nor is the outside yet absolutely known. 
Objects already here remain “on this side” of the external origin 
(PG 137, PdG 225). A rigorous interaction, for Derrida, does not yet 
succeed until it interacts with the absolute origin. Yet the “already” 
implies that each interaction finds the origin is outside, thus 
problematic. Thus: such interrelations do not yet solve the problem 
absolutely.  
Derrida often employs this kind of reasoning. When an attempt 
to know the object fails, “[W]e remain on this side [en deçà] of 
absolute originarity” (PG 137, PdG 225, our emphasis). We call this 
“shortfall”, as employed in the 1960s, where  
presence [...] had already from the start [from its 
origin] fallen short of itself (SP 87, VP 97, our 
emphases).
34
 
                                                 
34 In French : “[L]a présence avait déjà commence à se manquer à elle-même” 
(SP 97). A “lack” (manque) is also a “falling short”. As to remaining upon “this 
side” (en deçà) in later work cf. DLG 55, OG 47 of 1966 and 1967. 
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Given Derrida’s demand, shortfall is unacceptable. Note, 
however, that shortfall is not yet a judgment of failure, but rather 
a judgment that shortfall is not yet a success. 
Thus shortfall is a judicative consequence of the inside-outside 
criterion. If the origin remains outside, it is judged that the system 
does not yet meet the demand for absolute solution. Hence 
Derrida’s difficulty will be that the demand to solve the problem 
is not yet met; rather than that the object is not there, for the 
object is undeniable (as we will elaborate upon below). The 
problem is merely that the question of its origin is not yet 
absolutely answered.  
The “absolute” would be knowledge of the undeniable object as 
full presence without shortfall in an affirmation of truth or falsity. 
This will in due course lead to even absolute affirmation and 
denial becoming problematic. An interrelation with presence is 
thus set forth: the demand to affirm origin finds, on its “inside”, 
the presence of an object which must be absolutely determined, 
but shortfall leads to the problem. These interrelations will form 
the bases for Derrida’s approach. Hence we turn toward his 
reading of Husserl, to assess whether this object can be 
determined, as Derrida demands absolute knowledge. Derrida 
addresses Husserl’s published works in the order of their 
publication. 
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Part Two: the spatial and its joints 
Progress through Husserl’s works  
Even in his earliest published work, The Philosophy of Arithmetic of 
1891, Husserl had sought to explain how objects could be 
“unified” in consciousness. Husserl proposes that the parts of 
objects are “joined” in consciousness in that their parts are 
“collectively combined” into a “totality” (PA 76, ln. 10-15, cf. 
111, 312-352). Moreover, even in 1891 Husserl took his approach 
from intentionality, developed by Husserl’s teacher Franz 
Brentano (cf. PR §14 ff.). Crucially, intentionality for Husserl, is 
“consciousness of something”. Derrida too takes this as basic. To be 
sure, Husserl later deemed this work of 1891 was 
“psychologistic”, at least in that it took psychical phenomena as 
its concern, without critique of how they could be possible (PA 
348, cf. FTL §65). Even intentionality in that work was 
psychological.35 
For Derrida, the difficulty is more basic: a concept of 
“something” is already required in order to have something to 
                                                 
35 Dallas Willard takes it from Husserl’s references to the “intention” in 1891, 
and detailed accounts of “something”, that Brentano’s psychological 
intentionality is “paradigmatically exemplified” in Husserl’s account of 
collective combination (PA 69, fn. 1). However, Willard argues that Husserl’s 
account is “not ‘mental’ in any usual sense of the word”, but is “‘psychological’ 
only in the sense that it is “a member of a unique class of relations” which 
Brentano’s intentionality “had used to characterise the psychological or 
psychical over the physical” (PA 69, fn. 1). That is, Willard is arguing that 
Husserl’s approach in 1891 was a mathematical or formal analysis. Derrida in 
1954 would take either a formal or “usual” sense of the psychological to be 
beset by his difficulty. 
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collectively combine (PA 84). Derrida deems that this undermines 
any explanation of objectivity in general, for  
if one wished to deduce [...] the ‘something in 
general’, one would already have to presuppose 
some other objectivity in general (PG 27, our 
emphases). 
This “objectivity in general” would already be there, and seeking 
its absolute origin would imply an infinite regress. Thus Derrida 
concludes that 
[t]he ultimate foundation of objectivity cannot 
be deduced empirically or psychologically (PG 
27).
36
 
Derrida deems that this undermines all psychological thought. 
For 
                                                 
36 Note that even from this early juncture, Derrida was wary of deduction 
(progressing from more general premises to a more particular premise (cf. PDP 
124)) as a method that could solve his difficulty. Even so, his concerns in this 
work of 1954 are in the main unrelated to this whole-part progress, which we 
will develop in our next chapter. 
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an exclusively psychological condition [...] will 
always have to be already there, in front of a 
passive consciousness whose presence remains 
accessory or accidental (PG 21, our emphases).  
All psychologistic thought – to which Husserl was averse from 
1900 onwards – fails to explain “presence”, as its origin is already 
outside.37  
The predicative form as basic 
In the 1890’s, Husserl began to develop a “logic” which was 
critical of psychology, but which was never aligned with the 
symbolic logic that would soon come to underpin logical 
positivism (and then modern logic). For Husserl, however much 
proficiency is attained in manipulating a logical calculus in 
application to objects, to develop the calculus itself requires 
theoretical insight (cf. Moran LI p. xxx). Husserl envisaged logic 
rather as the theory of this insight, a “science of science” as “pure 
logic”, an inspiration that he attributed to Bolzano (PR §61, in 
Moran LI p. xxx). The Prolegomena to Pure Logic (henceforth, 
                                                 
37 The implicit issue of the “inside” and “outside” in the Philosophy of Arithmetic 
has been well-covered since Frege’s criticism that Husserl makes everything a 
presentation. For a summary and opposing view that Husserl’s system was 
never a simple “correspondentism” (to the “outside”) cf. Bernet et. al. (1993, 
14-24). 
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Prolegomena) and the Logical Investigations of the following year 
(1901) aimed to provide a “theory of knowing” that could justify 
such an approach.  
In the Logical Investigations of 1901, Husserl developed the basis of 
“pure logical grammar”, the word “logical” having been added by 
Husserl to the revised publication in 1913 (LI 4 §14, 2001 74, LU 
2 1 348). In brief, for Husserl, particular intentions can be 
signitive, in seeking to constitute the object as a sign. Moreover, 
the form (which word we address below) of intentionality in 
general corresponds to that of a logical proposition. Thus even 
though he avoided symbolic logic, Husserl still based his progress 
upon the classical form of a basic logical proposition, expressed 
in language. Husserl exemplifies this by “S is P” (PR § 6 ff.). To 
explain this basic conformity between intentionality and logic, we 
begin with the former. For Husserl, “constituting” is the term for 
the act which “brings into being the consciousness of something” 
(I §88), as the animating function of intentionality. The 
“constituting” is “active”, while its intentional object is 
“passively” “constituted”. 
 Then, as to logic, for Husserl the first act of constituting of the 
object is a positing (Setzung). Consciousness posits a predicate of the 
subject S (which is an act of “predicating”). “The apple tree is 
blossoming” would be one instance of this form. It predicates “is 
blossoming” of the subject “the apple tree”. This “of” is worthy 
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of note. Consciousness predicates of the object to determine that 
object as the logical subject. Hence every intentional act has a 
logical underpinning (cf. I §§117, 148). Husserl writes in 1913:  
[E]very act [...] harbours explicitly or implicitly 
a ‘logical’ factor. (I §117) 
Thus far, then, the “apple tree” as particular logical subject is in 
the first instance the object of an intention (cf. I §3). In this 
particular moment, the essence “apple tree” is intended, and only 
upon this ground can one confirm, for example, whether an apple 
tree is blossoming; a ground would be required to provide the 
right to affirm whether the logical proposition can be true. The 
confirmatory judgment thus follows only after the logical predication 
or position (cf. I §6). Applying this to intentionality, one could 
also write that knowing the object occurs only after the intention 
as a consciousness of the “object”. Moreover, with this goal of a 
constituting logical judgment as a confirmation of the constituted 
object, comes the relation of truth and falsity, and its relation to 
psychology.  
The necessity of essences developed 
From at least his Prolegomena, Husserl was also wary of traditional 
logic in that it merely predicated of a particular object (Husserl 
deemed this “objective” logic). Husserl noted that any particular 
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judgment by an individual psyche about an object can be false. 
Moreover, even judgments of truth hold at multiple times and 
places. This, for Husserl, implies the necessity of ideal laws that 
hold at all times and places (PR §31). These in turn must hold in 
accordance with essences which are related by those laws. A law 
for Husserl relates “essential forms” (I §148). From this 
reasoning, Husserl developed eidetic phenomenology (each such 
essence is an eidos). The judgments of a classical objective logic are 
deemed “psychological”, and from this Husserl begins to build a 
“phenomenology” that no longer addresses a “natural” object. To 
explain it, Husserl keeps the goals of the judgment of truth and 
the avoidance of falsity, but this truth must hold at all times and 
places. That is, it is the essence of the object which must be 
affirmed as true in a particular instance, rather than the real object 
as a psychologism would take it in a “natural attitude” (cf. I §§27-
30, 39).  
Three of the major concerns are thus judgment, logic and 
“ontology”, and their interrelations. For the relations of each eidos 
that make truth or falsity possible (we return to possibility and 
necessity in our next chapter) must already have been grouped 
into “regions”, which Husserl calls “ontologies” (cf. Ch. 2 (155)). 
These regions set out formations that do correlate to a “world” 
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(we place this word in inverted commas, to signal that its sense is 
no longer supposed to be of the natural world.38  
Thus Husserl takes it that the relations as formal. The formal 
relations of judgment of what can be affirmed of regions occur in 
the form of the proposition (as apophansis). Simply put, 
“apophansis” is “the form of judgment in the logical sense” (FTL 
§22; I §134). Moreover, even the proposition is thus a formal and 
essential relation. Thus whether an apple tree can be blossoming, 
and whether this can be essentially True would hold according to 
formal and eidetic law. It thus might be true or false whether an 
apple tree is blossoming here and now (this judgment would be 
“contingent”). Any formal-logical law – a logical law as to what 
can be true or false of something in a proposition – can be 
deemed a formal-ontological law, which holds for eidetic reasons 
(I §148). But moreover, for Husserl, in pure logical grammar, 
even the laws of signification are fixed by these relations, for each 
object (such as “apple tree”) can be named, and Husserl deems 
such ontological relations are ideally “fixed” (LI 4 §14, LU 2 1 
348). As Derrida puts it, the essences are “canonised” in a 
“system of laws” (IOG 41).  
                                                 
38 Derrida summarises that “[T]he existence of the world is the correlate of 
certain experience-patterns marked out by certain essential formations” (PG 
79, PdG 145). 
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Apophansis is easily thought of simply as “judgment”, the 
proposition as “that which is employed to judge with” of the 
object in intentionality, and ontology as the fixed regions of 
eidetic relations which determine what can be judged as True or 
False. While Husserl emphasises the formal overlapping of these 
relations in intentionality, Derrida is rather interested in each of 
their shortfall.  
Derrida merely glosses the Logical Investigations in 1954, yet applies 
his basic relations. As to the logical proposition, its object (the 
logical subject itself) would be already given. The “already” (and 
henceforth) implies that  
pregiven [objects] have only external relations 
(PG 112, PdG 189). 
“External” in this case refers to what must be prior to 
consciousness of an object (we develop these directions and 
levels from our next chapter). Thus, for Derrida, a “logical” 
proposition must suppose “another genesis” prior to the psychic 
(IOG 40). For Derrida, when phenomenology sets aside 
psychologism, then a priori logic is outside thought. But 
moreover, this holds even when the relations are essential. Constitutive 
logic is situated “this side” (i.e. as shortfall) of “constituted 
essences” and 
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have not yet allowed Husserl to throw a 
suitable light on their originary relations. (IOG 
41) 
Note that this Derrida of 1954 is demanding his own answer. 
Husserl in the Logical Investigations is explaining how it can be 
confirmed that the apple tree is blossoming. Derrida wants 
absolute knowledge that it is blossoming, in a priori synthesis, as an 
absolute knowledge of its origin. But the “already” and its 
resultant shortfall leads to the difficulty. 
The basic relations of the reduction 
Nevertheless, Husserl’s progress after the Logical Investigations 
might better address Derrida’s demand. For Husserl might have 
been aware that any such constituted ideal object of a judgment is 
“outside” a particular moment of thought, even as eidetic, and 
thus prone to psychologism and doubt about the possibility of its 
Truth. A famous innovation occurred in 1907 (IOP 33-34). 
Instead of seeking to determine the object in an external world, in 
a reduction judgment of the existence of the object in its external 
world is “suspended”, without doubting it (cf. IOG 33-34, I §32). 
This suspension was somewhat controversial (even in 1950, 
Ricoeur suspected that Husserl’s reduction arose from a 
“sceptical crisis” about the external world, in the years between 
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1905 and 1907 (cf. Ricoeur, 1967, 33)). For Husserl, after a 
reduction the origin of the world need no longer be considered, 
which consideration adopts a “natural” attitude; thus nor is one 
vulnerable to the errors of psychologism. Instead, the 
phenomenologist simply begins describing the manner of the 
object’s appearing as such.39 Such a reduced consciousness even 
from 1907 was deemed to be pure (cf. IOP 33-37), in that its 
relations are no longer even considered as having been provided 
with content by a psychological origin. By this innovation, 
Husserl aligns his method with the pure intentional moment of logic in 
essence. Thus although Husserl’s published works had several aims 
                                                 
39 The “epistemological” also “phenomenological” reduction” was first 
introduced by Husserl in his lectures of 1907 (IOP 33-34). This, at its simplest, 
reduced what appears as content in evidence as “absolute” givenness, to a pure 
and “immanent” essence. Husserl in 1912 deemed that temporality (and 
spatiality) are never “objective”, but appearing only in a form “as such” (ITC 
§1); which was not quite a reduction, but from 1913 Husserl employed their 
relations within the eidetic reduction (cf. below). The “phenomenological 
reduction” as a methodology of “suspension” of judgment of the givenness of 
the object, thus “bracketing” of doubt about its appearing, arises in 1913 in (I 
§31). This will be the basic form of reduction that we will employ in address to 
the problem, for it will set aside doubt about the object as internal and 
external. The “eidetic reduction” is implemented midway through the Ideas of 
1913, which reduces individuals to the eidetic or purest essential relations (I 
§§59-60). Husserl works out the transcendental-phenomenological reduction 
by developing form into transcendental logic, and then into transcendental 
subjectivity, in Formal and Transcendental Logic of 1929 (cf. FTL §§11ff.). The 
transcendental-phenomenological reduction as the reduction to an essential 
ego explicating what is given by its history in itself, is implemented from 1931 
(CM §8), which for Derrida will permit a return inquiry in transcendental 
subjectivity. Judgment, like the pure forms of temporality, is also deemed not 
yet to pertain to external objectivity, and in Experience and Judgment of 1938 will 
no longer have an explicit reduction assigned to it, although Derrida will retain 
a reduction even in relation to judgment. Kamei deems that for Derrida the 
eidetic reduction comprises the “centre” of the reduction (Kamei 1995, 345); 
we note that each has its purpose, in a sequence, thus retains that purpose in 
the evolution – the phenomenological as applied to the doubt of the object not 
yet given absolutely (which Derrida will strongly critique in 1954), the eidetic as 
the reduction from the individual and external object to pure phenomenology 
as such, and the transcendental-phenomenological which will permit 
transcendental subjectivity in a return inquiry, while setting aside Cartesian 
doubt, which Derrida will align with from 1962. 
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(Derrida will address how Husserl seeks to reconcile science, 
logic, perception, geometry and metaphysics as we continue), the 
above relations will remain basic.  
The reduction as difficulty 
However, the student Derrida never believes that Husserl’s 
reductions provide exemption from the “problem”, even should 
the psychological “world” be put in parentheses. Rather Derrida 
complains that even within the reduction Husserl sets aside the 
problem of the origin of passive synthesis itself (PG 142, PdG 
232). For Husserl, we note, this is exactly the aim; pure and 
descriptive phenomenology is supposed to begin with the 
reduction (IOP 34). In deeming that the passive content requires 
a justification, Derrida demands that phenomenology answer his 
concern. Hence none of what follows in 1954 is actually about 
Husserl’s phenomenology. Addressed thus, this young Derrida never 
was Husserlian.  
Indeed, in the printed version of his next public work, the speech 
on Husserl in 1959 (which we touch upon only here), Derrida 
concedes that the reduction is supposed to allow objects to be 
constituted in consciousness without enquiry into their origin. He 
admits that phenomenology itself would be “offended” by his 
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“question”. 40 But even in this work, he proceeds to “confess” his 
aims, to assess whether Husserl  
reconcile[s] the structuralist demand (which 
leads to the comprehensive description of a 
totality [...]) with the genetic demand (the search 
for the origin and foundation of the structure) 
(ED 233, GaS 157, our emphasis last). 
Note, indeed, the term “demand” (exigence), as justification for our 
employment of it. Integrating rigorous shortfall with an origin 
outside, in accordance with the demand, will remain Derrida’s 
central concern. The “demand” is deemed a first requirement for 
“structure”, as well as determination of the “origin”, which 
relation will be made systematic by 1966. 
The Ideas as central work  
However, it is in the phenomenology of Husserl’s Ideas of 1913 
(since called “Ideas 1”, and henceforth “Ideas”) that Derrida finds 
Husserl’s core. Husserl divides reduced and intentional being into 
                                                 
40 Derrida writes: “[The reduction] brings eidetic forms once again to light, that 
is the ‘structural a prioris’... in Husserl’s mind, at least, there never was a 
‘structure-genesis’ problem. Phenomenology, in the clarity of its intention, 
would be offended, then, by our preliminary question” (ED 231-232, GaS 
156). We quote from the version of 1967, as the first printed version of 1965 
appeared six years after the initial speech. 
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the pure phases of the material (hyletic) and noetic (I §85). The 
latter constitutes essence without material input from the hyle. The 
noema is the “intentional content” which “corresponds” to such a 
noetic phase. However, for Husserl, the “noema” is no longer a 
real object (I §88); rather, Husserl deems it “reell” (which term 
refers to the contents of consciousness as noetic phases).  
To help explain why the noetic is no longer “real” in a simple 
sense, consider the working of a mind. When describing the 
contents of its consciousness (a “content” (Inhalt) for Husserl is a 
particular moment of intentional sense (cf. I §§85, 90)), then a 
reader would probably not yet deem the “phases” by which those 
events happen actual “contents” in a natural or psychologistic 
sense. The latter, more familiar sense might be termed real 
(wirklich). For Husserl the noetic contents would thus be 
intentional, but only “reell”. 
However, as to the noema, this is at even a further remove from 
the “natural attitude” (110). For as a noetic phase is intentional, it 
arises along with a content. Hence it is no longer orientated to the 
natural world but related to the essence of what is thought as 
such (Husserl’s example is “this tree blossoming”, also placed in 
inverted commas). As a content is intentional, the noema too is 
intentional, and deemed “correlative” to the noetic phases (I §90). 
This “noematic correlate” would no longer even be a component 
of the reell intention (cf. I §88).  
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On the other axis, the hyle, which ought to supply “sensile” (or 
sensory) material is real (reell) yet – Husserl claims – not intentional 
(I §85). But then, Derrida asks, how could a noematic intention 
interact with the hyle? The origin of the hyletic material raises a 
problem – it is only because such material appears as already 
constituted that it can be intended.41 
Hence, for Derrida, the noema does not yet interact with its 
outside. But a reader should avoid supposing that a natural 
“outside” strands this noema: intentionality arises as multiple 
intentions (contents) related in this flux. Derrida rather applies his 
demand to what he requires phenomenology to achieve. Thus he 
overrides phenomenology again; for he does take Husserl’s Ideas 
back to the natural inside-outside sense. By containing sensile 
matter, the hyle also claims to convey what is outside itself. But 
then, Derrida asks, “does [Husserl] not reintroduce, in the form 
of a “hyletic datum”, passively received, the transcendent object 
that he claimed to exclude [...]?” (PG 63, PdG 121). Again, the 
reduction is rejected, as the outside remains a problem. Just as he 
did in addressing Husserl’s work in 1891 and 1901, Derrida 
applies his demand to Husserl’s phenomenology of 1913. 
                                                 
41 Derrida adds that it is only “because [hyletic material] appears as already 
constituted in its very being, prior to any noematic synthesis, that 
consciousness can experience originary constitution” (PG 63, PdG 121, our 
emphases). 
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Next, Derrida applies his demand and its requirements to 
apophansis. In Experience and Judgment (EJ §1-16), begun from 
around 1918, Husserl deems that the “world” is a horizon of 
possible judgments, which appear as believed evidence. Husserl 
applies no explicit reduction to apophansis in this work, which 
may be because judgment ostensibly does not deal with external 
objects. However, active judgment still judges of passive 
“substrates” of judgments. These Husserl explains as 
antepredicative, i.e. already there. Derrida again suspects that 
Husserl re-creates an inside-outside border, thus a problem of 
origin. 
Second, the texts collated in this work heralded Husserl’s turn to 
“genetic phenomenology”. The object, for Husserl, contains a 
sedimented history of past judgments. These are “evident” to 
active judgment. Phenomenological analysis, from within the 
horizon of possible judgments, must then strip off prior 
judgments in regressus to explicate the object in progressus. This 
project, were it completed, would reveal the originary judgment in 
its life-world. 
Derrida thus turns to arguing that Husserl’s address to the problem 
of origin does not yet succeed. The problem arises in that Husserl 
deems the object to be pre-given (EJ §10), and thus 
antepredicative. Hence, for Derrida, predication of a “history” 
falls short, as any regression through sedimentations finds that 
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the object was already given, thus there may always be a further 
term. We write “may”, as there would be a shortfall of judgment 
– one would not yet know absolutely, Derrida writes, whether this 
is a perceptible basis or even an absolute lack of determinacy. It 
is not known whether the regression that has 
to be effected to return to antepredicative 
existence has to end in a sensuous reality or in 
an absolute indetermination (PG 114, PdG 
193). 
 Indeed, to begin to introduce a further term, the reference is to 
the indeterminate, rather than to falsity of the determinate. As a 
precursor to what Derrida from 1962 will deem “open” (222 ff.), 
it is not yet even known whether the outcome is indeterminate, 
for a judgment of indeterminacy still judges of an object.  
Thus far, judgment can neither affirm nor deny the outcome of a 
predication (which we deemed “shortfall”). For Derrida, this 
undermines Husserl’s entire genetic project. The “passive” 
substrate of judgments – what one actively judges “of”, just as 
one judges of ontological objects – merely reproduces the 
problem. Indeed, Derrida is willing to deem that his basal 
reasoning holds of any object, even without a reduction; he 
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suggests that this could just as well be deemed a problem of an 
empirical genesis (PG 109, PdG 186).42 Derrida is willing to 
devolve three decades of Husserl’s work to his basic interactions 
between inside and outside.  
Indeed, Derrida’s approach is no longer compatible with 
Husserl’s. For the latter, the precedence of the passive is still 
buttressed by evidence, a criterion which he applied from at least 
1900; something arises to be predicated of (cf. PR §6 ff.). Hence 
the antepredicative is the solution allowing regression to the 
originary judgment: 
anything built by activity necessarily 
presupposes, as the lowest level, a passivity 
that gives something beforehand (EJ §38, in 
PG 141, PdG 231). 
Derrida demands that evidence appear absolutely, which thus 
leads to the “problem”.  
This, we suggest, is the source of Derrida’s most fundamental 
misunderstanding of Husserl in 1954. As Derrida will concede in 
1962, Husserl’s approach to evidence never required him to 
                                                 
42 It is “a genesis that itself took evidence for granted, and which could easily 
be assimilated to a simple empirical genesis” (PG 109, PdG 186, our emphasis). 
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demand an absolute outcome; rather an implicit reservoir of 
evidence allows the telos of further explication and as yet prevents 
absolute outcome. Derrida, rather demands an absolute outcome 
from evidence in the first place, which would have prevented 
Husserl’s explication from proceeding. At this moment of 
extreme divergence, we begin to explain how Derrida is 
approaching the problem.  
The “joint” upon directions – a model to 
understand Derrida 
As Derrida has not yet begun to problematise metaphor (which 
begins to occur from 1964 (cf. VeM 446 fn.), we explain his 
approach via a simplified version of the metaphor “joint” (brisure: 
also “break”, “hinge” etc.).43 The word “joint” expresses both a 
separation and a connection, as it is associated with both 
movement and stasis. Thus far we have followed Derrida’s 
address to static separation. Every object or structure has an 
inside and an outside, between which lies a “joint”. The sense of 
                                                 
43 We will develop this word in Of Grammatology of 1967. In that work, Derrida 
explains that the joint underpins the way in which all metaphysics, bound to 
inside-outside criteria, can be thought. Prior to Of Grammatology, it appears 
briefly in 1962, in the “Introduction” to Husserl’s “The Origin of Geometry” 
as a double relation that is “out of joint” (cf. IOG 139). In The Archaeology of the 
Frivolous, Derrida will develop the joint as a hinge (brisure) (AF 58). In “Psyche, 
Inventions of the Other”, the joint underpins the way in which the “invention” 
is thought relative to truth as a separation and a connection. As Derrida writes 
at the outset in regard to “The Invention of Truth”, “[A] fold or a joint 
separates, even as it joins, these two senses […] which are also two forces or 
two tendencies, relating to each other, the one settling over the other, in their 
very difference” (P 31). The joint also underpins the overall progress of Specters 
of Marx, where Derrida quotes: “The time is out of joint – Hamlet.” (SM xx).  
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an object instils a direction (crucially, and henceforth, the French 
sens also implies “direction” (cf. Lawlor 118)).  
Thus, in a spatial model, there are at least five directions by which 
to address a problem: from outside to its outside, outside to 
inside, inside to outside, inside to its own inside, and overall 
shortfall (everything to its outside). One side of any joint can be 
taken as a position, which is only hypothetical (for the problem of 
the origin has yet been solved). More simply put, even if the first 
position on one side of the joint holds, then the relation to the 
other side that it addresses is not yet justifiable because of 
shortfall, and thus problematic.  
Every one of Derrida’s arguments above, and in our chapter, can be treated 
as a direction upon a joint. This younger Derrida seeks to assess each 
of Husserl’s relations by thoroughly examining each direction. 
Even though only nascent, this approach and these directions will 
remain the hallmark from which Derrida’s “system” will evolve 
(cf. DLG 1041 ff.). We will demonstrate how each direction is 
addressed in Derrida’s analysis of active and passive constitution, 
which he deems the “final stage” (PG 153, PdG 215) of his 
research.  
First, to put the directions in the simplest fashion, the outside 
falls short of affirming its outside. That is, Derrida argues that 
passive constitution outside does not yet justify its presence from 
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the outside, for it appears as already constituted. Approached 
from a joint in the opposite direction, it is outside its own 
constitution (PG 118, PdG 198).44As it is already no longer 
“absolutely originary”, we are referred to a “preceding” moment 
of constitution. Derrida applies the implicit criterion of shortfall, 
and the passive falls short of justifying its presence. Importantly, 
Derrida avoids supposing that “preceding” or “prior” necessarily 
has a “temporal” sense (for in predication, one does not yet have 
a right to determine that an “outside” will be temporal (PG 86, 
PdG 153-154)); rather, what is “already” there does not yet escape 
the problem.  
Second, the active inside falls short of the passive outside. From this 
juncture, we begin to include the term “synthesis”, as Derrida 
seeks to unite these two sides of constitution.45 The “active 
synthesis”, Derrida deems, is “always preceded” by a passive 
synthesis (PG 144, PdG 235);46 the latter is already there. Third, 
the passive synthesis outside falls short of the active inside. For 
example, Husserl deems that the passively constituted is “not 
intentional”. The active itself constitutes the passive. But, Derrida 
suggests, this includes the passive merely as formal in the active. 
                                                 
44 Thus Derrida writes: “[T]he supposed transcendental passivity is thus not ab-
solutely originary here and refers us to a preceding moment of constitution” 
(PdG 198, cf. PG 118).  
45 To wit, “the fundamental form of synthesis [is] identification” (PG 135, PdG 
225). 
46 For “the active synthesis that inaugurates the possibility of a piece of eidetic 
research is always preceded by a passive synthesis” (PG 144, PdG 235, our 
emphasis). 
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But a form of something is not yet the original; a problem of 
origin (PG 142, PdG 231).47 Hence the passive is “foreign” to the 
active as for Derrida it is not yet inside constituting 
consciousness. 
Finally, overall shortfall applies, as the system falls short of its 
outside. For Husserl also posits something of the active in the 
passive (PG 118, PdG 199, cf. EJ §23a). But, when the active 
alone is intentional, the passive does not yet concretely appear in 
passivity.48 However, even if there were a real moment of the 
active in the passive (Derrida would deem this a problem), then 
the passive would no longer be passive (PG 143, PdG 233).49 
Hence, even if the active does interact with the passive as an 
entire rigorous unity, the system still falls short. Derrida 
summarises: 
Why does any constitution start with a 
synthesis of passivity and activity? [...] These 
questions, which were being posed from the 
                                                 
47 Derrida puts it thus: “[I]s this inclusion of the passive into the active not 
precisely to include formally in the activity what is really and ‘in itself” foreign 
to the constituting intentionality?” (PG 142, PdG 231). 
48 For “[T]o say, as Husserl does [...] that passivity is a moment of activity is to 
make use of an abstract concept of activity” (PG 142, PdG 231).  
49 Derrida explains: “[T]he passive synthesis […] is thus a constituting [active] 
moment of the unity of intuition” (PG 143, PdG 233). 
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very first moments of phenomenology, are still 
without an answer (PG 118, PdG 199). 
As an outcome, having assessed each of these options Derrida 
affirms that, overall, “genesis is never met” (PG 117, PdG 198).  
Even so, it is important to note that Derrida’s assessing of each 
option signals thoroughness rather than pedantry. In addressing 
the options comprehensively, he aims to arrive at a credible 
outcome. When this detail is dismissed, one cannot appreciate 
Derrida’s subtlety or his rigour, in this work or later years. More 
importantly, an audience might yet doubt that Derrida’s progress 
is rigorous and meticulous, and even doubt that these relations 
could be addressed in such a fashion. Thus we will explain the 
sequence of Derrida’s argument, as each outcome implies the 
next.  
The difficulty of formal idealism 
Indeed, following the interactions allows them to cohere to some 
degree. Following from this shortfall, the “outside” is constituted 
inside only as formal. In its insistence on active and intentional 
constitution, Husserl’s phenomenology creates a formal idealism. 
But form too generates a difficulty, for it is an important 
peculiarity of form that it allows appearing, thus does not yet appear 
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itself. For example, a tree appears with a given form, but the form 
itself allows the tree to appear. 
As Lawlor also argues, this leads to a “formalism”, for the 
appearing is always already formed. That said, form could be 
intended as an essence or content, but then even the essence is 
already there; absolute form is problematically outside.50 
Alternatively, if form is somehow given from outside, then the 
origin arises from a (passively constituted) outside, and for 
Derrida, “one would have to admit that knowledge has made a 
jump, from the evidence of the given to the [...] judgment” (PG 
107, PdG 183-4, our emphases). To allow judgment, Derrida 
would need to jump across a joint. Thus far, not even the 
evidence of form can explain its origin. Rather, for Derrida in 
1954, form is the innermost problem. In the relations that we 
have set forth above, form in any judgment, logic, or ontology is 
problematised. Again and again, Derrida finds formal idealism in 
Husserl, from Ideas to the Cartesian Meditations (PG 107, PdG 183; 
PG 142, PdG 232). Yet this outcome has followed from Derrida’s 
basic criteria.  
At every turn, indeed, Derrida has posed an either-or choice 
requiring absolute presence from a hypothetical object in active and 
                                                 
50 As Derrida writes, “[I]f passivity [as form] is placed inside a constituting 
sphere of activity, the problem is only pushed one stage further back [outside]” 
(PG 64, PdG 123, our emphasis).  
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passive constitution. Husserl, however, wants an interweaving 
constitution within the reduction. Derrida notes:  
Husserl [...] merely indicates the impossibility 
of a ‘language’ that would distinguish strictly 
between passivity and activity (PG 118, PdG 
199).  
We will take it that in 1954 Derrida’s approach arises from his 
own demand.  
Part Three: temporising and the joints 
With the static and spatial relations thus set out, we turn toward 
phenomenological time. This was emphasised by Husserl since 
his lectures of 1905 to be the base of constitution (cf. ITC §§16-
17, PG 90, PdG 159). At this juncture, Derrida finds shortfall in 
Husserl’s “protention” and “retention”. The former is a “pure” 
intention of what has not yet occurred. For example, on hearing a 
melody, a series of protentions can arise which anticipate what 
the next sound might be (ITC §24, 25). These protentions are, 
however, merely empty intentions – they do not yet have real or 
individual content. A sound (for example, a melody), is a “primary 
impression” which moves through the now. Hence the primary 
impression passes into primary memory, which is restored to 
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consciousness by a representation (Vergegenwärtigung). Retention is 
“primary memory” and constitutes the present. But as Husserl 
puts it famously, this content (e.g. sound) is only a nucleus of a 
“comet’s tail” (ITC §§11-12, cf. SP 1973, 62) of other retentions. 
Thus, for instance, a listener understands a musical note restored 
to consciousness in relation to its place in the melody. For 
Husserl, the content of a retention is indubitable as it simply 
restores immediate evidence (ITC §16, 17, I §78), while 
“secondary memory”, which returns recollections, can be false.  
This flux of restoring the past and anticipating the future leads to 
the directions of what Husserl deems the fundamental form of 
the Living Present. Protention moves from forward to backward, 
and retention from backward to forward. For Derrida in 1954, 
that protentions do not yet provide a real content leads to the 
difficulty: as the anticipated events have not yet happened, the 
intentional object they seek to present falls short. Protention as 
yet falls short of the absolute. 
Next, as retention occurs within a reduction, for Husserl its origin 
need no longer be considered. However, Derrida notes, for 
Husserl it is an a priori necessity that “an originary impression 
have some temporal density” (PG 62, PdG 120).51 Even in a 
                                                 
51 Derrida explains: “[I]t is an a priori necessity of the perception of time and 
the time of perception that an originary impression have some temporal 
density (PG 62, PdG 120). 
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temporal reduction, Derrida demands that phenomenology 
render absolutely all of the sense of temporality’s density. Thus he 
rapidly devolves retention to his joints. First, he notes that 
Husserl especially deems that the retention avoids presenting a 
“real” (reell) impression. For example, the restored sound of the 
earlier notes in a melody are no longer really there at a fixed point 
in time.52 But again, Derrida asks if the retention, since it must 
still present an intentional object, nevertheless “announces” a real 
object anyway.53 This retention falls short of a real instance of time. 
Next, Derrida argues for overall shortfall; for even if either 
protention or retention presented a real object, any moment of 
the “now” would still need to be a moment of passive 
constitution. Derrida’s arguments against spatial constitution 
apply just as much to the constitution of living temporality.54  
But nor is it merely living temporality that is addressed, for given 
that the intention has a logical underpinning, this holds also of 
what can be predicated of time. Derrida turns to Experience and 
Judgment, where Husserl divides time into the “subjective” and 
“objective”. The former is the time of perception experienced by 
                                                 
52 Derrida puts it that “Husserl does not present the a priori necessity of this 
synthesis [retention of an originary impression] as ontological – and especially 
not real – but as phenomenological” (PG 62, PdG 120; cf. ITC §12).  
53 That is: “[B]ut so that this originary impression may be intentional [...] must 
it not as such ‘announce’ a real object that is constituted in the same way since 
it is aimed at it originarily?” (PG 62, PdG 120). 
54 For “retention […] implies a synthesis or a passive genesis of a new ‘now’, 
[but if] the constitution and retention of the past were active, they would, like 
any pure activity, shut themselves up in the actuality of an originary now” (PG 
93, PdG 163, our emphasis). 
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the subject; the latter, the “time of nature”, is that temporality 
found in the unity of sense in objects (cf. EJ §36).55 Derrida 
emulates the directions of spatial active and passive synthesis. 
First, the inside of subjective time cannot determine its outside, for 
the activity of constituting time finds that objective time is 
“passively received by consciousness” (PG 119, PdG 200), and 
the problem of passive constitution is posed again. Nor can the 
outside allow for its outside; objective time outside the subjective 
activity must already have been given (PG 119, PdG 200), 
preventing the unitary source that Derrida demands.56 Again, this 
implies shortfall from the overall outside.  
Further, and importantly, time brings with it the essential basis of 
being perceived as a “series” of moments. This could be 
addressed either from the inside (assessing the origin of the 
“next” term in its “order”) or as an objectual and thus formally 
static view of the aggregate (space and time overlap, which we 
explain below). In the former case, each term of the series leaves 
its “outside”, which – for Derrida – Husserl never seems to 
                                                 
55 Husserl writes: “The time by which objects are united is not the subjective 
time of perceptual lived experience but the objective time conjointly belonging to 
the objective sense of this experience” (EJ §36, in PG 119, PdG 200). Both 
subjective and objective time are thus “experienced” (which Husserl deems a 
highest pure genus (cf. I §12)). Derrida in 1954 is not yet concerned with these 
essential relations, but addresses them as objects, demanding that their content 
appear absolutely. 
56 For what is presented to activity, “the unity of objective is [...] produced by a 
[…] genesis of which the ego is no longer the only source” (PG 119, PdG 200). 
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consider. In the latter case, when the series is made an object in 
space, only its form yet appears, leading to a problem.  
After cataloguing the directions upon his joints in both space and 
time, Derrida determines that 
[W]hat is noteworthy here is that any formal 
program always stops before the actual genesis; 
yet any philosophy not attaining the actuality of 
genesis is condemned to remain immobilised at the 
level of a formal idealism. (PG 121, PdG 203, 
our emphases) 
Any formal address, working through the given series of 
constituted spatiotemporal objects, falls short, returning to formal 
idealism. This in turn leaves the origin as a problem and Derrida’s 
demand as yet unmet.  
Toward the irreducibility of the spatial and 
temporal  
With both space and time having devolved to a common 
difficulty, we turn toward assessing their interaction. To do so we 
move to the moment of the object’s becoming in time and space. At 
this juncture, each finds that it never appears as its counterpart. 
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First, if time is indeed fundamental, then each spatial moment 
should devolve to original time. Husserl never asks himself this 
question, and for Derrida, thus, “at the interior [the inside] of the 
spatial hyle [...], the problem of the constituting becoming is still 
being posed” (PG 92, PdG 161, our emphasis).  
Parenthesis – the difficulty of time 
By this juncture, Derrida has evolved a new mechanism, arising 
from the privilege of formalism. For the above suggests more 
than that time itself is a problem. To assess this upon the 
“inside”: time is a condition for appearing, but in appearing, it 
undoes the basis of appearing. Space only appears in the form of 
origin, thus as a problem of absolute affirmation. But time does not 
yet even appear at first – this is what Derrida deems 
“irreducibility” (cf. PG 90, IDG 159). It will be crucial in later years 
(265 ff.).57 Yet even so, nor is time doubted, it “interrupts”58 
active constitution even “inside” the spatial moment of becoming 
(PG 120-121; PdG 202).  
However, to be thorough, Derrida works irreducibility out via the 
joints. To address this from the joint from the outside of 
becoming: as temporality does not yet justify the absolute outside, 
                                                 
57 This difficulty has a long precedent in the history of metaphysics. As Derrida 
will note in “Ousia and Gramme: Note on a Note from Being and Time” 
(henceforth, “Ousia and Gramme”) of 1968, Aristotle had posed it early on. 
However, it is a seam that Derrida will interrogate over the years. 
58 For “the temporality described is fixed; it interrupts the whole movement of 
constitution at a certain moment” (Derrida PG 120-121; PdG 202). 
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a right no longer holds to affirm that what is “outside” the becoming 
of the object is temporal in its origin. To avoid confusion, note 
that “right”, for Husserl, arises in the moment of positing rather 
than affirmation (202). Even the right to posit an originary and 
active intention is no longer temporal. As Derrida puts it: 
How can it be affirmed of a reality [...] that it is 
lived before being intentional if absolute 
evidence is made into an intentional act? One 
has the right to determine the hyle as lived 
only from that moment when an intentional 
morphe has come to animate it (PG 86, PdG 
153-154). 
 Instead, “becoming” leads to a difficulty of affirming that what 
appears “inside” has even come from a temporal origin (outside), 
as “behind”. Nevertheless, Derrida’s demand is that the origin be 
affirmed absolutely. 
Toward complication of origin 
To follow this demand, we add that the directions and joints 
apply to space, which must be perceived to be absolutely sustained 
in time. For example, space in constitution, as a cessation of time, 
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is outside temporal movement and its own absolute origin. As, for 
Husserl, space and time allow a priori synthesis, then synthesis is 
jointed in three directions: space is already outside time, time is 
irreducible to space, and the living now is outside time. In this 
moment, synthesis is not yet simple. Even so, the interactions are 
rigorous. Becoming is outside the irreducible temporal (living) 
intention which would fix its origin, and the having-become is 
outside its temporal origin.59 Yet in each instance, time itself still 
becomes; irreducibility is a dissymmetry.  
The directional model set upon these bases 
Note that this has been a progressive development from the 
demand into the joints and directions. Having arrived at this 
nexus of an objectual movement in both the static and temporal 
moments, it is relatively easy to add the next parameters, 
“forward” and “backward”. These will form the basis of the 
“return inquiry” of the later Husserl, which Derrida begins to 
support in 1962, as treated in our Chapter Two. For only insofar 
as temporality is a difficulty at origin can what is no longer given 
from behind (a history) come to be interchangeable with what has 
not yet come from the “front” (a telos outside, in future) in 
moments of space.  
                                                 
59 Derrida will still write in 1967 that spacing sets out “the becoming-space of time 
and the becoming-time of space” (OG 68, DLGb 92, our emphases). 
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Derrida follows Husserl’s basic model in three areas: perception 
of the object, history and science. As to the first: the structure of 
perception of the object is the basic preoccupation of 
epistemology. For Husserl, most obviously in the Logical 
Investigations of 1901, identification of the object absolutely is also a 
telos. Husserl diverges from the Kantian distinction between the 
appearance and the thing in itself; for Husserl a thing is one kind 
of essence (cf. I §15). Hence to return to the things themselves is 
to adumbrate an object toward its ideal completion. However, as 
the phenomenological object is given only partially, consciousness 
then adumbrates its aspects forwards towards its putative 
completion (cf. Husserl LI 6, §14(b); I §142). Hence again, 
determination always remains outside the adumbration of the 
object.60 Thus far, the approach has still led to shortfall from the 
absolute.  
Second, “history” – in theory, “behind” – is aligned with this 
base. In Husserl’s genetic project, regression to the life-world 
would reactivate the history of the object. However, for Derrida, 
when the process of regression through sedimented judgments is 
infinite, history would end up remaining inside consciousness, in 
the movements of intentionality alone. Derrida complains that 
“[H]istory will thus be only the intentional chain of meanings [des 
                                                 
60 As Derrida notes of Experience and Judgment: “Intentional referrals are in 
principle infinite and, to that degree, never take on the absolute of their sense” 
(PG 144, PdG 235). 
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significations]” (PG 144, PdG 234). Thus the teleological project of 
seeking a history itself in the sedimentations in the object finds 
simply a process of explication without solution.61 As intentions 
are explicated forward, in the Living Present, then regression and 
explication, movement forward (through aspects in progressus) and 
backward (in regressus), become indistinguishable. History is also a 
telos. 
Third, in the Cartesian Meditations of 1931, Husserl introduces a 
“teleological ideal” of an ultimate science, which phenomenology 
aims toward by assessing individual sciences. Thus the telos is 
something that would need to be achieved by moving “forward” 
in time. As any particular object, including a science, would need 
to be seen as intentional, Derrida applies his bases set forth 
above, leading to his dilemma.62 If this telos of the ultimate 
science were achieved, then its becoming would be fixed, and it 
would be divorced from its origin in time. However, if the object 
of science were determined, it would no longer be a becoming. 
The joint “forward” to the absolute telos of an ideal science could 
be crossed only if time is set aside. As Husserl does allow an 
infinite temporal continuation, this implies that the project of an 
                                                 
61 Derrida writes that “this infinite totality of sedimentations is an idea: the idea 
of an absolute and completed history or of a teleology constituting all the 
moments of history” (PG 108). 
62 If the object “managed to [achieve its telos, then], on the one hand, the sense 
that it would thus produce would not have its foundation in any existence, on 
the other, it would mark the end of its own becoming: two mythical or meta-
physical consequences that would suspend the originary intentionality and 
temporality of lived experience” (PG 142-143, PdG 232). 
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ultimate science, his mathesis universalis, will explicate its objects 
without ever reaching its telos. These arguments thus far apply to any 
intentional object, iterated toward its completion. Adumbration as yet falls 
short of the outside. Seeking for genesis in history and the telos of 
an ideal science become a single structure in that each is a 
teleological moment, explicating evidence but as yet falling short 
of its object.  
As an outcome, which would otherwise seem an absurd 
conclusion, the teleological ideal already “precedes” the historical 
object, which is thus made problematic.63 Derrida is confronted 
by a reasoning by which what would come from outside in the 
genetic, scientific or epistemological projects cannot even be 
affirmed as “in front” or “behind”. Enquiry forward ends up 
being a problem of origin “behind”. In short, nowhere in 
Husserl’s projects of history, science or the knowledge of objects 
does Derrida find the absolute solution, the synthesis of the object 
that he demands. He finds only shortfall in every direction, including 
even the ability to determine direction.  
                                                 
63 Derrida puts it that “teleology could not be given to a concrete subject in an 
originary clear evidence. To be faithful to its mission, it had to precede any 
active constitution” (PG 153). 
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The “transcendental” sort of approach, and its 
subjectivity as a problem  
Next, Derrida turns toward their integrated moment (PG 130 ff., 
PdG 215) in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations of 1931,64 in what 
Husserl calls the “transcendental” ego. Importantly, this term 
“transcendental” develops from at least Kant’s employment of 
the term. It begins from the idea of a science to investigate 
essential relations as to their origin. It does so via a logic that 
assesses these relations only a priori, thus no longer refers to their 
existence in the natural world (cf. CPR A57-58/B81-82).65 That is 
to say, only by 1931 could Husserl introduce a “transcendental 
reduction” to an ego that addresses the origin. 
Moreover, by 1931 Husserl deems the ego to be the surest basis 
of investigating what has already been given.66 After the 
                                                 
64 Husserl deems its basis applies to all issues of constitution thus, Derrida 
quotes, it “applies to phenomenology as a whole” (CM §33, PG 137).  
65 As Kant puts it, this would be “the idea of a science […] whereby we think 
objects entirely a priori. Such a science, which should determine the origin, the 
scope, and the objective validity of such knowledge, would have to be called 
transcendental logic [which] […] concerns itself with the laws of understanding 
and of reason solely in so far as they relate a priori to objects.” (CPR A57-
58/B81-82, Kant’s emphases). For Kant these relations apply via the reason 
and understanding, which latter, Derrida explains, will have no important sense 
in Husserl. 
66 In so doing, Husserl also extends his project in Formal and Transcendental 
Logic. Husserl writes “All Objective being has in transcendental subjectivity the 
grounds for its being. [...] [for] it finds, as constituted within itself, all 
‘Objective’ being and all ‘Objective’ truth, all truth legitimated in the world. [...] 
Thus the ultimate grounding of all truth is a branch of the universal self-
examination that, when carried through radically, is absolute. [...] As this 
absolute ego, considering myself henceforth as our exclusive fundamental 
thematic field, we carry on our specific philosophical sense-investigations” 
(FTL §104). Husserl insists that this occurs only after a transcendental 
reduction: “In other words, it is a self-examination which we begin with a 
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transcendental reduction, in this phenomenological method, the 
ego explicates what it already knows. The constituted judgments 
already sedimented in itself become the object of the constituting 
ego. Hence the latter, Husserl writes, is inseparable from 
“intentional objectivities” (CM §31). According to Husserl from 
at least 1913 (cf. I §16), each region of eidetic relations already 
holds as a priori (which we will develop as a direction “behind” 
consciousness). Essential relations already predetermine what can 
hold of the object in its appearing. But these must be determined 
as the telos of science, history and so on. 
Hence the transcendental ego is also the general form of the 
essential ego (the eidos ego), in which such regional relations must 
have been sedimented. In turn, this ego must be determined as a 
“transcendental subject” in its logical moment. A transcendental 
subject is a telos that must be determined by an undoubted 
transcendental ego. However, in explicating the constituted ego, 
the constituting ego comes to be involved as constituted as itself 
by itself. In general, transcendental subjectivity, whatever its 
senses – egoic, intentional, historical, etc. – takes the form of a 
                                                                                                        
transcendental reduction, and which leads me to the grasping of our absolute 
self, our transcendental ego.” (FTL §104).  
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teleological circularity between the “two poles” of the constituting 
ego and its appearing.67  
The latter particular moment in this circularity is what Husserl 
again calls the appearing of the ego “as such” (als solches); that is, 
described in the manner of its essential appearing, without direct 
reference to the intentional object from which it arose (for 
instance, “pleasure” would be accompanied by “pleasing as such” 
(I §88, cf. I §5).68 Rather than a direct ego, the transcendental ego 
in phenomenological method describes even its own appearing as 
such. [OT] 
Indeed, Husserl emphasises that the entire method across his 
oeuvre has arrived at this juncture. As Derrida quotes:  
[I]f we think of a phenomenology developed as an 
intuitively a priori science purely according to the 
eidetic method, all its eidetic researches are 
                                                 
67 As Husserl writes: “I exist for myself and am continually given to myself, by 
experiential evidence, as ‘I myself’. This is true of the transcendental ego and, 
correspondingly, of the psychologically pure ego; it is true moreover with 
respect to any sense of the word ego.” (CM §33). 
68 Husserl writes: “Perception, for instance, has its noema, and at the base of 
this its perceptual meaning, that is, the perceived as such. Similarly the 
recollection, when it occurs, has as its own its remembered as such precisely as it is 
[...] ‘consciously known’ in it; so again judging has its own the judged as such, 
pleasure the pleasing as such, and so forth. We must everywhere take the 
noematic correlate, which (in a very extended meaning of the term) is here 
referred to as ‘sense’ (Sinn) precisely as it lies ‘immanent’ in the experience of 
perception of judgment, of liking, and so forth” (I §88). 
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nothing else but uncoverings of the all-embracing 
eidos, transcendental ego as such (CM §34, in PG 
137, PdG 225, Husserl’s emphases). 
The transcendental ego applies the method to explicate the 
“universal eidos” contained in the ego as such. The transcendental 
ego thus becomes a circularity in a method (moving forward, then 
backward) in which a constituting of the constituted uncovers its 
own particular sedimentations, as “the same I”. The “I” is the 
particular moment of the transcendental ego in general. It is this 
sense of “the same I” that in turn is part of the constituting of the 
sense of its objects. By 1962, Derrida will have come to rest the 
necessity of such determination upon foundation on the Idea in 
the Kantian sense, which for Husserl permits such moments to 
be re-identified (in an identity synthesis) as the same (IOG 139, I 
§143, (270 ff.)). In 1954, Derrida still demands the genesis of 
transcendental subjectivity (PG 159, PdG 256), and applies his 
spatial reasoning.69  
First, Derrida notes Husserl’s concession that the “genetic 
structure of the ego” remains to be explained. To attain a 
“maximally universal” phenomenology, Husserl would like the 
                                                 
69 As Derrida summarises, this is “at once a temporal and ontological 
necessity.” (PG 140, PdG 228). 
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ego eventually to “vary itself” so freely that it is no longer 
restricted by the world constituted in its own sedimentations (CM 
§37), freeing itself from shortfall. Derrida refers to his analysis of 
temporality, where becoming falls short of the temporal absolute 
(PG 138, PdG 226). Given this “finitude of temporal existence”, 
Derrida grants no such freedom to the ego to escape the world by 
determining the infinite series.70  
Second, for Husserl the transcendental ego in turn requires a 
reduction (cf. FTL §104). Yet for Derrida, the transcendental ego 
falls short of the “absolute constituting source” of consciousness 
itself. It is constituted rather than constituting, and falls short of 
its origin (PG 137).71 The “egological genesis” would already be 
there, thus not yet determined. A separation arises in the 
transcendental circularity of the ego from itself.72 Thus Derrida 
concludes, “we remain on this side of absolute originarity” (PG 137, 
PdG 225, our emphasis). Transcendental subjectivity has become 
the locus of directions by which every particular object or telos 
would be explicated. However, affirmation of the object (itself) 
falls short.  
                                                 
70 “Idealism being constituted by the finitude of temporal existence, a universal 
[absolute] eidetics of genetics will never be possible. [...] The ego, contrary to 
what Husserl said, cannot carry out variations of the self with [such] freedom” 
(PG 140, PdG 228). 
71 Derrida writes: “[T]o reduce the [Me] to an eidetic generality is to lose what 
there is in it that is both originarily temporal and constituting. [...] [To do so is] 
to miss [fall short of] the description of an authentic transcendental genesis.” 
(PG 137, PdG 225). 
72 As Derrida quotes Husserl even in 1967; this is a separation from the 
absolute origin, as “[W]hat can look at itself is not one” (OG 36, DLG 55). 
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Part Four: the law and initial bases of 
contamination 
We can thus interrelate the above to address the “law” with which 
we began. The divorce from original relation leads to a problem of 
“identification”. In turn, Derrida deems identification is the basic 
form of synthesis, with which his law is concerned.73 At this 
juncture, both the ordinary object (which is ontologically outside) 
and the ego as object itself are beset by a structure of separation in 
becoming. Synthesis as yet precludes the demand for absolute affirmation of 
identity. Were an intentional object to be identified, it would be 
determined in a priori synthesis in an intuition. But proceeding 
from the argument advanced above, by way of the inside-outside 
and forward-backward joints, synthesis has remained problematic. 
The “already” leads to synthesis as the locus of a problem.  
At this seeming lack of resolution to identity, however, we evolve 
toward the next, crucial aspect. In no instance is a “joint” (brisure) an 
absolute separation. Nowhere in the work does Derrida deny a basis 
upon the given in synthesis. Rather, when pointing to the flaws of 
the ego, as explained above, Derrida comments that 
there is the risk of transforming the passive 
synthesis, the only foundation of objectivity so far, the 
                                                 
73 Derrida notes that “the fundamental form of synthesis [is] identification” 
(PG 135, PdG 225). 
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only certainty of an access to being as being, into a 
pure activity of the subject (PG 144, PdG 235, 
our emphasis). 
Being for Derrida is undeniable (as “certain”). Even though the 
genetic project was problematised, Derrida writes, the sedimented 
history of an object depends upon what must already have been 
given, thus on history even in the natural sense (PG 143, PdG 
233).74 Just so for time: Derrida insists that inner temporality does 
not escape natural (or psychologistic) time, for after a reduction,  
the autonomy it seems to have acquired is only 
a modality of its dependence (PG 108, PdG 
184). 
 Indeed, as phenomenology is supposed to be based on time, the 
problem of phenomenology is one of unsolved dependence of 
the particular object upon the world (as essential or natural). 
Hence this applies to every major relation thus far. Shortfall is just 
as much a connection as a failure of relation.  
                                                 
74 Thus, Derrida continues, “phenomenological history presupposes real 
history” (PG 143, PdG 233). 
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This returns us to the methodical aspect of the problem. Rather 
than givenness failing, the explanation of givenness has failed. 
Derrida in 1954 appears as the most frustrated idealist rather than 
an anomist or nihilist. Indeed, in sustaining his demand that falls 
short, nihilism is what he seeks to avert (cf. 571). It might thus 
become more obvious how claustrophobic the “problem” is for 
one who demands absolute solution. Indeed, it is plangent that 
this young Derrida finds himself “imprisoned” by it (PG 107, 
PdG 183; cf. PG 142, PdG 231). 
Return to the basic “law”: synthesis and 
contamination as rigorous 
It might thus be appreciated in a basic fashion why Derrida puts 
the question that impels his oeuvre:  
‘How can the originarity of a foundation be an 
a priori synthesis? How can everything start 
with a complication?’ (PG xv, vii, quoting PdG 
xxv, 12, our emphasis) 
When, instead of a “pointlike” synthesis, a scission preventing 
affirmation arises, the problem of the “already” is unsolved. Yet 
the attempt to deny the pointlike synthesis also falls short.  
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This allows us to return to our beginning to address how the 
problem leads toward the initial difficulty of contamination. As 
Derrida later explained this student work: 
[A]ll the [either-or] limits on which 
phenomenological discourse is constructed are 
examined from the standpoint of the fatal 
necessity of a “contamination” (“unperceived 
entailment or dissimulated contamination”) 
between the two edges of the opposition: 
transcendental/“worldly”, eidetic/empirical, 
intentional /nonintentional, active/passive, 
present/non-present, pointlike/nonpointlike 
(PG xv, PdG vii). 
We have explained each relation in the progress above. First, 
when the transcendental is not real, predication “falls short” of a 
real world. Second, Husserl’s eidetic explication is “outside” an 
empirical basis, to which it is nevertheless connected. Third, the 
hyle remains outside the intentional noema, preventing material 
data from entering pure phenomenology. Fourth, the passive, 
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outside the intention, precludes affirmation across the “joint” to 
the active, without allowing denial. Fifth, the essence has arisen 
merely as a formal constitution without passive empirical 
givenness; thus (sixth) non-presence can neither be affirmed nor 
denied, in the indeterminacy which prevents pointlike synthesis of 
reality (seventh).  
Furthermore, any term above can also be reached from any other. 
For example, the “eidetic” (second above) has arisen only in 
active constitution without an affirmable link across the joint to a 
passive outside; the resultant indeterminacy prevents a pointlike 
synthesis of reality (sixth). This holds in general as a complication (a 
co-implication) of synthesis is common to each such term. For Derrida 
continues:  
the quaking of each [particular] border com[es] 
to propagate itself onto all the others (PG xv, 
PdG vii, cons.). 
Thus far, we note, “contamination” is more than merely a simple 
opposition of two contents which fails as they interpenetrate each 
other. In contamination each of the options – logical, ontological, 
apophantic, eidetic, intentional – has led to a mutual inability 
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either to be separated from or to solve the problem of origin.75 
Thus far, in 1954, contamination arises from complication. By the latter 
term, even at this juncture, we refer to a group of ordered 
transitions, in which each particular term nevertheless falls short 
of absolute solution to the problem of origin.  
What needs to develop after 1954 
To be sure, Derrida in 1954 has not yet worked out the 
implications of his approach. Notably, he determines that the 
project of absolutely affirming the origin is “condemned”76 to 
continually run into this problem (cf. PG 138, PdG 226).77 
Derrida in 1954 deems this outcome is a “dialectic”. This holds in 
terms of the ordered transitions we have developed: following 
from the demand, originary bivalence, joints, directions and the 
problem, the progress continually moves from one position to its 
opposite, falling short of the absolute of sense or the 
determination of essence in arriving at the problem. However, we 
also note how, at least in some measure, “dialectic” is a term that 
Derrida later needed to “give up” (PG xv, PdG vii). The difficulty 
                                                 
75 As Derrida puts it, contamination is an “unperceived entailment” (PG xv, 
PdG vii). The unperceived would be unaffirmed, while the entailment would 
be inseparable relation of implication. 
76 For Derrida, “the race toward the originary is permanently and essentially 
condemned to failure” (PG 122, PdG 204). He even generalises this to all of 
philosophy, concluding that: “[E]very philosophy is condemned to work back 
along the actual itinerary of every becoming” (PG 138, PdG 226). 
77 As Derrida explains, this synthesis is already there, thus “[T]hese intentional 
referrals are in principle infinite and, to that degree, never take on the absolute 
of their sense” (PG 144, PdG 234). Derrida takes “never” in this case to be an 
affirmation of what cannot hold, rather than an eidetic necessity of 
incompletion. We address these relations from Chapter Three.  
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rests in the affirmation of the instances leading up to such 
dialectic.78 Derrida in 1954 summarises: 
[T]here is here a classical dialectical movement 
that we will verify at every moment [instant]. All 
the absolutes meet in the same indetermination. (PG 
xxxiv, PdG 24, our emphases) 
Such verification (affirmation as true) again determines at least one 
characteristic of the particular object (its indetermination) in each 
moment, and this holds for all address to the absolute, or the 
whole approach. The problem of origin is dispelled in all of its 
directions “forward” and “backward”. Derrida does not yet 
comply with the premise that he noted en route: 
[I]n all good logic, the absolute antepredicative must 
not receive any determination (PG 112, PdG 
190, our emphases). 
He has instead determined the absolute, dispelling the problem. 
Thus in 1990 Derrida stresses that his student work was re-
                                                 
78 Thus Derrida deems this a “hyperdialectic” (PG xv, PdG vii); it is a moment 
which falls short of the “worldly dialectic” of phenomenological sense. 
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published without removing “imperfection” (PG xvi), at least one 
of which would be this overall difficulty. By 1962, Derrida will 
redress the difficulty by developing Husserl’s proposition until 
verification falls short even of indeterminacy (cf. 232). 
The preparation for Derrida’s outcome in 1962  
However, Derrida acknowledges even in 1954 that Husserl made 
the explication of the object toward the telos take the form of a 
“return inquiry” which, instead of absolute determination of the 
“antepredicative”, returns to the particular act that undoubtedly 
arises from origin (PG 145, PdG 235). Derrida even deems this 
the moment of “greatest clarity” in Husserl’s “whole reflection”. 
However, he still finds this form and its directions are 
“paradoxical”, as it already requires a “whole ontology” (PG 128, 
PdG 214) that precedes the particular moments of a becoming. For 
Derrida, this “signifies nothing less than the collapse of 
phenomenological transcendental idealism” (PG 128, PdG 214). 
It is ironic that in 1954 Derrida notes a relation that he will take 
as basal to phenomenology in his next work; yet in 1954 his 
demand for the absolute makes this the moment that he deems 
that Husserl’s project fails. In his next work, Derrida will begin 
from his demand for the absolute, but at the last will reformulate 
his approach to arrive at a first moment of deferral. To prepare to 
assess this, our next chapter turns to Husserl’s phenomenology. 
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Chapter Two: From Husserl to Derrida’s 
Requirements 
Introduction 
Our previous chapter was concerned with Derrida’s progress in 
1954 as he addressed Husserl. We thus turn to Husserl’s “logic” 
in more detail, along with its whole-part relations, to prepare for 
Derrida’s asking of his question in 1962. That is, how can the 
object be determined absolutely? The object, as noted (cf. 134), 
can be a thing, science, future, history, origin, or (as we address in 
our next chapter) language, other consciousnesses, and so on. We 
will devolve four requirements and four parameters by which 
Husserl’s phenomenology could determine the absolute. Our next 
chapter turns to Derrida’s first published work of 1962, as he 
addresses the requirements via the parameters, to work out how his 
demand for the absolute must evolve to an early basis of deferral. 
Part One: preparing Husserl’s basis 
We will first develop Derrida’s employment of directions to the 
object to include whole-part relations. These, Sokolowski explains, 
are 
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the skeleton for Husserl’s more elaborate 
philosophical doctrines about subjectivity and 
its world (Sokolowski, 1968, 537).
79
  
To explain this “skeleton” as a basis for subjectivity, we will 
address Husserl’s first chapter of the Ideas, and his amended Third 
Investigation, both of 1913.80  
From the content to the whole 
To start, we note that for Husserl “Whole” and “Part” are 
deemed to hold “eidetically”, as pure eidoi. They will hold at a 
highest level, and in turn provide the logic by which the levels are 
worked out. As to the relations “contained” within the whole, 
Husserl’s Third Investigation proceeds via genus and species. 
Husserl tells us that 
many enquiries would bring the relation of 
genus and species to eidetic division under the 
                                                 
79 Moran also notes that Husserl’s “part-whole analysis always remains central 
to his philosophy” (LI Vol. 1, lv). 
80 When republishing his amended Logical Investigations, Husserl noted: “I 
have the impression that this [Third] Investigation is all too little read. I myself 
derived great help from it: it is also an essential presupposition for the full 
understanding of the Investigations that follow” (LI Vol. 1, 7). Husserl also 
refers the reader to this Investigation in the Ideas (I §15, fn.). The Third 
Investigation was first published in 1901, and even in his Philosophy of Arithmetic 
(1891), Husserl had deemed that “unity” into a “totality” arises when “parts” 
(such as “1 + 1”) are collectively combined (PA 76). 
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relation of the ‘part’ to the ‘whole’. Here, 
‘whole’ and ‘part’ bear indeed the widest 
conceptual meaning of ‘containing’ and 
‘contained’ (I §12).  
These will indeed be the “widest” (most encompassing, or what 
we deem “basic”) relations by which we proceed. We will begin 
with the part, in order to develop from our previous chapter.  
As noted, a content (Inhalt) arises with an intention, thus as an 
intentional object which has sense (I §85). However, any content 
arises as an object, and thus as partial. Husserl explains that  
[W]e need only say ‘object’ and ‘partial object’, 
instead of ‘content’ and ‘partial content’ (LI 3 
§5). 
Every part is in some relation to and thus “founded” on a whole. 
However, parts can be relatively independent or non-independent 
of the wholes that found them (cf. LI 6 §58, I §85). The former 
(when independent, they are called “pieces” (LI 3 §17)) can be 
thought as a separate object: 
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[A] part often can exist without a whole whose 
part it is. (LI 3 §11, Husserl’s emphasis) 
We will develop this “can” as we proceed (cf. 242). Thus far, as 
an example, “something” can be thought as separate from, yet 
still a part of, “everything”, as the content “roof” is separate from 
yet still a part of a “house”. As to dependent parts, these cannot 
be separated from the whole (as “red” cannot be thought without 
“colour”, for instance).81 Some parts can be separated from 
wholes, but cannot be varied without in some measure affecting 
the whole, or related parts. As Sokolowski explains, the brightness 
of an object cannot be varied without altering its colour. Such 
variations are deemed “moments” (Sokolowski 1968, 541, cf. 
Smith et. al., 57). Any parts or moments can be content of the object: 
‘Content’ means the parts and moments of the 
perception or the parts and moments of the 
object. (TS §11) 
Next, from our previous chapter, we add essences (which are 
henceforth denoted by capitalised first letters). Any parts are different from 
one another (as a “house” is different from “red”) in accordance 
                                                 
81 Husserl explains “dependent” parts rather as “non-independent”. We will 
follow the convention of translating these as “dependent”.  
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with their essences, which delineate what that content can be. Thus 
rather than perceiving an object (or content, such as “red object”) 
directly, for example, the essence of “Colour” allows me to 
perceive a specific instance of the colour “Red” as a content in the 
object. Whole-part relations thus divide into levels of relation – in 
this case, the genus or essence “Colour”, its specific instance 
“Red”, and its appearing as a content as an object.  
For Husserl, there are ever only three such levels, in that the highest and 
lowest are the “limits”, and the second level holds as grades of 
specificity between these limits (cf. also FTL §§13-28, EJ §49 ff., 
IOG 98-99).82 The highest pure essence would be the Eidos, or 
also “Idea” (cf. I §§3, 12, 142), at the eidetic level. The middle 
would be the graded relations, and there may be many such at this 
level, as it holds between the limits. These are still pure essences (cf. 
I §§12, 142), which Husserl explained above as those of the 
species. The lowest level is the specific essence made most 
singular and partial, as a content (FTL §28). 
However, crucially, that all contents are parts, never implies that 
all parts are contents. These levels can also be without content (thus 
“empty” and “pure”). This requires some explanation. Husserl 
explains his crucial maxim in 1901 (and every moment across our 
dissertation continues to apply this): 
                                                 
82 Cf. (183 fn.) and (178 fn.) for summaries of the levels in Formal and 
Transcendental Logic and Experience and Judgment. 
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anything, everything can be objectified […] i.e. can 
become an intentional object (LI 4 §8, our 
emphases). 
We begin from the constituted (objectual) side. As multiple 
essences hold at each level, even the levels can be made into objects and 
divided according to their whole-part relations. This, it seems to us, is 
Husserl’s most indispensable premise.  
Thus even the highest eidetic level can be made an object and 
would have its singular relations, and these singular relations would be 
without content (when made constituting, just below, these relations 
will be deemed “essential generality”). In turn, any relations at any 
level can be different – whether as essential (eidetic), or specific. 
Husserl summarises the above: 
[E]very essence, whether it has content or is 
empty (and therefore purely logical), has its 
proper place in a graded series of essences, in a 
graded series of generality and specificity. The 
series necessarily possesses two limits that 
never coalesce. Moving downward we reach the 
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lowest specific differences [Differenzen], the eidetic 
singularities, and we move upwards through the 
essences of genus and species to a highest genus. 
(I §12, our emphases on “downward” and 
“upward”) 
Henceforth, in our dissertation, “upward” and “downward” refer 
to a movement from one level to its part or whole, and “never” 
expresses what must be precluded for essential reasons. 
The formal and contentless levels 
We are still assessing how the object can be determined. We begin 
with the “pure” and (Husserl claims) contentless relations, on the 
constituted side. Such “mere essential forms” are “completely 
empty”. At this highest level, the “formal” and “pure” region, 
then, is “properly no region at all, but the pure form of region in 
general” (I §10). We will develop the relation of generality below. 
Thus far, of such “formal, contentless items”, the purest and 
most formal essences are notably those of  
Something, One, Object […] Relation, […] 
Order, […] Whole, Part […] etc.” (LI 3 §11).  
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Husserl deems these categories (PR 67, LI 3 §11, I §11)). These 
essences are grouped into the formal-ontological regions. In formal 
ontology, importantly, “Something” would devolve (i.e. move 
“downward”) to a singular “something”, and “Object” to 
“object” and so on. A part at the furthest limit from whole 
relations holds at the lowest level. This most particular and 
essential moment, not yet even one, something or an object, is 
called experience (I §1). This minimal relation is deemed “originary” 
(originärer, cf. I §1, HU III 11), as the first condition by which 
essential wholes can be particularised, and thus a condition for 
the appearing of objects. We will return to it. 
The relation to content via correlativity 
Next, each such pure relation would need to relate to content (it 
must be possible to relate “something”, for instance, to a content 
“house”). To assess this: note that contents arise as intentional 
objects. Hence “content” is never placed “into” a “pure” relation, 
as though consciousness is comprised of boxes within boxes. 
Objects arise in acts, and moreover as compound intentions where 
multiple terms arise as correlative. A “correlate” is a consciousness 
of – thus positing, and predicating of – contents which “mutually 
entail one another” (LI 3 §11), which contents thus arise in 
“parallel” (I §§104, 139). Correlation between essences is thus a 
positive and necessary relation where each accompanies the other 
upon “one side” and the “other side” (I §10). In such instances, 
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correlation permits the positing of “correspondence” (cf. I §88), 
whenever laws (i.e. the essential forms) pertaining to an essence is 
shared by a related essence.  
Thus correlative to the pure, formal and empty essences, 
correspond the relations of content. That is, to 
these essences [having content] correspond the 
concepts of propositions, which we sharply 
distinguish from purely formal concepts and 
propositions, which lack all […] ‘content’ (LI 3 
§11). 
Note that “concepts” for Husserl are taken to arise from unities 
of particular and given moments. It might be suspected that these 
formal relations, as contentless, are without existence. Indeed, as 
Husserl confirms in 1929, they are irreal (cf. FTL §61). However, 
the corresponding concepts (essences) which can have content 
are deemed propositions.  
The relations of essential generality 
We thus begin to include directions “across” (and return to their 
correspondence below). Importantly, the general (as its form 
implies) is a predicating of an object, thus of an object which can 
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have content, yet can also set aside content. That is, as any level 
can be made an object, the pure object is still intended as an 
“individual”, as “distinct” in the visual field. However, when the 
highest eidetic level is made an object, and predicated of as 
general, then a general direction predicates 
about the individual, but purely as an instance 
of essential being, and in accordance with the 
rubric ‘in general’ (I §5, Husserl’s emphasis). 
“In general” henceforth has this sense, as on “this side” of an 
existing or real content. By this innovation, Husserl accomplishes his 
earliest logical preparation for a reduction to the “pure”. Such predication 
is about the essential object’s appearing “as such” (als solches), 
without direct reference to the existence of the individual (I §5). 
At the highest level, this constituting moment is deemed “eidetic 
generality”, but as any essential relations can be specified at this 
level, it is more often deemed “essential generality” (I §5).  
From specification to a priori synthesis 
However, to determine an object nevertheless requires specific 
content. Taking this transformation to hold from the Ideas, each 
such addition of content follows from “an awareness of 
individual instances of the essence” (I §5), which we henceforth 
deem an “instance”. Following from essential generality, these 
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instances of parts of essences are specifications. These can be either 
pure or material, even when referring to a singular specification of a subject, 
for instance, “This house is red” (LI 3 §12). This proposition holds in 
accordance with a formal-ontological law in that, “in general”, 
every whole includes its parts. However, such a pure specification 
is without reference to existence. When the latter reference 
applies, Husserl deems the content is “material” (sachhaltige) (LU 
260-295).83 Just so, it must be possible to transform every specific 
content, whether material or pure (such as, “is red”) into the pure 
and empty form “is Something” (LI 3 §12), thus transforming it 
into a positing of eidetic law. This possibility holds insofar as the 
judgments (positing) thereof are deemed universal.  
The universal ought never be conflated with the general. As to 
the latter, Husserl worked out in 1900 that as particular judgments 
at one time and place can be wrong, then there must be essential 
laws which are thus pure and a priori (behind). Henceforth, all 
pure laws, as already holding in general, do so a priori (PR §21). 
As to generality, the latter predicates in essential generality of the 
specific content (from behind).84 Importantly, such laws are then 
                                                 
83 As Husserl puts it, in general, “the existence of a whole W (A, B, C …) 
generally includes that of its parts (A, B, C …)” (LI 3 §12). 
84 This emphasis will alter, Derrida will suggest, as Husserl develops over the 
years. For Derrida, the “concept of horizon is progressively substituted for that 
of structure and [structured] essence”, as a “modification of universal and 
transcendental norms in the classic sense”. Instead, “the essence becomes a 
norm” (IOG 80) – that is, appearing as incomplete yet requiring that it be 
given absolutely). Thus while Husserl in 1901 began from insistence upon the 
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posited (forward), as “universal”, as what must hold at all times and 
places.85 Husserl summarises that: 
[i]t must be possible, without altering the 
proposition’s logical form, to replace all 
material which has content, with an empty 
formal Something, and to eliminate every 
assertion of existence by giving all one’s 
judgments the form of universal […] laws. (LI 
3 §12, our emphasis) 
We will return to the “must” below. Note that to permit such 
replacements in accordance with formal law, all specifications must 
already hold a priori, even when of material content. 
The basic a priori propositions 
Husserl in 1913 emphasises these a priori relations hold even of 
material content. A proposition that contains “concepts” that 
                                                                                                        
universal rather than the general (LI 2 §2) by 1929 the universal will have its a 
priori (essentially, behind). We begin to explain this just below. 
85 Analytic approaches sometimes take the whole-part relation to be that from 
universal to particular, rather than general to particular (cf. ODP 387). For our 
progress in address to Derrida, the general-particular relation, as predication of 
generality of a part, precedes the essential relations of what can be judged to 
hold universally.  
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require no external foundation for the truth of their relations is 
“analytic”. That is, its truth is independent of an instance of 
external foundation. Such propositions are analytic a priori. That is, 
such relations hold in accordance with pure law (LI 3§ 11). Note 
that without external reference they can refer to specific material 
content, but cannot refer to an external foundation upon 
existence. Thus such pure laws (e.g. “Every whole includes its 
parts”) can correspond to the material and analytic a priori 
proposition (“Every house has a roof”).  
When the a priori proposition depends for its truth on an 
instance of a foundation that does exceed a concept (for instance, 
the colour of a house is never contained in the concept “house”), 
then the propositions are synthetic. These cannot be purely formal, 
hence they cannot be laws, although they must conform to law; 
Husserl rather deems these relations to be only necessities (LI §3 
11). However, as material, they can also include foundation on 
existence. In the latter case the material content can include an 
empirical specification. The specific and pure relation of “This 
house is red”, for Husserl in 1913, is thus an instance of material 
a priori synthesis. Husserl’s example of an a priori synthesis that 
includes empirical specification is “This red is different from this 
green” (LI 3 §12). We will briefly assess how such propositions 
can arrive at “truth” by working out how Husserl’s formal laws 
and necessities proceed. 
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The purest relations of ideal Objectivity  
That is, analytic or synthetic a priori propositions of any sort have 
a prior condition: to be possible, what they posit must accord 
with pure and formal law. This returns us to essential (eidetic) 
generality. When the Object is intended as essentially general, it 
can be individuated (rather than specified) at the eidetic level, i.e. 
as singular and particular. Importantly, the latter predicates of an 
ideal object (cf. also CM §38, OOG 161).86 At the purest limit, the 
logical relations and their laws in essential generality would be 
predicated of the ideal object. The latter, then, would be optimally 
suited for assessment of “transcendental” logical relations (i.e. 
without reference to external existence (cf. 138), in a fashion that 
permits formal assessment as to how to determine the object.87  
That is, and without exception, after Husserl in 1913 performs a 
reduction it will be the pure (i.e. irreal) relations developed from 
essential generality that he investigates, rather than the material. 
This will hold even when the pure regions in turn re-constitute 
the real relations in irreality. Essential generality will permit the 
transcendental approach as reduced and noematic. To explain how 
this occurs, we turn to Husserl’s Third Investigation of 1913.  
                                                 
86 Husserl explains “the form of region in general, or, which comes to the same 
thing, to the formal essence: object in general” (I §16). 
87 Thus in 1962, when Derrida seeks to assess what is essentially possible for 
transcendental subjectivity, he will begin from the ideal object as “model” for 
any object at all, thus for “objects in general” (IOG 66). 
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Developing the implicit teleology 
First, it is also important to emphasise that Husserl’s approach by 
at least 1913 is teleological; he seeks to demonstrate how an 
object can be known. Thus, it is pure relations that are specified, 
and – as explained above – the parts (or contents) that appear as 
objects, whereas the formal categories and their ontological 
regions already hold a priori. It is then the pure object in turn that 
must again be determined as an idea (forward). Even though 
Husserl allows for a priori synthesis, when his approach is taken 
as teleological, it nevertheless must proceed by examining the 
parts in this synthesis to determine the idea. 
The possibility of appearing  
Hence we begin to develop the formal relation “across” to the 
object. What appears as containing content in accordance with 
pure form does so as an object, and thus as a logical subject (S). It 
is thus a predicate of a proposition (Satz, which also implies 
“leap” (IOG 89)). Husserl explains that 
[e]very possible object, or to put it logically, 
‘every subject of possibly true predications’ has its own 
ways, that of predicative thinking above all, of 
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coming under a glance (I §3, Husserl’s 
emphases). 
We explain why this is merely the “possibly true” object below. 
Note that “thinking” for Husserl is a term referring to the general 
form of intentionality, of which predicative (logical) thinking is 
one sort. Thus far, the “glance” (or gaze) is a metaphor for 
objectifying an object “in front of” consciousness. This permits 
progress “forward”, in order to determine the object in front of it 
(IOG 83).  
From certainty, forward and upward 
To do so, note that moments of specific content at the inside 
(“internal content”) can henceforth be investigated to determine 
the unity of content in a Species. The moments of specific 
content can be addressed as to their “certain mutually requiring 
moments” (LI 3 §11). In our example, to determine “this red 
house”, as the species Red, the moments “red, brightness, 
intensity…” and so on can be “pointed to”. These positions (that 
is, judgments) can progress in accordance with formal law, as 
explained. To do so without reference to an external whole, in 
essential generality, each such moment can be freely varied (LI 3 
§11), by which act the related moments too are varied. Thus 
imagination, for instance, which can freely vary its moments 
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without external reference, is important to Husserl’s sort of 
progress.  
However, taken as pure and specific, Husserl never allows such a 
free variation of moments to be determined; “internal content” 
can refer to relative properties 
[b]ut it only does so with formal indefiniteness. 
(LI 3 §12) 
That is, such contents are not yet determined, even though their 
relations are possible. The mutual relations are rather merely 
certain (which we will explain, signifies the barest form of fact 
(205), cf. PH 151). Certainty is emphatically not yet an affirmation 
of truth, or determination. As Husserl explains,  
[i]f a certain A stands in a certain relation to a 
certain B, this same B stands in a certain 
corresponding (converse) relation to that A; A 
and B are here quite freely variable. (LI 3 §11, 
Husserl’s emphases) 
A “converse” relation switches the terms in a categorical 
proposition, e.g. “All A are B” becomes “All B are A”. Any 
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moment would mutually imply the moment of the corresponding 
moment. In our example, the specific colour “red” of an object 
would in turn be founded upon the corresponding Brightness, 
and assuming that white and black are colours, its specific 
brightness would also be founded upon Colour. Note, indeed, 
that whole-part relations of internal content for Husserl can have 
multiple foundations, in no obvious direction, but arising merely from the 
relations of their specific essences. 
As to this formal progress, such assessment of essential relations 
can progress “forward” from certain relations to determine this 
object as an Idea. Thus teleology can proceed in an “ideation” 
(Wesenschau). When progressing in the direction “forward”, to the 
object in front of consciousness, then instead of “descending” 
from the relation that already holds, ideation ascends to the 
specific relation. To do so, it proceeds from the singular essence 
“upward” through “more inclusive wholes”. That is, it can 
proceed through the degrees of generality at Husserl’s second 
level, in order to comprehend the species.  
As Bernet explains of Husserl’s levels: 
[I]nstead of descending from the ideal generality to 
its individual givenness, ‘ideation’ [Wesenschau] 
ascends from the singular individual to 
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comprehension of the species. (Bernet et. al. 
1993, 40 our emphases)
88 
Our progress thus far has instilled a formal-logical relation of 
levels and directions for the progress of ideation. As we explain it, 
the progress can proceed from behind (as the a priori relations 
that already hold), forward in the relation of internal contents that 
are certain but not yet given as a greater whole. In turn, these 
must proceed in an ideation that must determine the species, and 
then even the Idea. Note moreover that, in this progress the Idea 
does not yet appear; it somehow remains even “further” removed 
than the species. However, even the latter, according to the 
implications of Husserl’s approach, is also removed from 
determinability by internal relations of moments. This teleological 
and essential relation of levels and directions will be basal to 
Derrida’s approach in 1962.  
The material ontologies 
Nor is this process purely formal. Even though material relations 
can be specific, they arise from a priori relations which are no 
                                                 
88 In accordance with Derrida, we also emphasise that ideation arises as ideal 
relations that must hold already and a priori, in that they certainly provide 
content. For Derrida ideation forward (Wesenschau) to intuit the highest level of 
essence will lead to a problem of origin – the intuitable essence will come to 
depend upon a moment of idealisation, cf. IOG 66-67, fn. 61) as foundation on 
the Idea in the Kantian sense which must have produced this internal content. 
We are still working toward these elements. 
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longer formal and pure. They form an ontology correspondent to 
formal ontology. Thus, for instance, to rise in ideation from “this 
red”, to seek to determine the particular instances in the unity of a 
species “Red” (cf. LI 2 Introduction), would in turn be a species 
of the essential genus “Colour”. The latter, it seems to us, would 
be a highest level of essence in a “material ontology”, in that a 
“Colour” is confined to material applicability.89 The whole-part 
relations are merely correspondent. Thus a “material ontology” 
(as Pentzopoulou-Valalas emphasises (1981, 122)) is never directly 
founded upon but correspondent to formal ontology. Each is “on 
the other side” of the other.90 
The ordinal hierarchy of formal ontology 
However, as we seek to follow Derrida, we do note the ordinal 
relation. Formal ontology nevertheless predelineates what is 
essentially possible via laws, to which material ontologies 
conform. For instance, that “This house is red” is possible insofar 
as every whole in general includes its parts; but whole and part 
relations are never bound by the relations of houses and roofs. As 
Derrida puts it, material ontologies are “subordinated” (IOG 32), 
in a “hierarchy” of ordinality (importance). This will hold in that 
the formal-ontological laws hold of correspondent necessity even in 
                                                 
89 In the Third Investigation, Husserl founds the Genus “Colour” in turn upon 
extension, and situates that in turn in the visual field (LI 3 §10).  
90 The relations of “other” are not yet developed in the sense of Derrida’s 
progress from one to other.  
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material ontology. Indeed, the commonality in each relation 
above is necessity. Ideal laws must hold of necessity, so too must its 
regions and the a prioris. Just so, necessity is fundamental to the 
proposition, and the propositional form in turn is one of the 
regions that correlates to how the world is (106). That is to say, 
Husserl develops necessity according to his levels and directions. 
The levels of necessity 
To situate its relations, we will begin from the lowest level of the 
proposition. Most formal logic takes “necessity” only as 
propositional. Moreover, many logics define it in terms of itself, 
and in insoluble relation with truth: for instance, that what is 
necessary was always going to result in truth (ODP 257). What is 
true was necessary. This explanation, we note briefly, never seeks 
to explain why something is necessary. Husserl aligned such 
approaches with the “psychological” (PR §30-31).91 In the 
Prolegomena of 1900, in working out the necessity of ideal laws, he 
also noted that judgments occur after the necessity, and this is also 
why they can be false in particular instances. This is how Husserl 
                                                 
91 Husserl in 1900 equates this necessity with Heyman’s explanation in Die 
Gesetze und Elemente des wissenschaftlichen Denkens of 1890, 1, 19-20 (cf. LI V.1 
317), which “compels us to hold the conclusion to be true” (PR §31). But, 
Husserl notes, this necessity is prone to error, and can be revised. In the case of any 
particular judgment of truth, this is merely a person’s conviction that the 
element is true. Such “psychological” views of necessity, thus defined, are 
current even today. For example, “A proposition is necessary if it could not 
have been false.” (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 257). However, Husserl’s 
“logical necessity” is valid in any circumstances, for it has a “governance by 
ideal law” (PR §31). Nevertheless, the task for Husserl is that such laws and 
necessities must still be verified.  
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could work out that ideal laws remain necessary already and in 
general, prior to particular propositions and judgments. There 
must be a relation that already allows any particular proposition to 
be true or false, no longer bound to the vicissitudes of the error-
prone judger. For Husserl, the seemingly inseparable relation in 
psychological logic of necessity and judgment of truth needs to be 
revised. However, Husserl accepts that necessity is an 
indispensable component of a proposition.  
Thus, without commenting upon the undoubted rigour that 
symbolic and predicative calculus can attain, we note merely that 
Husserl seeks to supply a more encompassing logical approach 
than merely a direction across. Necessity first holds in the levels of 
essences.92 That is, it holds because of eidetic law. For example, that 
“A whole in general includes its parts”, or “Red is a Colour” is 
necessary in accordance with a law. For Husserl, to be necessary 
implies standing in the “context” of a law (cf. I §23). The issue is 
how essential laws can hold of necessity in a proposition, in order 
to allow judgments of truth or falsity without psychologism.   
                                                 
92 To avoid confusion with this living and transcendental subject (that is, the 
logical subject predicated of in transcendental subjectivity as circularity) we will 
usually deem predication occurs of an object, rather than in order to determine 
a logical subject. 
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How essential necessity allows material 
contingency 
We begin from the highest level. The highest necessity is that of 
the pure and formal eidetic necessity, which holds in accordance 
with formal-ontological law. This necessity is a priori (I p. 46), thus 
also “behind”. Any such relations can be particularised even as 
essential, and these objects in turn are “eidetic objects” (I §2). In 
turn, each specific law would hold of necessity, including the form 
that can have content – that of the proposition. These in turn 
predicate of “objects” (I §2). As noted, essential generality arises 
as predicating of pure objects. Correlative to an act predicating 
essential generality is that the relation hold of essential necessity (I 
§6). That is, essential necessity holds in propositions that 
predicate of a pure object.  
Such predicating thus allows for pure judgment. Each such 
judgment (at the lowest pure level) of an object, which can be 
true in accordance with a valid formal-ontological law, holds in 
turn by eidetic necessity (I §2).93 Hence, of essential necessity, 
even pure judgments can be true, and thus can be false (were this 
never so, phenomenology would emerge as complete). Essential 
necessity is the sort which, of its essence, allows for judgment of what 
can be false according to eidetic law.  
                                                 
93 As Derrida will seek to determine the ideal object as absolutely true, and it is 
analytically necessary that eidetic objects be true, he will be concerned mainly 
with essential necessity (cf. IOG 64, 173, VeM 436, VM 120). 
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In turn, as formal ontology corresponds to material ontology 
(167), essential necessities correspond to subordinate material 
necessities.94 This develops how propositions in material ontology can be 
true or false, in accordance with eidetic law. Note that such propositions are 
called “contingent”. They depend upon what is judged of the content 
to be true in accordance with eidetic law.95  
Part Two: the requirements for the absolute fact 
Turning toward truth – intentionality as genitive 
Thus far necessity holds of propositional relations, including any 
of these sorts of particular content. Next, we begin to ask how such 
propositions can be True. As the closest such necessity to judgment, 
we add the “apodictic” – the consciousness of the necessity of a 
judgment about specificity (I §5). However, even apodictic 
necessity is merely consciousness “of” the object (“the necessity 
of judgment about specificity”). It too conforms to the 
predicative act, which pure form is a consciousness of 
something.96 
                                                 
94 Husserl in the Third Investigation explains that analytic a priori relations 
hold both as laws and “analytically necessary propositions” (LI 3 §§11, 12), but 
synthetic a priori relations are mere necessities. We worked out how this holds 
above.  
95 The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy defines “contingent” as a truth “that is true 
as it happens, […] but that did not have to be true.” (ODP 257). It has also 
been noted that contingency has been deemed “a disguised necessity” (cf. 
ODP 257). 
96 Husserl writes: “[T]he consciousness of a necessity, or more specifically a 
consciousness of a judgment, in which we become aware a certain matter as 
the specification of an eidetic generality, is called apodictic, the judgment itself, 
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That is, Husserl retains the maxim of intentional objectification 
(and his keeping of “something” in addition to “whole” at the 
highest formal-ontological level is pertinent). For anything, 
everything can become an intentional object (LI 3 §8), even the 
levels; even necessity. A sort of circularity develops. What must 
hold of the object in general forward must already hold 
(“behind”), at a higher level. Its content must in turn already arise 
as certain, which must be determined of the particular object 
(forward). Hence intentionality proceeding “across” to the object 
is first a genitive relation, and only then dative.97 It is first a 
possessive predication of the object in general (across), in a sort of 
circularity of formal and a priori levels, which object itself is only 
then indirectly given (as dative) (cf. CM §38).98 For instance: to 
posit that “something is in front of me” (S is P) is also to intend 
that something is placed in front of me. Consciousness intends 
the “in front of me-ness” (cf. IOG 83) of the object. The pure 
form of intentionality is “consciousness of something” (I §84, our 
                                                                                                        
the proposition, an apodictic (also apodictically – “necessary” of) consequent of the 
general proposition to which it is related.” (I §5, Husserl’s emphasis). 
97 The Chambers Dictionary explains the genitive as “of or belonging to a case 
expressing origin, possession, or similar relation” (CD 617). The dative is a 
case “expressing an indirect object” (CD 382), to which we add that the dative 
is the case of giving (from dare). As to the genitive “of”, one is indeed first and 
certainly in possession of the origin (cf. IOG 140). As to the dative “to”, all 
such objects remain indirect though possible, mediated by their essence.  
98 As Derrida explains the bases of passage as movement “across” in 1962, in 
terms of the dative relation and this “in front of me-ness”: “[I]n front of and 
for ourselves essentially implies, then, given as an object. The world, therefore, 
is essentially determined by the dative and horizontal dimension of being 
perceived.” (IOG 83). However, to be perceived in this “horizon”, the world 
must first be intentional, which consciousness of something first allows the 
possibility of its explication. 
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emphasis). This helps to explain Husserl’s famous but only 
seemingly simple statement. Note, however, that the overall basis 
arose in that “anything, everything, can become an intentional 
object” (153), yet this too arises as a pure and a priori form.  
Parenthesis: circularity and intentionality  
One fashion by which Derrida would need to engage with these 
issues is in accordance with this first basis of intentionality as 
consciousness of something. We should thus prevent a 
misunderstanding as to whether phenomenology is to be 
approached as either a priori, formal and regional or a living 
intentionality. The essential regions demarcate what holds a priori, 
and such essences can be made ideal objects (noemata), which must 
be determined as an Idea, forward. Everything, then, has its a 
priori – the formal, material, universal, and even the living 
subject. But this is still everything, as a generalisation of the 
intentional object “something”. In turn, any a priori can be 
explicated as an intentional object (forward) to determine its 
essence in ideation (upward). Yet it is only via essential relations 
already holding in their highest generality that the “living” form 
of intentional consciousness can be described; even the essential 
relations of history. That is, past judgments are certainly 
sedimented in the history of the positing ego (cf. Ch. 1 (116)).  
Moreover, the formal possibilities of transcendental subjectivity 
already hold as the “subjective a priori” (VM 132), which 
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predelineates how a subject can predicate even of historical content 
in its levels.99 In turn, when made a noematic object, such relations 
take the pure form of judgment (apophansis) in a subjective a 
priori. No choice needs to be made between a consciousness of 
the appearing of the ideal object in its essential relations, and the 
essential relations which already hold to permit its appearing. 
Phenomenology takes the form of a vital, constituting 
intentionality, of ideal objects which essential regions are already 
constituted, where the back becomes the front (CM §50), and the 
front already holds behind (cf. IOG 64, I §76). It is the sense of 
these objects that must be explicated toward their Ideas (upward), 
toward the telos of affirming the object as True. We will continue 
to assess how intentionality could attain this telos. 
The necessities of a priori propositions 
We begin with a priori propositions. As noted, analytic a priori 
propositions (as pure or material), are irreal, and independent of 
external content for their truth. Husserl in these chapters never 
considers whether a judger could be mistaken in determining the 
truth of a particular analytic a priori proposition (for instance, in 
deeming that mermaids rather than unicorns have magical horns, 
or that a miscalculated mathematical formula is correct). It is 
                                                 
99 As Pentzopoulou-Valalas puts it, this is “the side of the subjective a priori 
which Husserl situated on the side of the knowing subject, on the side, that is 
to say, of intentional consciousness.” (Pentzopoulou-Valalas 1981, 116).  
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feasible to argue on these grounds that no particular judgment 
about such objects is analytically true. However, nor does Husserl 
need to consider this. He has defined his approach in a manner 
that should the judgment about such a proposition is false, then 
the proposition was never necessarily an analytic a priori law. 
Thus far, an irreal, a priori and analytic proposition could be 
affirmed100 as eidetically true only by a prior ontological relation of 
eidetic necessity.  
As to synthetic a priori propositions and material ontology, these 
can be without reference to existence of the content (as irreal). 
However, they can also include a reference to the existence of the 
content (as empirical or real). Husserl seems to run into a 
difficulty in the former case. For example, for Husserl, assertion 
of a particular moment (e.g. “This x here”) is insufficient to deem 
a proposition is “synthetic” or that its content is existent. Husserl 
explains that they arise only from the pure propositions that 
contain concepts from material ontologies that cannot be 
formalised as true of every instance (“salva veritate”).101 Only 
given this essential impossibility (which relation we will develop 
                                                 
100 The affirmation is the confirmation of the position (I §106b). We will come 
to position below, as the basis of passage across to the Telos which, upon 
being confirmed, would be affirmed. We will employ “affirmation” instead of 
confirmation, to signal what would be the affirmative moment of a consequent 
judgment. 
101 Husserl puts it that “[E]ach pure law, which includes material concepts, so 
as not to permit a formalisation of these concepts salva veritate – each such 
law, i.e. that is not analytically necessary – is a synthetic a priori law.” (LI 3 
§12). Since 1900, it has been the essential “Truth” that has concerned Husserl 
rather than the psychologistic and particular truths.  
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below) of material relations would such synthetic a priori 
propositions be possible. Husserl furnishes no examples, and 
these might be hard to come by, as to posit that essential and 
material concepts cannot be formalised, without formalising why 
this is so, seems absurd. It seems that positing this necessity 
requires knowing every specific moment of internal content of a 
specific object without formalising it; but were this totality 
known, the material content would be absolutely determined. 
Husserl has rather stressed that such relations are indefinite.102 We 
explain how this would apply just below. 
However, Husserl is on more obviously firmer footing as to the 
existent sort of synthetic a priori proposition. This can include a 
specification of empirical existence. Provided that the material 
content exists “here” as an internal content, this is necessarily 
both a material existent and “empirical specification” of the 
synthetic a priori proposition: for example, “This red is different 
from this green” (LI 3 §12)). Such a relation can escape 
formalisation. This might seem odd – as surely it is a law that one 
colour is different from another? In this instance the worth of 
Husserl’s logic comes to the fore – this proposition is synthetic as 
its predicate contains a material component (red, green), which 
                                                 
102 For instance, to determine that the relations of a totality of colours cannot 
be formalised into a law, it would be necessary to tally every instance of colour. 
Husserl never ceases to stress that such adumbrations never arrive at 
determination. 
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Red and Green are specific (at the lowest level). Yet these 
relations are not yet able to be formalised as no reference to a 
foundation in the genus “Colour” is included. Red and Green are 
never different per se; the proposition requires a shared 
foundation. However each such proposition is contingent and 
partial, dependent upon an empirical whole. In each case above, 
the synthetic a priori proposition is precluded from Truth without 
yet affirming a greater whole.  
Thus (setting aside the difficulty of Husserl’s lack of example in 
the first case) such material laws, by definition, also hold of necessity 
(LI 3 §21). In sum, the strongest version of each of these a priori 
propositions would be apodictic necessity. Yet even this remains 
merely a consciousness of the necessity of a specific judgment. 
We will consider what is necessary for truth in general. 
The first four requirements 
The correspondence between pure and material relations 
continues to exert its influence. To be an Idea, the object must be 
determined as true at all times and places (as eidetic truth (I §8), 
or “Truth” (I §139)). That is, Truth is an Idea, to which even an 
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Object must refer (PR §67).103 Our basal formal condition is that the 
ideal object must be true at all times and places.  
However, a particular truth must determine an object as true in a 
particular time and place .104 For our purposes, a pure, material, real 
or empirical existent “here” would determine the object as true 
“here and now”. Note that we include “pure” to this group; that 
is, something “pure” can also exist in spatiotemporality, for the 
latter is not yet a content. In general, this would be an instance of 
an object  
having spatio-temporal existence, as something 
existing in this time-spot [...] which is present 
at this place in this individual physical shape (I 
§2). 
                                                 
103 While Something, One, Whole, Part, Object etc. deemed categories, these 
must be referred to Truth as an Idea (PR §67).  
104 These levels also hold in Experience and Judgment (1918 ff.) to “determine” 
the sense of the origin in particular, Husserl again deems that the first level 
accords with predication of the form “S is p” (Husserl switches to the lower-
case variable “p” in later years rather than “P”). Moreover, “p” is again a 
“dependent” part (EJ §50) which has not yet “determined” the subject as a 
whole. Thus in the second level applies “a ray of attention” (forward) to “p” 
which “turns back to S” (EJ §50) as its whole. But as this second level has still 
not yet determined S as a whole, the “third and highest level” is indeed that of 
the formation of generalities as essential. That is, the third level is addressed to 
“the formation of generalities [which] […] opens onto the essence of 
predicative formation in general, and the relationship to events on the lower 
level.” (EJ §49). The levels and directions hold of all these phases, by which 
Husserl seeks to determine the object in general.  
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The next two requirements for this truth are that the pure, 
material, or real object must be determined in space and time. 
The necessary conditions for progress 
As to how such determination could occur, Husserl recognises 
the difficulty that a judgment here and now could only affirm 
judgments subjectively, and be false. Instead of a first relation to 
truth, he seeks instead to provide 
the necessary validity of the particular case, i.e. a 
validity grounded in the law. (PR 73, our 
emphases) 
Husserl begins to retract from truth to the constituting side of the 
proposition. Necessity arises when propositions are grounded in a 
valid form in accordance with an essential law. We will address these 
italicised interrelations in order. First, as to ground, a reader 
should avoid supposing this term refers to an actual physical basis 
– rather it refers to what lets it be known that the relation is 
necessary (PR §39).105 Second, validity applies merely to the form by 
which positing occurs. The grounded validity allows the necessity 
of the first positing of the object in general. These do not yet 
                                                 
105 “To know the ground of anything means to see the necessity of its being so-
and-so” (PR §§39, 88).  
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converge upon truth, which judgments can be wrong. They are 
not yet even positing, but merely conditions for positing of truth 
and of knowledge.106  
Indeed, these would permit all of Husserl’s projects, insofar as 
they align with this basic form. Husserl writes 
that we need grounded validations in order to pass 
beyond what, in knowledge, is immediately and 
therefore trivially evident, not only makes the 
sciences possible and necessary, but with these also 
a theory of science, a logic. (PR §6, Husserl’s 
emphasis last) 
To assess how grounded validations make it possible and necessary 
for a proposition to “pass beyond” trivial and immediate evidence 
requires a development of the logic. 
First, an “immediate” relation does not yet mediate relations 
between particulars. The term “Mediation” signals a general 
relation that is required to allow commonality between particulars 
                                                 
106 In his summary of to what is acceptable in logical necessity, Husserl writes 
“[N]othing is here said about a consciousness or the acts and circumstances of 
its judgment” (PR §31). 
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(e.g. for purely specific instances red and green to be different, 
they must be mediated by the genus “Colour”). As noted, 
mediation of particular moments occurs “forward”.  
Thus, third, instead of referring “forward” to find a ground, 
Husserl refers backward. Grounds must be provided by law (cf. I 
§8). For instance, given that “This house in front of me has 
extension”, then the law “all spatial objects have extension” 
would be a ground for judgment that “This house here is spatial”. 
Such a ground would allow even what was contingent to be 
judged of the predication according to essential law. A judgment 
that a particular object exists in space (“here”), would determine it 
as an individual. The individual “here and now” would be a “fact” (IOG 
47).107 We will develop the conditions for this fact at both the 
level of essential generality and the singular proposition, which as 
yet is material and real. That is, while it seems we are moving 
“forward”, we are rather moving “back” (PR §66) into ideal law 
to investigate the Relations that would provide a ground for 
possibility (forward).108 We are henceforth addressing essentially 
“necessary conditions” (PR §66). 
                                                 
107 As Derrida puts it in 1962, “the characteristic which defines fact [is] namely, 
singular and empirical existence, the irreducibility of a here and now” (IOG 47, 
Derrida’s emphasis). Derrida’s sentence is ambiguous, in that “irreducibility” 
also refers to what eludes appearing here and now. 
108 Husserl explains in the Prolegomena, “[T]he logical justification [as a ground] of a 
concept, i.e. of its ideal possibility, is achieved by going back to its intuitive or 
deducible essence. Logical justification […] demands that we go back to the essence 
of its form, and so to the concepts and laws which are ideal constituents of theory in 
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The fact as basis for the absolute  
For Husserl, a posited fact is not yet a Truth (i.e. eidetic truth), 
which would hold at all times for everyone. However, for instance, 
that “This house is here now” (which can hold as pure or 
material) is a fact also conforms to a pure and eidetic form (e.g. “S 
is P”. Thus 
every fact includes an essential factor of a 
material order, and every eidetic truth pertaining 
to the pure essence thus included must furnish a 
law. (I §8, Husserl’s emphases) 
Note that judgment would conform to the valid fundamental 
form “S is P”, which is valid and essential. This is also how, even 
for such material relations, “S is P” is the fundamental apophantic 
form (cf. FTL §13).109 The judgment of the truth of a fact as an 
individual “here and now” would determine material content in 
accordance with essential law. In turn, this fact would be True at all 
times and places. We deem this the next requirement.  
                                                                                                        
general (the ‘conditions of its possibility’)” (PR §66, our emphases). We employ 
“Relation” as for Husserl it is a category (cf. also ATVM 23). However, note 
that these are conditions of possibility; we add possibility just below. 
109 As Derrida puts it in 1967: “And one knows that for Husserl ‘S is P’ is the 
fundamental and primitive form, the originary apophantic operation from which every 
logical proposition must be derivable by simple construction.” (VP 81-82, our 
emphases, cf. H FTL, §13, cf. SP 73). Allison translates “originary” as 
“primordial”.  
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Developing the criteria from levels of possibility 
In order to examine further how the fact can be determined, we 
add possibility. The latter is also crucial as the laws of essence 
already define what can be posited of every object (LI 3 §14),110 
and hence whether a proposition can be judged to have sense 
(Sinn). The relations from our previous pages thus combine (170 
ff.). As with necessity, possibility also holds at every level. However, 
only some eidetic laws are concerned with “the formal laws of 
possible truth” (cf. Bachelard 1968, 14; FTL §§28, 51). To begin 
at the highest: every law already holds of eidetic necessity. Thus, 
moving “downward”, the laws provide the formal and essential 
basis for predication as a horizon of possibility “across” (Derrida deems 
this “horizontality” (DLG 83)). This level applies the fundamental 
form “S is P”. As eidetic necessity and possibility already hold, “S 
must be P” and “S can be P” already predelineate what can be 
posited as what it is via the form “S is P” in a particular 
proposition.111  
                                                 
110 As Husserl puts it, these laws show us what “can be said […] in advance of 
all objective matters” (LI 3 §14). 
111 The levels and these teloi still hold in comparable form in Formal and 
Transcendental Logic of 1929. As Bachelard (to whom Derrida refers in footnotes 
of 1962 (IOG 55 fn. 50, 135 fn. 16)) explains, Formal and Transcendental Logic 
begins on the categorial and apophantic side of pure logic, and indeed seeks to 
work out three “stratifications” to determine the truth of the object. Husserl, 
we note, calls these stratifications “levels” (Stufe, cf. FTL § 14, and overall 
§§13-28). The lowest level is indeed that of the fundamental logical form of the 
proposition “S is P” (Bachelard 1968, 11, cf. FTL §13b). To assess what can 
and must have sense, the middle level assesses whole-part relations as to what 
can have sense for essential and a priori reasons. For example, “All A’s are B’s, 
including some which are not B’s” would be absurd (Bachelard 1968, 13). The 
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Every such possible truth that holds in accordance with these 
eidetic laws (above, 187) is a formal and pure possibility. In turn, 
essential necessity is that part of eidetic necessity that allows for 
the contingency of objects (171). Propositions that hold of 
essential necessity can be true or false. Importantly, “can” in turn 
signals possibility (we will develop this). Essential necessities that 
can be true or false do so in accordance with formal and pure 
possibility. Every essential necessity as a contingency holds of 
formal and pure possibility. In turn, material ontologies are 
subordinate to formal ontology, and correlative to essential 
necessity are material necessities (171). Thus formal and pure 
possibilities correspond to material possibility.   
These material ontological propositions, even as particular (“This 
x here”) can avoid reference to existence; these are (irreal) (175). 
Such material ontological possibilities are still pure possibilities, and 
still contingent.112 Importantly, Husserl deemed that they can 
                                                                                                        
third and highest level, as we explained, indeed seeks to establish “the formal 
laws of possible truth” (Bachelard 1968, 14, FTL §§28, 51). We will remain 
with the progress from 1913 to arrive at transcendental subjectivity. 
112 Several further kinds of possibility have been noted. Mohanty, for example, 
also points to “presumptive possibilities”, where “something counts in favour 
of one as against another”, but one has not arrived at the affirmation “yes” or 
“no”. Mohanty may be referring to Experience and Judgment. For the purposes of 
application to Derrida, we could add the possibility that something may be 
such and such, where one forms a “problematical possibility” (EJ Sec 21b 94-
7) upon this base of primal validity. There is also an “enticing possibility”, a 
phenomenological element which leads us to believe that something is true or 
false of an object, even while doubting that it is so, yet leading to judgment 
(APS Sec. 11, 81). These are simply modalisations of the pregiven horizontal 
certainty. Finally, we note “fantasy possibility”, where one imagines that 
something could be real, even though it has no real possibility (such as Socrates 
with a longer nose). Derrida does refer to this sort in his “Introduction”; as we 
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escape formalisation, to truth as indefinite (170). At this juncture, 
we can explain how they can be indefinite which Husserl took for 
granted (LI 3 §12, (175)). Any such proposition that is inconsistent 
with formal, a priori and essential law, or incompatible with its 
content, must then be judged to be absurd and excluded from 
sense (as Widersinn (LI 4 §12)). Such absurdity can be formal and 
analytic (such as “something is nothing”) or purely material and 
synthetic (“a square is round” (LI 4 §14)). Such exclusions cannot 
be formalised “salva veritate” (LI 3 §12, (175)). They cannot have 
sense and thus are no longer necessary laws; their truth is 
contingent but indefinite.113 
However, material ontological propositions can also allow for 
reference to existence (176), these are no longer pure but real 
(reall) or empirical possibilities (176, cf. Pentzopoulou-Valalas 
1981, 122).114 These too for Husserl can escape formalisation, 
when such propositions do not yet determine a greater and 
essential whole (176). These real possibilities too are contingent 
                                                                                                        
will treat it, fantasy possibility arises from the free variation of pure possibilities 
in essential generality. We thus remain with essential, pure, and predicative 
(logical) possibility as that which Derrida will investigate. 
113 Given a telos of “rigorous” science (e.g. I §5), it is necessary to “avoid” such 
predications (LI 4 §14). Just so, it is necessary to avoid propositions that have 
no sense at all (Unsinn). 
114 By addressing Husserl’s summaries in 1913 we have thus suggested how, as 
Pentzopoulou-Valalas puts it, “‘This table here’ represents in the state of pure 
possibility, and prior to its being grasped by consciousness, a material a priori. 
Once ‘incarnated’ in the individual example, it is no longer an a priori matter 
except as the horizon of potentialities implied in the concrete example.” 
(Pentzopoulou-Valalas 1981, 122, our emphasis). Just so, the horizon of 
potentialities (which includes possibilities) depends upon the a priori (i.e. the 
eidetic (I p. 46) relations. Derrida will assess how such relations can be 
incarnated.  
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and can be indefinite. However, to be true, such real possibilities must be 
true of the ideal object at all times and places (182). They must be an 
individual fact, and thus a Fact. 
Next, however, from above, we move backward (181). For the 
truth of the object to be possible, it must be necessarily possible. 
The criteria of necessity thus apply to possibility. Henceforth, our 
enquiry into necessary conditions evolves to enquiry into conditions of 
possibility.115 To allow for possibility there must first be a grounded 
validity in accordance with a priori essential law (behind).116  
We have developed for criteria for truth: a ground of possibility 
(behind), and also the pure or real possibility of determination in 
space and time, or as a Fact (as horizontality, forward). Derrida 
will apply these criteria and sides in his demand for the absolute. 
Part Three: the conditions for the fact 
The relation of negation 
To assess how such conditions for a ground could have sense, or 
fact be achieved, we add the relations of negation, contradiction 
and impossibility. To continue from above: when an absurd 
proposition is posited, its necessity and possibility is then negated, 
                                                 
115 Cf. our page 185 fn. Above (PR §66). 
116 We avoid deeming this a ground for “the possibility of the truth of…”, as a 
ground is required prior to the constituting of truth. 
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which is “designated” by “not” (I §106).117 This act is a 
“cancelling” (cf. I §106, EJ 21). In apophansis (the sedimented 
forms of judgment), when I discover that a thing is not what I 
anticipated it to be, I am disappointed and “cancel” my previous 
position (for instance, I am disappointed that the far side of a 
table is not white). Husserl applies a formal and logical negation 
to the positive proposition (“S is not P”).  
However, negation “modifies” and is thus subsequent to the 
positing (I §106). As we will explain below, it is removed from the 
originary evidence of positing. For Husserl, “S is not P” is never 
deemed a component of the fundamental form (cf. EJ §72). Just 
so, each negation in turn must have derived from a “position”, 
which arises from a positing intention (i.e. a judgment) (I §§5, 
106). That a negation occurs by a prior and sedimented judgment 
is accepted by Husserl from at least 1918, and augments the basic 
relation of Husserl’s genetic project; the appearing of the object 
must arise from a history of judgments (passive substrates) 
already sedimented in the object, and consciousness must proceed 
first by positions and cancellations through those prior judgments 
toward its closer determination (forward) (cf. EJ §1-14).  
                                                 
117 Husserl explains: of “the ‘cancelling’ of the corresponding positing 
character, its specific correlate is the cancellation character we designate as 
‘not’.” (I §106). 
 - 188 
- 
The avoidance of contradiction 
Next, we develop the kind of absurdity that such a progress of 
position and negation must avoid – that of contradiction (cf. PR 
§40).118 For Husserl in 1900, “Contradiction” at the highest level 
is an essential, pure and hence timeless “law of logic”. It takes the 
form of positing the truth of two ideal relations which for 
essential (thus a priori) reasons cannot both be true (PR §28).119 
In particular, contradiction would arise when two incompatible 
predicates are posited of one content “at the same time” (PR 
§28), and this act judged as true.120 Such incompatible predicates, 
we note, are then deemed contradictories (VeM 446 fn. 1).121  
Note, however, that just as negation arises after position, 
contradictories can be posited – for anything can be made an 
                                                 
118 Husserl appeals to the laws of “[Non-]Contradiction, Double Negation, or 
the Modus Ponens” for the avoidance of formal absurdity (LI §14). Derrida 
will overtly appeal only to the first – although we note that his progress of 
inductive implication will be in accordance with Modus Ponens, while he will 
never employ Double Negation in 1962 as he will avoid negation, and nor will 
he allow it in 1964 insofar as this is deemed to turn back to an absolute 
Identity. We will address the latter briefly only in Chapter Six. 
119 Husserl explained in 1900 that “the same content of judgment cannot […] 
be both true or false.” (PR 36), by which Husserl also takes it that such an act 
of judgment holds “in one and the same time and act” (PR §28), rather than of 
“timeless ideal unities”.  
120 Husserl’s version is basic even by classic standards. Kant’s “principle of 
contradiction” also distinguishes between formal contradiction of predicates 
and of the thing. Kant also refers to the relations of contraries (CPR 150/189-
152/191). In Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl divides contradiction into 
the subjective (the pure form of what a judger must judge as true), holding a 
priori, and the Objective, pertaining to a contradiction of the objects in general 
(FTL §75). However, it seems to us that by the Cartesian Meditations the 
distinction is much less defined as the ego explicates of sedimented relations 
within itself. We remain with objective contradiction, to emphasise how 
Derrida will develop away from what must hold “at the same time” in 
transcendental subjectivity. 
121 Contradictories cannot both be true or false together (CD 327). We touch 
upon impossibility (“cannot”) just below. 
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intentional object, and first can have sense. They are only then 
excluded from sense, upon the ground of what already held of its 
content. Rather than a contradiction of the things themselves, 
which would be a denial that arrives at absolute Truth, Husserl 
seeks to avoid necessary contradiction. He seeks to avoid the 
positing of necessity and possibility that is subsequently negated 
in accordance with a priori law. Henceforth, essential and a priori 
impossibility will be the criterion which replaces the judgment of falsity, until 
truth (or Truth) has been attained. 
The levels of impossibility summarised  
Husserl thus accords with basic modal propositional maxims, in 
that what is necessarily not possible is impossible (cf. Mohanty, 2005). 
However, as with propositional necessity and possibility, Husserl 
provides a systemic relation. The relations must begin from a 
general possibility (a priori), and then a particular predicative 
possibility, for anything can be made an intentional object and 
have sense. As Husserl puts it, “What cannot be thought, cannot 
be. What cannot be, cannot be thought”. That something has first 
been thought implies its possibility. The relations which must 
then be negated imply an a priori and essential impossibility of the 
laws of its relations (signalled by “never”, and “cannot”). To do 
so requires the negation of a necessary and possible proposition 
(which is also regional), in what we deem “propositional 
impossibility” (“S cannot be P”). Any possibility can have its 
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impossibility. For instance, thus far these would be pure, real, 
material or empirical. 
Without fail, when Husserl writes “can”, “must” and “not” in the 
Third Investigation and Ideas, he signals possibility, necessity and 
negation. In turn, every employment by Husserl of “cannot” in 
the revised Third Investigation and first chapter of the Ideas 
accords with the relations of essential impossibility (cf. LI 3 §12). 
We have accorded with these relations thus far in the language of 
our dissertation. However, from this juncture, “must”, “can”, 
“not” and “cannot” explicitly correlate to “necessity”, “possibility”, 
“negation” and “impossibility” respectively (cf. esp. I §106).122 
Husserl has situated these modal relations via his whole-part 
relations.  
The reduction from the material and empirical 
From this juncture, we continue forward in Husserl’s oeuvre. 
Further on in the Ideas, he proceeded to a reduction to pure 
phenomenology (110 fn.), and then toward transcendental 
subjectivity. Crucially, after a reduction, Husserl sets aside enquiry into 
the possibility of objects in the material ontologies (I §60).123 After a 
                                                 
122 Husserl explains: of “the ‘cancelling’ of the corresponding positing 
character, its specific correlate is the cancellation character we designate as 
‘not’. The cancelling mark of negation strikes out something posited […] in an 
analogous way, out of the ‘possible’ […] we get the ‘impossible’” (I §106).  
123 This is, then, an “eidetic reduction”. Husserl writes: “If we wish to 
construct a phenomenology as a pure descriptive theory [...] we must exclude from 
this limited field [...] the real Nature of physical science and the empirical 
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reduction, the material, empirical, and also natural sense of the real 
(wirklich, real (cf. I §88)) are no longer considered, in order to allow a 
descriptive phenomenology (111).  
Rather, within a pure (which henceforth also implies “reduced”) 
consciousness, the hyletic stratum provides the material data 
(Stoffe) for the noetic phases of consciousness (I §85). Husserl 
adds two further “purifications” to descriptive phenomenology. 
First, even the material data of the hyle, which is “reell” 
(subjectively irreal), is set aside as the noetic phases are 
considered. Here, the intentional object (logical subject) only 
allows “reell” noetic content (I §88). But even this is no longer 
considered. Rather, this pure noetic proposition itself finds a 
“correlative” relation to a noematic object. The corresponding 
noematic sense is even less real (irreal) (I §88).124 Devolving 
inward from the empirical to the material to the pure hyletic 
material, to the real noetic content, to the noema, develops the 
most “extended” form of content as sense (Sinn).  
In such a moment of “suspension” what appears again does so “as 
such” (cf. I §88, HU III 219)). For instance, the “pleasure” I feel 
                                                                                                        
natural sciences i.e. the sciences which study what belongs essentially to the 
physical objectivity of Nature as such. [...] [I]t is also advisable here to state 
explicitly that [this is a reduction] including the eidetic sciences in their material 
bearing” (I §60, Husserl’s emphasis). The material elements are reduced along 
with the natural sciences. As we proceed, such a science will be geometry. 
124 Husserl writes: “[C]orresponding to all points to the manifold data of the 
real (reellen) noetic content, there is a variety of data displayable in actually pure 
[wirklich reiner] intuition, and in a correlative “noematic content”, or briefly “noema” 
(I §88). 
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upon perceiving “an apple-tree in bloom” holds in just this 
reduced fashion, but the apple-tree keeps the characteristic 
“beautiful” (cf. I §88). Rather than related directly to the real, the 
noematic object appearing as such is perceived “in” the reduction 
via “content” that I predicate of it (hence as irreality).125 This 
position no longer makes reference to the external whole as it 
appears on the inside, which latter as a content is deemed the 
appearing itself. As Husserl explained since 1907, the reduction to 
the pure takes the givenness of content as “immanent” (IOP 33-
34, I §88), in its appearing as such. Rather than a simple inside, 
the immanent is an irreal content which external whole is no longer 
predicated of (thus “bracketed off”).  
What Husserl worked out via essential generality in his devolution 
to the pure and singular parts has thus been aligned with his 
reduction to pure phenomenology in the noema. These 
intentional objects are again pure, and thus able to be related to 
formal logic. Each noematic content is only pure, and pure 
intentionality only posits of the ideal object. To be sure, no sort of 
content is lost as a possible object (cf. 162). Notably, in such 
instances, the “spatial” and “temporal” in general can still be 
                                                 
125 Husserl explains: “Perception, for instance, has its noema, and at the base of 
this its perceptual meaning, that is, the perceived as such. Similarly the 
recollection, when it occurs, has as its own its remembered as such precisely as it is 
“meant” and “consciously known” in it; so again judging has its own the judged 
as such, pleasure the pleasing as such, and so forth. We must everywhere take 
the noematic correlate, which (in a very extended meaning of the term) is here 
referred to as ‘sense’ [Sinn] precisely as it lies ‘immanent’ in the experience of 
perception of judgment, of liking, and so forth” (I §88, Husserl’s emphases).  
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investigated for their sense. To avoid error and to permit truth at 
all times and places, even a fact “here and now” must be constituted from 
these pure noemata.  
The conditions for a constituted pure object 
Next, we will assess the ontological conditions by which such a 
fact here and now (i.e. as objectual) can be absolute. Note that the 
pure (irreal) still requires a worldly and real foundation, for all 
content must have arisen from the world. The real remains 
necessary (and Husserl will restore it as content, just below). As to 
their conditions, such a fact could be pure or real.  
The pure formal-logical relations of earlier years are kept by a 
reduction. In order to be restored, what is “real” must no longer 
be natural, but an essential object (i.e. specific, forward). Husserl 
– as Derrida will note – explained this in Experience and Judgment: 
 [W]e call real in a specific sense all that which, 
in real things in the broader sense, is, 
according to its sense, essentially individualised 
by its spatiotemporal position, but we call 
irreal every determination which, indeed, is 
founded with regard to spatiotemporal 
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appearances in a specifically real thing, but 
which can appear in different realities as 
identical – not merely as similar (EJ §65, 
Husserl’s emphases, in IOG 88 fn. 1/91 fn. 
93). 
Assessing “irreality” is relatively straightforward (at least, 
according to what is required). An ideality in essential generality 
(irreality) can be particularised, to what must hold in a pure 
spatiotemporality at any particular time and place. It can be 
“identical” to itself. This permission is analytic a priori. Were this 
never so, it was never analytic a priori. 
As identical at every particular time and place (the pure fact), thus 
at all times and places, it would meet Husserl’s requirement for a 
law true at all times and places.126 Moreover, it would meet 
Derrida’s requirement since 1954, as an absolute without doubt or 
limitation (97). This develops the relation to the objectual absolute, 
as without limit. As Husserl puts it, when 
                                                 
126 It would be absurd to suggest that an act is forever repeatable as identical 
yet is false, for what is determined as false is the particular act, and the law 
which continues to determine it as false would be ideal and true. 
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I look upon it it, I have before me an absolute; 
it has no aspects which might present 
themselves now in this way, and now in that. (I 
§44) 
A pure fact repeatable as identical would be invariant, thus an 
eidetic fact (Fact). As invariantly true it would be True, thus an 
absolute fact. 
Three conditions for a constituted real object  
However, we avoid suggesting that it is easy to determine such a 
proposition. First, from above, such a truth is merely analytic 
(behind). Yet the pure requires to be founded upon the real in accord with 
eidetic law (cf. I §8). At this juncture, the progress requires the 
possibility of a real content. Second, an absolute would need to be 
true as a synthesis. Invariance thus must apply for essential reasons 
to the (noematic) real fact. To that end, note that it is implicit 
above that the real content in individual moments of real space 
and time is never identical to itself, for it occurs in a different reality 
each time. It holds rather “merely as similar” (EJ §65, our 
emphasis). A condition of possibility for the real fact is that it can 
be repeated as invariantly the same in different times and places. 
We will address these in order (the latter will require the Idea in 
the Kantian sense (209)). For, from above (186 ff.), the prior 
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condition for determination of any object before it can be 
repeated, is that pure laws permit its content to be constituted in the first 
place. Both of these conditions must first allow for their grounded 
validity (behind). 
The crucial restoration of the real as positing 
To begin from the first condition, Husserl at this juncture 
performs an impressive feat. Just as in logic, pure relations can 
again relate even to the “material” content as hyletic (Stoffe)). 
Moreover, after the reduction to the irreal (reell), Husserl restores his 
sense of the real (wirklich) to phenomenology in this “noematic 
nucleus’ (I §103). Each relation from the earlier years is restored 
by the transcendental reduction. Second, however, such content, pure 
and real, arises again as first merely in relation to ground and validity, as a 
mode of “doxic” believing, and thus a “correlate” of “certainty” as “posited” 
(I §103, HU III 103, cf. I §141, HU III 346).127  
                                                 
127 Crucially, Husserl explains that this holds of every “noematic nucleus of the 
object” which “must be characterised somehow” by the “levels” of the nucleus, 
and indeed by “differences, alternatives and […]selected from each genus” (I 
§102). As to the restoration of the real, Husserl goes on that these are 
“correlatively related to modes of Being – as ‘doxic’ or ‘belief characters’ […] 
present as a real (reell) factor in normal perception, and functioning therein as a 
‘sense of reality’. […] To it corresponds in the appearing ‘object’ as noematic correlate the 
ontical character ‘real’ (wirklich). The same […] noematic character is shown in 
the ‘certainty’ which may accompany all repeated representations […]. Such are 
‘thetic’ acts, acts that ‘posit’ Being.” (I §103, HU III 103).  
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Part Four: the originary nexus 
From evidence toward truth 
Thus we turn toward how a content (pure or real) can begin to be 
constituted at this positing and constituting side. By this we assess 
the conditions to permit convergence upon the object in general, 
in order to determine it absolutely. First, possibility must arise 
with positing, which Husserl takes from a decision that guided his 
entire career as a phenomenologist. He began his Prolegomena thus: 
if [judgment] is to be called ‘knowledge’ in the 
narrowest, strictest sense, it requires to be 
evident, to have the luminous certainty that 
what we have acknowledged is, [...] if we are 
not to be shattered on the rocks of extreme 
scepticism. (PR §5, Husserl’s emphasis) 
From the outset, Husserl took “evidence” as a sufficient 
“authority” even for certainty, in that it evidently supplies 
something to be predicated of (“is”). Though positing or 
predication may not yet be true, evidence provides a ground for 
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believing it can be true, hence predication can occur.128 Husserl 
calls this ground a “trivial” evidence (PR §5), which term is far 
from dismissive: it implies a relation that requires no further 
justification. Hence Husserl’s famous “principle of all principles” 
is that originary (originär) dator evidence is the basic right (Recht) 
to allow knowledge (I §141).129  
As Husserl puts it in the “Origin of Geometry” (and Derrida 
quotes), evidence is  
grasping an existent in the consciousness of its 
originary being-itself-there (OOG 160, IOG 62, 
our emphases).  
Before assessing how this grasping is authorised by this “right” 
(Recht) in relation to ground,130 we assess the consequences for the 
demand for an absolute.131  
                                                 
128 Husserl writes: “The most perfect ‘mark’ of correctness is inward evidence, 
it counts as an immediate intimation of truth itself.” (Pr 17). An intimation is 
not yet an affirmation, but merely provides a right for convergence upon 
Truth. 
129 As Husserl puts it, the “principle of all principles [is] that every originary 
[originär] dator Intuition is a source of authority for knowledge, that whatever 
presents itself in “intuition” in originary [originär] form [...] is simply be 
accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only within the limits in which it 
presents itself.” (I §24, Husserl’s emphasis). 
130 Cairns, in his index to the Ideas, stresses that the right (Recht) is an “intrinsic 
justification” which confers “authority” (I p 458). 
131 As Føllesdal puts it: for Husserl [...] evidence is presupposed by judgment 
[...]. it is found already on the pre-predicative level, to use Husserl’s 
terminology.” (Føllesdal 2005, 210, our emphasis). As Ströker explained, 
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From evidence to the demand for truth 
For evidence as “grasped” is also already constituted for 
predication. As predicative and intentional necessity holds, there 
can be, Husserl explains, a “demand” for further giving of the 
object itself (FTL §60, C §7, IOG 146).132 Husserl too retains a 
demand, arising from the basis on evidence, to permit the telos of 
determination of the ideal (forward). Evidence, as the basis of all 
intentional (predicative) consciousness, sets up an “all-pervasive 
teleological structure” (FTL §60). This develops the next element; for 
that telos is knowledge as truth. The demand arises with the 
ground and right to allow logical predication of evidence as the 
truth. Husserl had put it since 1900: 
‘ground of judgment’ […] means no more 
than our logical right to judge. […] This means 
that we may demand of each judgment that it 
should declare what is true to be true. (PR §39, 
Husserl’s emphasis) 
                                                                                                        
evidence from the first was normative (2005, 115). It instills a norm for what 
must yet be determined in a rigorous science. 
132 Husserl explains: “[T]he single evidence, by its own intentionality, can 
implicitly ‘demand’ further givings of the object itself; it can ‘refer one’ to 
them” (FTL §60). We employ “refer” in this fashion. 
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It must thus be asked how the first positing, given the demand, can 
begin to pass horizontally to the telos of Truth. This will develop 
the basic relations at the “originary” side of this progress. We will 
explain this via a sequence, moving from “behind”, then 
returning to the originary moment. 
The progress toward Truth   
First, Husserl has moved “backward” to a formal, a priori and 
necessary moment prior even to a ground for positing the object 
(and truth is also an object). Thus the concept of truth, as for falsity, 
is deemed a correlate of the “formal implication of axioms”, 
rather than yet positing even the truth of the axioms.133 We 
remain on this formal axiomatic side thus far; the reader can 
deem this the side of the noetic. It can thus be taken as a 
“positing intention”, for a noema can contain structures “posited 
of”.  
Hence, truth is still implied by the formal axioms, as the first moment 
of the telos of a proposition. No truth is abandoned. However, it 
arises correlative to the positing intention (Setzung, henceforth 
“positing”). As noted, a “correlate” is an implied relation 
                                                 
133 Husserl writes, and Derrida quotes: “the concepts ‘true’ and ‘formal 
implication of the axioms’ are equivalent, and likewise also the concepts ‘false’ 
and ‘formally implied as the opposite of the formal implication of the axioms’” 
(I §72, in IOG 56).  
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“parallel” to, rather than occurring exactly when truth does.134 But 
truth remains only the telos that arises with positing, as “proto-
doxic”. Rather than simply believing as theoretical (the doxic), it 
has the sense of “believing certainty” (I §139).135 Thus, crucially, note 
that the “certain” (gewiss) is also only a correlate of positing (cf. I §103, 
HU III 256). Rather than an affirmation of truth, it allows positing 
only a “relative and imperfect right” to converge upon essential 
Truth (I §141, HU III 347).136  
However, certainty still has a “weight” (which latter, for Husserl, 
provides a “motivating power” (I§138, OG 93)). As we will 
address just below, certainty arises in the nexus of correlative 
reason, positing and evidence).137 Hence the certainty (and thus 
positing) cannot be dismissed. It still requires a ground and a right to 
begin to constitute the truth of the object, and yet is impelled to 
do so. Put in a related fashion (I §5), what is certain undoubtedly 
“appears” as such, but what is undoubted is not yet an 
                                                 
134 Cf. I §139, and above. If Truth emerged with correlative truth, all positing 
would be true “at the same time”. We will develop the latter as we progress. 
135 Husserl writes: “Truth is manifestly the correlate of the perfect rational 
character of the protodoxa, the believing certainty.” (I §388)  
136 Moreover, “certainty” is a root form of the noema. That is, in noesis, when 
one predicates doxically (i.e. one believes it), this implies a parallel noema, 
“being certain”. Instead of converging upon the simple object, “certainty” 
underpins the noema that allows phenomenology to avoid positing of the 
natural object. In the Ideas, Husserl notes that one should keep the two kinds 
of certainty separate. We primarily employ the former as we are explaining 
intentionality via predication, but every such predication has its noema. 
137 As Husserl writes in regard to what can said of positing and self-evidence in 
regard to “rightness”: “[I]n a certain way indeed every clear recollection 
possesses an original and immediate right; considered in and for itself, it 
“weighs” something, whether little or much [...].But it has only a relative and 
imperfect right.” (I §141, HU III 347) 
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affirmation. It must be determined, even though no logical basis 
for convergence upon its Truth has yet developed.  
This leads us to address how there can be such “grasping” of 
evidence; for positing in the certain moment only occurs 
correlatively to truth. Following from the correlation of intention 
and predication, positing for Husserl is an act correlating both 
logical positing of the subject, in the fundamental form “S is P”, 
and a living standpoint upon the object (I §139) in the demand 
for its perfectibility.138 Thus positing and reason (Vernunftsetzung 
§141, HU III 347), in turn, are the components which occur in 
the first moment of “grasping” the originary givenness as 
evidence (I §136, §141). Evidence evolves to self-evidence, and the 
“originary” is thus the first moment permitting the right to 
constitute a particular self-evident object. A “right” (Recht) is a 
justification, a permission, and also the character of “rightness” of 
the posited self-evidence. 
Thus in a fashion the “originary” must provide the right to exceed 
itself. Husserl explains this necessity by the word “ursprüngliche”, 
which implies an origin (Ursprung), but also authenticity, and thus 
                                                 
138 This fundamental logical form thus allows even the doxic beliefs to be 
treated in logic. For example, Husserl writes, “[I]f the protodoxic self-evidence, 
that of believing certainty, is lacking, then we say, with respect to its content of 
meaning ‘S is P’, a doxic modality may be self-evident, the presumption, for 
instance, that ‘S should be P’.” Husserl never lets go of the basic positive 
quality of “S is P”, for this can still be converted to the “self-evident position, 
or the truth, “that S is P is presumable (probable)” (I §139).  
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right, and third, has the sense of “springing up above” the originary. 
Husserl writes:  
[W]e are to understand, of course, that only 
the originary [originär] self-evidence is an 
authentic [ursprüngliche] source of authority and 
the rational positings [of it] are in certain ways 
‘derived’. (I §141, HU III 347, cf. I §138) 
This explains why Husserl’s “principle of principles” is that the 
originary (originär) is the fundamental “authority” for dator 
evidence (cf. I §1). As authentically originary (ursprüngliche) it 
provides the ground, and thus a basic right for a certain reason and 
positing (as perfectibility).139  
The circularity of the originary and original 
However, even the originary moment must have its essence, 
which as the predicate of an ideal object is deemed original. This 
essence of the originary moment, as yet without content, must 
essentially found even the originary (it must be even further behind 
what is behind).  
                                                 
139 Husserl summarises the above, it is valid that “the positing has its original 
[ursprüngliche] ground of legitimacy [i.e. its right] in the originary givenness.” (I 
§138). 
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This brings the moment of “grasping” toward its developed 
essential form. To reach back and “grasp” the origin sedimented 
in the subject presupposes this essentially original (“Original”) 
basis. For 
[E]very apperception [the ego’s positing of 
itself] in which we […] noticingly grasp objects 
given beforehand – points back to a “primal 
instituting” […] and the primarily instititutive 
Original [Original] act is always [already] livingly 
present (CM §51-§52, CMg 140-141, Husserl’s 
emphases).
140
 
Derrida’s employment of “originaire” and “original” will accord 
with Husserl’s (cf. VeM 440, VM 124).141 The original will be that 
predicate of the ideal object (forward), holding essentially and a 
                                                 
140 Note that the “Original” for Husserl is deemed primally “institutive”. 
Derrida will deem the source of the “institution” is irreducible. 
141 Moran, following Findlay, translates Husserl’s “originär” in the Logical 
Investigations at least on occasion as “in primal fashion” (cf. PR §62). As to 
Derrida, many translators have not yet been sensitised to or never emphasised 
this terminology. Spivak follows the translation accurately. Leavey’s translation 
of the “Introduction” translates “originaire” as “primordial” (cf. IOG 29, 153, 
cf. IDG 170-171), and “original” as “original”. Allison in “Speech and 
Phenomena” (1973) also translates “originaire” as “primordial” (SP 73). Bass in 
Writing and Difference (1978) often translates “originaire” as “original”. Overall, 
these lacks of consistency have made it difficult, we suggest, for English 
readers to discern Derrida’s whole-part reasoning and the common relations 
applied across his works.  
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priori, which must ground the originary grasping, in order to 
determine the originality of the object (forward) (cf. IOG 45, 
IDG 29).142 But this only must occur of essential necessity, for the 
Original has not yet appeared as an object. The particular relation 
that provides a right and ground to posit of content in a particular 
proposition at the lowest level is deemed originary.143 
These logical relations translate to the circularity of Husserl’s 
grasping of the object; the general right to posit formal law is 
provided by self-evidence, for an originary moment permits 
predication by the self of its own evidence. Originary production 
(Leistung, Bildung)144 is already a certain positing of itself, given this right 
of reason and self-evidence, for the constitution of Objectivity to 
converge upon absolute Truth. Originary self-evidence for 
Husserl validates what by 1931 is the mature transcendental 
subject, as the subject must explicate of itself.  
                                                 
142 As Derrida explains in the “Introduction”, both the highest level of essence 
(l’eidos) and the ideal object (l’objet ideal) must be “originarily grounded” (leur 
fondament originaire) and must do so “through” an “original history” (histoire 
original) (IOG 45, IDG 29). We will follow Derrida to employ “original” in the 
lower case as it is first the necessary and ideal object, which must already be 
essential.  
143 “Originaire” from the Latin “originarius” refers in French to what “originates 
from”, such as “Ma famille est originaire d’Alsace” (“My family is originarily 
from Alsace”). “Original” refers to what seems to have originated as anterior, 
but has the sense of “individual” (i.e. as predicated of in front). 
144 The term “production” is relevant to Husserl’s approach in the “Origin of 
Geometry”, which will assess these logical relations to determine the origin of 
geometry as it has been passed forward by tradition. As Derrida emphasises, 
“pro-duction, which leads to the light, constitutes the ‘over against us’ of 
Objectivity” (IOG 40, fn. 27, our emphases). “Bildung” in German also carries 
the sense of “culture” by which Husserl will allow the tradition to constitute 
the production which leads forward, hence permitting Objectivity. 
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The above instils the conditions for a predication of objectivity 
that has not yet attained Truth as absolute, but must merely 
return to the essential moment (behind). Each of the relations 
arising in the nexus of logic’s first “grasping of the originary” – 
demand, ground, right, reason, certainty, correlative truth, 
necessity evidence, positing – are connected (I §139). Yet these 
relations have not yet begun to posit Truth (forward). Husserl 
summarises that 
in the end all the lines of connexion converge back 
upon the primary belief, and its primary reason 
upon the ‘Truth’ (I §139, Husserl’s emphasis ).  
Even though having begun from essential and apodictic necessity, 
and having devolved to evidence, for Husserl the relations of the 
“formal implication of axioms” then merely converge “backward” 
to grasp the origin (in order to move forward).145 Yet until a 
ground, right, validity etc. have been found to exceed the 
originary, this is not yet even a constituting of the object (cf. I §5, 
below). There is not yet a ground even to begin to determine the 
                                                 
145 Husserl writes that to “reduc[e] evidence to an insight that is apodictic 
[necessary], absolutely indubitable, and, so to speak, absolutely finished in itself 
– is to bar oneself from the understanding of any scientific production.” (FTL 
§60). 
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fact or Truth (“forward”)(I§ 39).146 This remains an enquiry into 
the possibility of constituting ideal Objectivity. 
Part Five: toward Derrida’s reading 
From the internal to possibility of the beyond 
It might thus be wondered: How can subjectivity exceed this originary 
circularity to determine the absolute? Put via content: how can Truth or 
the fact be determined in space and time? This leads to two more 
criteria. The first is that of remaining within this progress, 
avoiding external relation, in order to proceed “beyond”. To do 
so, we assess the progress “forward” again, while remaining in 
accordance with formal relations “behind”. We turn to Husserl’s final 
emendations to his Third Investigation of 1913 (LI 3 §25).  
In these, Husserl addresses (particular) “bits” of space and time in 
nature (i.e. the a priori and essential region of nature). At this 
juncture, the naïve whole of part-whole logic is no longer sufficient 
to permit an absolute possibility of a whole (proof). Husserl 
explains that whole-part logic 
                                                 
146 Husserl in 1900, explaining the relations of ground, right, demand and truth, 
explained that “[o]nly the probability [i.e. the motivated possibility] of fact can 
be grounded, not the fact itself, or the judgment of fact” (I §39). It might well 
be wondered how the absolute fact can be determined; this will be Derrida’s 
difficulty, which we begin to address below. 
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does not prove the relative ‘foundedness’ of 
bits of space and time [upon a greater whole], 
and so does not prove space and time to be 
really infinite, nor even that they can [a 
possibility] really be so. This can only be 
proved by a law of causation which presupposes 
[...] [from behind] the possibility of being extended 
beyond [forward] any given boundary. (LI 3 §25, 
LU 1, 300, our emphases) 
First, to proceed “forward”, evidence allows the relations of space 
and time to be certain. However, to assess the progress “forward” 
the teleological structure addresses only parts of parts. Hence we 
include the finite and infinite. The evident parts of parts, as not yet 
proven as infinite, will be taken to be finite. But it is not yet even 
determined whether they can be an infinite, for this would be the 
greater whole uniting a finite series, and thus a unity of the 
infinite (note, indeed, that such an implication is absurd).  
Thus, Husserl emphasises above, this series of particular 
moments of space and time do not even yet determine the parts 
as real, even as infinite (Derrida will suggest both the sense of the 
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infinite and indefinite imply “opening” (IOG 138)).147 By this 
Husserl avoids dependence upon a naïve external whole, even 
though it remains necessary. Rather, from behind, only a prior law 
of causation can permit this progress. Possibility would need to 
come from formal relations “behind”, to permit the progress of 
finite parts (Derrida will call this a “finitising principle” (IOG 
138)). A formal and essential law of nature allows space and time 
to progress to the infinite.  
This develops two criteria that would meet the demand. First, 
note that, from furthest behind, this progress presupposes a relation 
that would allow the possibility of exceeding any limits, to the 
“beyond”. That is to say, such a possibility would be what 
Derrida deems “absolute”. We caution that Husserl does not yet 
assess whether such relations ought to be absolute; he is merely 
constraining the relations of possibility, “forward”. Yet could 
such a possibility in immanence be absolute, it would also permit 
this possibility in the progress of space and time, which are 
requirements for truth, Truth, and the fact.  
The Idea in the Kantian sense 
The second option accords with the progress above, and the logic 
that Husserl stresses in 1913, although we emphasise it merely to 
                                                 
147 We employ this example of partial “bits” of space and time for a reason, for 
these are the first two requirements to determine the fact, which Derrida will 
investigate via the finite and infinite in 1962. 
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prepare for Derrida’s reading. Above, Husserl sets aside the 
possibility of an external whole, yet retains the possibility of a 
beyond. Such a beyond would be foundational. It could allow the 
possibility of progress in space and time, by means of the finite 
and infinite relations predicated of evidence. Moreover, our third 
condition from above was that the real requires the progress to be 
repeatable as invariantly the same (195). Thereafter, we noted that 
to be possible a right must arise from originary evidence. 
Derrida will emphasise that these are the characteristics of the 
“Idea in the Kantian Sense” (I §§137-143).148 We summarise 
seven characteristics, in a circularity from “behind”: 
First, from furthest behind, the Idea in the Kantian sense must be 
the Idea of what must necessarily found and then determine even 
essence. It must thus for essential reasons never be an essence, 
whether formal or real (or material etc.)(I p. 46).149 To explain 
this, second, it is certainly grasped as “open to evidence” (I 
                                                 
148 Derrida deems these passages on the Idea in Husserl’s Ideas (I §§137-143) to 
be “the most precise text concerning its type of evidence” (IOG 139). 
149 Husserl explained at the outset of the Ideas “the need to keep the highly 
important Kantian concept of the Idea free from all contact with the general 
concepts of the (formal or material) essence.” (I p. 46). Thus Husserl avoids 
making this Idea a part of his logical components in the first Chapter of the 
Ideas, nor admits it to the originary lines of connection. Derrida in turn notes 
that Husserl never makes the Idea in the Kantian sense a (logical and objective) 
theme at all. We note that for Husserl this might have been planned. As 
Derrida seeks to exceed essential relations (cf. IOG 142 fn. 17), he too will take 
this as an authorisation.  
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§143).150 It thus has “a type of evidence all its own” (I §143). 
Third, as evidence provides a form to predicate of, and 
intentionality seeks its object, the Idea in the Kantian sense must 
thus demand that the partial and finite content be given as essential 
unity with the infinite. For it  
demands the transparent givenness [in 
evidence] of the Idea of this infinity. (I §143) 
These relations combine to make it what Derrida, in accordance 
with Kant (CPR A508/B356), will call a “regulative ideal”, which 
never can appear in simple phenomenological evidence (IOG 
139, I §143, cf. CPR A 617/B 645). 
Fourth, it must never appear as particular pure content in 
phenomenological evidence as itself. First, its evidence is general, 
and second, its evidence is never a simple phenomenological 
evidence (it “never phenomenalises itself” (I §143, cf. CPR 
A313/B369, IOG 137)). Yet, insofar as essential and particular 
relations certainly appear, it must demand content besides itself. 
This might be a pure Object, or a content (Husserl calls this “X” 
(I §§143, 145)). 
                                                 
150 Boyce Gibson translates “evidence” in this section as “insight”, which 
Husserl deems earlier in the Ideas is “evidence in general” (§137). Derrida 
translates it at “evidence”. 
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Fifth (forward), following from this demand and the given finite 
and thus partial content, Husserl explains, the Idea in the Kantian 
must allow the X to be repeated as  
ever one and the same (I §143, OOG 166, cf. I 
§145).
151
 
The Idea in the Kantian sense must allow closer convergence on 
“complete givenness” (the whole) in infinitum, by repeatedly 
identifying the content (“X”) as the same.  
However, sixth, that it is “demanded” (I §143) that the repetition 
be infinite, even as absolute, does not yet determine or even 
necessitate that the series is given as an infinite (forward), thus nor 
yet that the series is determined as finite or indefinite.152 It must 
rather be more closely defined as infinite in its directions. Husserl 
explains that 
this continuum is more closely defined as 
infinite in all directions (I §143). 
                                                 
151 Husserl explains of the “Object” that it “first comes forward as a noematic 
X […] it appears further as the title for certain connexions of the reason” (I 
§143). 
152 For “on principle we could only have inadequately appearing (thus 
inadequately perceivable) objects. But we must not overlook the modifying 
qualification we made: inadequately perceivable, we said, within the finite limits 
of appearance.” (I §143). 
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Nevertheless, seventh, the Idea in the Kantian sense, which must 
exceed evidence and finite or indefinite relation (beyond) 
nevertheless instils the necessity of complete givenness of the 
infinite as an absolute telos, for 
as Idea (in the Kantian sense), the complete 
givenness is nevertheless prescribed – as a connexion 
of endless processes of continuous appearing, 
absolutely fixed in its essential type. (I §143, 
Husserl’s emphasis first) 
It must thus return to its evidence, which is never 
phenomenological, restoring a circularity.153 
                                                 
153 Neither Husserl nor Derrida overtly develop the relations to Kant. In brief, 
Kant writes that the idea of the reason is a “regulative principle” that instructs 
us to attain the absolute necessity of the object. However, as a faculty without 
the empirical content of the understanding, “the idea of reason cannot then be 
regarded as valid [a part of logic] – except as a rule for the regressive synthesis 
in the series of conditions, according to which we must proceed from the 
conditioned, through all subordinate conditions, up to the unconditioned, 
although this goal will never be attained” (CPR A508/B356). That is, following 
this demand, the understanding must “scrutinise appearances” (CPR A125) to 
unite the totality of its conditions of possibility in accordance with a rule, to 
arrive at a judgment of absolute necessity of the object. However the 
accumulation of conditions in this series is never sufficient for the 
understanding to determine the totality in a judgment, and the progress 
continues (in infinitum or indefinitum (cf. 282 fn.)). As Fisher and Watkins 
summarise, whatever “reason demands”, nevertheless, “one can say that reason 
does not constitute the object, but rather regulates the understanding (and the 
relations between its judgments) and it does so by directing the understanding 
to act as if the world were constituted in a particular way despite the fact that 
the understanding may not have been given intuitions that would warrant 
constituting objects in this way.” (FW 381). There are myriad divergences from 
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Finally, we note that the Idea in the Kantian sense necessitates 
that the relations be “determined a priori” (I §143), in accordance 
with “an established dispensation of essential order” (I §143). The 
Idea in the Kantian sense would accord with the necessities of the 
originary nexus. Moreover, it applied to “all realities” 
(Realitäten).154 The Idea in the Kantian sense can pertain to finite 
relations as real. Even so, we caution, the Idea in the Kantian 
sense merely proceeds by necessity. It does not yet determine or 
require absolute possibility. 
Summarising the requirements and parameters 
How, then, can the object be determined absolutely? At this 
juncture we can explain some of the parameters and requirements 
for an answer (i.e. conditions of possibility). As to the parameters, 
any approach would need to accord with pure a priori law. It 
would need to proceed in accordance with levels and directions, 
which are also those of intentionality. Second, to be Husserlian, it 
must proceed via a reduction, and its whole-part relations of 
finitude in immanence. The reduction would need to make 
material content into irreal content, to allow for the irreal to again 
constitute the real (and material). Third, it would need to be a real 
rather than merely an analytic pure possibility or fact.  
                                                                                                        
Husserl, notably that – as Derrida adds – Husserl never develops any privileged 
sense of the “understanding”. The relations are Husserl’s. 
154 As Derrida explains in the “Introduction”, for Husserl the region of Nature 
includes that of natural spatiality (IOG 32). 
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As to the requirements, we thus note that any of these would 
suffice: at what we deem the “far side”, the real object must be 
determined in space and time, as ever one and the same. It must 
thus be a fact, which is true at all times and places, for everyone. 
Second, the object must be determined as the Same in space and 
time, and thus as an eidetic fact (or Fact), and True. Either must 
no longer be contingent, thus must no longer allow the possibility 
of falsity. However, at the “originary” and a priori side, an 
absolute and originary ground of possibility for constituting ideal 
Objectivity must be found. Only this originary ground would 
permit the possibility to begin constituting the ideal object.  
To unite these components, we note four direct requirements. 
First, such a ground must be possible in space. Second, the 
ground must be possible in time. Third, real possibility would 
need to hold in accordance with intentionality, as the form of 
consciousness of something. Fourth, a real possibility for the 
“beyond” by remaining in immanence would also suffice. Finally, 
a possible foundation by means of the Idea in the Kantian sense, 
which thus far remains necessary, would determine this absolute. 
Determining an absolute ground or truth for any of these would 
meet Derrida’s demand for the absolute from 1954. Next, we 
assess Derrida’s progress in 1962, as he seeks to do so. 
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Chapter Three: Toward the Absolute as 
Passage (the “Introduction”, 1962 pt. 1) 
Introduction 
This chapter turns to Derrida’s first published work, dated 1962, 
the “Introduction” to Husserl’s “The Origin of Geometry”.155 We 
will begin to assess the work from its middle sections (Section IV 
ff.). Derrida will set out a sequential progress addressing each requirement 
in the order above. First, however, Derrida will develop the bases by 
which he can question the problem of origin to allow for the 
possibility of an answer. Second, he will address the material thing 
in space, and its origin in time, to develop the criteria for his 
questions. These will indeed be those of an absolute ground of 
possibility, and absolute determination of the fact. Third, he will 
assess these questions in address to language in general. In so 
doing, Derrida will develop the circularity of the Idea in the 
Kantian sense as “analogous” in the relations, rather than a 
solution. Thereafter, Derrida will take the Idea in the Kantian 
sense as authorisation. He will directly address the requirements 
of space, time, and intentionality in general, and then the beyond 
by means of the Idea of God, to assess the possibility of the 
                                                 
155 The “Origin” was written in the early 1930’s but published as an Appendix 
to Husserl’s “The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology” of 1936 (hereafter, “Crisis”).  
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absolutely real. None of Derrida’s approaches will yet absolutely 
ground or absolutely verify the possibility of an external and 
objectual absolute. Instead, the analogies will imply a continuing a 
priori circularity as “passage”, and Derrida will revise his demand 
to accept an immanent, a priori, essential and pure absolute. This 
will be the “Absolute as Passage”. In our next chapter we will 
work out how Derrida develops this implication toward deferral 
and Difference. 
The Origin as palimpsest for the levels 
In the 1930’s Husserl began to deem that European science had 
been the recipient of a “tradition” and cultural world of truths (as 
theories, formulae etc.), but had neglected its responsibility to 
enquire into their provenance. Moreover, the empirical sciences 
employed a method that no longer even questioned the possibility 
of their object. To remedy this “bankruptcy” of “responsibility” 
(IOG 36) and naïve objectivism, the task was set for 
phenomenology as a Rückfrage (literally, “return question”) to 
uncover its origin by assessing the object.  
In the “Origin of Geometry”, Husserl selects geometry as an 
exemplary science to do so. His aim is still that of determining an 
ideal science (forward). Second, as acts of geometry are 
constituted in space,  Husserl deems that such objects (forward) 
take the form of the spatial thing (IOG 32). Third, geometry has 
certainly been provided to the community by the historical 
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tradition. Hence the subject certainly has access to the history of 
these syntheses sedimented in the geometrical object. The subject 
can work toward explicating that object (forward) from one 
particular synthesis of geometry to another (cf. OOG 159). Such a 
completed project would allow the reactivation of the primal 
institutive act of geometry in the essential history sedimented in 
the subject’s originary self-evidence (backward) (OOG 160, IDG 
29, IOG 45). The successful reactivation of the origin would be 
the eidos of geometry.  
Derrida thus from the first takes Husserl’s “Origin of Geometry” 
(henceforth, “Origin”) to be a palimpsest for Husserl’s project as 
it had matured by 1931 into transcendental subjectivity (IOG 
29).156 The directions proceed “forward” in subjectivity through 
particular objects, with the necessity to determine the origin as a 
one particular object, in order to return “backward” to the 
                                                 
156 Derrida had done so even in 1954. In bringing his student essay toward a 
close, Derrida had deemed that Husserl’s “Origin” holds at a “level” below the 
basic directions in Husserl’s approach to history and the origin. In turn he 
deemed that the latter depended upon Husserl’s prior analyses. Thus, as to the 
whether the regressive method to the origin will necessarily be “indefinite”, 
Derrida noted that “[t]his is a question that cannot be posed at the level [niveau] 
of the Origin of Geometry. This latter – and this is true of the whole of Husserl’s 
philosophy of history – remains finally below the constitutive analyses which 
have nevertheless preceded it.” (PG 165, PDG 264). The “Introduction” of 
1962 is thus revealed as Derrida’s sustained attempt to answer a question that 
he had posed as a culmination of his approach in 1954. Moreover, it will do so 
in accordance with his concerns for the origin, directions, and “law” of 1954. 
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origin.
157
 Moreover, Husserl deems that these directions are 
applicable to any invention:  
[O]bviously it is the same here with every 
other invention (OOG, 159, Husserl’s 
emphasis). 
For Derrida, the geometrical project corresponds to the basic 
directions of approach to any object (IOG 25 ff.). He emphasises 
that  
[t]he ideal object is the absolute model for any 
object whatever, for objects in general. (IOG 
66) 
The model of levels and directions is made absolute, in the sense of 
“primary”. It will be basal to Derrida’s progress. 
                                                 
157 Derrida quotes Fink’s division in a footnote, between Husserl’s “logical 
explication” (our intentional and logical movement “forward”) and reactivation 
of the “tradition of sense-formation” (backward). Fink writes that “when 
reactivation in the first sense [“explication” forward] is completed, when it 
comes to an end, only then does reactivation as return enquiry concerning the 
“primal instituting” begin” (Fink 1939, 215; in IOG 55). Explication “forward” 
(of the intentional object, across) in time must be completed first. The 
direction “forward” will be the first direction. How it can occur is just what 
Derrida is enquiring into.  
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The addition of levels 
However, in 1962 Derrida will more obviously allow for levels. 
The progress of parts from one to other (forward), determined as 
a totality, would rise to a higher essential level (IOG 45, IDG 29). 
As Husserl summarises: 
[C]learly, then, geometry must have arisen out 
of a first acquisition [and is] not only a mobile 
forward process from one sort of acquisition to another 
but a continuous synthesis [...], all make up a 
totality such that […] the total acquisition is, so 
to speak, the total premise for the acquisition 
of the new level (OOG 159). 
Derrida will assess how this origin can be determined (forward), 
in order to “acquire” the levels that Husserl takes as a premise. 
Part One: from science to the opening 
The reduction to “this side” of exact sciences 
First, as Husserl had deemed that the “crisis” of objectivism and 
origin holds of all European sciences, Derrida must assess how to 
approach geometry as a particular science. Moreover, as to his 
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concern, Derrida will assess how his demand for the “truth” of 
the origin ought to apply. In so doing, he will begin to develop 
the structure of his teleology as passage.  
First, as geometry is a mathematical science, Derrida rapidly seeks 
to retract from “exact” scientific approach. He will rather seek to 
allow enquiry into an essential basis prior to mathematics. As 
noted, the ideal of an “exact” science is to determine the truth or 
falsity of its object by means of its formulae etc. (217). Derrida 
takes this to apply to mathematics. The latter proceeds by means 
of prior axioms. However, for Derrida, even axioms are 
dependent for appearing upon prior relations of “axiomatics in 
general”. In turn, even axiomatics in general depends upon the 
originary relations which allowed the formation of their “sense” (sens). 
“Formations” are made necessary moments “behind” even form 
(henceforth “behind” implicitly holds as “always already” so, and 
we take this to hold as necessarily prior).158 Derrida quotes Husserl 
that:  
[O]riginary evidence must not be confused with 
the evidence of ‘axioms’ for axioms are in 
principle already the results of originary formations 
                                                 
158 That formation is prior to form will be important to Derrida in 1967 (901). 
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of sense, and have this sense always already behind 
them (OOG 165, IDG 41-42, cf. IOG 65, our 
emphases). 
As noted, since 1954, the difficulty for Derrida was that even 
form does not yet appear as content. Hence axiomatics in general 
requires “an originary evidence” for its content (IDG 42, cf. IOG 
52), yet that evidence has not yet appeared itself. Mathematics is 
“already exiled from the origins to which Husserl now wishes to 
return” (IDG 42, IOG 55).  
Such an origin would be prior to mathematical truth and falsity. 
Importantly, mathematical propositions concerning the origin do 
not yet have values of truth and falsity (IDG 43, IOG 56). In 
accordance with logic, Derrida deems that propositions without values of 
truth or falsity are “open” (cf. ODP 270).159 “Values” for Husserl are 
those noemata arising as doxic positing prior to material content – 
Husserl’s examples are “goodness” and “badness”. As doxic 
(believing (200)), open propositions nevertheless allow for a 
                                                 
159 The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy defines an “open sentence” as “[A] 
sentence containing free variables, i.e. an expression that is not itself 
interpretable as true or false” (ODP 270).  
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consciousness of the possibility of truth or falsity in general (I 
§116).160 In turn, they keep a value.  
However, from above (222), values too depend on the prior sense-
formation of truth in general. In turn, that truth or falsity in general 
are the basic options holds from a prior assumption of bivalence 
(two values). Derrida argues for 
a truth, or rather a […] truth-sense in general, 
which does not permit itself to be bound by 
the alternative of ‘true’ or ‘false’ (IOG 56). 
Thus Derrida is never dispelling truth or falsity in general, but 
assessing what holds of them when the concern is to determine 
such truth-sense. As truth in general, or rather truth-sense in 
general (behind) has not yet appeared as particular evidence, from 
this juncture mathematical truth and falsity hold as originary 
contents along with axioms. They are deemed “equi-valent” to 
Husserl’s “formal implication” of axioms (I §72, IOG 156, (199)). 
                                                 
160 As Husserl puts it, in the pure noetic phases “there is constituted no new 
determining marks of the mere ‘material’ [Sachen], but values of the materials 
[…] [such as the noemata] goodness and badness; or the object for use […] 
and so on. [These are] similar in function to the ‘possible’”. Thus, for Husserl, 
this doxic progress of values is still “positional” (I §116). That noted, for 
Husserl, such noetic phases are “grounded in the noemata” (I §116). Derrida 
has not yet accepted that such a ground can be found.  
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Thus falsity keeps a value, but as “disvalue” (Derrida no longer 
employs “falsity” alone).161 
As Derrida seeks an origin prior to bivalence, importantly, he also 
seeks an approach prior even to “undecidable” propositions. The latter 
cannot be proven as true or false within an axiomatic system 
(PDP 224). However, by no means is Derrida seeking to dispute the 
rigour or validity of mathematical systems in general, or the difficulties raised 
by mathematical undecidability. He accepts their relevance but seeks 
to allow for his progress. 
He seeks to do so via a long chain of implications . First, he notes 
that even undecidable propositions have a “value” (IDG 39-40, 
IOG 53). Hence, as values are doxic they still allow for the 
possibility of determination as true or false, which Derrida calls 
“decidability”.  There must be some relation to the possibility of 
decidability before it can be deemed that a proposition is 
undecidable. He thus notes that undecidable propositions 
necessarily have some “reference to an ideal of decidability”. Thus 
the determination of truth, falsity and even undecidability depends 
upon a prior Idea (i.e. essence) of decidability.  
Derrida has developed the necessity of dependence upon at least 
one Idea (essence). The latter is required even for the Idea of 
                                                 
161 Disvalue is no longer a negation of truth. We will explain below how 
Derrida sets aside negation. 
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truth-sense. Hence truth-sense in turn depends upon a formation 
of such truth sense. Derrida thus deems that even undecidable 
propositions depend on the formation of the truth-sense of truth or 
falsity (behind). In turn, in accordance with Husserl, Derrida 
notes that such a dependence of mathematical propositions in 
general – true, false or undecidable – also requires a grounding to 
begin to constitute value.  
Hence Derrida goes on that his “kinds” of concerns with the 
formation of truth-sense seek a prior ground to those concerned 
with a ground for mathematical determinability (IDG 41, IOG 
54). As noted, dispelling the latter would be unwarranted in that 
Husserl too was often accepting of mathematical rigour (cf. I §7), 
and thus sympathetic to mathematical grounds. Derrida is thus 
able to deem that Husserl wanted mathematics in general to be 
his “secondary grounding” (IDG 41, IOG 54-55).162 Moreover, 
Derrida has worked out how Husserl could feasibly do so. 
                                                 
162 Derrida is seeking to protect Husserl’s overall progress, in that Husserl’s 
“confidence” in mathematics had been “seriously threatened” by the work of 
Gödel in 1931. Note that Derrida is avoiding engagement with, but endorsing 
Gödel’s theorems. The latter had demonstrated that “in any consistent system” 
that “an arithmetical sentence can be found that cannot be derived within that 
system” (PDP 224). Gödel deemed these “undecidable” propositions, and also 
noted that his proof applies “to the axiom system of set theory” (Gödel 1986, 
194-195). The latter formalises whole-part relations. Thus Derrida puts it that 
“[E]ven if Husserl at one time adopted the conception of grounding axiomatics 
and even proposed it as the ideal for all ‘exact’ eidetic disciplines (Ideas 1 §7 
[…]), it seems he only considered this to be a secondary grounding” (IDG 41, 
IOG 54). However, Derrida retracts even from what Husserl on occasion might 
have wished, for “without doubt” these kinds of enquiry would seek to be prior 
to axiomatics in general. Thus Derrida from the first hives off that part of 
Husserl who had since been demonstrated to have untenable aims.  
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From this juncture, and at least as far as 1967, Derrida will no 
longer align with systems that seek to determine truth via axioms 
(that is, “deductive” systems).163 He rather opts for “formal 
implication” in the fashion of Husserl (I §72, IOG 56, (199)). The 
latter, we note, seeks to proceed by “inference” from formal 
relations and its “directions”. Moreover, it does so to find a 
“ground” (behind) to judge upon the fact (forward) (PR §39).164 
Such approach still allows for essential laws such as 
Contradiction, which remains crucial to any thought that seeks 
sense (LI §14 (188 fn.)).165 Derrida continues to seek this ground 
by pursuing the implications of his enquiry. 
The teleology of opening 
First, note that Derrida by seeking a ground avoids deeming that 
a prior dependence upon the ideal of decidability determines that 
                                                 
163 Derrida’s claim of the dependence of mathematics upon the ideal of 
decidability is broad, and would be indefensible were it a polemic, as there are 
many sorts of mathematical approaches. To support how he seeks to allow his 
sort of enquiry from the logic of that era, we note merely that any variable (such 
as the “p” in “S is p”, or “x”) already arises from and is constituted by a 
positing consciousness. Gödel had developed his theorems in address to the 
Principia Mathematica of 1910 to 1913 (Russell and Whitehead, 1997). In 1937 
the younger and still logical-positivist Quine noted that “[a]ll logic in the sense 
of the Principia, and hence all mathematics as well, can be translated into a 
language which consists only of an infinity of variables ‘x’, ‘y’, ‘z’ ‘x1’, etc.” 
(Quine 1937, 72). Derrida will ask how such variables come to be constituted. 
164 Husserl explains, for example, that “[e]very principle of inference, every 
genuine axiom is in this sense groundless, as in the opposite direction likewise every 
judgment of fact” (PR §39, our emphases). 
165 For example, Derrida adds that Husserl’s “confidence [in mathematical 
exactitude] did not have to wait long before being contradicted; […] 
particularly when Gödel discovered the rich possibilities of ‘undecidable’ 
propositions in 1931” (IDG 39, IOG 55). Derrida suggests that even Gödel’s 
results depend upon a prior consciousness, by someone considering them, that 
they contradict the telos of deductive mathematical systems. 
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there is such an idea (i.e. essence). The latter would make his 
argument inconsistent, in that it could be false or undecidable. 
Rather, Derrida adds Husserl’s question. Importantly, for Husserl, 
a question follows from certainty, as a modality of doxic positing (I 
§103).166 That ideas are believed to hold rather develops the task of 
questioning the origin of the idea of decidability. This moment develops 
the beginning of Derrida’s teleology. 
Thus in this sequence, Derrida can prepare to ask whether 
“undecidability” of mathematical propositions is no longer an 
ideal of determinability (or decidability), but already a determination 
(that is, a prior and positional determination). Yet Derrida is 
aware that it is not yet true or false even that undecidability is a 
determination; such a question still requires a ground. Hence 
Derrida will posit this question as a conditional. As we noted since 
1954, a conditional begins as a hypothesis (we will develop this 
relation as we proceed (119)).  
In turn, the above develops an initial sort of reduction, although 
applicable merely to the mathematical object in general. To ask if 
the ideal of decidability as an originary truth-sense prior to true or 
false content seeks at least a telos of purity. Following this 
                                                 
166 Husserl writes: “[T]he way of “certain” belief can pass over into that of […] 
question” (I §103, Husserl’s emphases). Moreover, Husserl emphasises its 
circularity. He also puts it: “[T]aken in a completely general sense, questioning is 
the striving [forward], arising [from behind] from the modal modification, from the 
cleavage and obstruction [division and problem], to come to a firm judicative decision” 
(EJ §78, Husserl’s emphases). 
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retraction to a question, then when “investigating origins”, the 
“ideal itself of decidability […] is reduced” (IOG 56).  
Thus, as Husserl did after his reductions, Derrida seeks to restore 
this ideal of truth as a task in pure phenomenology. He 
investigates the origin of the truth-sense in general of truth 
(forward). Note that Derrida never quite deems that he seeks a 
truth-sense prior to undecidability, which would be difficult to 
support. Rather, in this teleology, he questions the ground of 
possibility of a truth-sense prior to open propositions. To that 
end, note that the “open” too becomes an intentional object, and 
thus constituted. Derrida has not yet developed a retraction from 
a natural sort of space (cf. 237), and any such telos is still 
constituted. In 1962, Derrida thus deems this telos of a 
constituted origin of the open the “opening” (ouverture).167 
Importantly, as he seeks to return to determine the truth (i.e. the 
truth-sense) of the origin, Derrida still seeks to determine the truth-
sense of the opening.  
Moreover, the opening remains possible and certain. Thus, as for 
Husserl, progress to an opening is not yet precluded from 
particular progress in infinitum (208). However, Derrida asks if its 
possibility is already precluded from final determination. At this 
                                                 
167 Leavey in the English version of the “Introduction” of 1978 translates 
“ouverture” as “openness”. We opt for the more usual translation of “opening” 
in line with Bass in “Violence and Metaphysics” in 1978 (VM 120-121). 
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juncture, he does deem this exclusion an a priori (essential) 
impossibility. For Derrida, as for Husserl, this impossibility is 
signalled by “cannot” (we will develop this too). However, rather 
than a position – which would invalidate his approach – Derrida 
has worked out that such an implication already arises as a norm 
(below, “should only”) by which to question the hypothesis of 
determination.  
Thus to assess the implications for mathematics in general, 
Derrida is able to summarise the chain of implications above. He 
is able to ask, and a fortiori without polemics, but allowing for his task:  
what is mathematical determinability in general, if the 
undecidability of a proposition, for example, is 
still a mathematical determination? Essentially, 
such a question cannot expect a determined result 
[réponse], it should only indicate the pure opening of 
an infinite horizon [of possibility].” (IDG 43-44, 
IOG 56, our emphases).  
As the origin is first an object, only proceeding “forward” to the 
opening will allow a “return” to the origin. Importantly, Derrida 
refers to this telos by the verb “to open”. That which first allows opening 
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is a condition for truth and falsity, and thus a condition for 
response to the question. He is working out how 
only a teleology can open [s’ouvrir] a passage toward 
the beginnings. (IDG 54, cf. IOG 64, DLG 31 
(cf. 808), our emphases) 
Moreover, note that Derrida deems this implication of a progress 
forward with a telos that it can open the origin backward a 
“passage” (cf. Lawlor, 2002). He thus begins to assess how passage 
in general can occur.  
Part Two: the permissions for the question 
The first preparation – the ideal object in space 
First, Derrida addresses the progress “forward”, in space. To 
begin, note that the geometrical object is still mathematical 
(Derrida merely allowed for seeking its prior ground). As 
geometry pertains to spatial form, Husserl deems geometry is a 
material ontology (IOG 32). The geometrical object is thus a spatial 
thing appearing in the region of Nature (IOG 32).168  
                                                 
168 Derrida writes: “geometry is a material ontology whose object is determined 
as the spatiality of the thing belonging to Nature” (IOG 32). Husserl writes: “it 
is the essence of a material thing to be a res extensa, and that consequently 
geometry is an ontological discipline relating to an essential phase of such thinghood, the 
spatial form” (I §9, in IOG 32, Husserl’s emphases).  
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Next, Derrida indeed deems that material ontology is “subordinated” 
to formal ontology (167). He thus prepares to apply the 
correspondent relations of formal ontology that will delineate the 
necessities of material ontology (167). Derrida’s argument is much 
easier to comprehend upon noting that he works out the relations 
of material ontology at each juncture by means of formal 
ontology. He can slide from address to history or a thing, to ideal 
objects, yet the form remains basic. 
The retraction through prior dependencies 
As did we, Derrida begins from intentionality (153 ff.), to retract 
to prior essential dependencies of formal ontology. The 
geometrical thing depends upon a formal relation of appearing as 
something. To appear as something in particular (forward), 
everything must first appear as an object, and thus first depends 
upon the category of the Object (backward)(155). Yet as it must 
first be an object, Derrida proceeds at the level of essential 
generality (156), which predicates generality of the object 
(forward). Everything – including the origin of geometry – first depends 
upon the category of the object in general (155 ff.). This instils 
the initial direction of phenomenology: the 
object in general is the final category [behind] of 
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everything that can appear [forward] (IOG 64, 
our emphases) 
Thus, he questions the origin of the object in general (Object). As 
such an origin has not yet been constituted, he thus questions its 
Objectivity (forward). Yet as noted, Derrida first seeks a ground 
for this Objectivity, and thus for its possibility. The question from 
our second chapter (148) takes “its sharpest form” as: 
‘How is ideal Objectivity possible?’ (IOG 67, 
cf. OOG 160, 163) 
However, Derrida adds the telos (i.e. the object of the demand) of 
determining this Objectivity as absolute. Husserl proceeds “as if 
[his] theme were” 
the genesis of the absolute Objectivity of sense 
(IOG 63, Derrida’s emphases).
169
 
Derrida concedes, we note, that this “absolute” demand was 
never quite Husserl’s. Thus far, he has developed the first 
                                                 
169 The “as if [it] were” is the phrase upon which Derrida’s reading turns – in 
employing a subjunctive conditional, Derrida avoids positing this of Husserl, 
committing to it himself, or positing directly of an absolute genesis. Derrida 
will let go of this supposition and re-orientate his explanation of what Husserl 
seeks of the absolute, in closing. 
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question from our previous chapter – enquiry into the absolute 
ground of possibility of ideal Objectivity (behind)(cf. 214).  
Next, Derrida is still questioning the possibility of the essential 
relations. In turn, such questioning of the object occurs by means 
of (the region of) subjectivity in general (forward). The latter restores 
questioning of essential generality as to the pure relation of an 
“inside” to consciousness. 
The progress “forward” again  
At this juncture, Derrida begins to restore a concern for content. 
As we explained, a purely formal ground remains analytic (195). 
Even a subjectivity in general must determine a fact of “real” or 
material content (in particular, that content is the mathematical 
thing). Derrida thus deems that Husserl’s approach arises from a 
concern holding since at least 1907: 
[H]ow can subjectivity go out of itself in order to 
encounter or constitute the object? (IOG 63, IOP 
17, our emphases)
170
 
This was our final question in our previous chapter. The demand 
(“in order to”) is that subjectivity (in general) exceed its inside even 
to begin to constitute even the originary object as outside (97 ff.).  
                                                 
170 Derrida also finds this question in FTL §10, cf. IOG 63 fn. 38.  
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From facticity to the two questions 
Yet Derrida seeks for this object (forward) to be absolute. It must 
thus indeed be “invariant” (IOG 47), and determined without 
possibility of error. To “go out of” itself (forward), subjectivity 
must indeed “encounter” the object as a fact. Derrida explains 
this by the word “facticity” (facticité). That an object can be a fact 
is certain, which is predicated of it as its facticity. Yet a certain 
object is not yet determined as truly itself; “facticity” in French 
also has the sense of “artificiality”. As not yet truly itself, facticity in 
French also has the sense of contingency (170). In turn, as not yet 
determined as truly itself it can be false here and now.171  
Derrida thus allows for the necessity to consider truth both in 
space and time. Subjectivity must indeed begin from the facticity 
of an ideal object (forward) to judge upon it as true no longer 
merely “here and now”, but in all times and places for everyone. 
It must be an eidetic fact (Fact) (IOG 47).  
Hence Derrida asks, of this sequence that began from the 
problem of the truth-sense of evidence: 
                                                 
171 Leavey translates “facticité” as “factuality”, which we have changed as we 
progressed. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy explains the issue in English thus: 
“[T]he question of […] facticity is whether a commitment is apt for truth” 
(ODP 134). Derrida is indeed seeking to question whether (doxic) 
commitments in general are apt for truth. 
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[H]ow can [evidence] give rise to an ideal and 
true object for ‘everyone’, […] uprootedness out 
of every ‘here and now’ facticity, etc.? (IDG 52, 
cf. IOG 63, our emphases) 
Derrida has re-orientated the approach to ask the two versions of his 
question from our previous chapter (214). At the originary side, he asks 
(demander) whether the subject can absolutely ground (i.e. affirm) 
the possibility of ideal Objectivity. At the “objectual” side, he asks 
whether the subject can absolutely determine the truth of the Fact 
at all times and places (IOG 63). However, such a Fact is not yet 
material. 
The reduction by essential necessity 
For Derrida is still assessing the mathematical thing, as essentially 
“here”. As noted, subjectivity in general is no longer external to 
essence. Its pure form is that of a subjectivity in general that 
addresses objectivity. Derrida aligns this with the pure form of 
intentionality (IOG 64). In turn, subjectivity in general must 
question objectivity as to its facticity. For Derrida, this conforms 
to essential necessity. As we noted, the latter progresses from 
essential generality to objectivity in order to permit contingency 
(184).  
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Derrida takes it for granted that essential necessity corresponds to 
material necessity. In turn, we worked out how essential necessity 
thus predelineates the necessities and possibilities of particular objects 
in material ontology (170, 183 ff.). Yet as ontologies never appear 
besides as an object, such a sense of the originary act in material 
ontology (the first act in history) must be found in the particular 
and constituted object: 
[T]he sense of the constituting act can only be 
deciphered in the web of the constituted object. 
And this necessity is not an external fate, but an 
essential necessity of intentionality (IOG 64, our 
emphases). 
Derrida has effected a second sort of partial reduction. This 
mathematical thing in space is thus no longer quite real, material, 
or a “natural existent”. Its necessities and possibilities are 
questioned insofar as they pertain to the ideal object of formal 
ontology. Thus nor is this yet the noema (IOG 66). Derrida 
emphasises: 
[t]his ideality of the object, i.e. here, of the 
mathematical thing itself, is not the non-reality of 
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the noema (IOG 66 fn. 61, Derrida’s 
emphases) 
 Derrida has not yet worked out a “final” reduction, but is still 
progressing via eidetic logic.172 However, he has restored the 
possibility of address to the facticity of the mathematical and 
spatial thing in accordance with the formal relations of the ideal object.  
The second preparation – the temporal object 
Next, Derrida must allow for questioning of the geometrical 
object as true for everyone at all times. He thus addresses 
temporality and history. For the mathematical object of geometry 
in space also has an origin in time, in its history (backward). A 
“primally instituting” (cf. EJ §50) constituting act of geometry 
must have occurred (behind), for the object of geometry is certainly 
intended (across).173 The geometrical origin appears in evidence. 
                                                 
172 Thus Derrida refers with approval to irreality in a footnote (IOG 66), but 
refrains from deeming the ideal object is yet irreal. He merely deems that the 
ideal object is “more objective than the real object, than the natural existent. […] 
Therefore, the real object can never retain that absolute Objectivity which can 
be proposed for all subjectivity in general in the intangible identity of its 
sense.” (IOG 66-67, our emphases).  
173 To support this, Derrida quotes Husserl that geometry “has, from its primal 
institution, an existence which […] – of this we are certain – is accessible to all 
men”(OG 160, IOG 65). In general (as Husserl explains of acquisition of the 
invention, above), the evidence of a content provides access both to what 
necessarily must have occurred, and certainly occurs because its evidence must 
first have occurred. By this the movement from past to present arises as 
sedimented in the object. Husserl ever implies the implicit maxim ‘Ex nihilo 
nihil fit’. That is, when ‘Out of nothing, nothing comes’, then when something 
comes, it has come and was never absolutely nothing. 
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Thus certainty indeed holds even without a material (spatial) 
instance of this act. That is,  
[S]ince the first geometrical evidence has had 
to conform to this pattern, we can have a first 
certainty about it in the absence of any other 
material knowledge. (IOG 62, OOG 160). 
As a first certainty holds without materiality, the origin of 
geometry is taken as an instance of the general “model” for any 
such origin of an object (forward). Thus the levels of origin are 
added. The geometrical approach corresponds to any approach to 
the essential origin of the object. Derrida had earlier noted that  
geometry would equate to the original origin of 
any object of consciousness (IOG 25).  
To the “originary” and “certain” Derrida has added the “original” 
(204). Indeed, the latter is taken to be the predicate of the 
particular object (the origin in general), which in turn remains 
essential (behind). 
Yet as with the spatial object of science in general, the “primitive 
genesis” is “already done, its sense being already evident” (IOG 
62). Derrida had mobilised the “already” as support in retracting 
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from deductive mathematics to a certain truth-sense prior to 
originary evidence (behind). From this juncture, the “already” 
instil the difficulty (98), as he is seeking for the origin (forward). 
Thus while Husserl indeed takes the originary moment as support 
given his “profound decision” to take trivial evidence as his 
“principle of principles” (203) (IOG 62), Derrida notes that, as 
already given, evidence would be merely a “general” form.174 No 
particular evidence of origin yet appears to be predicated of. 
The implications of Derrida’s questions  
Hence Derrida assesses the prior conditions for the directions in 
history. Thus far, the origin of geometry is certain, even without 
its materiality; it arises with evidence in general. For this originary 
constituting act in history to be evident as having occurred “after” 
the general relation that permitted it, the sense of “after” must 
already be available to the subject. An ideal relation must permit 
this sense of “after” (cf. IOG 65, OOG 160); hence this essence 
must not yet be wholly available here and now for the subject. 
Thus such employment of temporal directions must depend upon 
“supertemporal” essences. The latter, by their essence, do not yet 
appear even in temporality. In turn, temporality does not yet even 
appear in spatiality (cf. 134).  
                                                 
174 Husserl, Derrida explains, “is content to recall that we know the general form 
of this evidence” (IOG 62, our emphasis).  
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This dependence upon an even purer relation necessitates a 
retraction further “backward” into a third sort of “reduction” 
(IOG 65) (cf. 448). Derrida worked out of the mathematical 
object that it depends upon an essential relation prior to originary 
content, which is then questioned as pure; the temporal 
“reduction” accords with these levels. He has developed the 
necessity to question a supertemporal essence that does not yet 
even appear in the general evidence of temporality. Yet such a 
return to the origin in passage still remains possible (228). Derrida 
goes on: 
‘[B]efore’ and ‘after’ must then be neutralised 
[reduced] in their facticity and employed in 
quotation marks. (IOG 65, our emphasis)
175
 
Note, however the “facticity”. Derrida thus applies the implications 
developed en route, for “the necessity of this reduction has been 
justified at the outset” (IOG 65). The temporal origin in history 
too corresponds to a pure objectivity. Subjectivity in general again 
can question its objectivity (233). The necessities and possibilities of 
essential necessity still apply to allow the contingency of the ideal 
                                                 
175 We address how “neutralisation” is an intentional basis for the reduction in 
more detail below (448). We also employ Husserl’s “behind” rather than 
“before” (222), as the former more obviously explains directions without 
seeming to privilege a temporal form. 
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object (IOG 64) (170, 183 ff., 235). Yet this investigation 
henceforth proceeds by essential logic (236). These allow 
questioning of the facticity of the pure material object. In an 
essential investigation, the subject can be wrong in judging that an 
originary act of geometry in history holds at all times for all men. 
Yet as this is a material object in time, the telos of such a facticity 
is no longer merely an eidetic Fact but a material fact.  
Thus, in formal ontology, Derrida has allowed for the questioning 
of the grounds of ideal Objectivity. At the “objectual” side, he has 
allowed approach to the material and real object in space and time 
as to its facticity. He has developed the criteria by which necessities and 
possibilities from our previous chapter can be questioned. An “a priori and 
eidetic reading […] should be possible.” (IOG 66). He goes on: 
[f]actual history can then be given free rein: […] 
it will always more or less naively suppose the 
possibility and necessity of the interconnections 
described by Husserl. (IOG 65)  
Only from this juncture (IOG 66 forward) can Derrida begin to 
assess his questions.  
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The transition to language in general 
Henceforth, in our dissertation too, the directions are no longer 
employed naively. To be sure, Derrida’s reductions in address to 
the spatial object merely retracted to the truth-sense prior to the 
empirical and mathematical object, and then prior to a real or 
material natural existent. As to temporality, he has merely 
developed a reduction of directions from a certain geometrical 
origin. Derrida seeks to address the implications of these relations 
for the absolute object in general. He requires a broader 
reduction. His first address to his questions will also do so.  
To allow this transition, Derrida notes that the sense of the word 
“after” is necessary for the evidence of the supertemporal 
essence. Hence this sense of the word is no longer bound to a 
single subjective temporality. The sense of the word “after” must 
be available at all times and places to “everyone”. In turn, the 
condition for this availability of the sense of the words “before” 
and “after” is permitted by language in general.  This particular and 
material object is thus far the word. Language in general thus 
conforms to progress from generality to particular ideal objects. 
Hence language in general too conforms to ideal Objectivity.  
Indeed, Derrida’s progress has been sequential. This sequence 
implies that even the formation of the truth – i.e. the truth-sense 
in general – of science in general has come to depend upon the 
prior premises of language in general. Yet the latter still depends 
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upon ideal Objectivity, and its eidetic relations. Derrida starts his 
next section: 
ideal Objectivity not only characterises 
geometrical and scientific truths; it is the 
element of language in general. (IOG 66) 
Derrida begins to address his questions to language in general; 
and will do so overtly by means of the three levels. 
Part Three: beginning the assessment via levels  
The three levels of language and their reduction 
Derrida has yet to work out the essential relations of language, 
and adds a level of particular languages. As noted, language in 
general (behind) too is “thoroughly made up of ideal objects” 
(OOG 161). Its parts are particular languages. The smallest part of a 
particular language that first appears as a material object is thus 
deemed the word (OOG 161).176 As Derrida must yet work out 
the reduction, he begins from the “empirical” moment of the appearing of 
the word. In turn, he seeks the absolute of a fact, true at all times 
and places. Thus in every language words must refer to the same 
                                                 
176 The word is the most particular object. Husserl also refers to “Language 
itself in all its particularisations (words, sentences, speeches)”, each of which 
can be ideal objects (IOG 161).  
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thing. Only this “translatability” to every language would permit 
words to be true for all men, thus at all times and places.  
First, note that just as anything and everything can become an 
intentional object (thus an ideal Objectivity), anything and 
everything for Husserl is “nameable”. Thus, at this lowest level, 
the word “lion” requires the empirical instance of a lion (IOG 
70). In order for it to have been named (of this Derrida is 
certain), someone at some time must have seen something like a 
lion. This word is “bound” to the necessities of an empirical 
content. A judgment of a lion (forward) can only be contingent 
upon an encounter with a lion. Hence, it of all the levels can only 
be an “empirical fact” (IOG 70), bound to merely one time and 
place. It can least be true at all times and places.  
Hence Derrida “crosses” (i.e. across, via correspondence) and 
rises to the “higher” level of ideal Objectivity (IOG 70, IDG 64), 
from the word to the particular language. This linguistic level 
accords with Husserl’s second level, in that when positions are 
taken from several languages, each can refer to a specific 
Objectivity that must be the same for each (I §85). The possibility 
of sameness has begun to be introduced. Indeed, at this second 
level, “the same content can be intended starting from several 
[particular] languages” (IOG 70, Derrida’s emphasis first).  
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But even such a language is not yet free of particular specification 
(e.g. the word “Löwe” occurs only once in German (IOG 67)). 
Moreover, this word is still “bound” to the necessities of an 
empirical content (that is, no-subject that speaks a particular 
language might yet have encountered a lion). The 
word lion, then, will not be absolute and 
universal. It will be empirically conditioned by 
the contingent [contingente] encounter […] 
[with] something like a lion. (IOG 71, IDG 63) 
Thus while the sensible thing (a lion) “grounds its ideality” it does 
so merely as contingent. These levels allow neither an absolute 
ground nor “absolute” (and universal) translatability (IOG 71).  
Derrida thus proceeds to the highest (“tertiary” (IOG 72)) level 
of language in general. This would be a “free” ideality, without 
tethering to words with their particular essences, but merely the 
Objectivity governed by the pure and formal laws of language in 
general, which in particular are propositions about ideal objects. 
Derrida thus makes the telos of truth overt. Such propositions 
about ideal objects can be repeated as the same (which holds for 
pure relations henceforth), and thus “the same for all” (at all 
times and places). For example, Derrida notes, I can repeat the 
assertion “The automobile is the fastest way to travel”, which was 
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true at one time, but “I know it to be false and out-of-date” (IDG 
66, cf. IOG 73). Even this level  
can still encounter a factual restriction: that of 
disvalue, falseness (IOG 73).  
However, this access to ideal Objectivity is certain, and must and 
can still be accessed (IOG 73). Derrida argues that such 
propositions “had been true” (IOG 74). Each possesses an 
“omnitemporality” as an essential relation no longer bound to an 
empirical contingency. Moreover, one can always distinguish that 
“about which” something is said, as independent of the assertion, as 
ideal Objectivities (IOG 75, OOG 74). In such essences,  
we pass beyond and rid ourselves of the ideal, 
but still bound, Objectivity of language [at the 
lowest level]. We simultaneously reach an 
Objectivity that is absolutely free with respect to 
all factual subjectivity. (IOG 75) 
Note the inclusion of “passage” as progress “beyond” the particular 
subject to the actuality. This level allows the absolute of Objectivity 
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– as defined since Chapter One, as without limit (IOG 72) even 
by language; as ideal fact, without possibility of falsity (195).177  
Reduction to the lowest pure level 
However, nor would such an absolute possibility yet be 
acceptable. There is not yet a relation to a pure particular content, 
thus not yet a ground. The highest level merely and henceforth 
provides the right (droit) of relation of subjectivity to language 
(IOG 75). To relate to this content, Husserl “seems to re-
descend” to the lowest level of language (and its predicating of 
particular objectivity) (IOG 76).178 It turns out that “we see” this 
relation “in advance” (forward, thus from behind). That is, a 
particular content of language is already a  
condition of possibility for absolute ideal 
Objectivity, for truth itself (IOG 76).  
A fortiori, the “re-descent” is no longer in address to an empirical 
particular, but to the particular instance of an ideal language no longer 
bound to content. It is intended as “pure possibility”. Such pure 
objects (such as a “lion”, or “geometry”), are henceforth established as 
irreal noemata.  
                                                 
177 Derrida writes: “[T]he ideal Objectivity [...] is absolute and without any kind 
of limit” (IOG 72). 
178 Derrida puts it that: “Husserl then seems to redescend toward language as the 
indispensable medium and condition of possibility for absolute ideal 
Objectivity, for truth itself.” (IOG 76). 
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Derrida has worked out how a reduction to pure and a priori 
phenomenology can occur via whole-part reasoning, to determine 
essential Objectivity in general. This  
brings to its final completion the purpose of 
the reduction itself. (IOG 76)  
This instils our parameter of the reduction for pure phenomenology in general. 
Intentionality (across) is thus consciousness of the particular in 
the pure and general relations of language, and the descent to the 
lowest level remains pure (henceforth, taken in its reduced sense). 
At this juncture, Derrida can ask his questions of language in 
general in pure phenomenology. 
Parentheses – the turn toward signifying 
This situates what will be helpful to appreciate Derrida’s language 
up to 1967. Language in general and logic are correlative, thus 
conformant in address to ideal Objectivity. Hence, for Husserl, 
necessity, possibility and negation are expressible by their 
noematic correlates “must”, “can”, “not” (cf. I §106 (187))). 
However, Derrida sought to retract from axiomatic systems. The 
reduction to pure phenomenology in address to the object in 
general developed from language in general. Even should 
deductive logic in general be set aside, the prior foundation upon 
language in general still allows the ideal object in general to be 
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named.179 The correlative intentional verbs of signifying (to speak, 
call, name, designate, mean (signifie), express, announce, say, and 
so on) can still be employed to name ideal objects. So too can 
“thinking” be employed, which form is that of intentionality in 
general. In so doing, thinking and speaking still conform to the 
essential levels and directions.180 Such possibility holds even when logical 
propositions imply an opening (cf. 283). Language and logic will 
continue to be inseparable. However, Derrida often employs 
verbs of signification (or thinking) to refer to ideal objects.  
Parenthesis: avoiding a confusion with the sign 
Hence we must forestall a confusion. Derrida is able to do so 
without yet addressing a “sign”. The French “signifies” (signifie) is 
a standard term for “means”, and also has the sense of “implies”. 
“Designate” has the sense of “referring to” and “naming”. The 
French terms can refer to a sign (by 1965 they will overtly do so); 
but are not yet bound to it.181 Derrida’s concern in 1962 is not yet 
with Husserl’s sign (Zeichen) of 1901,182 nor the meaning (Bedeutung) 
                                                 
179 For example, Derrida explains in 1967 that “[T]he subject S must be a 
name, the name of an object.” (VP 80-81, cf. SP 73, cf. FTL §13). 
180 Thus, for instance, Derrida proposes of the undecidability of mathematical 
propositions, as noted above, that their “unity is still to come on the basis of what 
is announced in its origin” (IOG 53, our emphasis second). 
181 Cf. VM 127, VeM 443. 
182 Since the Logical Investigations Husserl had divided these into a double sense, 
“expression” (Ausdruck) and “indication”. The former concern those senses of 
a sign intended for communicative meaning, and were aligned with writing and 
speech (cf. LI 1 §5). The second was aligned with senses of a sign – such as 
gestures, or knots in a handkerchief – never intended or believed to convey 
meaning, or to attain to the reality of an other (person) (cf. LI 1 §2 ff.). The 
word for “expression” (expression) in the “Origin” – Derrida notes – is 
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that develops in relation to it. Derrida will not yet address these 
until 1967 (SP, FM).183 In 1962, he remains concerned with sense 
(Sinn) in its directions (sens).  
We must thus avoid a second confusion, as writing and speech 
will be major concerns for Derrida from 1965. At this juncture in 
1962, Derrida goes on to address writing and speech. But he is 
not yet concerned with their relations to the sign, or even their 
relations to each other. Rather, for Husserl in the “Origin”, writing 
and speech are treated as parts of language in general.184 Derrida 
will ask whether the parts of language in general can absolutely 
ground the possibility of ideal Objectivity or the fact. 
Parenthesis – the elision of negation 
The reduction to the pure thus has an important logical 
implication. It is indeed the necessity of pure possibility that is required 
to exceed the life of one “factual individual” (the geometer) to 
converge upon this truth: 
                                                                                                        
Äusserung, as an utterance, rather than Ausdruck (IOG 77). Hence, Derrida also 
avoids mobilising the signitive intention, which Husserl introduced in the first 
Investigation and developed in the Sixth Investigation (LI 6 §70) since 1901. 
The latter nevertheless keep to the form of intentionality. As Husserl puts it, 
for example, signitive intentions are the ‘significative acts’ which give expressions 
meaning [Bedeutung], and which have […] a certain objectivity of reference” (LI 6 §70, 
our emphases). Derrida does not yet develop these relations (cf. our next 
footnote). 
183 Cf. SP 36, FM 114 ff. When Derrida relates “Bedeutung” and “Sinn” in “Form 
and Meaning”, he correctly equates them with the levels (strata) of the noetic-
noematic structure in the Sixth Investigation (FM 114 ff., cf. I §124). 
184 Husserl in the Logical Investigations relates writing and speech strongly to 
expression (Ausdruck (cf. LI 1 §§5, 6 ff.), but never relates them directly to 
language in general. 
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[T]he Objectivity of this truth could not be 
constituted without the pure possibility of an 
enquiry into a pure language in general. (IOG 
77, Derrida’s emphases) 
Pure possibility is a condition from which to begin to constitute 
Objectivity from language in general.  
However, Derrida has separated negation (signalled by its 
correlative “not” (I §106 (187)) from pure possibility, in that 
without such separation there could not be a reduction. There 
must first have been a negation to devolve from the outside to a 
reduction. However, from that juncture the negation of the 
outside must then be excluded. That is, by the re-descent a 
negation would determine an empirical instance (outside). It would 
preclude the pure possibility required for the reduction. Thus, 
Derrida stresses, every reduction “must be kept from being […] a 
negation” (IOG 119, cf. also 86, 46 fn. 38). To avoid this, Derrida 
deems the difficulty of determination a pure essential impossibility 
(“cannot”). As preventing sense a priori, the latter does not yet 
necessitate a predicative possibility of the sense of Objectivity 
(forward). It thus precludes negation (“not”) of the possibility of 
ideal Objectivity. For example, Derrida explains: 
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as long as ideal Objectivity is not, or rather can 
not be engraved in the world [as empirical] [...] 
then ideal Objectivity is not fully constituted. 
(IOG 89, IDG 86, Derrida’s emphasis) 
Even though the difficulty is that of a priori impossibility of 
determination, Derrida prefers this to the negation of that lack of 
determination. To be sure, what is essentially impossible implies 
what is necessarily not possible. This unsustainable exclusion of 
predicative negation (“is not”) will be set aside in 1964. 
However, as to how this direct negation could be avoided in 1962, 
Derrida adds a condition that must hold forward. As noted, for 
ideal Objectivity to be possible, it must be possible at times and 
places that exceed the individual. Thus the ideal object must be 
able to be re-identified as the same (IOG 70, above, ff.). In 1962, 
Derrida takes it that what is essentially the same is not yet (or no 
longer) “not” something else. Derrida in 1962 excludes negation from 
passage, and pure phenomenology.185 This will be relevant in his next 
argument. 
                                                 
185 Derrida explains several pages later: “the Living Present permits the 
reduction, without negation, of all alterity” (IOG 86). This occurs in his 
address to a single subject, which we explain below. 
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The next argument: assessment of speech 
For having returned to the pure, Derrida returns to subjectivity. 
However, as he has returned a “completion” of the reduction, it is 
no longer a natural but a transcendental subject that employs 
language. Derrida henceforth avoids dividing subjectivity into an 
“ancient” history of the first geometer, and the “modern” 
geometer in his community. These would naively return the 
directions to a natural subject. Even a “modern” geometer would 
essentially have a history in these directions, and the possibility of 
explicating a judgment that would determine geometry absolutely. 
Derrida is rather concerned with the possibility of determining 
ideal Objectivity in pure phenomenology, and begins from the 
horizon of possibility to determine language in general (forward, 
and thus at its origin). As language in turn is employed by 
multiple subjects, Derrida explains,  
at bottom [most basically, behind], the 
problem of geometry’s origin puts the problem 
of the constitution of intersubjectivity on par 
with the phenomenological origin of language. 
(IOG 79) 
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In 1962, Derrida follows Husserl to set aside the problems of 
intersubjectivity and the origin of language.186 Both are merely 
accepted as “interrelated possibilities” (IOG 79, OOG 161).  
Given this interrelation, for Husserl, the “horizon” of man is not 
yet even singular. Rather, it depends upon the possibility of a 
language in general, which certainly gives the subject access to a 
community. Thus this language and community must have held a 
priori; the linguistic consciousness is already consciousness of 
other egos. As Derrida explains of at least “two men”, their 
languages 
will appear to them at the bottom of an a 
priori structure: the linguistic community, i.e. 
the immediate certainty of both being speaking 
subjects (IOG 81). 
Thus Derrida returns to assessing the pure and a priori spatio-
temporality of subjects in a world. Note that he no longer 
proceeds via the universal (cf. 241), which is dependent upon this 
prior possibility. Such a “classic sense” of “universal 
                                                 
186 In “Speech and Phenomena”, Derrida notes that Husserl bracketed off the 
question of the origin of the essence of language in general across his entire 
“itinerary” (SP 7). Derrida from “Of Grammatology” of 1965 will enquire of 
this origin, and assesses the relations as indirectly pertaining to Husserl only in 
1966. The origin of intersubjectivity in Husserl will be addressed in “Violence 
and Metaphysics” from our Chapter Five. 
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transcendental norms” (IOG 80), would retain the division 
between the historical subject in a natural history, and this 
“modern” subject with a history, a childhood and so on (IOG 
80). Derrida continually prefaces the “universal” with the 
“possible” (IOG 79, 85, 87). This horizontal “we-consciousness” 
originally establishes the possibility even of a universal language (IOG 
79).187  
The finitude of translatability 
This consciousness of a “pre-cultural we”, with a prior possibility 
of accessing universal language, instils the immediate certainty 
that the same thing is being perceived by two subjects. Derrida 
deems these speaking subjects. Such an “absolutely fixed” 
foundation ought to determine that the same objectivity is 
perceived here and now by speaking subjects. This ought to be an 
absolute but particular pure fact.  
Derrida argues that, when the eidos in general has become a norm 
(telos), the essence of Nature is never wholly present. However, 
speaking subjects can share perceptions of material things only in 
Nature. Thus, for essential reasons, even when it is certain that the 
same thing is perceived, the natural ideal object appearing as such 
                                                 
187 Derrida writes: “[C]onsciousness of being-in-community in one and the 
same world establishes the possibility of a universal language” (IOG 79). We 
develop this “same” just below. 
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is merely partial, and any subjects can still be wrong. Even when 
they agree that they perceive the same thing. Thus,  
are not non-communication and 
misunderstanding the very horizon of culture 
and language? […] [I]s not finitude the 
essential which we can never go beyond? 
(IOG 82) 
As noted, Derrida has worked out an essential impossibility, 
precluding the horizon of possibility of determination of the 
absolute. Subjectivity is thus far constrained to finite knowledge, 
not yet going beyond itself to speak to a second subject (forward), 
and precluded from the pure fact.  
The speaking subject and the same 
Hence Derrida can devolve from the linguistic community to 
within a speaking transcendental subject. He assesses whether the 
single subject in a linguistic community can agree with itself that 
what it perceives is absolutely the same over time.188 For Husserl, 
from the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, the Ego – as essential, a 
                                                 
188 Derrida writes, the “world is consequently the universe of Objects which is 
linguistically signifiable in its being and its being such” (IOG 2, quoting OOG 
162). 
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priori and general – constitutes of what is sedimented in 
transcendental and sedimented bases inside itself; including 
constituting egos in the community. Derrida deems this basis is 
the “egological” speaking subject (IOG 86). Before I employ 
language, I must be conscious of the sedimentations in myself as an 
originary “we”. It is a condition of access to the absolute 
possibility of Objectivity that the egological subject constitute the 
“absolute origin to other absolute origins” (IOG 86, our emphasis) 
in itself.  
To this, Derrida adds the logical result of setting aside the negation 
of the same in his reduction to the pure. What is no longer 
negated cannot be not the same. This lack of an object that is no 
longer “not the same” is merely predicated of as “other”. Thus the 
egological subject, before constituting a relation to other egos, 
must essentially constitute a certain Ego already in itself. It can 
thus constitute the same thing from its position and in a 
consciousness of the other ego’s position upon this thing (IOG 
86).  
Such a series adds a form of “temporality” (i.e. necessary and 
essential rather than real). The single subject in this temporal 
series (the “Living Present”) thus can constitute the same thing as 
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other inside itself over time.189 Inside itself, the ego can also then 
constitute the other position as other to the same, and thus a 
position upon the same thing in itself. Thus Derrida summarises 
that, inside itself, the position from  
the Living Present permits the reduction, without 
negation, of all alterity. The Living Present 
constitutes the other as other in itself, and the 
same [thing] as same in the other [ego]. (IOG 
86, our emphases)
190
 
We emphasise – when the suppression of negation is rescinded in 
1964, this will amend the logical relations of the same in large measure, to 
add a “second direction”. In 1962, Derrida is following his 
requirements. A speaking subject, it seems, can agree with itself, 
as other to itself, that it is conscious of the same thing over time.  
                                                 
189 Derrida summarises: “[B]efore being the ideality of an identical object for 
other subjects, sense is this ideality for other moments of the same subject” 
(IOG 86). 
190 Derrida also employs the “same” in a blunt fashion in 1962 in relation to 
identity: what is the same in myself is a “coincidence [recouvrement] of identity” 
(IOG 86). This is not yet an identity, but a relation of two identities. However, 
Derrida has not yet developed the relations of this co-incidence that would 
divide identity as always other to itself. He does so from 1964 (cf. 508). 
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The relations “forward” as speech and writing 
But nor is this yet an answer (réponse). For, Derrida explains, even 
a speaking subject as transcendental is by its essence tied to one 
time and community (IOG 87).191 It cannot provide an absolute 
access to history (forward) across all judgments in time.  
But the latter is a condition for any essence. Thus a speaking 
subject by itself cannot absolutely ground the constituting of ideal 
Objectivity. Derrida goes on: 
[B]y itself the speaking subject, in the strict 
sense of the term, is incapable of absolutely 
grounding the ideal Objectivity of sense. (IOG 87, 
our emphases) 
In turn, no possibility yet holds for the speaking subject to begin 
to constitute ideal Objectivity to determine a fact.  
Hence Derrida develops the next part-whole relation; writing too is 
a part of language in general. For essential reasons, writing can 
perdure across time in the absence of a single subject, to permit 
                                                 
191 Derrida avoids overtly mentioning that speaking subjects die, as this would 
restore the natural sense of a geometer in history. A reader might complain 
that the implicit basis for arguing that a speaking subject is tied to an 
“institutive community” (IOG 87) depends upon this essential relation anyway. 
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access to the origin in history. That is, moving forward, Husserl 
takes it as certain that this ground for possibility must have 
occurred. After having been written as true, writing perdures 
across history without the possibility of encountering falsity. For 
Husserl, writing thus permits a true judgment of the same thing at 
all times and places. In turn, this would absolutely ground ideal 
objectivity. Writing, it seems, will ensure the possibility that ideal 
Objectivity be absolutely true. Such a writing would be the “place 
of absolutely permanent ideal objectivities and therefore of 
absolute Objectivity” (IOG 88).192  
Writing set aside in 1962 
Given that completion requires deeming that the partial object is 
the same while converging upon truth, and the speaking subject 
has been excluded from doing so, Derrida explains that writing is 
the primary condition of possibility and necessity for absolute 
completion:  
[T]he [pure] possibility or necessity of being 
incarnated in a graphic sign [...] is the sine qua 
                                                 
192 Moreover, it seems, writing will assure “absolute ideal Objectivity – i.e. the 
purity of its relation to a universal transcendental subjectivity.” (IOG 87). Note 
that such possibility of universal transcendental subjectivity would be divested 
even of essential relation to speaking subject.  
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non condition of Objectivity’s internal 
completion. (IOG 89, our emphasis)  
But that Husserl makes writing the sine qua non condition, we 
suggest, never implies that Derrida is privileging writing.193 He 
continues to seek an absolute ground for the possibility of ideal 
Objectivity (indeed, below, he will rather align the Absolute with 
essential Speech (IOG 139, 141, 149, (302))).194 
From lack of ground to opening 
Thus writing too is set aside. That is, Derrida explains, Husserl took 
writing to permit the perdurance of what was already true (as 
above), but neglected to assess how this could have been made 
absolutely true in the first place (IOG 89-90).195 Such a moment 
requires an origin “outside” origin and “before” the particular 
instantiation of the sense of objectivity (indeed, this holds for 
                                                 
193 Bernet suggested this privilege is basal to Derrida’s “Introduction” (Bernet 
1989, 144, 144-148); we address this in our “Contribution” section (390).  
194 From 1966, that writing can perdure without a speaking subject will be 
important to Derrida’s developing of a kind of writing no longer necessarily 
bound to a human consciousness (cf. 859). At this juncture Derrida mentions 
Hyppolite’s suggestion of transcendental phenomenology as a “subjectless 
transcendental field” (IOG 88). Hyppolite made this comment, Derrida tells 
us, in the discussion following the lecture of Father Van Breda upon “The 
Phenomenological Reduction”, in Cahiers du Royaumont, 323. Derrida will never 
develop the “subjectless transcendental field” in 1962, as he will argue rather 
for the responsibility of the philosopher to continue questioning. 
195 Derrida writes that what holds of speech is “a fortiori true for writing”, and 
asks, “but does not this linguistic embodiment permit [as a fortiori that of 
writing] to be understood as taking place outside the being sense of ideal 
Objectivity? […] Does not this formulation give the impression that ideal 
objectivity as such is fully constituted before and independently of its embodiment 
[…]?” (IOG 89-90, Derrida’s emphases second and third). 
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speech too). Hence this instantiation too could have been false, 
which precludes the absolute ground of the possibility of ideality 
in general. This progress does not yet permit the constituting of a 
fact as true (i.e. in its truth-sense) at all times and places (forward). 
Just as for the speaking subject, Derrida deems that this 
transcendental sense of writing does not yet ground the possibility 
of ideal objectivity (IOG 92). 
Having addressed language in general, writing and speech, 
Derrida summarises that whenever 
sense must first be able to be set down in the 
world and be deposited in sensible 
spatiotemporality, it must put its pure 
intentional ideality i.e. its truth-sense, in 
danger. (IOG 92) 
More than merely applying to what holds “here and now”, this 
endangering of truth-sense holds of transcendental subjectivity 
thus far for any instance of space or time, even in history. An 
absolute ground has not yet been found for the possibility of ideal 
Objectivity, nor yet for the absolute truth of a fact.  
Even so, Derrida’s progress is remedying some of his relative 
immaturities from 1954, where he “verified” the problem at every 
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turn in his bivalent approach (146).196 In 1962 he as yet finds no 
ground even for the possibility of ideal Objectivity to be absolute, 
thus even to begin to constitute facticity as true (let alone True). 
As both speech and writing in particular retained the possibility of 
disvalue (IOG 73), Derrida notes that Husserl insists both speech 
and writing are necessary (IOG 80) and seeks to absolutely 
determine language in general.  
Univocity and equivocity as circularity 
Derrida only has the certainty, however, that language in general 
appears as words. The demand is that the intention determine the 
word, or words.  Such words must be univocal (cf. LI 1 §32 ff.). 
Rather than implying only one essence, univocality would imply 
only one object, and have merely one sense – itself. Having 
retracted from truth to value, this “telos” is deemed the “positive 
value of univocity” (IOG 104). Such a positive univocity would 
determine a word as the same as itself at all times and places (IOG 
101, cf. 70, IOP 35).197 It would provide an “absolutely selfsame” 
sense to the word. A positively univocal word would thus ground 
itself as an identity, and ground ideal Objectivity. Moreover, 
should all of the word’s senses be fixed in one word, this would 
set aside relation to an external essence or greater whole 
                                                 
196 It was Derrida who later deemed that his outcome of ongoing verification 
of dialectic was immature (PdG xv, PG vii). 
197 Derrida explains: “[as] it brings everything to view within the present act of 
evidence, univocal language remains the same” (IOG 101, cf. 70). 
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(“language in general” (IOG 104)). That is, we note, univocity 
would imply that even part-whole relations vanish; language in 
general would be known absolutely. Positive univocity would be 
“absolute univocity” (IOG 104, cf. (271)). The form of Derrida’s 
questions have been developed again. 
To situate this, Derrida notes that Husserl seeks the univocity of 
each word in a scientific language. This would set aside language as 
equivocal, which latter seeks to refer to multiple objects and 
essences via its words (Derrida’s provides the example of Joyce’s 
Ulysses (IOG 102, 103 fn. 112)). Husserl rather seeks to 
“impoverish” language to arrive at the “transparency” of a 
referent as the origin of the word.  
Derrida begins from the initial component of passage – an 
undeniable (certain) univocity. He thus begins from the positing 
moment. Even should Joyce have wanted to write nonsense 
(“non-sens”), there “must have” been at least a consciousness of 
the intelligibility of his telos for Joyce in writing a word. An 
equivocal word must admit a first, a priori and undeniable moment 
of )particular) univocity, or its basis “would have been 
unintelligible” (IOG 103). Thus, Derrida argues, the “positive 
value of univocity” is a “common telos” even for equivocity 
(IOG 103)). This instils a first originary basis as positive; 
henceforth the positive progress is a priori. 
 - 265 
- 
As to the absolute determination of univocity from its first 
insertion into equivocity, Derrida argues by “reductio ad absurdum”. 
That is, he begins with the premise of absolute univocity to assess 
whether it is absurd. For a word as positively univocal to be a part 
of language, it requires a “network of linguistic relations”. It must 
thus be both with and without external relation. This 
“hypothesis” of a univocal language “is, then [donc] absurd and 
[essentially] contradictory” (IOG 103). As we explained (185), what is 
absurd first has sense but is then excluded from a priori and 
essential relations (behind) at any level, and from directions (sens).  
But just so, Derrida continues, this first univocity – as merely 
partial and finite – does not yet determine the absolute of univocity. 
Thus, partial univocity too as yet finds no absolute ground for its possibility:  
the ground of univocity […] is always relative 
(IOG 104).  
Univocity has to “re-admit” equivocity to its origin. However, as 
noted of Joyce, equivocity never appears even partially in the first 
constitution of this a priori positing. As it cannot be included in 
the first place to the horizon, equivocity would then be 
“irreducible” (IOG 103), in the fashion of temporality in Chapter 
One (131), as what certainly applies yet eludes appearing.  
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However, Derrida argues for Husserl, a scientific language has at 
least the certainty that its ideal objects can be asserted as 
repeatable “once and for all”, which can thus forever be 
repeatable as identical (IOG 104, OOG 165-166).198 This instils 
the horizon of possibility as an infinite progress of finite parts. 
Thus, as to irreducible equivocity in the first moment of passage, 
the undoubted moment of univocity in turn instils “the absolute horizon of 
equivocity” (IOG 104, our emphasis). The possible senses of 
equivocity are somehow predelineated by univocity, even though 
the latter’s ground is relative.  
However (moving forward), an absolute equivocity would exceed a 
finite horizon. For instance, we note, it would be absurd – and 
thus already essentially impossible – to suggest a limit to the 
linguistic relations of poetry. Equivocity, thus far, implies 
irreducibility at both the origin and the end. Without a ground for 
or possibility of material content at origin, or as object, Derrida 
writes “there is a sort of pure equivocity here” (IOG 104). 
However, the relation at origin is “non-symmetrical”, in that even 
the first positing of equivocity is univocal. This is why “there is” 
even a sort of pure equivocity. Even though merely finite, a first 
                                                 
198 Derrida quotes Husserl that “[I]n in accordance with the very essence of 
science, then, its functionaries maintain the constant claim, the personal 
certainty, that everything they put into scientific assertions has been said ‘once 
and for all’, that it ‘stands fast,’ forever identically repeatable, usable in 
evidence and for further theoretical or practical ends” (IOG 165-166). 
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univocal moment arises even with pure equivocity; however, 
equivocity is excluded from positing (irreducible).  
Thus Derrida develops the partial relations of the “finite” in this 
certainty of repeatability (IOG 105). As the ground of univocity is 
also relative in the progress of (finite) parts it “takes its source in 
an infinitely open project” (IOG 104), without determination 
either as absolutely univocal or equivocal.  
Derrida has worked through each of the elements of language, and instead of 
determination has found an open relation. He has not yet deemed this 
an “opening” prior to originary content. Rather, the progress 
“forward” does not yet absolutely determine the value of its 
object, but renders it open. Derrida goes on that, if equivocity is 
irreducible, this is because  
words and language in general are not and 
never can [i.e. essentially cannot] be absolute 
objects [forward] (IOG 104, Derrida’s 
emphasis). 
Thus far, for essential reasons, an irreducible equivocity prevents 
that words be absolute objects. However, even that emphasis is nested 
in a conditional form. Derrida proceeds by “hypothesis” (IOG 103). 
The “if” never affirms even the possibility of the antecedent (i.e. 
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the possibility that equivocity is irreducible). To affirm or deny 
even the ground of possibility for equivocity determines the 
irreducible, necessitating contradiction. No absolute foundation 
for either the univocity or equivocity of a word (thus nor of 
language in general) has yet been deemed possible or impossible. 
Crucially, in arriving at the “infinitely open project” rather than a ground 
for determination, Derrida is working out a pure circularity. His 
address to language in general has worked out that a first univocal 
moment is the a priori condition that permits passage toward a 
telos of itself as absolute (IOG 104). Univocity as 
the absolute horizon of equivocity […] is both the 
a priori and the teleological condition […] without 
which the very equivocations of […] history 
[behind] would not be possible. (IOG 104-
105, our emphases)  
But this “absolute” a priori condition arises only as a partial 
univocity with only a relative ground (behind). It thus as yet falls 
short of absolute determination in the repeatability of either 
univocity and equivocity as open. 
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The circularity of language, as conformant to the 
Idea in the Kantian sense 
This brings Derrida’s work in 1962 to an important juncture. We 
will summarise the characteristics of passage in the form of the 
circularity that has developed from univocity, and explain its parallel to 
the Idea in the Kantian sense.  
First, a univocal moment is a necessary condition for 
intelligibility. We noted that the Idea in the Kantian sense is 
necessary for appearing (IOG 142, (210)).199  
Second, as even equivocity is relative only to univocity, the latter 
undeniably arises as a finite certainty. The second characteristics of 
the Idea in the Kantian sense was that its finite content remains 
certain (I §§143, 145, (210)).  
Third, the common telos of the positive value of univocity, 
instilled a teleological consciousness. The third characteristic of 
the Idea in the Kantian sense was that it “demands” “givenness” 
(I §143, (210)).  
However, fourth, Derrida worked out that an absolute univocity of 
a word would be absurd (IOG 103), thus the absolutely univocal 
itself cannot enter the originary moment in the first place. The 
                                                 
199 As Derrida puts it: “The Idea, then, is not essence. [Moreover,] it is also 
necessary to say of the Idea that it has no essence [...]. As the invisible condition of 
evidence, by preserving the seen, it loses any reference to seeing indicated in 
eidos.” (IOG 142, our emphases).  
 - 270 
- 
fourth characteristic of the Idea in the Kantian sense was that it 
never appear as finite evidence itself (211).  
Rather, fifth, a moment of positive univocity applies as the 
horizon of equivocity, setting it an “infinite task” (IOG 104). 
Moreover (to proceed forward), a scientific language has at least 
the finite certainty that its ideal objects can be repeated in words 
“once and for all”, and thus be “identically repeatable” as the 
same in infinitum (IOG 104, OOG 165-166, fn.). The fifth 
characteristic of the Idea in the Kantian sense was that it allows 
repeatability as “ever one and the same”, and indeed as “infinite 
in all directions” (I §143, OOG 166, (211)). 
However, this passage of univocity to the object arose merely as 
an “infinitely open” project (IOG 103), not yet determined even 
as infinite or indefinite. The sixth characteristic of the Idea in the 
Kantian sense was that the progress of finite conditions not yet 
necessitate that the progress be infinite or indefinite (212). 
Even so, univocity remained both the absolute “teleological” and 
“a priori” condition of equivocity (beyond), a passage which 
would be absolute (IOG 104)). The seventh characteristic of the 
Idea in the Kantian sense was that it nevertheless proscribes the 
continuation of the progress as given absolutely (212).  
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This restored a circularity to univocity, and thus passage without 
absolute univocity; so too it restored the necessity of a return to 
circularity for the Idea in the Kantian sense.  
Indeed, a fortiori, Derrida thus goes on that in this progress of a 
word, identically repeatable as the same, to determine the ideal 
Objectivity of language, the former as yet finds no absolute 
univocity, thus no absolute ground for sameness: 
[A]bsolute univocity is inaccessible but only as 
an Idea in the Kantian sense can be (IOG 104, 
our emphases). 
Importantly, Derrida continues that the levels, directions, and 
thus passage in all of the relations of language in general are 
“analogous” to those of the Idea in the Kantian sense (IOG 106). 
 However, we note, the relations above are merely analogies. The 
circularities are merely basically conformant. The Idea in the 
Kantian sense proceeds as regulative evidence, whereas language 
certainly arise as phenomenological evidence. However, Derrida 
is seeking a way to address the conditions for determination. 
Thus, he suggests, the Idea in the Kantian sense “authorises” (i.e. 
provides the right (198)) to “leap” across to the limit (IOG 135, 
141) to determine the absolute. He begins to address the 
 - 272 
- 
requirements more directly, according to the Idea in the Kantian 
sense’s sort of evidence.  
Parenthesis – ambiguity and instability 
Before addressing this, we add an important relation: the 
circularity can still continue by means of language, and in words 
in particular. Derrida had explained that the a priori circularity 
would be a difficulty, which he aligned with “ambiguity”. That is, 
ambiguity has more than one sense, thus more than one possible 
value, and also implies a circularity “in” the word (from 
“ambigere”, which also has the sense of “to go around” (CDWH 
19)). Derrida employs “disappearance” as his example. As to “the 
possibility of truth’s disappearance”, he explains:  
[W]e purposely [i.e. toward this telos] use the 
ambiguous word disappearance. What 
disappears is what is annihilated, but also what 
ceases, intermittently or indefinitely, to appear in 
fact, yet without affecting its being or being-
sense (IOG 93, our emphases).  
In French, the word “disappearance” (disparition) has the sense of 
a departure from a place, of what no longer appears as something 
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(in progressing toward nothing, as an-nihil-ated), and then 
extinction or death. That is, the ambiguity first names the certain 
appearing in a living present, which sense is as yet open rather than 
a fact. It must return to the origin prior to living consciousness 
and disappear. Ambiguity evolves to a basis of passage in the 
sense of a single word, by which Derrida seeks to address the 
problem of the absolute. Derrida went on of this truth-sense:  
[T]o determine the sense of this 
‘disappearance’ of truth is the most difficult 
problem posed by […] all of Husserl’s 
phenomenology (IOG 93).  
When this ambiguity applies to an object in general, including a 
word, we henceforth deem it “instability”. There will be many such 
examples, the first will be that of “God” in his third argument.  
Next, we turn to the final segment of the “Introduction” (IOG 
134 ff.), as Derrida begins to address the issues directly. 
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Part Three: the first two arguments, spatiality and 
temporality 
Derrida thus goes on from language in general to address the four 
requirements from our previous chapter.200He had worked out that any 
sensible spatiotemporality must put its truth-sense “in danger” 
(258). Just so, the source of language in general merely has a value 
of the open. Yet he had devolved language in general to the pure 
noema, and can still speak of pure relations (249). His first two 
arguments question the possibility of an absolute ground for pure 
spatiotemporality (IOG 104). In turn, such relations are objective, 
and as pure can be questioned in general (forward). He thus is 
also questioning ideal objectivity in general:  
Husserl often says that ‘geometry’ is an 
‘abbreviation’ for all the objective and exact 
sciences of pure spatiotemporality. But this is 
generally true for all pure absolute ideal objectivity. 
(IDG 142, cf. IOG 131 fn., our emphases) 
As Derrida will assess what can be absolutely “true” of absolute 
ideal objectivity for spatiotemporality in general, this would settle 
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what can hold of an absolute ground of space and time for all of 
phenomenology, including the real (IOG 131 fn. 153).201 
The argument addressing spatiality 
Derrida’s first two arguments address the originary side, to assess whether 
the ground of possibility of ideal Objectivity can be absolute. As a 
ground must be sought in the origin (“behind”), Derrida turns to 
the “origin of the ability to idealise” (IOG 134). That is, he indeed 
asks how what does not yet exist is “graspable” as particular 
evidence (IOG 142 fn. 160 (201 ff.)). As noted, he treats the 
“already” as a difficulty (239), and disqualifies even pure formal 
ontologies (at the highest essential level) as a source. To be 
intended inside, the Idea must already have arrived.202 A relation 
from beyond essence must permit the content to be given (from 
behind), and in turn allow the ideation to essence. (IOG 139).  
Rather, explication of self-evidence as ideation toward the Idea 
(Wesenschau) from the first depends upon idealisation of the Idea in 
the Kantian sense. Derrida deems the latter “the invisible 
condition of evidence” (IOG 142, cf. fn. 170), and begins to 
examine its relations. The characteristics of the Idea in the 
                                                 
201 Derrida explains that the arguments will hold in essential spatial relations: for 
the Telos of Husserl’s overall model could be “true” in an a priori “only 
insofar as these objectivities are related [...] to spatiality in general; [and] [...] to 
movement in general.” (IOG 131, our emphasis)  
202 This exclusion occurs via protention and retention: “for the intentional 
anticipation [as protention] to leap to the infinite [forward], it must already be 
ideal.” (IOG 139). We will explain the spatial argument first, and address 
temporality second. 
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Kantian sense will apply overtly – it will be that which “never 
phenomenalises itself” (IOG 139), yet instils a regulative demand for 
the complete givenness of evidence, in a finitude not yet given 
absolutely that must and can be repeated in infinitum, permitting 
the object to be repeatedly identified as the same.  
Derrida begins from the simplest moment: that Husserl’s 
“archetypal” kind of evidence is finite. As we explained, Husserl’s 
approach is based on the decision to predicate of an evidential 
given, always presented “in person” (IOG 138-139), thus as 
always enough to predicate of.203 Husserl notes that the particular 
ongoing appearances in its directions must be infinite:  
[T]his continuum is more closely defined as infinite 
in all directions, consisting in all its phases of 
appearances of the same determinable X (I 
§143, our emphases). 
Importantly, Husserl avoids affirming the movement of 
directions is even infinite – it is rather a closer convergence upon 
this infinity. Yet it is evident and thus certain that the finite is 
given – the originary (“finitising”) moment. Insofar as the part is 
                                                 
203 The Idea’s “archetypal” form of evidence is the immediate presence of the 
thing itself “in person”. The latter is implicitly “the phenomenally defined or 
definable thing, therefore the finite thing.” (IOG 138-139). 
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not yet the whole of originary evidence, it is ever first possible to 
predicate of evidence, in infinitum.  
The difficulty resides still in finding a ground for this “primary 
possibility”. For Husserl does accord a ground for this 
convergence (cf. §§86, 116 (223 fn., 346 fn.)); yet the horizontal 
movement (of possibility) could be wrong. The infinitising could 
“in principle” only continue in infinitum were there no ideal laws. 
But it is the ideal laws (via the Idea) which must afford the 
principle (formal law), or else a judgment even of infinity can be 
wrong. Derrida notes that phenomenology is caught between its 
two principles – the “principle of principles”, which indeed takes 
the originary moment to supply evidence (it is “finitising”), and the 
ideation that seeks to move the finite into infinity (“infinitising” 
(IOG 138, cf. Leavey 16)).204  
We address the finitising basis first, at both the originary and 
objectual ends. First, the Idea essentially proscribes the presence 
of finitude in person. Such a presence would need to be the 
absolute terminus of the series of predications, rather than still 
given “now in this way, now in that” (195), which latter could be 
wrong. This leads to an important involution. It is easy to note 
                                                 
204 Derrida explains: “[p]henomenology would thus be stretched between the 
finitising consciousness of its principle [intentionality] and the infinitising 
consciousness of its final institution, [...] [and is] indefinitely deferred [différée] in 
its its content, but always evident in its regulative value.” (IOG 138, Derrida’s 
emphases). 
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that affirming Objectivity would unite it even with the “beyond”, 
at the end of passage. But crucially, as what must arise at origin, as 
the foundation even of essence, the Idea thus can be equated with the 
telos of absolute solution. The demand is for absolute solution to 
ideal Objectivity, thus to anything which can be an object (Truth, 
determination of the thing itself, Science, and so on).  
However, at the objectual end, finitude can only be given in 
phenomenological evidence. Thus when the object is the Idea 
itself the content of this evidence is set aside, for the Idea 
demands the finite (hence is not yet the finite). This Idea would be 
the “Idea (in the Kantian sense)”. But then the particular 
comprehension of the Idea in the Kantian sense is no longer 
dependent on appearing in phenomenological evidence.205 As 
Derrida explains: 
[I]ts own particular presence, then, cannot 
depend on a phenomenological type of 
evidence (IOG 139, cf. I §143 (211)).
206
 
                                                 
205 Derrida puts it that “it loses any reference to seeing indicated in eidos […]. 
The Idea can only be heard [entendre]” (IOG 142). “Entendre”, Leavey notes, 
also has the sense of “understand”; although what is heard does not appear.  
206 “Presence” at this juncture is merely associated with the object that must be 
absolutely affirmed. 
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To assess what can be said of it, then – as made an object without 
evidential content, the Idea in the Kantian sense is finite only as 
“pure” and “formal” – thus the content of the Idea in the 
Kantian sense is absent from finite evidence. Its 
content [...] is evidence only insofar as it is 
finite, i.e. here, formal, since the content of the 
infinite Idea is absent (IOG 139, Derrida’s 
emphases).  
On the objectual side, as the Idea in the Kantian sense must (and 
problematically does) allow the repeatability of the object, as the 
“Same X”, it would predelineate the possibilities of objectivity as 
infinite. Thus, as original pole of the demand, it is also the starting 
point from which something in general can be determined (IOG 
139). The Idea in the Kantian sense is, in effect, also the foundation 
of the categories of pure and formal ontology that can determine content 
(Object, Something etc.). It would be the basis of Objectivity as 
such. Derrida thus goes on: 
[T]he Idea [in the Kantian sense] is the basis 
[fond] on which a phenomenology is set up in 
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order to achieve the final intention of 
philosophy. (IOG 141)
207
  
Hence (which is more than a recap) this “basis” (foundation) 
instils the necessity of an institutive infinitising that could arise 
only as devoid of finite evidence of itself, or any objectivity (as a 
condition for something); second, it necessarily seeks determination 
of the finitude of this evidence, and third, it must then make that 
objectivity possible in its determinability. These are the characteristics of 
intentionality. As noted, Derrida first founded even the latter upon 
the category of the object in general (IOG 234, (224)). But the 
latter in turn depends upon an Idea as no longer even objective. 
Derrida sums up: 
[T]he Idea [in the Kantian sense] is only the 
pole of a pure intention, empty of every 
determined object. It alone reveals, then, the 
being of the intention: intentionality itself. 
(IOG 139) 
                                                 
207 Derrida settles upon the Idea in the Kantian sense as the basis instead of 
Husserl’s a priori of History, as the former would found even the a prioris.  
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By this Derrida avoids (absolutely) affirming such an Idea, or that 
it is intentionality absolutely, for it has as yet no evidence. It is 
merely the basis that must permit intentionality in general. What 
would found the end of phenomenology must found its 
beginning. But importantly, as it also must found possibility on 
the side of givenness, the Idea in the Kantian sense arises as a pure pole 
(IOG 139) as yet without a possible evidence of itself, but which must pass to 
itself.  
We thus assess the kind of evidence that this Idea in the Kantian 
sense requires to achieve the “final intention of philosophy” (the 
absolute). It follows – and Derrida quotes Husserl to this effect – 
that this evidence is of an “absolutely exceptional” kind (IOG 
139, cf. §143);208 such an Idea allows no originary or finite content 
that is evidence of itself as Idea.209 
Hence we turn to the “infinitising” side. Note that “infinitising” is 
not yet an objectual infinite, nor posited of trivial evidence (which 
latter is the ultimate authority for the possibility of intuition, the 
principle of principles). Infinitising arises upon the “side” of the 
necessary and regulative principle. Derrida explains this return to 
the origin via the relation of the infinite and indefinite. Return to 
                                                 
208 Derrida quotes Husserl, this Idea “designat[es] through its essential nature a 
type of evidence that is its own.” (I §143, IOG 139). As noted, Boyce Gibson 
translates this “evidence” as “insight”, which Husserl deems is “evidence in 
general” (§137). 
209 It “has no proper content, or rather it is not evidence of the Idea’s content.” 
(IOG 139). 
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Kant is helpful to explain this. In address to the necessity to 
determine the totality of conditions, Kant allowed for both a 
regressus in infinitum and in indefinitum (CPR A511/B540).210 For 
Kant, if the whole can be given in experience, then a series is 
possible as given in infinitum; however, if only one part can be 
given, this series is possible only in indefinitum. For example, a 
piece of matter, Kant argues, can be divided into parts in infinitum, 
but the series of ancestors proceeding backward could only be 
given in indefinitum; as there may or may not be a final ancestor, 
one cannot be judged that the procedure is infinite. Just so, as we 
explained, Husserl is aware that determining even that a whole of 
a given series (parts of parts, in space and time) is infinite, or even 
that it can really be infinite (a real possibility) would determine 
finitude (LI 3 §25, (207)).  
Husserl follows his logical bases; he cannot affirm either the 
finitude of the formal progress to determine the origin (for then 
he determines a finitude absolutely) or its infinitude, for no law 
allows this (LI 3 §25, above). No evidential ground yet holds for a law 
that permits positing an end to the series that seeks to affirm the 
first real origin; even infinitising constitutes the finite as 
                                                 
210 Kant puts it: “[I]f the series is given in empirical intuition as a whole, the 
regress in the series of its internal conditions proceeds in infinitum; but if only 
one member of the series is given, from which the regress is to proceed to 
absolute totality, the regress is possible only in indefinitum.” (CPR A511/B540). 
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indefinite.211 Thus in 1954 Derrida complained that Husserl never 
considered the origin of the temporal series (130). In 1962 (hence 
we are considering the series in general, and only reach the 
temporal (below [pg[) Derrida admits that Husserl’s omission was 
strategic.  
Thus we continue to a seeming difficulty. Husserl allowed a 
certain right of convergence upon the continuum as infinite (I 
§143), yet no formal law provides this ground (LI 3 §25). To be 
sure, the Idea’s content is never supposed to be law, but what 
founds law. Thus Husserl seeks to retain a unique kind of evidence 
(and the ground for certainty) of the Idea as regulative. Derrida 
summarises that phenomenology is “stretched” between its finite 
moment as regulative principle, evident as regulative rather than as 
content, and the resultant necessity of consciousness that the 
ongoing finite series be made absolute (“infinitising 
consciousness”). Husserl seeks a basis 
indefinitely deferred [différée] in its content but 
always evident in its regulative value (IOG 
138).  
                                                 
211 For Kant, this applies particularly when there may not be a final term. For 
Husserl as Derrida reads him, this holds in general as there may not yet be a 
ground for positing the infinite. 
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Thus we reach Derrida’s first mention of “deferral” in his oeuvre.212 While 
as yet undeveloped (it merely addresses a progress as not yet 
determined content, without yet relating to Difference), it arises 
from an important implication.213 Thus far even a certainty of the 
convergence of the finite upon the infinite no longer corresponds 
to its trivial evidence. Hence 
the finite certainty of infinite 
phenomenological determinability [is] a 
certainty without a corresponding evidence. 
(IOG 139) 
Yet Derrida too takes it as certain that a ground for the possibility 
of the objectual holds, demanding that it be absolute; thus he 
begins to assess this regulative kind of evidence. 
But rather than invalidating certainty, its basis is merely resituated. 
For Husserl still retains one certainty at the finitising side, and thus one 
finitude: that of the indefinite. Hence Husserl does need a simple 
ground (the logical content which reveals a necessity) to allow this 
certitude of a finitude. The regulative idea with its own unique 
                                                 
212 Credit must be given to the translator Leavey, in his attentive translation, 
for isolating the instances of this word in the work.  
213 Leavey has explained this paragraph as the overall result of Derrida’s 
introduction. By following the procedure, we are working out how this is still 
only a first moment, which Derrida will interrogate in much more detail before 
leading toward deferral of Difference in closing. 
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evidence thus does need the provision of at least one content from 
(trivial) evidence. Husserl’s basis comes to depend upon just the 
provision of a content which the Idea itself excludes. The pure 
pole of intentionality allows no content to describe itself as 
regulative.214 Hence this content essentially cannot find a logical 
ground.  
Nor, at the last, can phenomenology thus ground the positing of 
the “limiting” of its power215 even that of positing the infinite or 
indefinite. Crucially, as the intention for Derrida is the basis of 
phenomenology, he goes on: 
[A]ccordingly, phenomenology cannot be 
grounded as such in itself, nor can it itself 
indicate its own proper limits. (IOG 140, 
Derrida’s emphases)
216
 
                                                 
214 Thus Husserl cannot “describe” an “intention in which nothing is given [...], 
at least, not in its content.” (IOG 140). 
215 As Boyce Gibson has explained, “power” (Kraft) is a synonym for the weight 
of positing (I 454). 
216 That is, even though for Husserl “the general aim of grounding science 
absolutely” (CM §3 ff., our emphasis) motivates his project in 1931, its own 
relations originarily fall short of this Telos. For Derrida, “phenomenology’s 
ultimate critical legitimation: i.e. what its sense, value and right tell us about it 
[...] never directly measures up to phenomenology” (IOG 141). By this 
juncture, phenomenology, in a constituting pole positing itself, cannot find a 
logical ground for positing its own value, even though its general Telos 
remains. 
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Is it is positing of evidence which provides a ground that (along 
with a right and reason) allows the convergence on the object. 
Thus on the positing side of self-evidence, even though positing 
instils necessity, a ground for this basis has not yet been found 
within phenomenology. 
For the first time in the “Introduction”, Derrida’s progress is 
overtly no longer in accordance with Husserl. It is a difficulty for 
Derrida that in doing so, he takes a position from outside the 
formal or transcendental approach of transcendental subjectivity 
in a natural and absolute affirmation of what objectually occurs. 
Derrida notes that Husserl, “without wanting to” posits space 
anyway (IOG 140, our emphasis). Even though he never wants 
to, nevertheless 
Husserl [...] recognises, distinguishes and posits 
this intentionality as the highest source of 
value. He locates the space where consciousness 
notifies itself of the Idea’s prescription. (IOG 
140, Derrida’s emphases) 
Derrida is developing his first result. Thus far, a positing of space 
goes on anyway even without a regulative ground for its pure 
possibility, and thus without absolute phenomenological possibility. Just so, 
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this positing of a highest value occurs even of the objectual 
absolute as indefinite.  
As a ground supplies a right of convergence upon the object, this 
outcome will be Derrida’s basis for developing a positing of space 
even without ground for convergence even upon external spatiality. From 
this juncture, “positing” refers to a positing without a ground for 
the object in which objects appear. However, we note that this 
loss of absolute ground of pure (also called “phenomenological”) 
possibility does not yet impede the first “regulative possibility” 
(IOG 139)) of the Idea’s kind of evidence. With this development 
in place, we turn toward Derrida’s second argument. 
The argument addressing temporality  
For the above also applies to temporality, and we return to the 
“indefinite”. First, we note a further way to explain the 
groundless positing of the indefinite. As noted, even positing the 
possibility of the indefinite posits of the object, thus its value is at 
least open. However, a positing also implies that even this 
inability to determine the open cannot yet find a ground.  
This preface in place, Derrida’s assessment of the second 
requirement for determining the absolute – predication of 
temporality – can be explained concisely. It again depends upon 
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the Idea and thus the argument above.217 Derrida begins with 
phenomenological time, where the future is treated as the Telos. 
What must be perceived in time has not yet occurred, and is 
posited as a protention (forward). These set out only pure 
possibilities (ITC §§24, 25 (124 ff.)). The demand to determine 
time requires that the content of the protention be fixed. Yet as 
Derrida requires a factual temporal moment, for the origin to be 
present “now” (IOG 136)) rather than in an objective time and 
thus separate from me (ITC §1 (139)) it must be lived. Derrida 
takes this back to the Living Present in its essential directions.218 To 
appear, this lived moment cannot be fixed as the now itself, for 
that would leave the Living Present on the inside of the Now, and 
temporality outside the Now.  
Instead, Derrida remains with phenomenology’s kind of thinking, 
calling this the Now as such (comme telle). Temporality is taken in 
the manner of its appearing, thus no longer referring to an 
objective temporality, or to an external whole for its completion 
(207).219 But here, as essential, would appear the (noematic) 
                                                 
217 Derrida set up the approach to temporality prior to the static argument, to 
make the static result (his passage) definitive. We have swapped them to avoid 
an extremely lengthy first argument. 
218 All of this is summarised in Derrida’s dense sentence: “[T]he Living Present 
has the irreducible originality of a Now, the ground of a Here, only if it retains 
[...] the past Now as such, i.e. as the present past (présent passé) of an absolute 
origin, instead of purely and simply succeeding it in an objective time.” (IDG 
149, cf. IOG 136-137).  
219 Husserl, in the Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness, explained: “[O]ur aim is 
a phenomenological analysis […]. [I]nvolved in this, as in any other such 
analysis, is the complete exclusion of every assumption, stipulation or 
conviction concerning Objective time (of all transcendent presuppositions 
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phenomenon as the sense of the predication, while “itself” for 
Derrida refers to the noematic constitution of the external as 
absolute (cf. IOP 33-34). As the content of this kind of objectual 
appearing has a sense (Sinn), in this instance, this moment now as 
such in the Living Present must be a “present past” (present passé), 
that sense of the past returned from behind to the present (IOG 
136-137). Thus what holds from behind, for Derrida, also holds 
as a priori and essential, which future remains as a pure possibility as 
yet without objective content (forward). Just as in Husserl’s 
example of objective “pleasure” which evolves to the “pleasing” 
as such (137), Derrida calls the objectivity of the “Now” 
(Maintenant) which is necessary as such a “Nowness” (Maintenance). 
The temporal has become an ideal Objectivity as such.  
It is pertinent to note a somewhat polemical move by Derrida. 
What can be restored as a present past could be a sedimented 
memory, holding in accordance with a priori law, but can also be 
a retention. The latter is no longer compatible with Derrida’s 
project of seeking for the first judgment in history, which would be 
secondary memory that can be false. To preserve purity, and 
alignment between the “return inquiry” and Living Present, 
                                                                                                        
concerning existents). […] [Thus] what we accept, […] is not the existence of a 
world-time, the existence of concrete duration, and the like, but time and 
duration appearing as such.” (ITC §1). 
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Derrida overtly privileges the protention (IOG 137).220 For the 
future to be able to be lived as fixed – to determine the origin – 
retention in turn depends on the protention for its material 
basis.221 That is, for the originary act to be restored in its 
phenomenological sense, it could have been lived only as a pure 
moment which comes from the future, and which has thus not 
yet appeared (IOG 137); thus indeed implying an indefiniteness in 
its appearing. Derrida summarises the difficulty in a rather 
formidable sentence: 
[T]his Maintenance [Nowness] itself appears as 
such, it is the Living Present, and it has the 
phenomenological sense of a consciousness only if 
the unity of this movement is given as indefinite 
and if its sense of indefiniteness is announced 
                                                 
220 That is, we must admit “the privileged position of the protentional 
dimension in intentionality, that of the future in the constitution of space in 
general must be acknowledged.” (IOG 137). 
221 Derrida explains: “this retention will not be possible without a protention 
which is its very form” (IOG 137). Only the directional form of the protention 
could allow the material element to be restored in the retention. 
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in the Present (IOG 137, Derrida’s 
emphases).
222
 
As noted, when predicating loses its ground, verbs of correlative 
language can still hold (“is announced”). Second, Derrida has retracted 
to necessary conditions (“only if”), which can proceed without a 
ground for possibility, as the latter first requires a necessity. The 
necessary condition of the absolute is determination of the future 
in the Now (the Living Present).  
To move from this evolution of Derrida’s approach to the 
argument: the characteristic of now-ness (rather than the “Now” 
itself, which would be absolutely objectual) could only appear even 
“as such”, as Living, only if a basis of finitude – or infinity – is 
avoided (as we come to, either must pass to opening).223 
Nevertheless, finitude is certainly announced as such. Yet to make 
this temporal basis of the first institutive act (predicatively) 
possible, there would need to be a productive act: that is, without 
ground for positing an “outside”, thus preventing positing of a 
                                                 
222 Husserl does refer to the finite and infinite, but we have found no such 
reference directly to the “indefinite” in relation to the Idea in the Kantian sense 
in those paragraphs in Husserl’s published work to which Derrida refers (for 
example, in the Ideas, Husserl explains that it is “intrinsically incapable of being 
given”, and “endless” (I §43, cf. 83). Derrida refers to Group C of the 
manuscripts at this juncture in the Husserl Archive (IOG 137). 
223 Such an idealised space would allow “us to go immediately to the infinite 
limit of what is in fact an unfinished movement” (IOG 136). For Derrida, this 
cannot be justified. 
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content from the future as finite or even infinite, or temporality 
itself.224  
Yet even though no ground for a simple distance yet arises to 
allow even a subsequent content, the progress is an involution to the 
originary, prior to content, which space is located anyway. Moreover, 
even without a ground, a moment of originary space retains the 
necessity of a right. As noted (198), a “right” (Recht) for Husserl 
also arises at the originary side, as accorded by the authentic 
(ursprüngliche (202)) relation of the originary to evidence and its 
certainty of a given object. Reason retains its right to constituting 
of ideal objectivity. Thus, for this (undeniable) right to be 
provided, it would need to be lived. Derrida goes on that this 
movement holds in the Living Present only 
if the opening of the infinite future is, as such, 
a possibility lived [vécue] as sense and right 
(IOG 137). 
The second argument concerning temporality then devolves to 
depend on that of spatiality. It too cannot absolutely ground 
phenomenology. However, this progress is no longer merely an 
                                                 
224 It “will not be comprehended as sense but as a fact extrinsic to the 
movement of temporalisation.” 
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infinitely open project, which the analogy with language had 
developed, but an opening. 
Parenthesis – space and the opening 
For, in address to both space and time, Derrida has worked out a 
progress, as yet without a ground for determination, yet prior 
even to originary evidence and originary content. He has moved from 
the “infinitely open” to the criteria for “opening” (228). For essential 
reasons, this ought to preclude any possibility of a ground for 
ideal objectivity or a fact at all. Yet Derrida arrives at “opening” 
only upon arguing for his evolution. This opening retains a right 
and is lived. Moreover, even without a ground, and even without 
wanting to, yet Husserl “posits” this space anyway. Opening is 
introduced in its essential relations without a ground for originary 
content, prior to phenomenological evidence, yet arising with 
originary space.225 Moreover, the first possibility of time is not yet 
precluded (indeed, it is certain), and the necessity still holds to 
determine it absolutely (forward). Derrida has not yet found an 
absolute ground; but nor will he yet allow preclusion of 
possibility. The opening retains the possibility of determining 
objectivity in space or time.  
                                                 
225 Note that we avoid deeming – yet – that opening arises as a direct metaphor 
for the opening of originary space. Derrida argues for the positing of space and 
possibility of time that goes along with opening.  
 - 294 
- 
Part Four: the next two arguments, genitivity and 
the beyond as God 
Situating the progress via Derrida 
Thus, without an evident ground for pure spatiotemporality, 
Derrida sets aside seeking a ground for the possibility of its ideal 
Objectivity. He indeed turns directly to assess whether ideal 
objectivity can be absolutely real as an object (i.e. as an individual 
in its spatiotemporal position). That is, he begins to directly assess 
whether intentionality can go “beyond” itself to a real absolute. 
By this juncture, however, Derrida is also working out what the 
approach implies, even should no absolute determination be 
arrived at. 
Situating the implications of the progress  
That is, the implications of the progress are more accurately taken 
as following less from a “Derrida” (or Husserl) interpreted as a 
philosopher in a natural attitude than in accordance with the 
necessities of transcendental subjectivity. Thus far, an absolute 
ground of possibility of ideal Objectivity has not yet been found 
in pure spatiotemporality (although positing of space goes on anyway). 
Moreover, a regulative necessity and possibility remain 
foundational even without such evidence, to permit the closer 
determination of the finite as infinite: 
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[W]hat does appear is only the regulative 
possibility of appearing and the finite certainty 
of infinite phenomenological determinability 
(IOG 139). 
The above is not yet a “result” (réponse) of the logic or “answer” 
(in French, also réponse) to the question; such an answer would 
determine a content,226 while the question has merely implied an 
opening (IOG 56, cf. IDG 164, IOG 148). Instead, insofar as it is 
originarily prior to content, the pure and regulative possibility and 
necessity of the teleological subject seeking an answer implies a 
responsibility (réponsibilité) for the future.227 Hence 
phenomenology starts from the lived 
anticipation as a radical [originary] 
responsibility (IOG 141, cf. 146). 
Thus far, the responsibility to determine the content in this and 
future times as the same for everyone, hence as True, is based on 
                                                 
226 Derrida emphasised this use of “réponse” (as both “result” and “answer”) in 
first arriving at his questioning of mathematical indeterminacy, as the teleology 
and his opening: “such a question cannot expect a determined result [réponse], it should 
only indicate the pure opening and unity of an infinite horizon [of possibility]” 
(IOG 56, cf. IDG 164, IOG 148, (232), our emphases). 
227 The German versions of the relations from which Derrida develops 
“réponse” and “réponsibilité” are “Antwort” and “Verantwortung” (cf. IOG 149). 
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the Idea in the Kantian sense, “in order to achieve the final 
intention of philosophy” (IOG 141). Yet the Idea is never known 
by any evidence except the regulative demand and responsibility 
to know it (IOG 137).228  
Indeed, note that while Derrida began by aligning the teleological 
(ideal) object with irreality, he had not yet justified it as noematic 
(236). This Idea as “pure pole” of the opening, but moreover 
without even a ground for space, time, or the possibility of 
evidence, qualifies as an extreme sort of irreal noema. Hence 
importantly, in such a teleology it can be said to be only the 
purest source of being without even pure content or essence; that 
is, the being of intentionality itself. As pure relation to the object, in the 
furthest moment from its particular sense, it  
is, in the broadest sense, Objectivity itself. 
(IOG 139) 
Thus, Derrida summarises, Husserl  
                                                 
228 Thus what makes this “phenomenalisation of time possible” is “therefore 
always the Idea in the Kantian sense which never phenomenalises itself.” (IOG 
137). 
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speaks of disclosing the final sense (Zwecksinn) 
of science as a ‘noematic phenomenon’. (IOG 
142, cf. CM §§4) 
Derrida can thus begin to align this basis with transcendental 
subjectivity in its directions, and the responsibility to determine 
the origin as a fact, in order to prepare for his next two 
arguments. For what must be determined in future (the telos as 
“target”) is History (“behind”). Of course, the joint between the 
Idea and History is a problem; if the basis of the Idea is 
ahistorical (outside History), how could it interact with the first 
historical fact, that is, here and now (IOG 141)?229 Yet as a certain 
basis on history is necessary, there must have been an origin.230 
Indeed, there must even have been an “empirical” origin in the 
simplest sense of this term. But “inside”, the return-inquiry 
requires explicating of the absolute object (the object itself) here in 
a determined space. However, as its history is sedimented in the 
object as such, this must reveal the historicity now. The certain 
                                                 
229 Derrida writes: “Are we not confronted with an ahistorical Idea on the one 
hand and its insertion in the event or historical fact on the other?” (IOG 141, 
our emphases). 
230 Hence, “[W]hat we truly need is to investigate the Idea’s profound 
historicity.” (IOG 141). 
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historical origin (“behind”) must be affirmed here and now in 
phenomenology as such.231  
The basis of the double necessity 
Importantly, Derrida had earlier deemed this 
a double necessity: it is that of a Quod [because, 
why?] and a Quomodo [how?], a necessity of 
having had a historical origin, and having had 
such an origin (IOG 49, Derrida’s emphases).  
Phenomenology in this nexus of Objectivity questions the divide 
between “why” this origin arose in history (there) and “how” to 
speak of it as such (here). For, since Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations 
(CM §8, (cf. 463)), the transcendental subject was deemed to 
explicate the sedimented history (there) as given to itself (here). 
The regulative necessity, for the subject, evolves to its 
responsibility. Combining the above, the double necessity occurs 
in the noematic constitution of the responsibility for the 
transcendental subject to ask itself why the origin is given to itself, 
and what of the origin is given.  
                                                 
231 To relate this to the earlier argument, the regulative demand is for the 
totality of the temporal series, as finite appearing in infinitum, to be given now, 
while even the indefinite relation between the infinite and its Telos, is located 
willy nilly, as a stretch in space. 
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Rather than a History, this evolution to subjectivity instils the 
regulative possibility in irreality, with the telos of explicating the 
origin, as the subject’s historicity (Geschichtlichkeit).232 These instil the 
directions (sens) as “historico-transcendental subjectivity” (IOG 
142). As Derrida puts it: 
historicity […] is a ‘sense’, a teleological ought-
to-be which constitutes being as movement. 
(IOG 145, Derrida’s emphasis, cf. 150)  
To be sure, this necessity holds as one single intentional passage 
which finds its historicity sedimented in its object (forward) (IOG 
148). Subjectivity and objectivity (itself) mutually constitute of one 
another, in a finitude without ground even for positing space or 
time in the Idea (IOG 142, cf. CM §34).233 No distance arises to speak 
of, or ground to find. The transcendental basis successively evolves 
backward into itself.  
Thus, in its most “radical” moment – this also implies its 
etymological sense, of historical “root” – Derrida’s telos of the 
absolute as objectual is devolving to the essential necessity of what Derrida 
                                                 
232 Derrida explains that “these essential interconnections would be impossible, 
they would be nothing without a transcendental subjectivity and its 
transcendental historicity” (IOG 142). 
233 As Derrida explains it, “subject and object are reciprocally engendered and 
governed” (IOG 142).  
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will call the Absolute. It no longer constitutes an objective absolute 
here, no longer only descends into an originary history “there”, 
which space would constitute its empirical limit. As Derrida puts 
it: 
[T]he Idea is not an Absolute that first exists in 
the plenitude of its essence and then descends 
into history [...]. If that were true, all 
transcendental historicity could be said to be 
only an “empirical history [...]” (IOG 142, 
quoting Cavaillès 1947, 77, our emphases).  
Such an Absolute is no longer concerned with avoiding appearing 
as “now in this way, now in that”, in the fashion of the objective 
absolute thus far (195). As Absolute – in the upper case – it is 
essential insofar as its movement is that of the responsibility of 
transcendental subjectivity to circulate in its Objectivity rather than as 
objective,234 as the pure and regulative circularity of the Reason. Quoting 
Husserl, Derrida summarises this pole of the Absolute, 
combining the Idea and historico-transcendental circularity as 
                                                 
234 As to Derrida’s use of “circularity”, he writes that in the movement of 
historicity “Traditionality is what circulates from one to the other in a movement 
wherein consciousness discovers its path in an indefinite reduction, always already 
begun, and wherein every adventure is a change of direction” (IOG 149). We 
have italicised the bases that we have explained. 
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“absolute subjectivity in its historicity” (IOG 144, fn. 173, cf. 
Diemer, 36).235 The only absolute thus far is the circularity prior 
to objectivity. But Derrida has not yet turned away from the 
absolute as Object – the argument is still in progress.  
The alignment of the Idea in the Kantian sense 
and Speech 
Derrida thus redresses his earlier difficulties with speech and 
writing. A writing perduring across history (from behind) and 
positing of space (across) provided no absolute ground of 
possibility for ideal objectivity. The difficulty, Derrida has come 
to realise, is that phenomenological evidence demands what is 
“visible”, “in front of” the subject (as writing or any spatial 
determination). Hence nor did the speaking subject find a ground 
for the same object “in front of” it; historico-transcendental 
subjectivity is prior to a human subject. Thus Speech – as essential 
and a priori – by its essence also cannot appear in 
phenomenological evidence (behind), yet makes particular acts 
without visual content possible. Speech in general is “like” – 
analogous to rather than the same as – the irreducible Idea in the 
                                                 
235 Derrida refers this subjectivity to a letter by Husserl, published by A. 
Diemer (1954), which Derrida will also quote from in his final argument on 
transcendental divinity. Husserl writes: “For, with the transcendental reduction, 
we attained, we are convinced, concrete and real subjectivity in the ultimate 
sense [...], and in this subjectivity, universal constituting life [...]: absolute 
subjectivity in its historicity” (Diemer 36, IOG 145, fn. 173). We still employ 
the lower case version of “absolute” as it will be to this kind, Derrida suggests, 
to which Husserl devolves. 
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Kantian sense and its regulative possibility.236 Derrida no longer 
makes writing the “sine qua non”, for even when it finds no 
ground, and even though the Idea essentially cannot appear in 
phenomenological evidence to be determined, the movement 
then permits something in general to be said (IOG 139). Derrida 
goes on: 
[T]hat a phenomenological determination of 
the Idea itself may be radically impossible from 
then on [after its particular kind of evidence] 
signifies perhaps that phenomenology […], 
can never be given in a philosophy of seeing, 
but (like all Speech) can only be heard or 
understood through [i.e. in passage through] 
the visible. (IOG 141)  
That it is necessary to go back to the irreducible (such as the 
presence of Speech) to assess originary writing will be important 
in “Of Grammatology” (cf. 890). Thus far, in general, Derrida has 
made the Idea in the Kantian sense permit a thought of 
                                                 
236 Levinas emphasises this “logical” divergence of the like and the same cf. TI 
289, TEI 26. 
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something in general, in a phenomenology which no longer gains 
a simple distance or ground to reflect on its object.  
The Absolute of Genitivity as pure possibility 
Yet in addressing the originary and objectual sides of passage 
Derrida has merely assessed consciousness of something. Next, he 
addresses “consciousness of something” (which relates the 
transcendental subject to the ideal object) via correlative language 
in general. Hence Derrida turns to the genitive relation to the object and 
its possibility. He excludes the particular bases – noting of language 
that this “of” can be neither an absolutely subjective nor an 
objective genitive (IOG 143). He explains:  
[T]he of designates neither a merely objective 
nor a merely subjective genitive (IOG 142). 
Derrida is brief, and we interpolate an explanation from 
linguistics. Subjective and objective genitives have a common 
form that unites two words, to allow definition of the linguistic 
subject and object. The subject in such cases is the active agent and 
the object the recipient of the act (or patient)). The subject, for 
Derrida is also the logical object, “S”, which has devolved since to 
the originary, active and essential object as the noematic correlate in 
pure transcendental subjectivity – in such a thought, the subject is 
something. The object is rather the ideal objectivity as predicative; it 
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“is P”, which demand is for the absolute, as consciousness. Each 
genitive can be recognised by revising the linguistic sentence.  
In general, then, Derrida explains, what is being assessed is the 
Absolute of Objectivity itself. In this phrase the “consciousness of 
something” would signify the subjective genitive, and “something of 
consciousness” what is objective. Hence the originary 
consciousness of the object in the objective genitive remains 
certain, as the “pure relation to the object”; however, the 
subjective genitive finds merely a regulative possibility in its 
dependence upon the irreducible Idea in the opening (IOG 143). 
The subject can be made originary object, and dependent upon a 
prior opening, and the subject in its regulative opening can 
constitute the originary (pure) object. Even so, the general form 
of the “of” remains common and implies its possibility. Derrida 
explains that  
[T]he of can mark the subject’s; as well as the 
object’s, genealogically secondary and 
dependent status; then, through the very 
opening of its indetermination, it can mark its 
originary interdependence. (IDG 157, cf. IOG 
143, Derrida’s emphases). 
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Such a circularity of opening and originary does not yet even determine 
the absolute possibility of facticity, let alone an absolute fact (IOG 144). 
Rather, the circularity – i.e. passage – of genitivity retracts to a 
possibility prior even to the originary content and its absolute, to 
an Absolute. Derrida summarises: 
the Absolute of genitivity itself is the pure 
possibility of a genetic [originary] relation (IOG 
143, our emphases second). 
Moreover, we note, the progress implies that the transcendental 
circularity to the Absolute retracts to passage in general, in the circularity of 
the opening and the originary. Yet Derrida has still not yet abandoned 
the demand that the absolute be objectual. 
Preparing for the final address to the real 
Having as yet found no absolute result, Derrida addresses the 
second half of his question directly. He considers what can be 
absolutely determined of the original objectual act in general, as to 
whether it exceeds the (noematic) irreal object. Derrida asks 
whether a pure possibility to posit the “beyond” (au delà, cf. IOG 
78, 82) as absolute transcends irreality to arrive at the real. To 
assess this, Derrida must re-orient the entire basis of transcendental 
subjectivity toward the beyond as object. He prepares for this in (at 
least) six moments, four upon the originary basis of the Absolute 
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in subjectivity (soon to be termed the Logos), and three at the 
objectual or Teleological end. That is, Derrida is asking Husserl’s 
question (IOG 63, IOP 17, (233)): how can subjectivity go out of 
itself, to encounter the object as a fact? 237 
First, on the side of the originary: as noted, each relation in 
historico-transcendental subjectivity is based upon the Idea. This 
includes the Ego’s constituting of itself, as ego. Thus, first, 
Reason is made a condition of historico-transcendental 
subjectivity. To do so, by referring primarily to the Cartesian 
Meditations (CM §34, IOG 145 fn. 174),238 Derrida dismisses the 
suggestion that Reason is an ability, for indeed, the latter restores 
psychologism, positioning reason as “extrinsic” to History (IOG 
145). Rather, second, he notes that there could have been no 
institutive act without an (irreal) act of Reason in historicity as 
such (rather than History itself), nor could there have been 
transmission across the tradition without historicity.  
Third, Derrida thus evolves Reason to the Logos. From the outset 
of the Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl (FTL §1ff.) 
devolved the Logos to investigation of what the Ego can 
establish. Logos, for Husserl, implies Reason as thinking, the 
                                                 
237 Husserl puts this: “we have still not yet gone beyond the subject and his 
objective, evident capacities; that is, we still have no ‘objectivity’ given.” (OOG 
163). 
238 Derrida reveals his exercise in selecting elements which are helpful to his 
model at this juncture, for Husserl does say reason is an ability in the Formal 
and Transcendental Logic (FTL §1). 
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general form of consciousness of the object. Logical predication 
is one part or form of thinking, as is speech. That is, henceforth, 
the Logos implies the uttering (and thus speech) of what is 
thought (FTL §1),239 as well as correlative predicating or asserting 
of the object. The Logos is thus the 
predicating, the asserting, or other thinking in 
which a sense-content is generated as 
concerning the objects [...] in question (FTL 
§1). 
The Logos is the irreal form of thinking (in particular as speaking, 
positing, asserting and so on) of the object, in which the sense-
content is generated (for Derrida, produced), impelled by 
regulative evidence with a telos of Truth (FTL §1).240 As we 
explained, for Husserl, convergence upon Truth occurs in the 
nexus of positing and Reason, to which the right to determine the 
Truth more closely is provided by the ground of evidence (I 
§134). The right holds even without a ground. As noted, Derrida 
prefers to avoid the telos as only “absolute truth” (IOG 146 fn. 
177), in this “common telos” such values can be signified in many 
                                                 
239 “Logos” in Classical Greek means “speech” (FTL §1).  
240 Husserl also explains that “reason itself is thinking directed to a truth given 
in evidence [Evidenz]” (FTL §1). 
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forms (absolute univocity, the total fact, and so on (cf. 272)). He 
thus investigates what can be said of the absolute right of the Logos 
to pass to its Telos in general.  
However, this right needs a motive impetus. Fourth, Derrida 
continues to follow Husserl to apply the “demand” in transcendental 
subjectivity based upon the Idea of the Reason as the subject’s 
“responsibility” (IOG 146, (295)). In the pure pole of radical 
circularity, the constituting ego as Logos demands its Telos, and as 
constituted, it is demanded of and must respond (répond). As 
Reason is the essential basis of humankind as “animal rationale”241 
(IOG 145 ff., cf. CM §23), to it falls the constituting responsibility 
to respond (répondre) and realise the Telos of humanity itself. Each 
of the regulative and then epistemological demands of the Idea in the Kantian 
sense are situated upon this Logos and its Telos. 
Parenthesis – the responsibility of the radical 
philosopher 
Indeed, for Derrida, insofar as this regulative necessity is an 
originary responding to the demand (forward), rather than a 
determined result (réponse), the responsibility of the subject can be 
particularised to the originary philosopher. Derrida explains: 
                                                 
241 Derrida writes: “If Reason is but the essential structure of the 
transcendental ego [...] it is, like them [the essential structure and 
transcendental ego], historical through and through” (IOG 145).  
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 [I]nsofar as the radical philosopher complies with 
the demand of the Logos, he must prescribe 
[the Telos]: insofar as he responds to and is 
responsible for it, he assumes the responsibility for 
the mandate. (IOG 146, our emphases) 
The reader may find such whole-part divisions upon a regulative 
side allegedly without content to be implausible, as while Reason 
may never need to appear in phenomenological evidence, at least 
the body of a philosopher must. Moreover, Derrida has gone to 
great effort to remove transcendental subjectivity from natural 
human consciousness. Nevertheless, Derrida set aside the problem 
of other human egos (253), and is developing the implications of 
the progress. That is, while the body of a philosopher obviously 
can appear as finite content in phenomenological evidence; in 
1962, the philosopher is a pure and originary part of humankind 
as “animal rationale”, and to that extent a part of Reason without 
corresponding content. In 1962, even the philosopher is a 
moment of the originary directions and levels, and we continue 
with these more general relations of passage. 
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The objectual side of radical passage 
Thus, fifth, to turn toward the objectual end, the above develops 
the overall telos – by situating Reason as an investigation of being 
as such which aims for the “beyond”. In this work, Derrida treats 
being simply, as the posited weight of the sense of what arises 
originarily in Reason (IOG 145). Yet in historico-transcendental 
subjectivity, the telos is history itself. Hence sixth, in this nexus of 
the Logos, being and history are set up as what “ought-to-be” in 
approaching the Telos. Everything remains essential in this pure 
Telos of the Idea, to determine a content.242 That is, it is “being” 
(ousia) that Reason investigates in order to form the medium by 
which to determine what can be said of the Idea as “beyond”. The 
Idea, Derrida emphasises, is “beyond being” (epekeina tes ousias).  
A fortiori, to approach this fact directly, “beyond”, Derrida’s 
argument crystallises all of the relations of the direction of 
passage “across” into the teleological movement of the Logos to the Telos. 
Derrida deems that 
historicity can only be the passage of Speech [like the 
Idea], the pure tradition of an originary Logos across 
to a Telos (IOG 149, our emphases).  
                                                 
242 Derrida writes: “But being, which articulates Reason and History in relation 
to each other, a ‘sense’, [which overall approach creates] a teleological ought-
to-be which constitutes being as movement.” (IOG 145). 
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We have italicised the words explained thus far. Indeed, the 
relations are sufficiently condensed, without relation to a content 
appearing in simple distance, to be deemed a passage of only one 
“Pole” of the Logos to its Telos (IOG 147).  
The fourth argument – divinity and reality 
Each argument has devolved to this passage so as to address the 
absolute, “beyond”. Thus Derrida assesses the ultimate basis for 
an outside – the idea of a transcendental God. To situate this: 
from at least 1913, and to avoid admitting the outside, Husserl 
treated transcendence as one kind of constitution in pure 
consciousness – to be adumbrated, as in all passages, without 
determinable result.  
In Derrida’s condensed (irreal) passage, transcendence should 
simply be another basis of the movement of the Logos to its 
Telos, whose demand is to determine the transcendental subject. 
Thus Derrida notes 
since the Logos has the form of a Telos, its 
transcendence would not be a real 
transcendence, but the ideal Pole for bringing 
about [i.e. as its Telos] transcendental 
subjectivity itself. (IOG 147) 
 - 312 
- 
Yet Derrida seeks to re-orient this explanation, for he requires this 
transcendence itself to be the absolute beyond the ideal. He turns to God, 
accorded an unusual role in Husserl’s treatment of transcendence. 
In the Ideas, Husserl explicitly set aside the “world-transcendent” 
God (I §51), in favour of a God situated in the reduced stream of 
consciousness. God, Derrida argues, is the principle which points 
to what eidetic and formal laws could never prove. God is the 
indicator of eidetic “impossibility” within eidetic possibility (cf. IOG 
147). Thus Husserl allowed no real (or empirical) fact, instead 
using the word “God” in an “ambiguous” sense (272): as absolute 
impossibility, and thus the irreal origin within pure consciousness; yet 
also to signify the origin of possibility243 as a formal fact of the beyond 
(I §58).244 God is a privileged and pure Pole which signifies in 
particular what is beyond the possible. Moreover, for Derrida, an 
Idea of God has been derived from the Idea in the Kantian sense 
in transcendental subjectivity. But Derrida seeks to assess the 
possibility of God’s transcendence to absolutely determine the 
real.245  
                                                 
243 Derrida explains that this “transcendence of God” is “not concrete facticity 
in general, but concrete actuality as the source of possible and real values” 
(IOG 174). 
244 Derrida puts it that that Husserl’s God is “the transcendent principle – and 
consequently also ‘reduced’ [principle] [...] – of every universal factual 
teleology” (IOG 147) Derrida seeks a concrete (individual) facticity, and 
moreover a possibility that is real rather than pure.  
245 That is, Derrida seeks to assess what can be said by means of the real fact 
beyond, rather than the irreal noematic object. 
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It is hard to avoid noting that in doing so, Derrida’s aim diverges 
from Husserl’s published works: and he admits this divergence 
(IOG 147).246 Derrida avoids, however, admitting that he is 
addressing unpublished fragments to develop his concerns. For 
the innovation in the fragments, Derrida writes, is that 
[D]ivine consciousness [...] [is] the directing 
Telos for the real universe. As such, it is a 
facticity. (IOG 147, OdG 163) 
A fortiori, Derrida investigates what can be said of the absolute “beyond” 
as the real universe, by assessing the facticity of God “inside”. This 
develops the next, and much stronger sense of the absolute than 
an objectual invariant. Derrida quotes Husserl; this is 
[T]he absolute polar ideal Idea, that of an 
absolute in a new sense, of an absolute which 
is situated beyond the world, beyond man, 
beyond transcendental subjectivity: is the 
absolute Logos, the absolute truth. (Husserl, E 
                                                 
246 He explains that “[O]ther passages suggest this, passages which, [...] more 
literally conform to all of Husserl’s most lasting intentions.” (IOG 147, cf. I 
§51). 
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III, 4 60, in Diemer 39, IOG 146 fn. 177, 
Husserl’s emphasis) 
Every moment has devolved to this – what is at stake is what can 
finally be determined of the absolute at its extreme, beyond the ideal 
object in any form, and thus as absolutely real. In other words, what is at 
stake is how the object beyond the logical object can be affirmed 
as true without reservation or limit. This was Derrida’s version of 
the absolute, which led to his problem, since 1954.247 
The fourth requirement addressed – the real  
To do so, Derrida’s argument treats of the Logos in both 
language and logic (that is, in both correlative parts of 
intentionality). First, in language, it is certainly possible to speak of 
the beyond in its broadest sense. As noted, however, in the turn 
                                                 
247 Derrida’s emphasis is upon the inversion into the Logos of transcendental 
subjectivity. He thus notes that Husserl “profoundly recuperates the original 
scholastic sense [i.e. sens, also direction] of the transcendental” (IOG 146). It is 
worthwhile noting that the “transcendental” in the Scholastic tradition (or at 
least, as first developed by Aquinas) also proceeds via “directions” and 
“levels”, in a parallel “analogy” that has not yet determined being. As 
Macierowslei and Montagnes explain it, “[T]he analogy of being develops in 
two directions: the horizontal one is that of the divisions of being according to 
the categories; the other, vertical dimension, is that of the degrees of being 
constituted by the substances themselves. Let us call them predicamental 
analogy and transcendental analogy” (Macierowslei and Montagnes 2004, 6). In 
the transcendental analogy, God arises as the essential level of being, which is 
transcendental in that God grounds being prior to the predicamental direction 
(across): “In the same way, on the transcendental level, [it] is God who 
grounds the analogy of being, since beings receive by participation what He is 
by essence; there is no primary instance of being other than He” (Macierowslei 
and Montagnes 2004, 6). Derrida has instilled this basic relation of 
“transcendental” as the essence of “God” prior to predication of possibility in 
Husserl, although Derrida has also worked out that Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology cannot ground itself, and Derrida does not yet accord such a 
ground to God.  
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to the signifying rather than objectual language, these senses have 
again been simplified to what can be questioned of eidetic sense. 
The demand of a scientific language is that its principle must be 
revealed as law in transcendental subjectivity, and yet these words 
must refer beyond subjectivity. Thus Derrida notes that Husserl’s 
use of the word “beyond” proceeds by “ambiguity” (272). 
Derrida avoids writing “equivocity”, passage is no longer a simple 
distance in which separate senses of the word “beyond” stand “in 
front of” a subject. Yet even so, from above, even though the real 
cannot be absolutely separated from the interplay with the irreal, 
signification of it still intends the beyond. The absolute referent is 
still inseparable from yet exceeds the irreal object.  
Thus, instead of affirming the real possibility, Derrida settles 
upon pure possibility. For an Absolute as only pure possibility no 
longer permits this simple distance in general, but rather the Idea 
of God as pure circularity of transcendental subjectivity 
constituting the sense of the beyond in an originary moment. 
Given this factual (factice) indeterminacy, only the reduction of God 
– to the pure circularity of language – would allow the eidetic 
constitution of a transcendental “beyond” as factual (rather, we 
emphasise, than fact); for as Derrida explained, the pure level of 
language is no longer bound to particular words (IOG 70, (246)). 
Only  
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the reduction of God as factual [factice] being 
and factual consciousness sets free the 
signifying of transcendental divinity. (IOG 
147, IDG 163) 
This addresses the requirement that the factual be real. A 
reduction to factual consciousness can indeed signify the beyond 
as transcendental divinity. However, it is a condition of the real 
(and of real factuality itself) that it be individuated in its spatial 
and temporal position. Yet even taking God as a pure Pole for 
signifying the real universe in transcendental subjectivity, God is 
never by his essence really spatial or temporal. This is a pure 
beyond only for the pure self, thus only factual (and a Fact) for 
the Self. Derrida goes on: 
in this sense, the Pole as ‘beyond’ is always 
beyond for the Self of transcendental 
consciousness. It is its own beyond. It will never 
be a real transcendence (IOG 147 fn. 129, 
Derrida’s emphases). 
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The attempt to aim “beyond” in the fourth argument has not yet 
met Derrida’s criteria for an absolute. Instead, the arguments have 
progressively devolved to a pure possibility in an Absolute 
without simple distance, in the passage of the Logos to its Telos. 
Derrida has assessed the requirements in the order we have developed across 
Husserl’s oeuvre, employing the parameters of intentionality, logic, and Idea 
in the Kantian sense, but he has arrived only at this involuted passage.  
The analogy to temporality 
Derrida adds one more relation before applying the above. For 
his task is to assess the possibility of ideal objectivity as absolute 
for all of descriptive phenomenology. This has been condensed 
into the Logos as passage. However, the fundamental form of 
intentional consciousness for Husserl is temporality. Derrida at the 
last must address the basal form of temporality in relation to the 
Living Present as transcendental subjectivity, to determine the 
ideal object as fact.  
To explain: when one considers the appearing of things in the 
world in time as an object, one is assessing the ideal objectivity of 
several objects together. This, for Husserl, describes a pure 
“omnitemporality” (Überzeitlichkeit) (EJ §64d)). This temporality, 
we note, is predicated of only as what must never appear in 
particular ideal objectivity. One could thus infer a time that allows 
even such an ideal unity of temporalities, and the origin of 
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temporality – “supertemporality” (Urzeitlichkeit), or early 
temporality.  
This, Derrida notes, is “profoundly analogous” to seeking the 
“beyond”. In essence, supertemporality is so far removed as to no 
longer even be temporal, intemporal (in-temporel, (EJ §64c IOG 
148)). Rather than absolute, Derrida takes supertemporality as the 
Absolute of time itself, for predication is merely of the 
(characteristic of) “timeliness” (Zeitlichkeit) of Time. That is to say, 
“omnitemporality” maps to what exceeds a particular “ideal 
objectivity” of what can appear, and its “factual reality” (IOG 
148). Supertemporality, as intemporal, maps to the beyond. This 
relation of temporalities has been made “profoundly analogous” 
(at a deeper level, for time itself has not yet appeared) to the 
fourth argument and the transcendental God.248  
Thus Derrida can begin to apply the progress developed across 
our chapter. As to language, the “ambiguity” still applies, as 
Husserl “speaks of” – signifies – the “constituting” of the 
possibility of a real temporal fact (that is, beyond the irreal) by 
                                                 
248 Thus Derrida asks, “[A]re not supertemporality and omnitemporality also 
the characteristics [i.e. predicates] of Time itself? [...]of the Living Present, which 
is the absolute concrete form of [...] all transcendental life? (IOG 148, Derrida’s 
emphases first). 
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both kinds of time. Yet again, the absolute beyond is addressed 
by constituting in the transcendental Absolute.249  
The generalisation of the analogies, as one 
progress 
Thus, insofar as it is without determinable temporality, this 
ambiguity of God (and the intemporal) as “beyond”, and God 
(and the omnitemporal) as pure pole of passage are said to hold 
“at once” (IOG 148) in the involutions of historico-
transcendental subjectivity to the Absolute. Indeed, crucially, 
Derrida generalises this relation to every passage that he developed since the 
outset, deeming that 
[T]his situation of the Logos is profoundly analogous 
– and not by chance – to that of every ideality 
(such as our analysis of language has enabled us 
to specify the concept) (IOG 148, Derrida’s 
emphasis last).  
We followed from the outset of our chapter how the relations of 
language to the ideal object were in turn analogous to the Idea in 
                                                 
249 Derrida writes that Husserl “qualifies [ideality in general, which should be 
absolutely factual alone] sometimes in one fashion, [e.g. omnitemporal] 
sometimes in the other [e.g. supertemporal], according to whether or not he 
relates it to factual temporality” (IOG 148). 
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the Kantian sense, which argument progressed to the Logos. 
Derrida is approaching a result to his overall progress.  
But rather than this ambiguity of both a pure pole and a beyond 
then leading to contradiction, in that both senses hold “at once” 
(for Derrida has not yet included negation or opposition),250 such 
contents (parts) would be founded by a unity which source is 
withheld (as beyond, “profound”). That is, 
[T]he two at once [à la fois], beginning from [à 
partir de] a unity even more profound, such 
[telle] is perhaps the only possible answer 
[réponse] (IDG 164, cf. IOG 148) 
A fortiori, Derrida has worked out what, for essential reasons, can 
be the only possible answer (result).251 Next, every ideal object 
arose only from withdrawal to appearing as such, to the reduction 
without negation. As – for Husserl – temporal constitution in the 
Living Present is deemed the basis of all ideal objectivities (125), 
                                                 
250 The senses of the ambiguity could no longer hold “at the same time”, as the 
ambiguity is in part temporal. Even so, when applying the necessity of thinking 
two contents “at once”, when they are opposite to one another and negation has 
been returned then Derrida, from 1964, will insist upon the necessity of 
contradiction (545). In 1962, this is not yet a contradiction of the contents as 
such, but rather depends upon a deeper unity, of the two at once.  
251 Derrida mitigates even this outcome by a circularity in the word “perhaps”, 
as it ought to imply opening rather than affirmation. He has not yet developed 
this “perhaps” in detail in his progress. 
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cf. EJ §64), Derrida thus generalises this to every reduction, and 
every kind of temporality. The 
hidden temporal unity of [...] ‘in’-temporality as 
one part [d”une part] and of omnitemporality on 
the other is the unitary ground of all the 
instances dissociated by the various reductions 
(IDG 165, cf. IOG 149).
252
 
A fortiori, the only ground that Derrida allows for a result is this 
moment of passage in the Logos. But even so the foundation is 
only hidden; the unitary alignment of all of the reductions as what 
constitutes a beyond in internality without evidence or positing, 
but rather as responsibility to enquire of the object.  
The evolution beyond 1954 
Thus Derrida can generalise this responsibility in order to answer 
(répondre) his question. For pure possibility has found no absolute 
external solution to the demand to determine the Fact. The 
subject no longer goes out of itself to encounter the object.  
                                                 
252 Leavey translates “instances” as “signifying”, while noting the French. We 
retain “instances”, which refers to a logical moment.  
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Rather, each argument has been assessed in address to his question, but 
in each case the Logos remains merely a passage in the Absolute. 
At this juncture a seminal change occurs in Derrida’s oeuvre, and a 
notable evolution toward the mature work which is familiar to so 
many readers, as his bases of 1954 are set aside. Without an 
absolute possibility of a real fact, Derrida’s imposition upon Husserl of 
the requirement of an absolute as objectual is set aside. Derrida no longer 
insists upon the “dilemma” arising from the demand that a 
problematic object be affirmed absolutely. Instead, he at last 
accepts the later Husserl’s intentions – phenomenology circulates 
in passages according to a form that has not yet appeared. 
Derrida goes on: 
[i]nstead of frantically investigating the options, we 
must strive toward [across to, à travers] the 
necessarily single root of every dilemma. (IOG 
148, our emphasis first) 
This “frantic” investigation has been Derrida’s approach in every argument 
since 1954. After eight years, he ceases struggling and accepts this 
involuted but single direction of passage and its necessity, as 
holding of essential law.  
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Arrival at the Absolute as Passage 
A fortiori, Derrida concludes  
all of this signifies then that the Absolute is 
Passage. (IOG 149, Derrida’s emphases)
253
 
Instead of exceeding passage in the objectual absolute, we have 
arrived at signifying of the Absolute as Passage. Indeed, Derrida 
emphasises that he has developed all of these arguments 
sequentially via intentionality. He writes: 
[A]ll this rigorously develops the discovery of 
intentionality. (IOG 150) 
We have followed how Derrida’s progress evolved via 
intentionality, in the “rigorous” progress of Derrida’s argument. 
In our next chapter, we turn to the final pages of the 
“Introduction” in 1962, as Derrida develops the “only possible 
result” to work out his first moment of deferral of Difference.  
  
                                                 
253 Derrida writes, summarising the bases we set out: “[S]ince there can be 
nothing outside the pure historicity of that passage, since there is no [...] sense 
outside of this historicity [...], since the [passage of the] Logos and Telos are 
nothing outside the interplay of their reciprocal [i.e. transcendental] inspiration, 
this signifies then that the Absolute is Passage.” (IOG 149, Derrida’s emphases). 
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Chapter Four: Deferral and Difference 
(the “Introduction”, 1962 pt. 2) 
Introduction 
This chapter continues to follow Derrida’s progress in the final 
pages of the 1962 “Introduction” to Husserl’s “The Origin of 
Geometry”. Derrida will work out how the Absolute as passage 
leads to deferral and Difference (as différant), as the emergence of 
these relations in his oeuvre. Hence by the end of our chapter we 
will have followed how the différant developed in a progressive 
argument from Derrida’s concerns since 1954. 
Part One: from the Absolute to the différant 
Retaining the absolute, inside 
In our previous chapter, we followed as Derrida questioned how 
the (external) absolute of ideal Objectivity is possible, and arrived 
in a sequence at the Absolute as Passage. Thus it is important to 
avoid supposing that a result has been determined for 
epistemology (or any other object that must be known entirely). It 
is important to avoid deeming that the absolute is done away with as telos. 
The argument is a necessary progression, and the absolute 
remains the first demand. The Absolute is only then Passage. 
Derrida has only set forth that the absolute should no longer be 
approached by naive insistence upon a “dilemma”. Hence as this 
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telos in passage holds, and necessity as a “single root” still 
applies,254 thought still seeks its object as absolute. In particular, one 
must also still speak of this absolute. None of the relations 
developed thus far are discarded. The question remains how ideal 
Objectivity is possible. The telos is still to determine the Fact, at 
the last even as “beyond”) and the outcomes of the four 
arguments in our previous chapter hold.  
The absolute in the Absolute 
We will first explain how the absolute remains the telos of the 
Absolute. That is, how the absolute as object is restored to ideal 
objectivity. This occurred in Derrida’s third argument, which 
outcome will thus be developed. Having devolved to the 
Absolute of Objectivity in transcendental subjectivity in its 
directions, and a pure possibility, Derrida turned to Cavaillès’ 
critique of Husserl which, in brief, seeks a foundation in Husserl 
as either subjective or objectual (absolute) logic. In what follows, 
Cavaillès’ “subjective logic” is taken by Derrida to be 
transcendentally-subjective logic, and his “absolute logic” (as for 
us) to be objectual. For Cavaillès, then, if an “absolute” logic were 
                                                 
254 Derrida emphasises this “indestructibility” of necessity across his oeuvre (cf. 
ToC 233, TdlC 597, ED 343, OG 89, AT 29, cf. Lawlor 139). Derrida refers in 
“The Theatre of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation” in 1966 to an 
“ineluctable necessity” [necessité ineluctable] (ToC 233, TdlC 597, ED 343). 
Importantly, in Of Grammatology, Derrida deems it “an indestructible but 
relative necessity, within a system that encompasses it” (OG 89, DLGb 136). 
Derrida is developing this system, but in 1962 it occurs in the levels and 
directions of intentionality (cf. the next footnote). 
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fundamental, as objectively founded, this would exclude a subjective 
(for Derrida, Absolute) and logical basis. Just so, for Cavaillès,255 
if subjective logic were the ground of the transcendental, then no 
absolute logic could be found (cf. L 61).256 The absolute logic 
would be a “consciousness of progress”, as objective genitive, and 
the Absolute the “progress of consciousness” as subjective 
genitive (IOG 143).  
Derrida worked out that the Absolute of Genitivity is neither 
(IOG 142), thus he seeks no foundation upon either, but 
proceeds via an Absolute as Passage. To do so he proceeded via 
the Idea which (as we saw) circulates as a pure pole of subjectivity 
to itself. For Cavaillès had deemed that Husserl found it 
                                                 
255 Cavaillès writes – of the Ideas and the Formal and Transcendental Logic: “since 
no content except consciousness has the authority to posit itself in itself […] 
[Then] [I]f transcendental logic really founds logic, there is no absolute logic 
(that is, governing the absolute subjective activity). If there is an absolute logic, 
it can draw its authority only from itself, and then it is not transcendental” 
(Cavaillès 78). Derrida does observe that Cavaillès allowed that the 
transcendental subjectivity of the Cartesian Meditations might allow a way out of 
this blunt dilemma (IOG 143, Cavaillès 1947, 65). Derrida had quoted this 
argument in 1954 (PG 124-125, PDG 208), to argue that even Cavaillès 
“transcendental genesis” without content made “the absolute of logical truths 
into something fleeting, contingent, and out of date” (PG 125, PDG 208). In 
1962, Derrida is reformulating his approach to a simple problem of origin, as a 
demand for the absolute, to allow for the moment of creativity of content 
(even pure content) as produced in the Absolute by the irreducible. 
256 We think Lawlor’s explanation of Cavaillès is excellent: “If subjectivity [...] is 
absolute, then formal logic would have to be conceived as relative to this one 
being known as consciousness; tied to something that is singular, logic would 
no longer be able to be conceived as universal [i.e., general]. In short, it would 
lose its authority over different beings. Conversely, if logic is absolute, it would 
not be able to be identified with [and in] transcendental logic, having cut its ties 
to [positing] consciousness, logic would be ungrounded.” (Lawlor 2002, 61) 
Note Lawlor’s employment of “absolute” and “ground”. We are following 
how, for Derrida rather than Cavaillès, neither absolute logic nor a logic of 
subjectivity are given primacy in this progress, as Derrida develops the 
relations of pure phenomenology. To that end, we are working out the 
relations of genitivity as neither subjective nor objective, by means of our 
whole-part relations of levels and directions in an ongoing progression.  
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“impossible or difficult to admit” (Cavaillès 1947, 65) a moment 
of creativity to transcendental subjectivity, as consciousness has 
the authority to posit content only in itself. This, for Cavaillès, 
inculcates a division between subject and object. For Derrida, the 
“creative” moment in Husserl’s oeuvre is precisely the production of 
the Idea in the Kantian sense (IOG 136, OOG 167), which did 
not exist before its originary idealisation (IOG 135-136, (210)).  
That is, even without a ground, or simple evidence of real 
content, idealisation and its production certainly arises, hence 
consciousness can create the beyond. In turn (IOG 136), such a 
“constituting” moment then allows the objective moment 
(forward), to proceed toward determining the mere intuition of 
the object in general.257 It can converge upon “the absolute”. Or 
as Derrida summarises, when the originary Idea is “constituting”, 
this leads to 
a constituted objective sense (which is 
therefore its ‘absolute logic’) (IOG 143). 
Next, the object in general can be the sense of the absolute origin 
in particular. This possibility, of course, again must determine the 
                                                 
257 As Derrida puts it: “[the] Idea in the Kantian sense […] is the object of an 
ideation, a name Husserl often gives to idealisation and which must be 
distinguished from the ideation as the intuition of an essence [Wesenschau]. The 
difference between these two ideations is: one can constitute an object as a 
creation, the other can determine it in an intuition.” (IOG 135-136, Derrida’s 
emphases). 
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productive moment of the Idea in the Kantian sense (beyond) as 
foundation for the essential levels and directions (intentionality) 
in itself. This is in turn originarily productive, in the circularity: 
[I]n the creative movement by which it goes 
beyond itself [it] produces a new sense [which] will 
also be the moment of a higher sense-
investigation in which the past [objectual] 
sense, sedimented and retained first 
[originarily] in a sort of objectivist attitude, will 
be reawakened in its dependent relation. (IOG 
143, our emphases) 
For Derrida, the Absolute and transcendentally subjective logic 
can in turn constitute the sense of the absolute as objectual in general 
(as “objectivist”), which can again be the object as particular (or 
singular) origin, even as the absolute. Hence this is never “to abuse 
the singularity of the absolute” (IOG 144, Cavaillès 1947, 65) as 
Cavaillès suggests. Rather, this return implies a re-application to 
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itself of the constitution of the object, leading to “the opening of 
indetermination” (IOG 143).258  
The absolute no longer arises as the Telos of an object (across), 
but “in” the constituting of idealities (“upward”). Thus far, this 
progress sets forth how the Absolute retains the absolute “in” the 
Living Present: in its circular essentiality. When the objects of pure 
phenomenology are essential, the creative application of pure 
phenomenology to sense can continually rise “upward”.  
Indeed, Derrida returns to the vertical metaphors to explain this; 
each moment would be “a higher sense-investigation” (IOG 143, 
just above) of these absolute moments of passage. Derrida, it 
seems, has justified the predicative possibility of the absolute. The 
constituting of the absolute leads to it as constituted “in” the Living Present. 
Indeed, this is deemed 
the co-implication of the constituted and 
constituting moments in [dans] the absolute 
identity of a Living Present (IOG 144, our 
emphases). 
                                                 
258 Derrida asks: “[I]f [this return] is clearly the case, why should we choose, as 
Cavaillès thought, between an ‘absolute logic’ and a ‘transcendental logic’?” 
(IOG 143, cf. Cavaillès 77).  
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Note that this is a “co-implication” (thus also a complication), the 
difficulty preventing identity synthesis which Derrida deemed the 
problem since 1954 (138).  
Thus far, were Derrida to remain Husserlian in opting for the 
Living Present as the fundamental form, the devolution to an 
absolute “inside” would have solved the problem of origin in 
general. Just by letting go of the problem as naïve demand for an 
external absolute, Derrida would have solved it. Notably, the 
transcendental Ego in its “pure pole” no longer posits itself as an 
external object. Rather, the absolute “in” (dans) the Absolute 
allows the Ego to create itself as other, to go beyond and enquire 
of the ego. Thus the entire “field” of possible ideal objectivities, 
sedimented in the Ego, can be constituted in the circularity of the 
Absolute (IOG 144, 149). Even so, this is merely a moment on 
the way; as Derrida explained in 1954, this complication 
continued to trouble him.  
Toward the separation of the object 
Indeed, the circularity of subjective and objective logic that 
Derrida defends against Cavaillès, he is willing to critique in his 
progress  (although, we note, he will refrain in 1962 from 
following this criticism through entirely). At this juncture we 
begin to work toward deferral and Difference.  
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Importantly, the naïve use of “in” (or “within” (cf. IOG 153, 173)) must 
be set aside, insofar as it constitutes an outside. The certainty of 
sense arises rather as production in a priori essential relations, 
retracted from content “to the inside”, as regulative demand to 
address the objective as beyond. However, this demand is as yet 
without ground for constituting this object. Address to the 
beyond as yet passes to opening rather than a limit that re-
constitutes the inside as an opposite to the outside. Thus the 
Absolute will pass to deferral, and this identity of the Living 
Present will be no longer be undivided in itself.  
To explain: in the first and second arguments in address to the 
Idea in the Kantian sense, phenomenology lost its ground, though 
Husserl located objectual space anyway. That was a shortfall of 
logic in general that left the certainty of the absolute (as object, 
whether internal or external) as an opening. Internally, the 
moments of sense could thus not yet find a ground to converge 
toward the absolute, at the “higher” essential level. We make 
three comments. First, whether the Absolute constitutes the 
absolute object as pure, or the absolute is made objectual despite 
the failure of ground in the Absolute, in either case the absolute is 
retained. Second, as the Idea in the Kantian sense must found 
both language and logic, both lose the ground that justifies 
constituting an object. Indeed, Derrida sets aside “ground” in 
what follows (IOG 142). To assess what can be said of the 
objectual (absolute), he rather turns to the correlative moment of 
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“right”. Only the pure will hold in the Absolute as a circularity, 
and why it can constitute without an object will arise from the 
question. 
The initial division in possibilities 
To begin to explain what will thus no longer be “undivided” 
(IOG 153) – it is important to note that the right to convergence 
(or closer determination) arises at the subjective side of passage. 
However, the kind of positing in the pure (or Absolute) passage 
cannot be direct (i.e. a simple doxic) outcome, but as yet implies 
opening (cf. 304). Henceforth, Derrida continues to deem the 
pure and regulative necessity and possibility to be “responsibility” 
(295)), but the horizon of predicative possibility to be 
“possibility”.259 Insofar as it is addressed by responsibility, it is 
certain that even the latter and its objects evolve in 
phenomenology in its pure sense. Thus Derrida’s outcome from 
his arguments was the responsibility to address a “pure possibility” 
                                                 
259 By this division, Derrida avoids what would otherwise be an unsurpassable 
gap between pure and regulative possibility and its constitution of 
phenomenological and pure possibility. The former merely evolves to a 
responsibility that the latter be determined, rather than it needing to determine 
the latter. As we explained, pure and regulative necessity and possibility in turn 
arose from the “demand” for the Reason to determine the ideal object. The 
progress has evolved from the demand to determine the complication of 
origin, which Derrida applied since 1954. 
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(IOG 152). Indeed, the latter possibility holds a priori and in 
general, as no objectual Fact was yet arrived at.260  
As to the Absolute, for Derrida, although Objectivity (in the pure 
form of intentionality) yet determined no factual basis, pure 
possibility remained. However, the first justification for the 
possibility of determinability of the object is even more basic, as 
possibility is certain. That is, as founded upon the Idea, a 
possibility to determine the object in general holds from the first, 
and consciousness can more closely determine the finite object by 
repetition. This possibility holds even when opening is the outcome. 
But one should avoid deeming that this possibility is a doxic 
positing (let alone affirming) of even an intentional object “as 
such” (e.g. a phenomenon) as absolute. In the evolution to the 
Absolute, pure possibility is reconstituted as possible. This 
remains an a priori, essential and general possibility in the 
Absolute as Passage.  
Further, from the address to the Idea, we worked out that what is 
given must have been created from an origin even outside pure 
phenomenology, and even though no corresponding content of 
such an outside can appear. Hence the responsibility to ask “why” 
(295, 297) applies in pure possibility in the ascension to higher levels of 
                                                 
260 As Derrida puts it: “in itself, [explication] is something historical, and as 
such it bears, with essential necessity, the horizon of its history within itself.” 
(IOG 173, our emphasis) 
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sense, of an object that is no longer outside (thus no longer 
“external”). Thus, as the objective sense can no longer arise from 
pure possibility, Derrida retains a possibility at the side of the 
subject constituting the object that is no longer even a predication 
of the object as content. It is a predication of what can no longer 
originate in pure possibility, by pure phenomenology. Thus Derrida has 
worked out a first “limitation” (cf. IOG 153, IDG 170) of pure 
phenomenology. He will thus re-instil a “division” between pure 
phenomenology and “(phenomenological) ontology”.  
The sense of the division between 
phenomenology and ontology 
But nor should this “division” be taken as merely external, the 
moments of “higher sense” produced by the Idea in the Kantian sense are 
investigated in pure phenomenology (IOG 143). It is easy to 
neglect that pure phenomenology applies a method, impelled by a 
teleology, and anything can be investigated in the sense of its 
appearing as such, and thus as essential (IOG 151, 152): even 
limitation and division. This a priori circularity of Method allows 
“methodic reflection” (IOG 152) even upon the sense of pure 
phenomenology as such in its division from ontology.261 Thus 
                                                 
261 This evolves the essential “Method” – which in 1962 henceforth is deemed 
thought as consciousness of its directions made object (IOG 149). The best 
explanation of phenomenological method that we have found is that by 
Heidegger in the “Fundamental Discoveries of Phenomenology, its Principle, 
and its Clarification of its Name”. As Heidegger explains in “My Way to 
Phenomenology”: “the expression the perceived as such now refers to this entity in 
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Derrida retains “Husserl’s phenomenological ontology” (IOG 151, 
our emphasis), yet he is also adding “ontology” in general.  
To develop the above: as this progress remains originary, instead 
of an ontological object, this questioning of higher sense allows 
pure phenomenology to ask the “ontological question” (IOG 150). 
Thus in asking “why”, Derrida can “separate” ontology from the 
subjective questioning by pure phenomenology as such. As phenomenology 
in its questioning retains pure possibility, a fortiori this permits 
the reconstitution by pure phenomenology of “ontological or 
metaphysical possibility” (IOG 150).262 Hence at this higher level, 
phenomenology in general can be “opposed” to ontology or 
metaphysics in general. Derrida’s next moment thus restores the 
sense of the problem of the origin. For upon entering the Absolute, 
the ontological possibility can be questioned as to its particular origin 
(to determine essential Being as History).263 The ontological 
question is that of Being.  
However, we caution, while Derrida seems to diverge from 
Husserl’s pure phenomenology, which never asked the question of 
Being, he is beginning to re-constitute the latter within Husserl’s 
                                                                                                        
the way and manner of its being-perceived.” (Heidegger 2002, 267). This, Heidegger 
explains, is “a completely new structure”, that of phenomenological method 
less as a school but a possibility of (eidetic) study of anything at all. Thus 
phenomenology “can disappear as a designation in favour of the matter of 
thinking” (Heidegger 2002, 256, our emphasis). 
262 This “or” is inclusive, on or other or both. The “ontological” and 
“metaphysical” are both kinds of possibility that reconstitute a limit. 
263 This, Derrida explains, is “philosophy [in general] posing [positing] the 
question of Being and History” (IOG 150). 
 - 336 
- 
phenomenology. As he explained, this essence must have been 
founded by the Idea; this question cannot (an essential 
impossibility) have come from within a pure phenomenology as 
such. To allow for this exclusion, Derrida deems this a “non-
Husserlian” sense. 
The “non” relation introduced 
It is pertinent to explain this “non”, which will grow in 
importance as we proceed. A usual sort of formal opposition 
would be bivalent, when one term is not the other. To be sure, 
Derrida set aside bivalence of truth and falsity early on (222 ff.), 
in retracting to value and opening. Yet Derrida must still allow at 
least the opening, thus the bivalence of possibility and 
impossibility of particular objects must also be avoided. For an 
opposite which is not Husserl’s phenomenology, would set aside 
even the reduction and purity.  
To explain this, it is important to note how predicative negation 
of a particular object diverges from essential, a priori and general 
negation. Within a proposition, for Husserl, “not” signifies the 
negation of a predicate. Such a negation does not yet modify the 
predicate itself. However, crucially, “non” is affixed to the predicate 
(the intentional object, word etc.). Nowadays this “non-relation” 
is called “predicate-term negation”, the “term complement” or 
“complement”. It is denoted in English by “non-” or “not-”, but 
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ever with a hyphen linking it to the predicate (object). A non-
relation signifies all that is not the object. As Hyppolite summarised: 
Non-A [Non-A] signifies [or means] all that is not 
A. (LeE 145, cf. LE 113, our emphases).
264
  
Note the “all” – this “not” signifies a negation in general, rather 
than a negation of a particular ideal object. Yet as purely 
objective, it is also helpful for readers to assess the relations 
visually, as everything around A when the relation are purely 
essential. Moreover, it can be expressed as all around A, when 
even the pure refers around itself, and thus no longer necessarily 
even to essentiality and generality.265 Moreover, as speech is a 
correlative and “non” is posited as a relation without content, 
“non” also signifies (or means) everything around the pure form of 
the relation, which we will take as implicit.266 We will develop 
these relations as we proceed (cf. 514).  
                                                 
264 The French is: “Non-A signifie tout ce qui n’est pas A” (LeE 145). We have 
amended the translation of “Non-A” as “Not-A” (LE 113), returning it to 
“Non-A”. We first developed this complement when comparing the French 
and English translations of Derrida by Bass, and comparing translations of 
Hyppolite’s Logic and Existence (co-translated by Lawlor and Sen) in address to 
Derrida. We are not yet sure whether Lawlor is aware of this in Derrida, as he 
and Sen translate Hyppolite’s “non” as “not” in 1998, but Lawlor in 2002 
translates Derrida’s “non” as “non”.  
265 As Hurley puts it: “[T]he complement of a class is the group consisting of 
everything outside the class” (Hurley 2000, 217, our emphases).  
266 Hurley adds, the “term complement is the word or group of words that 
denotes the class complement” (Hurley 2000, 217). We follow Derrida and 
Husserl, for whom the constituting of these relations occurs as correlative. 
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Thus far, in accordance with traditional logic, a relation of a 
complement which is no longer a negation of the particular 
relation is always positive (Nolt et. al. 2001, 114). Yet as explained, a 
reader should avoid supposing that even the negation in general is 
of an external object. Derrida’s progress has pulled “back” from 
such assertion to the Absolute in its essential relations. In this 
case, non-A can be substituted by “non-Husserlian”, which latter 
can only have a value that is no longer the particular negation of 
Husserl’s phenomenology, but is moreover a positive version of 
purity.267 Thus the non-relation can also be thought of as 
signifying all around phenomenology. Ontology (and 
phenomenological ontology) hold in a non-phenomenological (non 
phénoménologique) sense, as signifying all of what is no longer 
phenomenological (IOG 150). When this ontological question 
“cannot” stem from pure phenomenology (as non-Husserlian), it 
must stem from around the pure. Thus nor is the non-relation 
confined to ontology, for a non-relation signals all that is not 
phenomenology. This allows for any ontology, rather than merely 
phenomenological ontologies besides Husserl’s (henceforth, 
“ontology”). Derrida summarises this as the  
                                                 
267 Hyppolite’s “A” could just as well be Husserl’s “P”, although we have 
avoided this substitution to avoid confusion in translation. 
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‘ontological’ question (‘ontological’ in the non-
Husserlian sense of the word which alone can 
be, and often is, opposed to Husserl’s 
phenomenological ontology) cannot stem 
from a phenomenology as such. (IOG 150)  
The allusion to Heidegger seems to be obvious. 
Parenthesis – Derrida’s formal progress to 
ontology in general 
We do note, however, that as a non-Husserlian sense applies to all 
that is not Husserl’s phenomenology, this allows for those besides 
Heidegger’s. Indeed, even Heidegger situated his approach in this 
fashion. For Heidegger, “[a]ll ontology” (BT 9/SZ 11, Heidegger’s 
emphasis), begins by asking “what” the object is, even the 
“ancient ontology” in history (BT 20/SZ 23).268 Heidegger thus 
deems that “ontology” to be “a discipline [which] can be 
developed only from the objective necessity of particular 
questions [...] demanded by the ‘things themselves’” (BT 24, SZ 
27). In turn, for Heidegger, to continue asking “what”, ontology 
                                                 
268 For Heidegger, “ontology taken in its broadest sense” begins from the 
necessity to ask “what we really mean by this expression ‘being’” (BT 9/SZ 11, 
our emphasis). We explained how “being” for Derrida’s explanation of Husserl 
evolved to the Absolute as Passage. Derrida is situating his question prior to 
only the content “being”, which for Derrida follows from the “what”. 
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develops a “question” that is posed of the Being of beings in their 
historicity, to investigate its sense in History.”  
Derrida concedes that ontology seeks to ask this question. 
However, in referring to the “non-Husserlian” sense, thus as all 
of what is not Husserl’s ontology, he can continue to investigate 
what holds of these relations in general, as developed in his 
progress (thus Derrida avoids mention of external thinkers, or 
detail). That is, in assessing the directions, one of the double necessities 
was to ask “what” the origin of the object is in history (IOG 49). 
Having retracted to the Absolute, this indeed evolves to the 
necessity to question of the essence of Being in History.269 As 
these have developed from Husserl, Derrida in 1962 will work 
out in this progressive argument that only Husserl’s pure 
phenomenology can address them (cf. IOG 152).270 He continues 
to investigate the formal relations.  
                                                 
269 That is, address to Heidegger would be fruitful, but in 1962 would merely 
proceed by contrast; Derrida is following his concerns as they developed since 
1954. We will continue to follow Derrida’s “law”.  
270 Derrida’s progress could never have opted for Heidegger’s ontology, we 
suggest. For example, Heidegger explains that “[h]istoricity means the 
constitution of being of the ‘occurrence’ of Da-Sein as such; it is the ground 
for the fact that something like the discipline of world-history’ is at all 
possible” (BT 18, SZ 20). However much Heidegger will develop, still, Derrida 
in 1962 set aside a ground for the fact. Derrida will work out that 
“phenomenology alone can make infinite historicity appear […] as the pure 
possibility and the very essence of Being in manifestation. It alone can open the 
absolute subjectivity of Sense to Being-History [in the Absolute]” (IOG 152, 
our emphases). 
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Evolving the double necessity 
Thus far, the relations follow from this “division” in the pure 
Absolute to allow a “non-Husserlian” sense of ontology. 
Importantly, given a telos of the absolute, even without bivalence, 
what cannot hold of a particular object must originate from all 
around it. Thus when non-Husserlian phenomenology is limited, the 
possibility of asking “why” of ontological possibility must fall to 
Husserlian phenomenology, which includes its levels of 
“ontology”. As ontological possibility is objectual (in asking 
“what”, it constitutes a limit), it is also metaphysical. Hence, as the 
pure can constitute “ontological or metaphysical” possibility (IOG 
150, above), Derrida avoids disqualifying the question of ontology 
from convergence upon the sense as such of the external object; such 
a disqualification would determine the sense of the external object 
rather than leaving the question as an opening. Pure 
phenomenology as such, however, remains concerned with asking 
why the sense of the ideal Objectivity arises as appearing, rather 
than a simple external moment. Derrida retains the question for 
pure phenomenology too; even to question the sense of 
objectivity.271 
                                                 
271 That is, from the second and third arguments, this locating of space as 
positing goes on anyway, without convergence upon the external object, but 
rather in the moment of phenomenology stretched between the creative Idea 
and its address to origin. 
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Hence, possibility and right can be apportioned, for 
consciousness of the History of Being addresses the temporal 
moment of appearing in space, and consciousness of the pure 
object addresses the spatial object without ground or content as it 
must have appeared in history. Derrida is evolving his “double 
necessity” (298), which asked why the object had an origin, and how 
it had such an origin. Derrida can ask, in pure phenomenology and 
of History and Being, how an object which appears had an origin 
in time, and why it had such an origin in space. The former asks 
the question of the fact of the object’s history and being (in 
ontology as non-phenomenology), and the latter asks why 
appearing as such arises in its historicity as non-being (in pure 
phenomenology).  
A fortiori, the form of the question of the absolute with which Derrida began 
has been evolved. Husserl’s question as to “how” ideal Objectivity is 
possible (IOG 67, (232)) is evolved into “in view of what?” (which 
seeks to constitute its Object in space as absolute), while “why?” 
sets aside this object to assess the productive creation as 
Absolute. Derrida has indeed developed Husserl’s implications to 
assess the complication (co-implication (IOG 144)) of origin. 
That is, to ask “why” can only emerge after a consciousness – in 
ontological possibility – that the facticity of the object can then 
cease to be. Derrida calls this possibility that asks “what” its 
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“eventuality”, a word for “possibility” in French which also has 
the sense of contingency.272 However, that a being can be “what” 
it is only holds when a (pure) possibility (possibilité) of asking 
“why” applies. Thus to “pass from the question ‘how’ to the 
question ‘why’” (IOG 150), Derrida summarises the complication we 
developed above: 
[T]he why can emerge only from the possible (in 
the metaphysical or ontological, and non-
phenomenological sense [et non 
phénoménologique]) non-being of historical 
facticity, and non-being as non-history only 
discloses its eventuality in departing from a 
consciousness of pure sense and pure 
historicity. That is to say, from a consciousness 
of [pure] possibility in the phenomenological 
                                                 
272 Derrida will continue to align ontological possibility, with its empirical and 
contingent facticity, with “eventuality” (cf. VEM 445, VM 129 (548)).  
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sense (IDG 167, cf. IOG 150, Derrida’s 
emphases).
273
 
The question of which comes first – the pure and reduced “why” 
or the originary and constituted “what” – is the basis for what will 
become delay and Difference. Before addressing these, Derrida 
summarises the outcomes that we have developed thus far.  
Derrida’s assessment, and support for our 
explanation en route 
That is, as we have explained since Chapter Two, the telos of the 
objectual, set out in the four arguments, was ultimately to determine 
the Fact. As far as Derrida has progressed, in address to the 
objectual absolute, on the side of phenomenological ontology, 
asking why of its facticity would then ask what the Fact is. Indeed, 
Derrida explains that the question “to which a phenomenological 
ontology responds [répond] as a rule” is  
‘What is a Fact?’ (IOG 151) 
However, the evolution to the Absolute developed toward 
questioning facticity as no longer objectual (no longer a “what”), 
                                                 
273 Leavey translates “non phénoménologique” as “and not phenomenological”. 
Derrida is rather employing a non-relation without negation, as everything 
outside phenomenology, avoiding a “refusal” (denial) of pure phenomenology 
that would set aside the reduction.  
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thus as the “hidden source” of every reduction. That is, the 
original (essential and general) source of possibility. The 
responsibility holds to ask, in pure phenomenology, why the 
origin can arise as factual, i.e. as facticity. Thus, Derrida writes, 
phenomenology as such (pure phenomenology), can ask  
‘Why are a factual starting point in facticity and a 
reduction possible in general?’ (IOG 151, Derrida’s 
emphasis) 
We note a second benefit of the “why”: it supports our emphasis 
on a first certainty (the barest fact (cf. PH 151, PHG 179, (cf. 
238))). Indeed, the “why” is dependent upon this certainty for its 
possibility; but this must no longer pass to questioning of the Fact 
as objectual.274 Derrida summarises the evolution: 
[W]e pass from phenomenology to ontology 
(in the non-Husserlian sense) when we […] 
question the upsurge of stark fact and cease to 
consider the Fact as function. (IOG 152) 
                                                 
274 An absolute origin would be defined by the absolute or total fact as 
invariable, and also the solution to the “beyond” in the strong sense that 
Derrida developed thereafter. 
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For Husserl, “Function” is the essential relation pertaining to 
questions of the “constituting of the objective field” (I §86, Husserl’s 
emphasis). Derrida is aligning such questions with “ontology”.275 
He rather worked out that the a priori and essential Fact can then 
be set aside; it need no longer be asked “what” the fact is.276  
In the constituting moment of the transcendental subject in 
which the historical fact is sedimented,277 thus 
I can clearly ask myself why there would be 
any historicity. (IOG 151)  
Thus phenomenology in its pure possibility passes to and poses 
the question “why” to ontology. The “why?” can ask of Being 
                                                 
275 For Husserl – at which moment phenomenology evolves to a functionalism, 
questioning the function of the object – “Function” is an essential relation, 
“grounded in the pure essence of the noeses”, allowing address to “the greatest 
problems of all”, the “constituting of the objective field of consciousness”. This “central 
viewpoint of phenomenology” “enquire[s] how objective unities of every kind 
are ‘known’ or ‘supposed’” (I §86, Husserl’s emphases). Questioning of 
function is necessary as intentionality “is just consciousness ‘of’ something; 
[thus] it is its essential nature to conceal ‘meaning’ within itself.” (I §86). By 
addressing “function”, “ontology” in the non-Husserlian sense is allowed for 
again in Husserl’s progress without objectivity. However, note that in ceasing to 
question function, Derrida insists upon a purity that Husserl never quite did; 
Derrida is developing his concerns. 
276 The Fact remains certain, of course, but thus far must pass away: 
“[N]aturally, [...] the Fact must then not function: its [objectual] sense must not 
be determined outside or independently of phenomenology” (IOG 152). Note 
also that Derrida’s approach is still immature (by his standards) in that it 
employs a subsequent moment of negation, which he seeks to exclude.  
277 We will develop these relations of “I” to “myself” in Chapter Five. 
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(rather than being) only as phenomenology.278 Thus, Derrida 
writes, this (logical) “assertion” points to  
the moment phenomenology can be 
articulated, without confusion, with a 
‘philosophy’ posing the question of Being or 
History. (IOG 150, IDG 166) 
Derrida has returned to thorough support of Husserl’s bases, and 
deems the progress has arrived at a moment by which 
“philosophy” (as phenomenology) can ask its question coherently. 
The restriction of the right to the objectual 
For Derrida is still heeding the responsibility for philosophy to 
question how the absolute in its complication with the Absolute 
can be determined as a Fact, via intentionality.279 First, we note 
why a question would be “posed” in speech, in the progressive 
argument. Intentionality seeks to determine its object as absolute. 
Its every positing begins from the certainty of evidence, thus 
believing that its object is possible (I §5), as is determination of it. 
However, writing and the speaking subject found no ground to 
                                                 
278 This is phenomenology allowing “the pure possibility and the very essence 
of Being in manifestation.” (IOG 152)  
279 It is at this juncture that Derrida explains “[A]ll this rigourously develops 
the discovery of intentionality.” (IOG 150). 
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determine the possibility of the object in space (cf. 262). That is, 
both writing and the speaking subject posit what the object is in 
space, but lost their ground to do so. For Derrida, it was rather 
Speech which created the originary circularity of historicity that 
permitted speech (302); that in turn evolved to radical 
responsibility in pure phenomenology. In general, the radical 
philosopher in pure phenomenology still has a responsibility to 
speak to others to ask how the absolute is first possible as a Fact 
(the essence of speaking to others is deemed Discourse).280 But 
without a ground for asking “what”, the positing no longer quite 
believes in the possibility that the object can be what it is. This 
evolves the relations of the question. 
The question as developed in the progress  
That is, the progress of questioning is no longer merely a naïve 
sort of question as though merely posited by “Derrida”. Nor it is 
any longer quite posited as doxic (I §103 (227)).281 Henceforth, a 
question no longer quite believes in the possibility of an absolute 
answer (réponse (IOG 148)) to what it asks about. As to how it 
                                                 
280 Intentionality is deemed the “pure movement of the phenomenological 
temporalisation as going out from self to self of the Absolute of the Living 
Present” (IOG 151). 
281 Doubt is a related modality to the question. Husserl also deems: “[T]he way 
of “certain” belief can pass over into that of […] question and doubt” (I §103, 
Husserl’s emphases (cf. 347)). Doubt for Husserl is never quite serious, of 
course, such a modality rather occurs further along “passage” of a prior 
certainty. However, that an absolute solution to a question has arisen can then 
be doubted. 
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proceeds, the question thus retains its correlatives of right, 
certainty and ground of convergence for both phenomenology 
and ontology. Hence even without a ground, the right to speak 
remains for both phenomenology and ontology (205). We address 
ontology first.  
The privilege of pure phenomenology 
Derrida can thus work out that, as ontology no longer posits 
doxically of the absolute as what it is, it loses the right to absolute 
positing of facticity. It only retains the right to that constrained 
positing which no longer (quite) believes in the possibility of a 
result – the question. The questioning of space, we explained, thus 
far leads to opening rather than a result (292). Hence ontology 
must stand in the precarious opening of a 
question (IOG 151).  
Hence, when it posits or speaks, 
[O]ntology only has a right to the question. 
(IOG 151) 
Thus the privilege of (pure) phenomenology arises. As the 
ontological possibility of an absolute result no longer holds, this 
possibility can only be pure. Hence, on pain of missing the entire 
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progress, it is crucial to avoid deeming, as has been suggested, 
that 
[p]henomenology alone provides evidence; it 
alone makes sense, it alone knows. (Lawlor 2002, 
141, our emphasis) 
Rather, only phenomenology can know. Only pure possibility can 
permit transcendental subjectivity’s approach to the being of the 
absolute to open to the Absolute and Being. As Derrida puts it: 
[F]or phenomenology alone can make infinite 
historicity appear […] as the pure possibility 
and the very essence of Being in manifestation. 
It alone can open the absolute subjectivity of 
Sense to Being-History [in the Absolute] (IOG 
152, our emphases) 
Indeed, Derrida has arrived at an outcome he sought from the 
outset (230). “Manifestation” is deemed that originary moment of 
Being’s revealing itself which is not yet its (objectual) appearing to 
the gaze of the subject. That is, while the questioning of space 
arrived at opening, only pure phenomenology which asks “why” 
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can open the relation. It alone can open the pure possibility of a 
response, to avoid the opening of ontological possibility and its 
question. Rather than ontology and its demand for the absolute, 
such a possibility arises rather from the Absolute and its 
irreducible source. Thus phenomenology in the Absolute as 
Passage “begins by claiming the right to speech” (IOG 152, our 
emphases), and only this retains the pure possibility of an answer 
(or result, as réponse). Derrida summarises:  
[E]very response [réponse] to such a question 
can resurface only in a phenomenological 
process. [However] [O]ntology only has a right 
to the question (IOG 151, our emphasis). 
A fortiori, the possibility of response falls only to pure 
phenomenology, as only it questions “why?”. Yet such a question 
still begins from certainty, thus seeks to determine the fact 
absolutely (it takes the external object “seriously”). 
Each object that was excluded from pure phenomenology can be re-included in 
its rising to higher moments of sense. This is how thought in its pure 
certainty can again ask “why?” of the originary and pure sense of 
the Absolute, to ask “what” the object can be: 
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because the ‘why’ owes its seriousness to a 
phenomenological certainty and through this 
seriousness recovers the virulence of an ‘in 
view of what?’ (IOG 151). 
The double necessity has evolved to the single necessity of pure 
phenomenology and its responsibility (cf. IOG 148). Indeed, 
Derrida soon allots to pure phenomenology the responsibility to 
ask why for all of philosophy.  
But even this most positive moment (soon to be moderated) of 
the pure avoids the simple dogmatism of affirming the truth of 
phenomenology. Rather than retaining possibility for pure 
phenomenology because it can claim more, we suggest that 
Derrida does so in order to avoid claiming too much. First, to 
question (demander) still retains the demand to ask “why”. Indeed, 
phenomenology  
can only be a teleological consciousness. (IOG 
151, our emphases).
282
 
                                                 
282 In addition, Derrida writes: “[T]he why can emerge only from the possible”, 
and “I can clearly ask myself why” (IOG 150-151). 
 - 353 
- 
Such a “can only” arises from the preclusion of ontological 
possibility, retaining only an eidetic necessity of pure possibility. 
Thus essentially, phenomenology must be teleological. 
Consciousness in its seriousness remains a demand through and 
through. However, that something can and must occur has no 
affirmable bearing on whether it does. Accepting this “mandate” 
(IOG 146) for phenomenology may be a heavier burden than 
ceding responsibility for absolute truth to a realism or scepticism. 
Only pure passage can arrive at outcome even to ontology – but 
even that possibility is not yet affirmed.283 Its insoluble demand is 
caught in the Absolute’s evolution to an absolute as purer sense. 
That said, the reader might deem the above unconvincing. At 
base, that the absolute produced by the Idea as Absolute surely 
restores the essential object “inside” the Absolute. Thereafter, as 
a juridical priority is posited (every positing is a judgment (I §5), 
even a question), thus may be affirmed as absolute. Thus in 
excluding the ontological, the primacy of judgment returns absolute 
position, dispelling the problem.  
The arrival at delay rather than primacy  
But Derrida is aware of this, although he will not yet solve it 
entirely. He begins to undo both the Absolute and the 
                                                 
283 Derrida explains: “this teleology [...] cannot be determined in a 
philosophical language without provisionally breaking this unity for the benefit 
of phenomenology” (IOG 151). 
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complacency of the absolute “inside”. The difficulty, we note, is 
that Derrida’s outcome has been a privileging of the “why”. For one 
must first ask “what” in order to ask “why”, or there could have 
been no evidence for appearing at all. The Fact must only then not 
function. Thus, just as the positive conclusion about pure 
phenomenology and the possibility of asking “why” is generalised to 
all of philosophy, Derrida instils this primacy by appealing to 
conditions of possibility: 
[O]n the condition [of possibility] that the taking 
seriously of pure facticity follows after 
phenomenology’s possibility and assumes its 
juridical priority [...] [this] completes 
philosophy. (IOG 151, our emphases) 
Hence one should be cautious. This basis would complete 
philosophy only if the question taken “seriously” (i.e. asking only 
questions of what one believes can have sense) follows from 
possibility. The argument holds only if the pure itself first 
constitutes the phenomenological possibility of ideal Objectivity. 
That is, it holds only after a Reduction (as essential) in the 
Absolute. However, the difficulty is that the Reduction must then 
be prior to the object already given in ontology.  
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That is, the difficulty is again that of Method. As one must ask 
“what” before one can ask “why”, two options arise.284 If 
ontological possibility holds, even without the fact, then the 
objectual absolute comes first. Derrida’s outcome has simply been 
to rest the Reduction in general upon a first address to the object 
in order to determine the fact; instilling just the dependence he 
seeks to avoid in 1962. However, if pure possibility is taken to 
hold first, thus if phenomenological ontology is re-constituted by 
pure phenomenology in the Reduction, then the latter has to be 
imposed first and the object is first dependent upon the Reduction 
for the ideal constitution of its Sense.  
The explanation above in turn leads to two options, each 
developing to this difficulty of dependence upon origin; thus a 
problem. First, the Reduction is by its essence a withholding of 
positing “what” the origin is, a technique in pure phenomenology 
which avoids an ontological constitution. Thus Derrida explains: 
[I]n the lacklustre guise of a technique, the 
Reduction is only pure thought [...] 
                                                 
284 Note that whatever Derrida might have argued as to the avoidance of 
simple bivalence (229), the demand for the absolute is implicitly bivalent. Were 
both “what” and “why” accepted as holding at once, there would no longer be 
a difficulty. 
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investigating the sense of itself [...] within 
philosophy. (IOG 153) 
Again, this leaves the objectual basis (the origin appearing, at the 
end of passage) as that which first appeared in general (“behind”). 
Hence, and next, the object (forward) is also the origin (the 
possibility of historicity) as absolute object.  
A fortiori, instead of a result, the implication is a delay of 
judgment – the absolute of ontology before the Absolute, and of 
the absolute following from phenomenology as Absolute. This 
implies that for this Living Present, 
delay is the philosophical absolute, because the 
beginning of methodic reflection can only consist in 
the consciousness of the implication of another 
[i.e. forward], previous, possible, and absolute origin 
in general. (IOG 152, our emphases) 
Thus Derrida has begun to redress the seeming complacency of 
his argument against Cavaillès. Methodic reflection (i.e. making 
the method into an object), as a co-implication rather than 
synthesis, can only hold as delay. 
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That is, delay is first a consciousness of the problem of origin, rather 
than positing the priority of an object over a pure consciousness, 
or a pure consciousness over the fact. It is “pure thought 
investigating the sense of itself” (IOG 153). Thus Derrida moves 
to the (consciousness of) the necessary and particular moment of 
the origin, for there must “already” have been such an instance, 
which is itself problematic. That is, being or historicity can only 
be produced as originary, as the pure consciousness prior to a 
reduced and objectual absolute. But the object (in particular, the 
origin) is necessary to investigate what for essential reasons can be 
created prior to the originary. Derrida thus poses both of his 
outcomes, the problem of origin and philosophy’s acceptance of 
the responsibility to question its appearing, in sequence: 
[C]ould there [pourrait-il] be an authentic 
thought of Being as History, as well as an 
authentic historicity of thought, if the 
consciousness of delay could be reduced? But 
could there [pourrait-il] be any philosophy if this 
consciousness of delay was not originary 
[originaire] and pure? (IDG 170, cf. IOG 153, 
Derrida’s emphases) 
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Given the right to question facticity, the thought of essence in the 
Absolute is dependent upon a delay which as first object must 
exceed pure phenomenology (IOG 153). Yet in turn only a first 
pure consciousness and its Method could allow the object.  
As to the correlative language, there has been a subtle evolution 
that will be important for Derrida later: possibility (heretofore, 
“peut”) is phrased as a conditional (pourrait), as even the right to 
possibility implies the consciousness of its delay. A verb in the 
conditional tense never quite asserts even possibility (we develop 
this below (477 ff.)). The above works out how,285 as Leavey 
suggests, Derrida arrives at a “logic” that thus far avoids choice 
(cf. Leavey, IOG 5).286 Originary positing of any sort, demanding 
the absolute even in delay, is beset by consciousness of its delay. 
The evolution of delay  
That said, the progress is still developing, as Derrida must still 
assess delay from inside the Living Present, which latter is 
founded upon temporal constitution. For it is important to avoid 
deeming that delay is a postponement of judgment of a fact in time (or 
space).287 To explain: in particular, delay can arise only with the 
                                                 
285 We employ “how” in our progress, rather than “why” or “what” to 
emphasise the procedure as a concern for method. 
286 We add that logic is only one part of the movement of intentionality, and 
this outcome will also be spoken of as at the last a consciousness of 
Difference, which in 1962 nevertheless signifies a choice.  
287 In French, “délai” has much less of a temporal connotation, closer to the 
English sense of a delay of, in our example, a delay at a train station. Such a 
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right to question how this absolute fact (in omnitemporality) is 
constituted in my Living Present (made particular and genitive); 
but then delay as omnitemporal is not yet objective. In general 
and a priori, delay can only arise in a circularity of the pure and 
originary Absolute in my Living Present, as a supertemporality only 
“analogous” to the beyond. But this precludes essential 
constituting of the delay as beyond. This undeniable fact of delay, 
Derrida explains, is then inseparable from limitation. As Derrida 
explains, that the 
absolute origin structurally appears in my [i.e. in 
particular without distance from myself] Living 
Present and since it can appear and be 
recognised only in the originarity of something 
[a pure particular] like my Living Present, this 
very fact signifies [signifie] the authenticity of 
phenomenological delay and limitation. (IOG 
153, IDG 170, Derrida’s emphases) 
                                                                                                        
delay takes the form of a stretch of time, before a temporal event (the train 
arriving, and departing) occurs. As Derrida explained since 1954, one has the 
right to determine something as temporal only from the moment it is lived.  
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Note that the absolute origin is deemed to “structurally” appear; a 
word Derrida allows as even the certainty of this structure of 
delay is delayed. For as we will explain, the “limitation” of delay is 
that it appears as a “Difference”.  
Negativity rather than negation  
To prepare for this we first address negation. We explained above 
why and how negation (and its correlative “not” in language) was 
precluded to retain the reduction to the pure (250). However, delay 
was difficult to reduce even to the essential, and we assess 
whether ideal objectivity in this structure can be negated. For 
Husserl (187), negation follows after ground, right and certainty. 
However, ground was set aside except for the “hidden” unity of 
the reductions in the pure Absolute, with purity depending upon 
the exclusion of negation. To be sure, the latter does not yet 
preclude a ground in an ideal object seen as not myself. Even so, 
given a delay, no ground yet holds to determine what the object is 
not as absolute, thus nor in the Absolute.  
As to right, phenomenological ontology retained only the right to 
ask what the object can (or cannot) be; which question thus far 
retains the opening. But phenomenology claims the right to 
speak, yet even this is not yet a right to say what the object itself 
can (or cannot) be. Such a right does not yet speak of Being itself.  
Yet this Being itself certainly appears. In general, Derrida goes on: 
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 [in] the always open breach of this question, 
Being itself is silently shown under the 
negativity of the apeiron. (IOG 151)
288
 
The apeiron (cf. IOG 48-49, PCP 116, our emphasis) would be the 
fact without a border (peras), hence without position and negation 
of being, and thus without speaking of what is and is not.289 Yet it 
is certain that Being itself appears, thus being “shown” to me. 
Hence Derrida admits only a “silence” and “negativity” (the 
predication of a lack even of negation of appearing in itself).  
Excluding negation in particular, we note, might be hard to 
sustain absolutely, as negativity must still be “not” a positivity, even if 
only originarily. But even if negation were included, the other 
would not yet be myself.  
                                                 
288 What is “shown” for Derrida does not yet include negation, thus we avoid 
aligning it with Hegel. 
289 The apeiron would thus preclude the possibility of singularity as a fact here 
and now. Derrida had earlier quoted that, in “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” 
of 1911, Husserl had deemed that “the singular is eternally the apeiron. 
Phenomenology can recognise with Objective validity only essences and 
essential relations” (PCP 116). Derrida equates this merely with his progress as 
attempt to determine the fact. He continued that Husserl “evidently 
understood by singularity [in that sentence that] only the essence of oneness of 
act in its pure facticity and not that of the eidetic singularities defined in Ideas 1 
as ultimate material essences” (IOG 48-49, §§14, 15)). 
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Opposition as retained 
This shortfall from a limit allows us to re-assess opposition. In 
the first “two arguments”, even a groundless positing of the 
object as absolute located its space, thus a separation from the 
Ego. This is not yet an opposition of the object to me (it is merely 
a positing of space as the condition for objectivity). Moreover, as 
following from a reduction, this positing must avoid negation.  
But in the third and fourth arguments, all three of transcendental 
subjectivity, the Idea and address to the beyond “retracted” into 
an essential circularity without a simple external object or content, 
in the Absolute as Passage. This evolved to the Logos, in passage 
from a “pure pole”, and its “polar” Telos (310, 313). To address 
these three alignments respectively, the “me” arises as opposite 
(polar) to the “I”, originary evidence arises as opposite to 
regulative evidence, and God arises as opposite to God. Even 
without simple distance in involution to the Absolute, and even if 
never real or a fact, the Logos is first evidently an opposition 
between two contents. Only then does opposition fall short of a 
limit in the opening, in a lack of opposite pole.  
Just so, in the progress to the Living Present, the Object in 
general is in opposition to me. Thus including particular relations 
(forward), first, we note that opposition and limitation can hold 
originarily (essentially, behind). Only then do they pass to the 
particular object which avoids absolute opposition to me (or 
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anything) and avoids a limit. Importantly, as Lawlor first 
discovered (Lawlor 2002, 140), this particular object (forward) without 
an opposite or limit is deemed an “other” (un autre). The predicate of 
otherness in general, we add, is “alterity”. Thus as to delay, the fact 
of the appearing of this object implies an essential limitation, even 
when its alterity falls short of an external limit (peras). As Derrida 
put it (we repeat this quote with new emphases): 
[S]ince this alterity of the absolute origin 
structurally appears in my Living Present, […] 
this very fact signifies the authenticity of 
phenomenological delay and limitation. (IOG 
153, our emphasis) 
Without a first essential limitation, there could never be originary 
opposition to permit a Difference related to delay.  
Contradiction, at the same time, set aside 
Before addressing this Difference, we note that the progress in 
1962 thus sets aside Contradiction, which would usually arise 
when opposite characteristics are posited of an object “at the 
same time”, where each is also not its opposite. But for Derrida’s 
questioning of the other as delay without negation or opposition, 
negativity no longer permits contradiction; even when opposite 
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characteristics are posited “at the same time” (IOG 153). This 
allows the next evolution to the general basis of delay. 
From particular delay to Difference  
Given that delay must arise in the Living Present, and that as pure 
it demands the absolute, Derrida begins to set delay into relation 
with Difference.290 To explain this: the general (thus essential) 
relations of the basis (from behind) already hold in the particular, 
derived and certain moment. As ontological possibility lost the 
right to constitute content, this consciousness in the Living 
Present can only be a pure possibility of anticipation (forward, cf. 
(cf. 128)). Second, the historical address to origin (which evolved 
to the a priori investigation of the origin of the object in History), 
in turn implies this originary consciousness as delay. Derrida puts 
it that: 
an originary consciousness of delay could only 
have the pure form of anticipation. At the 
same time [en même temps], pure [teleological] 
consciousness of delay can only be a pure and 
                                                 
290 To be sure, even though Husserl employed a specific (essential) difference 
in the Cartesian Meditations, Derrida did not yet employ it in the four arguments 
(he does mobilise it earlier in the “Introduction”), and it is easy to wonder 
whether this Difference stems from the admission of phenomenological 
ontology, and thus an ontological sort of difference (cf. IOG 150 ff.).  
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legitimate [rightful] presumption, thus a priori, 
without which (once again), discourse and 
history would not be possible (IDG 171, cf. 
IOG 153). 
In doing this, Derrida sets up delay in its two directions of the 
Living Present – forward and backward – in address to the 
particular origin. But the “at the same time” is important – for it 
instils a prior necessity of opposition to that delay as “backward and 
forward”.  
As noted, the origin is a particular moment of the ideal object in 
general. Thus in general (and essentially) this consciousness can 
only be a pure possibility of the origin as such without real 
content. But in particular it can only depend upon the originary 
content as historical (backward).291 The first direction, forward, is 
the pure as Absolute as such, the second its constituted and 
objectual absolute (the origin of the pure). To be sure, general and 
particular moments are never essentially “opposite”. However, as 
predicates, they can be. The opposing predicates (forward-
                                                 
291 Consciousness “discovers its path in an indefinite reduction [to the pure 
passing to opening], always already begun [from behind], wherein every 
adventure [forward] is a change of direction, and every return to the origin [behind] 
is [a] move toward the horizon [forward] (IOG 149, our emphasis). But these 
directions have evolved into the whole-part relations in the pure pole of the 
first necessity. 
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backward, anticipatory-historical, general-particular) can only be 
possible at the same time without negation, thus avoiding 
contradiction. Thus in general, in the Living Present, the ego is 
always other to itself without absolute position or negation.  
This introduces the difficulty of identity to the origin. Such a 
Living Present as absolute origin (as delay) is always other to 
identity with itself. The 
Living Present [is] the sole and absolutely 
absolute origin [...] but always other in its self-
identity. (IOG 153, IDG 171) 
Note that Derrida is still finding fashions by which to address the 
absolute, even in delay. This otherness from self-identity is still 
the absolute, indeed, the “absolutely absolute”.  
Thus as “limitation” is as authentic as delay, nor is this certain 
moment “undivided” (IOG 153) in its identity to itself as other; 
Derrida returns the necessity of division. In general, the origin as 
absolute is first divided from itself and opposite to itself, but not yet a negation 
or contradiction. Derrida thus adds Difference into the relations of 
absolute and Absolute. In the progress above, the Absolute led to 
delay, and the absolute to the partial right to (questioning) the 
originary object. Thus difference has arisen from the latter as 
objectual; there must have been an historical origin as Difference, 
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and there certainly is a difference in the possibility of the object as 
“this side” of the absolute, while delay holds of the Absolute.  
At last, Derrida generalises this particular moment to call this  
the originary Difference of the absolute Origin 
(IOG 153). 
Such an originary Difference cannot have content (an essential 
impossibility (251)). This in turn develops the relations of the 
absolute Origin, which were founded upon the irreducible Idea 
“beyond” the Living Present. For the pure evidence of Difference 
must have been produced in consciousness by the “beyond”. 
Hence this “impossibility” is  
given in an originary and pure consciousness 
of Difference (IOG 153, our emphases).
292
  
                                                 
292 Once again, we caution that it would obscure Derrida’s progress to assess 
how his Difference derives from earlier philosophers. We follow Derrida’s 
“law” from 1954, and make only these brief comments upon Husserl, Hegel’s 
and Heidegger’s kinds of difference, the only sorts that Derrida mentions in 
the extracts that we will read as we progress. As to Husserl’s “lowest specific 
Difference” (Differenzen) (I §12, 15, 16), this indeed applies at the lowest level 
of essence. It is indeed, like Derrida’s, thus far an originary (evidentially based) 
difference which is already essential. However, for Husserl at the lowest pure 
level an eidetic singularity is different, in that it stands out from other elements. 
Overall, for Husserl, difference singularises. This is closer to what Derrida will 
deem distinction from 1965. Derrida’s “Difference” in 1962 is first but not yet 
absolutely opposite to its other, nor is it particular (specific) difference. As to 
Hegel’s Difference, we note three kinds: Unterschied, as scission between two 
poles, and Verscheidenheit, which – Derrida adds – Hegel employs to emphasise 
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But in turn (forward), Difference is nevertheless the condition for 
the possibility of appearing, and thus is necessary to signal the 
“beyond” from its most interior and originary possibility. That is, 
Difference is necessary for content to appear in particular. This 
arrives at a sort of outcome to every one of Derrida’s requirements. 
This Difference would be how ideal Objectivity is possible in 
particular; as real, empirical, or factual. It would be 
the beyond or the this-side which gives sense 
to all empirical genius and factual profusion 
(IOG 153). 
In this outcome, we have also developed the first kind of 
Difference that we meet in Derrida: as pure, essential, originary, 
necessitating originary opposition, but as yet without negation or 
contradiction. However, Derrida avoids capitalising “delay”, as it 
is merely a delay of the essential Absolute as absolute. There can 
                                                                                                        
qualitative variety. Derrida by 1968 deems that these are spatial sorts of 
Difference, and will rather align with the temporal “Different” he finds in 
Hegel’s earlier Jena Logic. In 1962, however, Derrida as yet allows no negation 
as opposite to position (and indeed, no simple position), thus preventing any 
kind of alignment with Hegel’s differences. This also remains far removed 
from Hyppolite’s Hegel, for Hyppolite makes both empirical and speculative (for 
Lawlor, internal) negation crucial to his kind of difference (cf. Lawlor 2002, 99, 
LeE 130-131, LE 101-102). As related to a question, Difference bears affinity 
with Heidegger’s “Difference”, for in general it questions the difference 
between being and Beings. However, this ascription too would be misleading, 
for in 1962 Derrida’s approach includes the basic progress of delay. Rather, 
this first kind of Difference that we encounter in Derrida appears as originarily 
opposite without, as yet, allowing negation of others. Notably, even Derrida’s 
Difference is developing, as he will include negation by 1964 (505), and has not 
yet allowed for difference as irreducible. 
 - 369 
- 
only be a consciousness of the particular essential moment as 
Difference.  
The circularity of the différant 
Thus, the transcendental ego in the Living Present is set into an 
uncomfortable relation where it must address itself as always 
other to itself, in accordance with an (intemporal) necessity, via 
the ideal Objectivity that is originarily given as consciousness of 
Difference. A determination remains possible, of course, but in a 
pure phenomenology, the absolute which it constitutes is then 
delayed in the essential impossibility of absolute solution to the 
Absolute.  
Even so, above all, the Telos is that the Absolute be given 
absolutely. But upon reflection, delay too must and can only 
manifest as object (forward). Yet as object, the Absolute as delay 
could only hold as already divided from itself by originary Difference 
(“behind”).293 It is an a priori impossibility (thus not yet a 
negation forward) that the Absolute appear. And yet, it must, can 
and certainly does hold originarily in a Difference from itself. 
Thus Derrida summarises: 
                                                 
293 As Derrida explains it, this is a moment preventing rest “in the simple 
maintenance [nowness] of a Living Present, [which is] the sole and absolutely 
absolute origin [...], but always other in its self-identity.” (IOG 153). 
 - 370 
- 
because the Absolute is [originarily] present 
only in being deferred-delayed [différant] 
without respite, this impotence and this 
impossibility are given in an originary [originaire] 
and pure consciousness of Difference. (IDG 
171 cf. IOG 153) 
Crucially, Derrida thus aligns the word “difference” (différence) 
with a synonym for delay (délai) in its “deferral” of itself (se 
différant).294 In the deferral of speech and object, delay is in turn 
only originarily given as Different.  
In sum, the Absolute as impossibility is delayed, and is certainly 
given only in the consciousness of originary Difference. As we 
have worked out since the first two arguments, such a process in 
transcendental subjectivity would be infinite. But as ever, given 
the demand, thought must strive to go “beyond” this originary 
Difference to affirm it absolutely; and can expect this result only 
to be indefinite (forward). This is: 
                                                 
294 The “différant”, according to Leavey’s translation, is a deferral-delay. Note 
that, “delay” in French even in the différant has the sense of an intemporal 
duration.  
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[T]he pure and interminable disquietude of 
thought striving to ‘reduce’ Difference [to the 
inside] by going beyond factual infinity. [But] 
thought’s pure certainty […] can look forward 
to the already announced Telos only by 
advancing on (or being in advance of) the 
Origin that indefinitely reserves itself. (IOG 
153) 
The above instils the circularity, as yet without absolute solution, 
of the différant in 1962.  
The conservation of sense in 1962 
Even so, we emphasise that Derrida’s outcome has been positive, 
and even “conservative” (that is, opting to retain rather than 
dispel the possibility of sense). Derrida in 1962 is anything but an 
anomist. Rather than an ongoing deferral, and loss of sense, 
Derrida prefers a relentless and absolute consciousness of originary 
Difference. His outcome insists upon an Absolute and a priori 
preservation of sense in general, as impossible in general and a 
priori but given in particular. This evidence is no longer “given” 
as phenomenological content, but arises from the regulative and 
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exceptional sort which must have been produced by the beyond; 
yet still first is evident and no longer a consciousness of delay. By 
1967, Derrida will have integrated difference and deferral as 
originary in the node of the word “différance”. Thus far, his progress 
has arrived at deferral that can be present and given via a 
consciousness of Difference. 
Indeed, this “progress” (cf. IOG 143) has developed in a 
sequence from the four arguments, to the Absolute as passage, to 
delay and Difference. The above, we suggest, has worked out in some 
measure how Difference and the différant evolved in a sequence across 
Derrida’s work of 1962. Moreover, it has followed how the progress developed 
from Derrida’s address to the “law” of the complication of origin and the 
problem as it held since 1954.  
Part Two: what must yet develop 
That said, even originary Difference has not yet arrived at 
absolute solution; Derrida’s progress – philosophy itself – must 
go further. Moreover, the approach is nascent, and we will briefly 
summarise what needs to develop. First, the progression is better 
considered as Derrida’s even in 1962. As noted, in the first and 
second arguments, Derrida deemed that phenomenology cannot 
ground itself (whatever Husserl might wish). Yet “without 
wanting to”, Husserl posits the space in which finite objects 
appear (IOG 140, (286)). Derrida’s progress early on exceeded 
what Husserl intended, in order to allow for continuing 
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possibility. Had this groundless positing of space never occurred, 
ontology and then originary Difference would have been 
precluded.  
Thereafter, Derrida’s selection of a fragment of Husserl’s 
unpublished work to address God diverged from Husserl’s “more 
lasting intentions” (IOG 147, above). Thus while the Derrida of 
1962 deems at the last that Difference and deferral is “the 
movement sketched in The Origin of Geometry” (IOG 153), this is 
probably the comment of a philosopher who still needed to 
moderate his claims. As in 1954, the approach is better thought of 
as his working out of how (parts of) phenomenology can address 
his telos of absolutely determining the problem of origin. Thus in 
1968 Derrida was willing to emphasise: 
[in] the introduction to Husserl’s The Origin of 
Geometry [...] the problematic of writing was 
already in place as such, bound to the irreducible 
structure of “deferral” in its relationships to 
consciousness, presence, […] the disappearance or 
delay of the origin, etc. (IMP 5, our emphases) 
We worked out how writing early on lost its ground to posit what 
ideal objectivity is as such (cf. 262), evolving to disappearance. By 
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the end of the “Introduction”, this progress had evolved to the 
return of the “what” to pure phenomenology, progressed to the 
structure of delay, then to deferral and Difference, in the 
“différant”.  
We do caution that Derrida in 1962 does not yet overtly mention 
that delay or deferral are “irreducible”, but we worked out that 
delay can appear even essentially only as pure Difference. 
Moreover, writing as a primary originary necessity was set aside; 
this is merely a problematic rather than irreducible writing 
(Derrida opted for pure Speech as irreducible foundation (302)). 
Moreover, writing (cf. IOG 87-93) has not yet been overtly 
aligned with Difference in the final pages (IOG 153). Insofar as 
pure phenomenology permits the reconstituting of the question 
“in view of what?”, and writing is essentially tied to letters in 
space, essential Difference can indeed permit a sort of writing. 
But Derrida does not yet develop or examine these until “Of 
Grammatology” of 1966 (672 ff.).  
Passage as still uni-directional 
However, the most obvious indicator that this is Derrida’s 
approach in 1962, and that it must develop, is that he explains 
only selected parts of Husserl’s phenomenology. First, and 
importantly, Derrida does not yet consider a position from the 
other ego upon myself. When addressing other consciousnesses in 
the community, Derrida was concerned merely with the lack of 
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ground for speech or positing (255). That is, his concern in 1962 
is the epistemological project developed since 1954, to found the 
absolute origin of the world for me.  
Thus in 1962, after this object always available to the gaze is 
returned to the involution to the Absolute, the subject goes forth 
in itself only from the finite Ego to the object, to fall short in the 
opening (we deem this passage “unidirectional”). Hence, the 
Living Present is made the only absolute origin of the world. Derrida 
explained that the 
Living Present [is] the sole and absolutely 
absolute origin of [...] Being and Sense. (IOG 
153) 
The address to the Living Present never allows that it in turn 
might be other to another absolute origin. Derrida had merely noted 
that the issue of the origin of intersubjectivity was set aside (IOG 
79, OOG 161, cf. SP 7). Whether such address would still permit 
his outcome has not yet been addressed.  
Thus while Derrida’s progress does work out the implications 
from his bases, we are rather noting the lacunae that arise given 
his initial demand: to solve absolutely the epistemological 
problem that fascinated him since 1954. A more comprehensive 
explanation of Husserl, and more robust phenomenology, would 
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need to consider other possible origins of the world. Indeed, this 
is crucial to Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity, or what (in the 
Cartesian Meditations) Husserl calls “appresentation” (464). Taking 
the latter into consideration would allow this, by permitting the 
absolute basis of transcendental subjectivity as unidirectional to 
include (at least) one further direction – from the position of the 
other upon me. Derrida will do so in 1964. 
The suppression of negation  
Also important is Derrida’s suppression of negation. First, he had 
excluded it from a reduction (IOG 119, cf. 86, 46 fn. 38). To be 
sure, Derrida takes this sort to be a particular “negation” of the 
external world, which would invalidate a reduction. He rather 
opted for an a priori negation and essential negation, as already 
holding. Derrida then retracted ontology to a relation prior to 
truth or falsity, and pure opening.  
Yet Husserl allowed even for a negation in accordance with a 
priori and pure ontology:  
every negation is a negation of something, and 
this Something points us back to the modality 
of belief. (I §106) 
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That is, a predicative negation in turn holds in accordance with an 
ontological law, by which a doxic relation to pure law (forward) is 
established. In turn for Husserl (forward), the negation of the 
purely possible implied the impossible, and negation of the 
“questionable”, the “unquestionable”. 295  
Second, Derrida also elided consideration of negation of the 
origin in particular. Yet in Experience and Judgment (EJ §21, (187)), 
Husserl explained how negation (as “disappointment” and 
“cancellation”), is crucial to explication (forward). That is, upon 
realising that the far side of a table is not white, by this judgment 
of negation the sedimented history of the object is re-arranged; 
hence the ego has more closely intuited what the thing is, and 
thus was at its origin. Husserl’s return enquiry could never work 
without negation. Further, this applies to any kind of position. It 
holds in an analogous manner for every other 
intending, object positing consciousness 
                                                 
295 In the Ideas – within a reduction – Husserl opposes “negation and affirmation” 
(Husserl’s emphasis). He then goes on that “every negation is a negation of 
something, and this Something points us back to the modality of belief. […] Its 
specific correlate is the cancellation character we designate as ‘not’”. […] [Thus] 
through the transformation of the plain consciousness of Being into the 
corresponding consciousness of negation, the plain character ‘being’ [seiend] 
turns in the noema into that of ‘not being’. In an analogous way, out of the 
‘possible’ […] and the ‘questionable’, we get the ‘impossible’ [and] […] the 
‘unquestionable’. And therewith the whole noema is modified, the whole 
‘posited meaning’” (I §106). 
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(positional consciousness) and for its 
objectivities (H EJ §21c, 90).  
Negation could never be separated from enquiry into objectivity 
in Husserl’s overall phenomenology.  
The first impetus for the elision of negation 
Derrida in the early 1960’s never explains why he suppresses 
Husserl’s negation from pure phenomenology in 1962 – the only 
clue is from 1954. As we explained from Husserl, negation is an 
intentional modification (or “operation”) (I §106) that occurs only 
after the fundamental positional consciousness. For Husserl the 
fundamental form (S is P), is only then negated to “S is not P” (cf. 
EJ §72). Second, as it applies after such positing of ideal 
objectivity, negation is precluded from foundation upon the whole-
part relations of essence. Thus, first, for Derrida, the “operation” 
of negation is never permissible in the originary circularity of 
transcendental subjectivity. Hence in 1954, in assessing this 
section of Experience and Judgment (PdG 196-197, PG 115-117), 
Derrida had noted in a long footnote that 
Husserl, [when] trying to describe the 
phenomenon of negation starting from a 
transcendental theoretical subject must, as 
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soon as he is obliged to invoke a concrete and 
existential attitude (the only one that saves 
negation from a logical and predicative origin), 
do so in terms of psychology. Failure, 
disappointment, etc. have no transcendental 
status. They are thus purely empirical. (PG 
205-206, fn. 47) 
A negation as psychological permits error and precludes the possibility of the 
fact as absolute. Yet as empirical, it finds no particular evidence, and 
precludes the possibility of determination of an origin. Neither 
were acceptable in Derrida’s teleology of 1962.  
A reader might disagree with Derrida, in that Husserl also allows 
negation its authentically originary role. He emphasises in 
Experience and Judgment that in disappointment  
is described the authentically originary 
[ursprüngliche] phenomenon of negation of the 
‘other’ [anders] (H EJ, §21, our emphases). 
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The difficulty of admitting this for Derrida in 1962, we suggest, is 
again that of sequence – even when Husserl does seek “negation” 
to be originary, it is consequent to the originary production (187), 
precluding its applicability to the problem of origin. But even as 
transcendental, for Derrida, Husserl’s negation could never 
permit affirmation of the origin.  
Thus, we suggest, Derrida may have excluded negation of the 
other from Husserl’s pure transcendental circularity in that, as 
consequent to the positive moment, it is no longer even certain, 
and thought finds no basis in anything without this certainty. But 
when negation is included, it is no longer compatible with 
transcendental subjectivity. Difference as deferral might have 
included negation, but would have needed to exclude 
transcendental subjectivity. By this reading, Husserl’s negation 
never could have been included to Derrida’s transcendental 
address in 1962.  
We avoid suggesting that Derrida’s progress is wrong – he is well 
aware of the issue, and seeks to proceed at a more basic level to 
assess his telos. However, we do suggest that he would need to 
account for negation both to address Husserl more fully, and to 
develop a more comprehensive approach. Moreover, omitting 
consideration of negation in 1962 does raise difficulties. First, 
Derrida had avoided including negation to his assessment of 
writing and speech. When speaking subjects failed to absolutely 
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determine the fact, Derrida allotted this difficulty merely to the 
essential possibility of “misunderstanding” (IOG 82). He 
considered merely partial relations of sameness and otherness.  
Second, Derrida then evolved the address to the “positive value 
of univocity” as not yet an objective truth. That implied an a 
priori impossibility that words can be absolute objects, by which 
he arrived at a basis “analogous” to the Idea in the Kantian sense. 
Yet without a pure negation, it is difficult to justify Derrida’s 
inclusion of impossibility, even as only a priori impossibility. Third, 
indeed, Derrida then retracted to the Absolute as a priori, yet still 
avoided negation. Rather, he opted for negativity, in thought’s 
“pure certainty”. Yet nor could some kind of negation be 
absolutely separated from Derrida’s pure certainty, for even a 
Being silently shown as negativity (IOG 151) must be a negation 
of positivity, even should this have been a priori (cf. I §302, (377 
fn.). Finally, he then argued only for the opening of the question. 
Yet consideration of negation would concede the 
“unquestionable”. Derrida sought to allow a right to the question 
without restraint. The possibility of an unquestionable object or 
origin, in 1962, would threaten the possibility of sense.  
The first important corollary is that when Derrida includes 
negation, he will need to re-assess the relations of sameness and 
“otherness”. Second, he will need to add relations of negation to 
the progress “forward”. Third, he will need to reconsider 
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transcendental subjectivity in its arrival at deferral. Deferral will 
no longer be mentioned in Derrida’s approach until he works it 
out again by revisiting his approach to transcendental appearing 
in “Of Grammatology”. By that juncture, Derrida will be able to 
apply the arguments which developed his unidirectional passage 
from 1962. 
The second impetus for the elision of negation 
However, Derrida never does address negation in Husserl in the 
early 1960s; his reading of Husserl was ever selective. When he 
does add negation in 1964 he will set Husserl aside, and briefly 
opt for alignment with Hegel (VeM 442-443, VM 126-127). Even 
this was portended in 1954 when, in critiquing Husserl’s kind of 
negation he noted that, as an operation, it never questioned its 
origin. He preferred Hegel’s and Heidegger’s kinds, which sought 
to give an originary sense to negation and 
found it, not on […] an operation but on 
nothingness. ( PdG 197 fn. 47, PG 206 fn. 47) 
As to Hegel, Derrida in 1954 is referring at least to the first 
section of the Greater Logic, where Hegel arrives at the first 
moment of determinate Being by the negation of Nothing (H GL 
1 99, WS 72). As to Heidegger, Derrida is referring at least to 
Being and Time, where Heidegger deems that “not” has no ground 
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besides nothingness (BT 261-262, SZ 283-284). Yet even in 1954, 
Derrida was wary of supposing that such a basis upon 
nothingness as productive of becoming could be entirely 
separated from the logical production of sense. That is, such 
inseparability from a foundation would preclude any absolute 
foundation except no foundation at all. Taken absolutely, this 
would imply nihilism.296  
In our next chapter, we turn to “Violence and Metaphysics” of 
1964. Derrida will include the second direction from Husserl, 
considering other absolute origins in his teleology. In Chapter Six, 
we will follow as Derrida includes negation to this progress, and 
sets Husserl aside to align briefly with Hegel and Heidegger. He 
will evolve the relations of sameness and otherness in the two 
directions. Yet that alignment too will be merely partial, as 
Derrida develops his progress from earlier years to continue to 
question finitude but avoid nihilism. Before turning to “Violence 
and Metaphysics”, we will contextualise our progress thus far. 
  
                                                 
296 Nor do we suggest that Derrida adopted Hegel’s approach to negation. In 
1954 he went on that “[I]t would remain to be seen if, in making of 
nothingness a dialectical “motor” of becoming, there is not given back to it a 
logical sense that would be the dissimulation of the originary nothingness” 
(PdG 197 fn. 47, PG 206 fn. 47). By 1964, Derrida will be more accepting of 
Hegel’s negation, although not yet of Hegel’s contradiction (583). By 1966, 
Derrida will deem that the “blind spot” of Hegel’s dialectic is the origin of 
negation (RGEf 30, RGE 259). Those elements of the article in 1966 can thus 
be seen as the evolution of a task Derrida had proposed to address since 1954. 
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Contribution of Chapters One to Four 
Contribution of Chapter One 
As far as we are aware, only Lawlor has followed a path from 
Derrida’s The Problem of Genesis of 1954, through Derrida’s 
“Introduction” of 1962 to demonstrate a “logic”. Hence our most 
notable sense of interlocution in the prior chapters has been with 
the Lawlor of 2002. Thus it is important to avoid deeming our 
address is critical; it is required of a dissertation to signal its 
divergence and contribution (this will apply to every reader we 
address). Lawlor’s approach to Derrida’s work in 1954 merely 
diverges in emphasis from ours, although our approaches and 
outcomes are incompatible by 1962.297 
As to 1954, Lawlor assesses Derrida’s external influences, while 
we follow Derrida’s “law”. Thus Lawlor follows Derrida’s 
progress via comparison of Derrida’s dialectic to Tran Duc Thao 
and Cavaillès) (Lawlor 2002, 48-87). We sought to explain the 
basic interrelations of the demand and problem, merely noting 
that dialectic verifies the problem and would need to evolve. 
Hence Lawlor suggests that Derrida’s awareness of a “logic” 
                                                 
297 Lawlor then progresses to a short explanation of “Violence and 
Metaphysics”, although his mentions of the 1964 version are brief, and he 
takes his argument from the version of 1967; by that juncture we will have 
diverged almost entirely. Thereafter, we move to “Of Grammatology”, while 
Lawlor proceeds to assess “La Voix et le Phénoméne” of 1967 (published as 
“Speech and Phenomena). 
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arises in 1962. We agree, but followed Derrida’s transitions 
insofar as they would be habitual in his approach, even though 
Derrida could not yet have known it then.  
That is, to our knowledge, we are the first to mention Derrida’s 
“law”, and the first to begin from it to seek a basis by which to 
follow Derrida’s oeuvre.298 Following from this, that we started 
from Derrida’s “demand”, then developed the basic relations, 
directions of the joints, relations of contamination and the 
problem are novel. That our dissertation develops in a 
progression from these bases, we suggest, will make our approach 
novel at least overall. 
Contribution of Chapter Two 
As we have not yet had access to Husserl’s unpublished 
manuscripts (and work mostly from the English texts), we deem 
our reading of Husserl a contribution merely to study of Derrida. 
Moreover, Derrida proceeds mainly by assessing those works that 
Husserl published or approved for publication in his lifetime 
(with the notable exception of his fourth argument in 1962 (IG 
146-147)),299 and we usually follow this protocol.  
                                                 
298 We introduced these relations in our articles “Finding a Systematic Base for 
Derrida’s work”, and “Re-Thinking what we Think about Derrida” (Galetti, 
2010b, Galetti 2010c). 
299 In 1954, Derrida notes he had not “had the time” to include Husserl’s 
manuscripts after his visit to Louvain (PG 149-150/241-243). The exception to 
Derrida’s rule of only working from the published works as definitive, in those 
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Even so, our overall interpretation of Husserl is based upon the 
whole-part relations of the Third Investigation of 1913 (LU 227-
295).300 Although the importance of these sorts of relations is 
accepted and applied (cf. LI p. 7; Sokolowski 1968, 541), to our 
knowledge direct transcendental-logical readings of this Third 
Investigation are rare (cf. also Mohanty 2005). We are aware of 
none that have sought to facilitate this logic by working from the 
emendations of 1913 to relate them to the Ideas of 1913, to 
prepare a way to apply these to Husserl’s oeuvre as Derrida reads 
him.  
As to those who have assessed Husserl in this way: our reading of 
Derrida diverges from Sokolowski in that we introduce three 
levels and their relations. Second, Sokolowksi deems that 
“moments” are crucial, while “pieces” (such as a “head”, which 
can be thought separately, thus can be independent parts) are 
“not very important philosophically” (Sokolowski 1968, 541; 
2004, 257). Our concern has been to assess the relations of what 
can be separated, thus separated from its outside (cf. our note 
upon LI 3 §25, in which Husserl avoids mention of an external 
whole). For Derrida, the difficulty of separation from the whole 
                                                                                                        
arguments that we follow closely, occurs in Derrida’s address to God in 1962, 
which he takes from a letter published in Biemel, Hua VI, from K III (IOG 
147). For examples of Derrida’s referring to the manuscripts only in passing, 
without engagement cf. IOG 82, 117 fn. 128. 
300 Sokolowski also notes that “[n]eglect of this Investigation could indeed 
prove disastrous to understanding Husserl’s thought” (Sokolowski 1968, 537; 
2004, 253). 
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(outside) develops the primary problem for philosophy. Third, 
Sokolowski remains upon the “constituted” side (Sokolowski, 
544). Derrida is concerned with the shortfall of judgment from 
affirming content of the object. He thus begins from the 
“constituting” side to apply his “directions” forward and 
backward in whole-part relations. 
Second, J.N. Mohanty deems that Husserl’s “pure possibility” is 
situated at the level of dependent essences or ‘abstracta’. For 
Mohanty, a dependent essence such as “red circle” would be a 
pure possibility.301 We noted that Husserl deems that the entirely 
pure is without content (LI 3 §11). According to our progress, 
“red circle” is a content in a material ontology. Mohanty takes no 
account of the ontologies (Mohanty 322-326). By taking “pure 
possibility” to hold in pure ontology, thus correspondent to 
material ontology, we have been able to apply the relations to the 
Ideas, and in turn to the form of intentionality. In turn, we were 
able to apply these to a reduction, and to Husserl’s oeuvre.  
Third, in so doing we are much closer to Pentzopoulou Valalas, 
whom we supported above (185 fn.). However, Pentzopoulou-
Valalas deems that material ontologies, “once incarnated” are no 
longer a priori matters” (Pentzopoulou-Valalas 1981, 122, our 
                                                 
301 Mohanty writes: “[t]he ideal objects that are pure possibilities, then, are what 
Husserl calls ‘dependent essences’ or ‘abstracta’ (Hua III/1, 35). The ‘red 
circle’ refers to a dependent essence, it cannot be by itself.” (Mohanty 2004, 
322). 
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emphasis). As Derrida takes it, we explained, the movement 
retracted to a priori relations as the Absolute.  
Fourth, Husserl’s whole-part logic has been important to the 
development of mereology as a mathematical discipline (cf. Smith 
et. al. 1982, Fine 1995). However, such approaches set aside the 
living aspect of intentional directions that are also crucial to 
Husserl. They are also not yet concerned with applying the formal 
whole-part relations to assess how Husserl works out his progress 
across his oeuvre. Rather, these approaches proceed via symbolic, 
deductive and diagrammatic reasoning. We followed how Derrida 
seeks to avoid these in favour of a situation in “formal 
implication” as a primary ground prior to deductive axiomatics 
(IOG 56, cf. I §72).  
Fifth, we have diverged from formal-logical treatments of 
Husserl. Kit Fine notes that Husserl in his Third Investigation 
had deemed that he was amenable to the formalisation of whole-
part relations (Fine 1995, 464; LI 3 §24). Fine continues that 
Husserl often never clarifies whether he assesses relations which 
“indicate a relation between two individuals, which happens to be 
of the respective species A and B, and what indicates a relation 
between the two species A and B themselves.” (Fine 1995, 465). 
However, Fine goes on, as the relations between individuals are 
deemed “objectual”, that “it is clear that Husserl thinks the 
objectual notions are somehow to be understood in terms of the 
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generic ones” (Fine 1995, 465). Yet Fine then sets forth a detailed 
and deductive symbolic treatment that is concerned only with the 
“simpler” “theory of objects”. For Derrida, phenomenology 
proceeds by address to objects that must be related to generic and 
essential relations by formal implication. 
To that end, we have developed the levels and directions, and 
noted that influential and recent readers of Husserl explain 
movement through whole-part relations and directions by the 
metaphors of “upward” and “downward” (cf. Bernet et. al. 1993, 
40), and even Husserl scholars in Derrida’s era proceeded via 
three levels (Bachelard 1968, 11-14). We merely suggest our 
approach is basically compatible with how Husserl progresses. Our 
explanation of the criteria and parameters, and their interrelations, 
however, was oriented toward how Derrida approaches Husserl 
in 1962, to develop Derrida’s transitions as he proceeds.  
Contribution of Chapters Three and Four 
As we are aware of none that have sought to begin from Husserl’s 
Third Investigation to proceed forward and develop these criteria 
and parameters, we suggest our approach is helpful in reading of 
Derrida. We also believe we are the first to seek to explain the 
“Introduction” of 1962 as a progression, and to closely assess the 
final sections (Section X ff.). Should this hold, then we are the 
first to work out the relations of the différant.  
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Bernet, in seeking to summarise the work for Derrida readers in 
1989, is very aware of its situation in relation to various and 
incompatible kinds of reading of Husserl of that era.302 We have 
sought rather to follow the “law”, and thus Derrida’s concerns. 
We thus noted that any such readers can be appealed to by 
Derrida upon particular issues, insofar as they are helpful for 
Derrida’s argument at that juncture.  
Thus our progress and outcomes have diverged. Bernet deems 
that Derrida’s “principal contribution” is asking “why Husserl 
should have chosen geometry in particular” (Bernet 1989, 141); 
we have sought to explain that Derrida seeks to develop his 
concerns from 1954 to arrive at the différant. In turn, Bernet 
deems Derrida’s concern in the circularity is “pre-eminently” that 
of writing (Bernet 1989, 144). We have explained that Derrida 
sought a ground of possibility in a progressive argument, and set 
writing aside in his progress to alignment of Speech with the Idea, 
then to the Absolute as Passage, and then to the différant, in which 
writing could have a role (as difference), but was not yet 
implemented. Thus while Bernet deems that idealisation is “also” 
important, we have followed how Derrida evolves these in a 
progression. 
                                                 
302 We noted in footnotes, for instance, that Derrida refers at various junctures 
to the dedicated phenomenologist Fink (1939, 215, cf. IOG 55, 89), to 
Ricoeur’s transcendental-idealist comparison with Kant (Ricoeur 1967, 201, cf. 
IOG 140), Hyppolite’s reading of Husserl via Hegel, signification and passage 
(Hyppolite 1953, cf. IOG 67, fn. 62), and the logical approaches of Bachelard 
(in 1957, cf. IOG 55) and Cavaillès’ (in 1947, cf. IOG 142 ff.). 
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An overview of our divergence from Lawlor  
As to the Idea in the Kantian sense, Leavey provided an insightful 
but brief summary in 1978 (IOG, Translator’s Preface, 1-21). 
However, Lawlor’s is the only detailed explanation of the 
“Introduction” of which we are aware.  
As noted, Lawlor seeks external contrast rather than following 
Derrida’s law. Thus he develops Derrida’s indebtedness to a logic 
that Lawlor works out from Hyppolite’s reading of Hegel in Logic 
and Existence of 1953 (Lawlor 2002, 95-99).303  
Lawlor introduced several trailblazing relations to Derrida study from 
this contrast. He emphasised (in more detail than Bernet of 1989) 
that Derrida develops a “circularity” from a progress of return 
enquiry, where what holds “forward” and “across” (à travers) must 
in turn hold “behind” (cf. L 129-130). However, Lawlor was the 
first to explain that Derrida is a philosopher of “passage” (cf. 
Lawlor 1998 ff.). He was also the first to explain that Derrida 
employs language logically: that “must” and “can” are expressions 
of necessity and possibility, while “not” signifies a negation.304 
Thus, to our knowledge, he was the first to begin to demonstrate 
how a logic could apply to Derrida. Indeed, our appreciation of 
                                                 
303 We address the explanation of Hyppolite’s logic when touching upon Hegel 
below (613). 
304 Lawlor never noted that “not” is employed systematically in his reading, 
which is a pity, as his work might have been less appreciated than it should 
have been. Our summary in these pages be the first to engage with the logic. 
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otherness as avoiding opposition developed after reading Lawlor’s 
contrast to Hegel (cf. 617).  
Although our readings of Derrida diverge, several of our 
outcomes (which we developed in our progression) evolved to 
accord with Lawlor’s basic relations. Lawlor noted that for 
Derrida 
this passage implies that Derrida is separating 
alterity from negation [...]; in other words, Derrida is 
not allowing alterity to be pushed all the way up 
to contradiction or to be deepened down to 
opposition (Lawlor 2002, 140, cf. LE 113, LeE 
145, our emphases). 
We agree with this, and sought to work out how Derrida develops 
these relations.  
To that end, our inclusion of whole-part (general-particular etc.) 
relations, developed via Husserl, are ours. So too are the criteria 
and parameters that we developed from them across our chapters. 
Thus our progress diverges considerably from Lawlor’s.  
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A brief application to readings of Derrida 
We will demonstrate a brief but pivotal example. Lawlor’s 
explanation of Derrida’s “Introduction” finds the “logic” in its 
early part, in the address to language and writing. Lawlor notes 
(and we agree) that in this instance Derrida’s demand is a 
necessity for absolute univocity.  
However, we diverge from the crucial quote by which Lawlor 
begins to develop the logic. Lawlor quotes Derrida that:  
[I]f equivocity is always irreducible, that is 
because words and language in general are not 
and never can be absolute objects. (Lawlor 123, 
quoting IOG 106, Derrida’s emphasis) 
Lawlor then takes this is a negation of the possibility of 
determining the absolute. Thus, Lawlor quotes that “there is a 
sort of pure equivocity here” (IOG 107, Lawlor 124), and negates 
this relation, and moreover negates purity. For Lawlor, what 
cannot be pure equivocity cannot be pure univocity. There 
“cannot be [...] pure community”, thus words “can never be pure 
objects” (Lawlor 2002, 124). Lawlor thus affirms the end of pure 
phenomenology in 1962, and the first moment (not yet quite 
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impurity, but negation of the possibility of purity) of Derrida’s 
“contamination” (Lawlor 2002, 124, 141). 
However, we note, rather than the object “purity” in the quote, 
the object is “absolute objects”.305 Moreover, Derrida seeks to 
avoid the direct negation of its possibility, but seeks a circularity. 
He employs “are not” and “never can be”, which instils a relation 
from a negation (forward), to an essential impossibility as 
preclusion (behind) (cf. 250). Indeed, nor did Derrida affirm even 
this, prefacing the above with: “[I]f equivocity is always 
irreducible…”. To posit this irreducibility as possible would 
require a ground for possibility, and an instance of the equivocal – 
but Derrida has worked out that no such ground yet holds. Thus 
Derrida makes no mention of impurity or contamination, yet 
frequently mobilises pure possibility, and continues to do so.  
Following from this negation of possibility, Lawlor in 1962 
develops a “double necessity” (Lawlor 2002, 139) – a first 
necessity and possibility of exiting the Living Present as an 
“impotence” to exceed this limit and thus “oppositely”, the 
necessity to remain within the Living Present. Without a negation 
of predicative possibility, we found no second direction of 
“double necessity” in 1962. We noted that Derrida’s single 
employment of “double necessity” in 1962 is “that of a Quod 
                                                 
305 That the relation is “impossibility or negation” never settles upon 
predicative negation, but develops an instability. 
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[why, what] and a Quomodo [how?]” (IOG 49, Derrida’s 
emphases). We thus developed the argument progressively to the 
relations of “why” and “what” in closing.  
Lawlor, however, needed to exclude the pure possibility from the 
“why”. As we explained, by developing the relations of ground 
and the absolute, Derrida never could have sought the pure, for 
he sought the pure and absolute ground of ideal Objectivity, and 
it evolved to the pure movement as différant. Lawlor needed to 
exclude relations of possibility, and in the closing pages, which 
arrive at the différant, he rather suggests,  
[t]hat Derrida uses the word ‘pure’ so 
frequently in these closing pages shows again 
that he has not yet in 1962 understood the 
implications of the word ‘contamination’, 
despite the fact that he used it already in 
[1954]. Indeed, in these closing pages Derrida 
does not seem to understand the logic of 
totality that he himself develops in the 
Introduction. (Lawlor 2002, 141) 
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We rather noted that in 1968 Derrida deemed that in these 
closing pages, and the overall work of 1962, he had for the first 
time worked out the relations and even “structure” of deferral in 
relation to writing as such (IMP 5, cf. ToAT 39; Gasché 1986, 4, 
(373)). We sought to work out how this occurs.306 Lawlor thus 
never relates “delay” to Difference, nor does he mention deferral. 
We continue to suggest our working out of the différant is novel. 
Hopkins’ reading 
However, there has also been a hostile reading of Derrida’s 
“Introduction” by the Husserlian scholar Hopkins (2011) that 
warrants consideration, in case it signals a new wave of 
misunderstanding or regression in the comprehension of Derrida. 
Hopkins goes so far as to suggest Derrida’s reading of Husserl is 
“perhaps […] a joke” (Hopkins 2011, 260).307 We will merely and 
                                                 
306 In opting for direct affirmation, Lawlor rather sets aside relation of pure 
possibility as a shortfall from judgment, deeming that “phenomenology […] 
alone knows” (Lawlor 2002, 141), we explained how only phenomenology 
“can” know (350). 
307 We will summarise Hopkins’ rendition of what Husserl wants in the “crisis” 
years, relative to Derrida, in this footnote. For Hopkins, the difficulty of 
ideality rests in two “independent” moments. The first is that of the ongoing 
individuation of evidence in distinct moments (Hopkins avoids overtly 
deeming this “repetition”), and the investigation of the ontic (i.e. particular) 
modes of being of ideal (irreal) objects (Hopkins 2011, 249-250). Thus, he 
explains, natural ideal objects such as Husserl’s writing desk are irreal 
(represented in consciousness) insofar as they are in space and time, and 
implicitly in nature, but equilateral triangles are never situated in space and 
time, these moments are not “contaminated” by one another, and as Hopkins 
puts it, accounting for one moment “does not” account for the other. Hopkins 
deems that Derrida “collapses” both moments into one issue (Hopkins 2011, 
251), thus that Husserl’s genetic project is “not visible” to Derrida. We note 
merely that what Hopkins’ wants from Husserl diverges from what Derrida 
wants. Derrida takes it that geometry (and thus equilateral triangles) are 
material ontologies for Husserl in the region of Nature, and thus of space and 
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briefly assess Hopkins’ critique of deferral, as Derrida develops it 
in the “Introduction”.  
Hopkins, as we do, begins by emphasising that Derrida is never 
doubting the appearance of ideality, and takes it that Derrida 
enquires into how a fact can be determined (or unified) (Hopkins 
2011, 249). When this attempt to “unify” the fact is deemed “in 
principle, impossible”, Hopkins suggests that for Derrida pure 
ideality is “not coincident with its origin”, which leaves “a 
recovery of the origins of ideal meaning […] as being – in 
principle – impossible.” For Hopkins, Derrida deems that a 
recovery of the origin is thus “unrealisable as its telos” (Hopkins 
2011, 248). Thus, he explains, when passage for Derrida arrives at 
deferral (delay), then:  
[T]his delay and passage mean an ideality can 
only appear in terms of the alterity of its 
absolute origin, an alterity in which is 
                                                                                                        
time (IOG 32, cf. I §9) (219). Hopkins takes geometry to be free of space, time 
and nature. Thus while Hopkins wants to investigate Husserl’s “small 
beginnings” by which the modes of being of ideal objects can be investigated, 
Derrida dispels this aim from the outset: “[I]n the first place, we are not 
interested here in ‘the manner of being which the sense [of geometry] had in 
thinking,’” (IOG 35, IDG 15). Derrida wants to investigate the first conditions 
by which even material ontology could have an origin, prior to its mode of 
being. When it is noted that the difficulty is merely that the goals of Hopkins 
and Derrida diverge, conciliation seems  much more feasible. 
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announced the infinitely deferred telos of its 
absolute presence (Hopkins 2011, 248).  
We agree with Hopkins’ summary, and sought to work out how 
these relations hold.  
The difficulty for Hopkins is that he makes this unrealisability 
into the loss of origin. For Hopkins, this impossibility is  
[t]he principle behind Derrida’s rejection of the 
possibility of a recovery of the origins 
(Hopkins, 259, our emphasis). 
Most importantly, we suggest, Hopkins takes the relations of 
impossibility to be denial. Setting aside the logical difficulties in such 
an approach, we note merely that this precludes access to 
Derrida’s reasoning. 
Second, Hopkins takes Derrida’s continual opening of the 
question to be an answer. Thus Hopkins combines the difficulties 
to make Derrida’s answer that deferral “cannot provide an 
answer” (Hopkins 249). For Derrida, the opening of the question 
rather leads to deferral. That is why it is called deferral, rather 
than a rejection. It is Hopkins who turns the question into an 
answer (réponse). 
 - 399 
- 
Even so, Hopkins’ wariness might have been alleviated were it 
noted how Derrida is in no fashion a sort of pernicious anomist. 
For nor does Derrida in 1962 permit deferral to be a negation 
(even as negativity, Being is silently shown prior to vision). 
Derrida resists negation of an external origin (denial) far more 
than Hopkins does. Hopkins thus never notes Derrida’s arrival at 
possibility again in the relation to the open. That is, Derrida 
worked out that for a pure (irreal) phenomenology, the pure 
origin in history remains both necessary and ever possible (IOG 150-
151): 
[T]he ‘why’ can emerge only from the possible, 
[thus] I can clearly ask myself why there would 
be the history rather than nothing (IOG 150-
151, Derrida’s emphasis first). 
Only phenomenology can open such a relation. Instead, Hopkins 
worries that Derrida “is unable to see that what he calls the 
‘alterity’ of the origin of ideality is not something that necessarily 
has to remain inaccessible to thought.” (Hopkins 252). As we 
worked out, this is just what Derrida insists upon, by developing 
the relations of the “why” for pure phenomenology. Indeed, 
Derrida goes even further, to work out that what is impossible is 
given as Difference: 
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this impotence and this impossibility are given 
in an originary [originaire] and pure 
consciousness of Difference. (IDG 171 cf. 
IOG 153) 
The difficulty, for Derrida, is that what is given must be explained 
in a philosophy worthy of its name, which consciousness passes 
to deferral. Thus what Hopkins takes as a denial arises for 
Derrida first from a teleological consciousness of Difference. 
Hopkins makes no mention of Difference, which latter might 
have palliated his concerns. Instead, he continues to treat deferral 
as an answer, instead of a deferral.  
Thus we have sought to work out how Derrida’s progress occurs, 
from his earliest work, but also to suggest how it might be 
followed in his later work. We move on to Derrida’s work in 
1964, to assess this progression. 
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Chapter Five: Positive Economy 
(“Violence and Metaphysics”, 1964) 
In our next two chapters, we turn to Derrida’s French articles 
“Violence and Metaphysics”, published in two parts in 1964. We 
will address a core segment of the section “Of Transcendental 
Violence”, where Derrida seems to defend Husserl against 
Levinas, to justify that Husserl’s pure phenomenology allows for 
an ethics (VeM 434-442, cf. VM 123-133). In our first subsection, 
we will summarise how Levinas’ beginning from an aversion to 
Husserl’s sort of intentionality and reduction leads rigorously to 
Levinas’ “metaphysics”. We will develop a sort of ruptured 
circularity that Levinas calls “asymmetry”, that will be amenable 
to comparison with Derrida’s “levels” and directions. However, 
we develop this sequence merely to explain that, as Derrida will 
prefer Husserl’s intentionality, Derrida’s approach will be entirely 
incompatible with Levinas’. In our third part we begin to follow 
Derrida’s progress, as he evolves his basic concern from 1962, as 
to how to determine the absolute. He will still do so without 
negation, leading to a positive “economy” as a “most peaceful” 
ethics of “respect”. In our next chapter, we assess how Derrida 
adds negation, and leaves his partial alignment with Husserl aside, 
to develop his concerns to a negative economy of violence.  
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Part One: Levinas’ metaphysics 
Rejecting Husserl’s intentionality will develop “metaphysics” as a 
movement “analogous” to a circle. This will occur via Levinas’ 
Autrui, the other and the Other, and autrui. To begin: as has been 
noted (Davis 1993, 37), Levinas’ argument in Totality and Infinity 
anticipates and doubles-back on its progress; we will set the 
relations forth in a progression, beginning from intentionality as 
we did in Husserl. For importantly, Levinas in Totality and Infinity 
begins the section which arrives at his main ethical relation by 
rejection of Husserl’s intentionality (TEI 94 ff., TI 122 ff.). The 
latter is deemed to instil a “primacy of the objectifying act” (TEI 
95, TI 123), which for Levinas, assumes a “mastery” of the object 
(TEI 96, TI 123). Husserl oppresses the object’s “exteriority”.308 
                                                 
308 As far as we can tell, this critique of Husserl’s intentionality as a “primacy of 
the objectifying act” had been maintained by Levinas from the late 1920’s and 
early 1930’s, although it had vacillated in the decades afterward. Earlier in 
“Violence and Metaphysics”, Derrida had deemed in a footnote – lifted into 
the main argument in 1967 – that Husserl’s giving himself the power of theory, 
for Levinas, is a critique of the objectifying basis of intentionality (VM 85, cf. 
VeM 329). By this, Derrida is implicitly referring to the critique of Husserl that 
Levinas had maintained since his earliest years. In “On Ideas” of 1929, Levinas 
writes that intentionality is consciousness itself, as “the relation to the object”, thus 
“that the subject reaches the object cannot be a problem”. But Levinas indeed 
(as did Fink, and Derrida in 1954) deems this the “main problem” of 
phenomenology (Levinas 1998, 13). In his dissertation of 1930 Levinas wrote 
that the “theoreticism” of the objectifying act as one of representation and 
intentional adequacy (cf. TOI 135), which relation to adequacy we develop just 
below. That said, as his article of 1929 suggests that in 1930 the young Levinas 
was influenced by Heidegger, he had moved away from his concerns about the 
epistemological shortcomings of intentionality. He rather deemed that 
Husserl’s theoretism was an “intellectualism” that set aside ontological 
consideration of existence (Levinas 1973, 119, 154). By 1940, Levinas seems to 
endorse that Husserl’s intentionality allows an other: “[I]ntentionality is the 
way for thought to contain ideally something other than itself” (DE 59, Levinas’ 
emphasis). This approach precludes alignment with Totality and Infinity of 1961. 
The ontology and epistemology of 1930 and 1940 are set aside in favour of 
ethics by 1961. That Husserl’s is an “intellectualism” is explicitly no longer 
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Thus Levinas deems Husserl’s telos is “total adequation” (TEI 96, 
TI 123) between thinker and object. Levinas takes this from the 
Logical Investigations of 1901 (TEI 95, TI 124). In that work, we 
note, Husserl had indeed argued that the ideal object could be 
adumbrated toward its adequacy (cf. also Levinas 1998, 26-27).309 
Rather than absolute truth, we note, adequacy would be the most 
that can be known of the thing. For Levinas, however, Husserl 
judges adequacy is all there is to be known, which mastery sets 
aside concern with an exterior being (TEI 96, TI 123). Levinas 
deems that Husserl retains this “obsession” with adequation 
throughout his oeuvre (TEI 95, TI 124).  
From the violence of oppression to enjoyment 
Levinas thus deems that Husserl’s progress after the Logical 
Investigations continued to seek this mastery. Hence he is critical of 
Husserl’s “reduction”310 (begun from 1907) and its noemata, 
precisely as it “brackets” off external existence to allow the 
“astonishing possibility” of reducing the being of the existent 
(TEI 100, TI 127), again “exhausting exteriority”. The critique 
then extends to temporality – addressed via the Ideas of 1913 – 
and Husserl’s kind of “representation” (that is, a re-presentation, 
                                                                                                        
deemed by Levinas to be critical comment (TEI 95, TI 124); although the 
objectifying act is taken as a “mastery” of the other.  
309 Levinas writes in 1929 of the “results arrived at in the Logical Investigations”, 
that “[A]dequate self-evidence […] is characterised by the fact that the object 
intended is entirely covered by the object seen” (Levinas 1998, 26-27). 
310 Levinas refers to this as the epochē (TEI 98, TI 125), Husserl’s term for the 
bracketing of external existence. 
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also called “presentification” (Vergegenwärtigung)). Levinas 
complains that for Husserl, at the objectual side of intentionality, 
a representation of an object is restored to the intentional present 
only by a retention, and has a sense “ascribed by the representing 
subject to an object” (TeI 97, TI 125). Representation too is a 
mastery of the past, which refuses what is “exterior” (extérieur, 
which we also deem “outside”) to itself. This, for Levinas, in turn 
develops the constituting ego upon this “inside (the “I” (le Moi)), 
which was central to Husserl’s apophantic logic. The “I” grants 
itself centrality, again assuming a mastery and setting aside an 
exterior being.311  
Thus instead of Husserl’s doxic positing as arising first, Levinas 
deems each intentional reduction to noemata is one of negativity, 
its “first movement is negative” (TeI 98, TI 125). This negativity, 
we note, holds in two fashions. First, Husserl’s “positing of a pure 
existent” (TeI 98, TI 125) for Levinas is a moment of positing 
exemption from the outside appearing inside the I.312 Hence by 
this, second, Levinas is also deeming that even Husserl’s positing 
of the object, that pure and formal logic, as intentionality is 
unsatisfactory. For Levinas, its moment of negativity is a first 
                                                 
311 Levinas writes that Husserl’s basis is a “mastery exercised by the thinker 
upon what is thought in which the object’s resistance as an exterior being 
vanishes” (TEI 96, TI 123-124). 
312 Levinas summarises: “Its first movement is negative: it consists in finding 
and exhausting in itself the meaning of an exteriority, precisely convertible to 
noemata. Such is the movement of the Husserlian epochē which, strictly 
speaking, is characteristic of representation” (TeI 98, TI 125). 
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kind of violence. At this juncture, we introduce “the Other” 
(l’Autre) to Levinas’ reading of Husserl. It can thus far be taken in 
basic fashion as it pertains to Husserl; the Other is never included 
by the constituting of the I (TEI 93, TI 64). The first kind of 
violence is that this “I” insists upon mastery of the object (thus 
excludes the Other).  
In sum, for Levinas, Husserl begins by an objectivity in a simple 
intentionality, which violence “suppresses” (cf. TeI 45) the wholly 
outside, and then reduces that to a total mastery of the object 
“inside”. Again and again, Levinas makes it clear that acts of 
violence as expulsion of the outside are “negating”: 
to doubt [...], to destroy, to kill – these 
negating acts [actes négateurs] assume objective 
exteriority rather than constitute it. (TEI 100, 
TI 128; cf. TEI 172, TI 198)  
Above all, and from the first, Levinas seeks to avoid Husserl’s 
“objectifying intentionality” and its reduction, which would let go 
of the outside to master the object in a “negativity” as violence. 
The reversal of Husserl’s kind of intentionality is deemed 
“enjoyment”. Levinas summarises: 
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[T]he intentionality of enjoyment can be 
described by contrast with the intentionality of 
representation, it consists in holding on to the 
exteriority which the transcendental method 
involved in representation suspends. (TEI 100, 
TI 127)  
Note that Levinas’ “enjoyment” remains an intentionality, which 
can be described by “contrast” to Husserl. We will do so.  
The enjoyment of interiority 
Levinas builds his ethics and his metaphysics from this juncture in 
a sequence. First, enjoyment begins as a non-objectifying 
“intentionality”. Even for Levinas, the prefix “non” signifies what 
avoids opposition between objects, but refers to what is never 
included to an object (we avoid deeming that it refers to “all of 
what is not”, or “everything outside” the object, as these terms 
for Levinas are aligned with Husserl). Such a non-relation is never 
necessarily the whole outside the part, which would determine 
that a part has limits. Enjoyment is a living state prior to any 
division. Thus Levinas explains enjoyment as  
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life’s relation with its own dependence on things 
(TEI 84, TI 112, our emphasis).  
Note that Levinas’ approach begins by accepting whole-part relations 
in a fashion, but refusing Husserl’s sort of dependence upon 
wholes. Enjoyment is merely a dependence that “lives from” what 
gives life. That is, enjoyment is life’s relation to its relation with 
existence, as yet without objects or foundation upon an external whole. In 
such a moment life’s relation to itself as yet includes no whole, and 
thus no outside at all; not yet even an independence from a 
whole. The Other does not yet relate to enjoyment (nor yet does 
Autrui, as we address below). Thus nor does the particular object 
yet appear. Thus enjoyment is not yet a dependence of the 
particular (made individual) or upon the general, which are 
derived from whole-part relations (upward). Its content is its own 
whole, thus the “refusal” of a whole in general.313 This allows for 
intentional content as its own whole. Thus it develops Levinas’ 
version of “egoism”, a “happiness” (cf. TEI 122, TI 148) as it is 
without mastery or violence; for no object as such yet arises as 
outside, or in any sense. This is a moment in which life is 
produced and “throbs”) in which “I” live from “good soup” and 
air. It is solitude, as I am not yet even in relation to myself. Hence 
                                                 
313 We avoid deeming it is an “exclusion” of a whole, as does Levinas, which 
would restore the whole; a refusal resists the option. 
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the self is not yet even a “representation” of the self for itself 
(TEI 90, TI 118).314 No intentional negativity of the self to itself, 
or to the object yet holds, for no inside has yet developed to 
relate to exteriority (TEI 123, TI 149).315 Levinas calls this 
interiority – my relation without division.316  
Indeed, interiority staunchly refuses such concepts (TEI 90, TI 
118) as general or “specific” (TEI 93, TI 121), or individual object 
inside the outside; This is “ipseity” insofar as its relations hold 
together (below, con-sists). Levinas summarises our explanation 
thus far; the  
ipseity of the I consists in remaining outside 
the distinction between the individual and the 
general [...]. The refusal of the concept is not 
only one of the aspect of its being, but its 
whole content; it is interiority. (TEI 90, 118, 
our emphasis)  
                                                 
314 This is not yet “a representation of self by self.” (TEI 90, TI 118). 
315 Levinas writes: “[T]he original relation of man with the material world is not 
negativity, but enjoyment” (TEI 123, TI 149). 
316 We have relayed “my relation” as intransitive on purpose, to emphasise the 
lack of reciprocity in this relation as yet, even to myself. 
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We will develop “ipseity” below, to assess how it no longer 
consists of such relations. Thus far, as enjoyment does not yet 
permit relation to an object, even myself divided from self, nor does 
it yet permit opposition (nor its relations “across” which instil 
distance). Thus it does not yet permit the priority of positing, 
negation, or formal logic (TEI 31, TI 60). This is an “original” 
relation, of a sort without logical predication, dependence or 
spatiality.  
Nor is this yet a temporal priority, as time itself can arise only 
with separation in space. Every moment in Levinas’ sequence 
rather works out an ordinal relation. Thus Levinas summarises the 
above: 
ipseity is produced originally [originellement] in 
the enjoyment of happiness, [...] in this 
enjoyment the separated being affirms an 
independence that owes nothing […] logically, 
to the Other [l’Autre] which remains 
transcendent to it. This absolute independence 
[...] does not posit itself by opposing (TeI 31, 
cf. TI 60). 
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We must still develop “the Other” through opposition. For a 
beginning of separation does occur, and Levinas’ next moments 
are also those of Derrida and Husserl. First, a desire (what we 
deem Derrida’s demand) holds for the absolutely other (absolument 
l’autre, TEI 170, TI 196). This absolutely other is an expression of a 
relation of interiority to any otherness (alterity), and develops a 
limit as other insofar as it desires a lack of limit (cf. (97)).  
But even this first desire is preceded by a relation that allows it to 
avoid a simple return to dependence on an inside and outside: 
Levinas’ interiority begins by “holding on to the exteriority” that 
Husserl’s transcendental method suspends (TEI 100, TI 127). 
This moment of solitude is named the secret; a secret kept even 
from interiority.317 By this turn, “exteriority” too finds that its 
relations cannot be explained by a simple relation to an “inside”, 
for the secrecy of solitude resists such imposition.318 Interiority and 
its relation to the absolutely other is balanced upon a secret. As 
only keeping the secret allows this relation;319 the secret 
“guarantees” the entire basis (TEI 90, TI 118) even of an ethical 
relation (we thus work toward the latter); the secret first makes the 
absolutely other possible.  
                                                 
317 This withholding “is solitude par excellence. [Hence] [t]he secrecy of the I 
guarantees the discretion of the totality.” (TI 118, cf. 120) 
318 We employ this word “resistance” following Levinas, to refer to what resists 
inclusion to intentionality (TEI 96, TI 124). 
319 Levinas writes: “Totality and the embrace of being, or ontology, do not 
contain the final secret of being.” (TEI 53, TI 80).  
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From this secret, the relation to Autrui arises. Autrui in French, 
typically means (signifie) an “Other” with a religious connotation, a 
“You” (Vous) of a master (cf. TeI 48, TI 75) to which I am 
supplicant, in a dimension of height.320 Prior – i.e. henceforth, 
ordinally prior – to a simple relation between inside and outside, 
Autrui is higher than I am (for no “I” has yet arisen). Yet in 
holding on to exteriority, Autrui is only guaranteed insofar as 
secrecy holds in interiority, a closeness even before the “I” which 
Levinas deems “intimacy”. This is Autrui as “tu” (TEI 129, TI 
155).321 We note that “ipsus” originally means “self”, “himself”, 
but also a “master” and “host” (cf. CLD 191, TeI 48, TI 75). In 
ipseity, only secrecy allows Autrui to rupture interiority with a 
Thou as you (TeI 91, TI 119).  
Hence, for Levinas, this rupture of totality is “radical” (TEI 91, 
TI 119),322 which, as with Derrida, should be taken in an 
etymological fashion, as originally prior to a constituted division 
between inside and outside, and thus also an original relation. For 
Autrui would also be prior to the separation and thus prior to 
relation to intentional objectivity (TEI 37, TI 67). This permits 
                                                 
320 Levinas explains Autrui thus: “To recognise Autrui – it is to give. But it is to 
give to the master, to the lord, to him whom one approaches as “You” [Vous] 
in a dimension of height” (TeI 48, TI 75). 
321 For an explanation, of Autrui vs. l’autre as a “You” and “you”, without 
reference to any thinkers, cf. The Larousse French Dictionary, 
http://www.larousse.fr/encyclopedie/nom-commune-l’autre/autrui/24528 
[accessed 12 Feb 2012].  
322 Levinas writes: “[T]he rupture of the totality that is accomplished [by 
Autrui] is radical.” (TI 119, TeI 91). 
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the ethical relation as a “relation without relation” (TEI 52, TI 80) 
for it is thus a necessary relation from Autrui prior to relation.323 By 
this Levinas’ progress allows the beginnings of an ethical sort of 
“transcendence” which is more evolved from its outset than any 
simple metaphysics that begins from inside-outside division to 
overcome an opposite (cf. TEI 111, TI 41). A “relation without 
relation” must be without opposition, thus without negativity (TEI 
111, TI 40-41) and even without negation; it must thus be without 
violence (see above). No separation has yet arisen to allow anything 
to negate. For this relation without relation Levinas reserves the 
term “religion” (TEI 152, TI 80). We note that this develops from 
“religare”, to “revere”, and “bond”, both addressed above, and 
also to “obligate” (CDWH 520)).324 For as Autrui is prior to me, 
in this relation the Desire arises to go to Autrui, beyond. The 
Desire of transcendence toward Autrui is arising with religion as 
an “obligation” (cf. TEI 174, TI 201). No relation of opposition 
or negation yet holds. Thus this obligation (a term not yet bound 
to formal logic, as prior to opposition) is “non-neutralisable” (TEI 
172, TI 198). Hence no negation or position upon possibility yet 
impacts on this priority of obligation.  
                                                 
323 Hence, Levinas writes, putting this via ontology and being: “the relation 
between the being here below and the transcendent being that results in no 
community of concept or totality – a relation without relation – we reserve the 
term religion.” (TEI 152, TI 80). Religion arises from the ethical relation. 
324 This obligation is just beginning, however, for Levinas as yet “reserves” the 
“term” religion, it is also held back. It is still religion and not yet responsibility. 
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The linguistic relations of autrui, prior to logic  
However, as Levinas proceeds in this ordinal hierarchy of what 
must precede the next, he too proceeds via necessity, thus by 
prior necessary conditions. As to how this Desire proceeds even 
before any separation, Levinas develops the next necessary 
relation, that of autrui. This allots an important priority to language. 
For, note how “ipseity” allows for an original instability, rather 
than merely “one” singular meaning. Just so, and crucially, in 
French the collective pronoun autrui usually has the sense of 
“others”. However, it is employed without a definite article, the 
relation resists singularisation, or pluralisation to the general (cf. 
TEI 93, TI 121). Moreover, Autrui in French also has the sense of 
“others” whenever it is a capitalised moment of autrui (we have 
yet to establish why it would be a capitalised).  
Such a moment is deemed a “sign” (rather than a word) (TEI 64-
65, TI 92). As autrui signifies itself by a sign, importantly, the prior 
relation of autrui in language “is already necessary” even should it 
be withheld (TEI 65, TI 92). Yet as autrui is prior to me, in this 
religion, I already receive autrui “as taught”. Such teaching occurs 
only by speech – for as I am still not yet in relation to myself, which 
requires an object, then I 
am not yet ‘in view of [my] own existence’ 
(TEI 90, TI 118). 
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Thus “[S]peech refuses vision” (TEI 273, TI 296). Speech occurs 
without separation from an object, even such as myself. For 
Levinas, no form of writing would have priority, as enjoyment has 
not yet divided to allow simple distance from the subject.325  
Importantly, following from autrui, this “reception” of original 
teaching from a “master” allows an expression of Autrui (TEI 64, 
TI 92), in a sense that resists singularisation (we also deem this 
“instability”).326 “Expression” means a distinction (from the old 
French “esprès”, originally from “espressus” as distinctly presented), 
and an act of speaking outward (CDWH 214). Thus expression 
occurs of Autrui who must be signified even though withheld. In 
turn, what must signify as withheld gives the sign; and thus 
language (this is not yet given to me, for I am not yet in view of 
myself).327 Rather, it is the sign of autrui that allows the expression 
of Autrui, and henceforth language relates to others. This instability 
in expression of language in obligation allows the next moment, 
of “responsibility”). This developed originally from responsus, the 
earliest sense of which was answering, and then answerable to, and 
                                                 
325 Levinas explains: “Speech refuses vision, because the speaker does not 
deliver images to himself only, but is personally present in his speech.” (TEI 
273, TI 296). 
326 We employ “instability” rather than equivocity, which latter assumes 
comparability of objects. 
327 The subsection “Expression is the Principle” makes no mention yet of an 
“I” or subject. The relation of Autrui to the cogito develops afterward (cf. TEI 
64-66, TI 92-93). 
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most recently the accepting of an obligation (CDWH 523).328 
Following from the Desire for Autrui, I am responsible to Autrui, 
autrui and others. 
The “logically absurd structure” of ethics 
The relation of expression and responsibility makes language the 
condition of ethics (TEI 174, TI 200).329 In answering to and 
answering I begin to obey and command the other (l’autre) in 
language. Yet as ethical, the other will still arise in relation to 
Autrui (we must yet explain this); not yet an other in the world. 
This command thus does not yet even attain the other in mere 
space (for no such division yet holds). Levinas writes that: 
[L]anguage, which does not touch the other 
(l’autre), even tangentially, reaches the other by 
calling upon him or commanding him or by 
obeying him, with all the straightforwardness 
[droiture] of these relations (TE 134, TI 62). 
                                                 
328 “The original sense was answering [to]. The current sense answerable [to] 
dates from the 16C, and that of involving responsibility from the 19C.” 
(CDWH 523). Responsibility in French also has the sense of the beginnings of 
a solution (réponse), the beginnings of logic. 
329 This is the “bond between expression and responsibility, this ethical 
condition or essence of language”, which is “prior to all disclosure of being” 
(TEI 174, TI 200). 
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By this Levinas never allows the sign to be produced by Husserl’s 
signitive intention (247), as an “intentional modification” and 
objectification, as though the other (even as thing) is a content of 
my consciousness. It is never quite Husserl’s “mastery” even though 
it commands (and obeys). Yet even though “straightforward” in a 
systematic fashion, the above – as yet without distance or 
phenomenological sense (sens) – has developed a “logically absurd 
structure” (TEI 90, TI 118). Language does not yet relate to 
“formal logic” and “truth” (TI 172, TEI 147). In the progress 
from enjoyment to language, Levinas’ “structure” addresses the 
other as ethical yet sets aside the primacy of theory.  
Preparing for the logical “structure” of the Same 
and the Other 
Having allowed some ethical relation to the other via speech, 
Levinas prepares to relate to the other (l’autre) in more 
conventional fashion. For necessary conditions still apply,330 and 
language and signification are “analogous” to appearance (TEI 
64-65, TI 92). Levinas begins to allow for a (merely analogous) 
“structure” of objectivity, sense, directions and logic. For what is 
analogous is withheld yet remains possible; language thus makes 
the relation to objects possible in that I can signify a theme as an 
object (TEI 185, TI 210; TEI 64, TI 92). Thus the relation to 
                                                 
330 Levinas does so less overtly than Derrida, and we will usually employ the 
present indicative tense, as does Levinas, instead of Derrida’s preponderant 
“must”.  
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objectivity arises (TEI 164-167, TI 189-193).331 With objectivity, 
empty space arises as a modality of enjoyment (TEI 165, TI 191). 
Space in turn returns a further condition of possibility, for it too 
makes the object possible. With the relation of object in space in 
interiority arises vision. That is, vision is horizontal, combining 
the direction with the horizon of possibility of determining the 
object (TEI 166, TI 191). It permits the “lateral” progress 
“across” (à travers) toward the object.  
From desire to the other 
This object in vision can also be myself. This instils the dividing of 
totality, which allows “the I” as object. This in turn develops 
“separation” of the I from its object. But objectivity allows for 
the object as absolute. The desire of the I becomes the desire for the 
absolutely other (TEI 3, TI 33, cf. TEI 165, TI 191). This develops 
the “mode” by which the absolutely other must be determined: 
[T]he I is thus the mode in which the break-up 
of totality, which determines the presence of 
the absolutely other [absolument l’autre], is 
                                                 
331 Levinas adds: “[T]he objectivity of the object and its signification comes 
from language.” (TEI 69, TI 96). 
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concretely accomplished. (TI 118, TEI 90 our 
emphasis)
332
 
Levinas emphasises that this progress does not yet permit going 
“beyond” (au delà) to Autrui. This is still not yet a separation 
permitting a simple objective opposite.333 Just so, no position upon 
myself can yet be taken as an object that is not myself. However, 
such relation can begin to develop. 
As objectification is possible, there can be multiple objects. Just 
so, as objective, the world becomes a theme, and thus an object 
(TEI 64, TI 92), and so too the things in the world. Thus the 
relation of space does allow horizontal relation of things toward 
the others (rather than autrui, these are singular objects). This is  
the space across which things are transported 
from one toward the others [les une vers les 
autres] (TEI 166, cf. TI 191).  
This permits the movement across others, which as yet we take in the 
basic sense of others as separated from me, merely as finite “goods 
                                                 
332 For Levinas, the Same also “turns to the absolutely other only on call from 
Autrui” (TEI 39, TI 67). We address this below. 
333 For example, amongst many quotes: “[T]he infinite does not raise up the 
finite by opposition” (TI 148). Levinas also separates from Hegel by this 
means: the other cannot be an “antithesis” that allows a dialectical evolution. 
We will return to Hegel below. 
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of this world” (TEI 49, TI 76). In this obligation, I must go via (or 
across) (par) the others as things of the world to the absolute, 
which is beyond (par-delà) (TEI 48, TI 76).334 Having returned 
space, separation, and movement across particular others, the 
progress begins to allow the “structure” of whole-part and 
predicative “logic” (cf. Lingis TI 14, (425 fn.)).  
The general-particular relations of Objectivity 
For as noted, language comes from Autrui prior to me, which 
permits the object. That there are many objects permits the 
subject also to be made object. However, Levinas reverses the 
phenomenological tradition in which the object is given to the 
subject.335 As speech is a condition of possibility for commanding 
and obeying the other, and the desire in obligation is to go to the 
absolute other in an ethical relation, it is the subject that proceeds to 
the particular object, in the ethical relation. The subject gives to the other, in 
generosity.  
                                                 
334 I must go “beyond [par-delà] the egoist and solitary enjoyment, and hence 
making the community of goods of this world break forth from the exclusive 
property of enjoyment” (TEI 48, TI 76). 
335 For the originary “givenness” of the object to intentionality in Husserl, 
without concern for the Other cf. I §§19, 67. In Being and Time, Heidegger 
explains the “es gibt”, translated in the English as “there is”, which can also be 
translated as “it gives” (cf. BT 5, SZ 7); Derrida argues the latter sense merely 
appears “discreetly” in that work (GT 20)). Heidegger develops the instability 
of “es gibt Sein” or “es gibt Zeit” , “there is Being”, and “there is time”, or “it 
gives Being” and “it gives Time” overtly in On Time and Being in 1962 
(Heidegger 2002, 5). Levinas’ intemporal reversal of the direction of giving to 
existence amends Husserl’s and Heidegger’s lack of concern for autrui and 
Autrui, while Levinas keeps his “there is” (il y a) for “pure existing” (cf. TA 46, 
(552)). 
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At this juncture Levinas seems to be more accepting of Husserl in 
this transition. For this “generosity” which begins the address to 
Autrui must already hold prior to particularity of the object, and is 
deemed correlative to the “generality” of the Object:  
[T]he generality of the Object is correlative 
with the generosity of the subject going to the 
Other [Autrui], beyond [par-delà] the egoist and 
solitary enjoyment. (TeI 48, TI 76) 
However, correlativity is also a moment of parallelism (as 
analogy), and by this progress Autrui does not yet appear even as 
pure content in the constituting of the Object (or object). From 
this juncture an essential logic holds; for Levinas has emphasised this of 
the Object in general. General and particular relations are returned 
in a tolerance for essential logic, as the relations of the other 
(l’autre) begin to develop via the particular objects in the world. 
For what my generosity reveals in the world is an existent other. 
Thus the other is also a thing that has form (TI 75, TEI 47). Things 
are those which I possess in the world; this is still a “happiness” 
for it has not yet evolved negation. But things in turn have 
bodies, and crucially, I too have a body. A fortiori, this develops 
the sense of an other like me.  
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The return of the Same as logic 
Thus the movement begins by going to the other (l’autre), but as a 
finite thing, to determine what is beyond the finite. In the world, 
such relations seek to determine the whole of the finite thing.336 I 
must proceed toward this wholly other (thing) via bodies in the 
world. Thus far, the prior relations are necessary to proceed, but 
the movement has not yet proceeded “beyond” things in the 
world. What is beyond the finite thus requires an idea of the 
infinite. (TEI 166, TI 191); but no way has yet arisen to constitute 
it.  
Levinas deems this relation is necessarily open. He explains:  
[E]goism, enjoyment, sensibility, and the whole 
dimension of interiority – the articulations of 
separation – are necessary for the idea of infinity, 
the relation with the Autrui which opens forth 
                                                 
336 Levinas explains: “[T]he metaphysical desire turns toward the wholly other 
thing [tout l’autre chose], toward the absolutely other [absolument l’autre]” (TEI 3, 
TI 33). 
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from the separated and finite being. (TI 148, 
our emphases)
337
 
In this Desire for the absolutely other, I (as subject, which makes 
of the thing an object) must proceed via the finite other, the 
existent thing in the world, to determine the infinitely other, which 
opens from this relation. We must yet explain how that it opens 
forth exceeds the finite alternatives of logic as true or false; thus 
far these relations are merely necessary.  
But that this finite other is like me permits a relation to the other 
as the same as me (in the lower case and as particular). It is 
important to realise the progress from the “like” as external to the 
“same” is deemed, by Levinas, to be a logical passage without 
external reference.338 As the other is in a fashion the same as me, 
this permits an essential relation to what I am in general, thus an 
Identity. I can be an Identity (“A is A”) to myself. As a first 
exteriority applies, the object is no longer identified as what it is 
from a simple “outside”. Identity occurs from within. In particular, as 
the other is never identical to me but merely the same, it is thus 
never “identified” as another ego like me (cf. VM 128). Thus an 
                                                 
337 Lingis has noted this division between “desire”, which is “attracted” by 
what is “not yet possessed or needed”, and the “need which seeks to fill a 
negation or lack in the subject” (TI 19). We agree, and are seeking to explain 
how this occurs, as need arises after desire. We add the resultant negation, 
below. 
338 Levinas explains: “[T]here exists a logical passage from the like to the same” 
(TI 289, TEI 265). 
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object is identical only to itself via being “the same as itself” only 
“from within”. Levinas summarises that  
[T]he identity of the individual does not 
consist in being like to itself, and in letting 
itself be identified from the outside by the finger 
that points to it; it consists in being the same 
[le même] – in being onself, in identifying 
oneself from within. (TEI 266, TI 289) 
In particular, given a lack of position from the outside upon a 
likeness, what is the same as itself is merely the identity of an other to itself 
(TEI 99, TI 126), without even an external object. In turn, this 
avoids opposition; the I is unalterable in relation to every one of 
the others (a multiplicity). Henceforth, “the other” and “the others” 
must be understood in this constricted fashion.  
Thus, in an implicit generalisation, Levinas explains that this 
movement is precisely the involution to the Same. As Levinas 
summarises,  
[W]e call it ‘the Same’ because in 
representation the I precisely loses its 
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opposition to the object; [...] bringing out the 
identity of the I despite the multiplicity of its 
objects, that is, precisely the unalterable 
character of the I (TEI 99, TI 126). 
This permits the return of a sort of internal negation (expressed 
by “is not”) of finitude. In particular, when an other is taken as 
the same as me, it is not identical to me. Rather, this other is a 
being  
that in a certain sense [sens] is not [me] by relation to 
me, […] that is in a relation with me only 
insofar as he is wholly by relation to himself 
(TeI 74, TI 200).  
Note, however, that this is no longer an “external” and violent 
negation of an other, permitting a sort of ethical progress to the 
infinite. When the finite is the name for the first moment of egoic 
limitation before the external other, a subject constrained only to 
be unalterable from itself (as Derrida will quote, “riveted” to itself 
(VeM 447, cf. TA 46, (588)), then the desire is for the other that is 
not the finite me. In ethics, I must and can go to the infinite other, 
which relation remains open.  
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This implicit bivalence (signified by “entre”) between what is and is 
not again evolves this horizontal dimension. For as this other also 
relates back to me only in order to be wholly itself, in general, I 
become conscious of the further degree of the Other (l’Autre). 
What is withheld in general from the other in interiority is Other, 
only insofar as it must also hold “beyond” me (par delà) only as 
wholly itself. “Insofar as” (dans la mesure où) never instils a 
determinate “quantity” (TEI 170, TI 196). It is by this constriction 
(retournement) that the interiority of a subject can go to the Other 
“beyond” itself (par delà) in a relation that still proceeds via (par) 
its relations to itself. The Same has henceforth evolved to the dual 
relation of interiority in a relation that must go from the finite to 
infinite other and to the Other. As this arose from the desire to 
determine the object, which object is beyond itself, this develops 
the logic.339 Indeed, Levinas tells us, it is only the Same which is in 
the mode of “truth”.  
In the movement of the Same, Levinas has thus constricted the I 
to the “interior” even upon this side of an other and Other. This 
sum of relations of the Same and the Other, then, is deemed 
                                                 
339 Lingis writes: “Levinas, of course, is not denying that a great part of our 
speaking and thinking is rigorous and bound by logic of some kind. What he is 
interested in showing is that prior to these systems, [...] and presupposed by 
them is the existing individual and his ethical choice to welcome the stranger 
[...] by speaking to him.” (TI 14) We have been aiming to augment Lingis, by 
setting forth how this logic in turn is included into the progress of metaphysics, 
to address how to speak to the other. Our only divergence from Lingis, then, 
upon the above is to note that the “individual” only arises with logic in going to 
the stranger (which latter will be autrui). 
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“totality”. It is this constriction to this internal in its relation to the 
beyond, this ongoing desire for address to an infinite other which 
returns to finitude that Levinas – from the etymology of oikos and 
nomos, the law of the house – occasionally in Totality and Infinity 
calls “economy”. Economy is a moment of totality which attains 
the beyond only insofar as it returns to a circularity “closed in 
upon itself” (VeM 442, VM 128), in accordance with law.340 
Indeed, Levinas tells us this passage from the like to the same is a 
“logic” which the “entire analysis” of interiority has sought to 
explain in his book (TI 289, TEI 266 (422)).  
From the logic of the Same to autrui 
However, Levinas only allots the sense of a “logic” to interiority. 
Yet the metaphysical desire is still for the “absolute other” 
(Autrui) (TEI 170, TI 196), and the horizontal movement must go 
beyond the Same, via the Other. Thus far, the finite other is a 
body and the Other appears as the other only insofar as he is 
wholly withheld (beyond). A position is taken upon the Other 
only insofar as it is an aspect (face) (TEI 170, TI 196) of a beyond, 
through which finite aspects I must proceed (a moment 
comparable to Husserl’s adumbration).341 Thus the desire for the 
                                                 
340 Derrida summarises the above: the Same would be “a totality closed in 
upon itself, and identity playing with itself, having only the appearance of 
alterity, in what Levinas calls economy.” (VeM 442, VM 128). 
341 Although comparable to an adumbration, this moment is no longer quite a 
doxic position (“the facing position can only be a moral summons” (TEI 170, 
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finite movement in the other as Other must exceed the infinite, 
but does not yet “conceive” of the infinite in this opening. The 
Kantian relation is rather of an ideal (produced in interiority from 
beyond the concept). The relation to exteriority is “maintained” 
in the idea of the infinite.  
This develops from the Other to the next moment further 
“beyond”, for 
what is produced here is not a reasoning but 
the epiphany of the face. (TEI 170, TI 196) 
Hence the movement “proceeds from the Other” (l’Autre) which 
is present only insofar as wholly Other, to the face which “turns 
to me”. It is an “object-cognition” only insofar as it maintains 
exteriority (TI 75, TEI 47), that is, only insofar as it is even further 
beyond. The face to face relation thus “maintains” a relation of 
exteriority to the logic of the Same. Importantly, in this progress, 
“only the face opens the relation to autrui.” (TEI 75, TI 81)). 
We develop Levinas’ “open” just below. Thus far, what exceeds 
but maintains the Same thus develops again a language that 
maintains but resists logic, as autrui (TEI 93, TI 121). To be sure, 
autrui arose first from a body, and thus far maintains a beyond 
                                                                                                        
TI 196)), for the Other as absolutely other is experienced only as “beyond”, 
thus merely by going toward its effect (as “effectuated”). 
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(par-delà) merely as totally different to the “object-cognition” of the 
Same. Yet it resists language and logic in a strange way. 
As noted, the pronoun autrui has the sense of “others” without a 
definite article; the relation again resists the singular (and plural). 
The strangeness of autrui begins to resist logic. It begins to resist 
the particular and general relations and predication as a singular 
object. It begins to resist the Same. Thus speech in address to 
autrui is no longer in the logical mode of truth (it is “rhetoric”). No 
longer in the mode of truth and resisting logic, such a relation 
remains open. Moreover, insofar as the collective noun Autrui in 
French also has the sense of “others” whenever it is a moment of 
autrui as essential; but it resists the singularisation or 
multiplication that could make this essence true (it is a 
“suppression of pluralism” (cf. TEI 196, TI 221)). Insofar as this 
sense of Autrui also avoids determining its truth as plurality, it 
avoids confinement to singularity or multiplicity as essential. A 
freedom is allotted to speak of autrui as resisting individuation in 
order to address Autrui. This is 
[T]he strangeness of autrui, its [sa] very 
freedom! (TeI 46, TI 73) 
But it is important to note the necessities in this structure arose in 
a chain (TEI 170, TI 196). The relation to the other as Other to the 
Same then permits the Freedom to go “beyond” rhetoric: 
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[F]reedom presents itself as Other [l’autre] to 
the Same [Même], [This existence] is in the 
world, a destitution. There is here a relation 
between me and the other [l’autre] beyond [au 
delà] rhetoric (TeI 47, TI 75) 
This develops the more extreme version of the “beyond” (au-delà) 
(cf. TEI 37, TI 67). As it is first a body, I must first determine 
autrui in passage across the things that I recognise in the world.342 
Thus 
[T]o recognise autrui is therefore to come to 
him across [à travers] the world of possessed 
things (TeI 48, TI 76). 
Yet “au-delà” is without the intermediary “par”. It expresses a 
relation closer to the world and destitute of a relation to a 
“beyond”, yet in a relation to the beyond without intermediary. 
Thus I am free to try first to pass (à le) to autrui as “beyond” 
without relation. Then the freedom arises to go “beyond” (au delà) 
                                                 
342 “Recognition” for Levinas has the multiple senses of what logically knows 
the object, thus the ethical acknowledge by the subject of the other, and also 
re-cognition of this object restored to me.  
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even autrui to Autrui. For Autrui is said to hold at a “height” 
beyond (au-delà) even the autrui that resists the formal logic of the 
Same. The desire to go to Autrui prior to logic and opposition has 
passed through the other and the Other to exceed logic again to 
autrui, then to Autrui.  
Yet as noted, Autrui holds most intimately in the secret of 
interiority from which separation, and then relation to things in 
the world arises. This allows for an “asymmetry”, only the Same 
allows a symmetry, in the Same as with itself without external 
opposition, yet Autrui expresses itself in interiority before 
symmetry, a non-symmetry without particular or general relation. 
This exceeds interiority to the relation without relation of Autrui 
from which ethics began (from behind), in asymmetrical relation 
to the logic of the Same. For importantly, this Other as absolutely 
Other (Autrui) is no longer merely necessary. It does not “limit” 
interiority (as opposition) but rather institutes (instaure) the freedom 
of the Same (TEI 171, TI 197). Autrui certainly “produces” the 
formal logic of the Same (TeI 31, TI 60) to permit even the idea 
of the infinite as symmetrically other to the finite. Autrui, then, 
opens up the “idea” of the infinite (in the lower case, a particular 
institution rather than Husserl’s eidetic necessity of the 
irreducibility of the Idea in the Kantian sense, for Autrui exceeds 
essence).  
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Levinas has developed the open relation prior to “individuation” 
(TEI 121) which is “irreducible” to (TEI 52-53) but maintains the 
relation to exteriority in the Same. Such a sequence begins to 
explain, as we noted above, how interiority evolves to 
the idea of infinity, the relation with Autrui 
which opens forth from the separated and finite 
being. (TI 148, our emphasis) 
In the Same (which is “inside” only after interiority) the relation 
of what the finite other is and is not can again proceed to the 
infinite other, with an idea of “transcendence” of finitude to the 
infinite other (TEI 18, TI 48).  
Indeed, note that Levinas deems the relation to autrui develops 
from a “structure” of “ontology” (TEI 170, TI 196). The latter 
term by this juncture includes Husserl’s pure ontology in his 
noetic-noematic structure,343 and also any standard versions of 
“metaphysics”, which would propose merely the limit of an other, 
finite and infinitely other, and Other. All of these for Levinas 
evolved in logical relation to the Same and economy. Levinas’ 
relation of transcendence allows his version of “metaphysics” 
                                                 
343 Levinas emphasises: “[O]ne of the principal theses of this work [Totality and 
Infinity] is that the noesis-noema structure is not the primordial structure of 
intentionality” (TEI 271, TI 294). 
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(TEI 18, TI 48). For as the idea of the infinite in the Same and 
the Other in turn supposes a prior relation to Autrui that institutes 
and opens up separation, for Levinas, “[O]ntology presupposes 
metaphysics” (TEI 18, TI 48).  
That is, in beginning from Autrui, Levinas’ metaphysics has 
developed a necessary progress to the other and the Other, and 
then, via autrui and the face, back to the origin as Autrui, then 
back to the infinite other and so on. However, it must never be 
deemed Husserl’s “return enquiry”. Levinas’ circularity ruptures 
itself. There have been two sorts of “structures”, the absurd 
(countersensical) and that of sense: could they even be aligned as 
“two”, which symmetry they resist also. Insofar as these relations 
are made themes (objects), as Levinas puts it, the movement of 
totality and economy continually “overflows” itself, in asymmetry 
(430). For Levinas, “asymmetry [...] summarises the theses of the 
present work” (TEI 190, TI 215).  
Levinas’ asymmetry of violence and nonviolence 
In turn, the structures above allow us to summarise three sorts of 
violence, to prepare for reading Derrida. The first arises from 
Husserl’s intentionality, as “oppression” of the Other (and thus 
autrui and Autrui). We began from this relation, as Levinas 
preferred to begin from enjoyment (405). Levinas then 
progressed to movement upon the inside, allowing negation of 
the one and the other. Progress to the other across the world of 
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possessed things is a negation. By employing a thing for my 
purposes, I make it what it is for me, thus not what it is itself. 
However, Levinas never deems this an ethical violence. For 
the negation effected by […] usage remained 
always partial. (TEI 173, cf. TI 198) 
Even destruction of things in the world – including living beings 
without a “face” – still “answers to a need”. It is negation of 
relations besides the particular that leads to violence. That is, the 
negation of the next relation, the face, begins to “annihilate” the 
Other rather than dominate things. Negation of the totality 
develops violence. Levinas calls this “murder”: 
[m]urder alone lays claim to total negation 
(TEI 173, cf. TI 198). 
The negation of the totality of others, and thus Others, 
annihilates the relation of autrui and Autrui. Yet it is Autrui alone 
who obligates me. I can only want (veut) to kill Autrui (TEI 173, cf. 
TI 198). As we noted, the “I” and possibility only arise with the 
Same. Violence arises as negation of the logical structure of one to 
other upon the inside, then of the totality, and thus of Autrui.  
The next sort of violence is that which refuses the structure from 
one to other in their progress of opposition, negation etc. (by 
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which I go to Autrui). Note that such progress from one to other 
need no longer be that of a single subject, it can also be a “being”. 
Violence is made “war”. Hence 
[w]ar therefore is to be distinguished from the 
logical opposition of the one and the other by 
which the one and the other are defined within 
a totality […]. In war beings refuse to belong 
to a totality (TEI 197, TI 222) 
The violence of the Same develops a part-whole hierarchy. As to 
what would be ethical, Levinas thus allowed only one logically-
absurd sort, which evades this hierarchy. As noted, Desire and 
thus the “obligation” to go to Autrui was non-neutralisable (TEI 
172, TI 198). As prior to negation and opposition, this obligation is a 
non-relation that Levinas deems ethical nonviolence. Even 
[m]urder finds itself before a datum absolutely 
non-neutralisable. (TEI 172, TI 198). 
Thus even though I can want to murder Autrui, interiority is 
already obligated to ethical nonviolence in the Desire for Autrui. 
Asymmetry also allows for the relations of ethics.  
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Levinas has developed his absurd and logical structures in an 
ordered fashion. He has allowed for violence, yet a prior ethical 
obligation to nonviolence thus has precedence. Derrida will 
develop these sorts of violence as he proceeds, in the sequence 
above. He will do so to work out how ethical nonviolence is 
possible. However, he will do so in his fashion. 
Part Two: setting aside of Levinas 
The incompatibility with Levinas 
We have explained the above in order to summarise that Levinas’ 
relations must be set aside, as Derrida will opt for Husserl’s 
intentionality.344 As every moment in Levinas’s progress arises 
from a rejection of Husserl’s intentionality, then every relation 
that Derrida develops will be incompatible with Levinas’. This will 
hold even though many terms are common, for Levinas develops 
from a tradition of metaphysics that includes Husserl. Moreover, 
Derrida adopts many of Levinas’ terms. He will be able to do so 
as he will develop his basic levels and directions from 1962. 
Indeed, those in turn developed from Derrida’s approach in 1954.  
                                                 
344 Derrida will argue that the thematisation of the face is “an intentional 
modification upon which Levinas indeed must base the sense of his discourse” 
(VM 128, VeM 444).  
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The alignment of Levinas and Derrida’s teloi  
That is, at base, and insofar as these relations will be transferable to later 
years, Derrida will be furthering his concerns from 1954. Hence he 
will accept Levinas’ telos of the desire to go to the absolute other 
(Autrui, absolument autre). Such a telos accords with Derrida’s demand 
for the absolute “beyond” that held since 1954. Thus he accepts the 
telos of relation to the absolute other as “ethical”. This necessitates 
the avoidance of the violences of oppression and negation, and war.  
These accord with Levinas’s asymmetry. First, a lack of 
oppression no longer instils an outside and a limit. Second, a 
relation without negation would be without limit. Avoidance of 
violence would allow for ethical relation to the absolute other. 
Each would allow for the subject to go out of itself, and thus for 
a determination of the absolute. Third, avoidance of war (peace) 
still allows for violence, merely in that beings enter the progress 
from one to other. However, this at least permits the progress of 
ethics (forward). The telos of what Levinas calls “ethics” accords 
with the form of Derrida’s telos from earlier years. A contrastive 
reading is thus very feasible. However, from this juncture we will 
follow how Derrida develops his earlier concerns and relations.  
How Derrida will proceed 
By no means, then, do we suggest that Derrida has little concern 
for an ethics. He will work out how the bases that he has 
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developed can allow for a better ethics. Yet at base he will be 
asking how the subject can exceed its subjectivity, and more 
basically still how the absolute can be determined without limit. 
Each of these are levels of teloi according to a basic form. 
Moreover, each were bases from 1962. 
Indeed, Derrida will begin by aligning his four arguments from 
1962 with this progress in an “ethical” and neutralised noema. He 
will then work out how thought in these directions must proceed 
to attain the beyond without limit (i.e. without violence). He will 
turn to Husserl’s Fifth Cartesian Meditation, in which Husserl 
addresses the relations of intersubjectivity to develop the relations 
of the other and the Other. Derrida will explain that Husserl’s 
“appresentation” allows for a phenomenology of “respect”, in 
that it seeks to avoid any determination of the Other.345 To work 
this out, Derrida will evolve the unidirectional passage from 1962 
to allow for a “second direction”. The two directions will address 
the other and the Other.  
However, Husserl has no phenomenology of autrui and Autrui,346 
and Derrida will need to account for how Husserl’s ethics could 
                                                 
345 For Levinas’ suggestion that his “ethics” is one of “respect”, cf. TI 43. That 
Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity is one of “respect” in the fashion 
that Derrida will take it, we note, had been suggested by Ricoeur in 1954 
(Ricoeur 1967, 197). Derrida develops this in much more detail. 
346 Derrida had justified his opting for Husserl’s as a “better” way to ethics 
earlier in “Violence and Metaphysics”. He noted (as we explained) that autrui in 
French (“others”) “tolerates” neither definite article nor plural (VeM 350, 350 
fn. 1, VM 104). Moreover, as a pronoun (such as “it” or “they”), autrui allows 
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consider them. Derrida will also suggest en route that Husserl 
wants to address Autrui only in its form of ego, which will also be 
respectful. The progress will allow for the most peaceful ethics 
possible. In turn, the necessity of thinking both directions as one 
object will evolve Derrida’s positive version of “economy”.  
Yet as in 1962, Derrida will be building an ethics from selected 
elements of Husserl. First, Derrida will still not yet include 
Husserl’s negation. Thus nor will Derrida concede that Husserl 
progresses in the Same, or even mention the same. As autrui resists 
position and negation, Derrida will not yet address autrui until he 
includes negation and the Same.347 By that juncture he will have 
set Husserl aside, to develop a negative economy. This will occur 
in our next chapter. 
                                                                                                        
no relation of an object to an “epithet” (a term which affixes a characteristic to 
an object). That is, as language is logical, autrui indeed tolerates no predication 
of Husserl’s sort, let alone predication of the logical Subject. As autrui allows 
no determined particular or multiple component, it never engages with the 
general, or categorical (i.e. regional and essential (cf. I §10)) relations. Thus “the 
French word autrui does not yet [pas … encore] designate a category of the genre 
autre” (VeM 350, VM 105). However, for Derrida, autrui nevertheless instils 
what it seeks to avoid. Derrida equates autrui and Autrui with Levinas’ Judaeo-
Christian heritage in the Latin “alter-huic”, the dative relation to “this other” (VeM 
350, VM 105). Thus from the outset, for Derrida, autrui and Autrui 
nevertheless are spoken of as what appears as an other in particular that 
exceeds otherness. Yet as autrui tolerates no relation of particular or general, 
Levinas’ metaphysics as yet provides no way to proceed toward the absolute other 
(Autrui) to remedy this contravention of its ethics. Derrida will thus opt for 
Husserl’s the other and the Other. As he explains, “the other” (l’autre) can allow 
a definite article, thus be an epithet (or predicate). Hence, second, “the other” 
can be pluralised, and then generalised (“des autres en général” (VeM 440)). 
Derrida will thus seek to proceed by means of the Greek category of the “other 
in general” (έτερον, henceforth “eteron”); as we will explain, eteron can also be 
translated as an adjectival “difference”. “Violence and Metaphysics” will 
proceed in an arc, as Derrida will have worked these relations out via his 
negative economy, in our next chapter. We are following Derrida’s “law” and 
will develop the relations as he proceeds. 
347 Levinas aligns Husserl’s “transcendental” progress with the Same at TEI 48, 
TI 76.  
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Part Three: building an ethics from Husserl 
Building from the relations of 1962 
It should be obvious that Derrida never would accept Levinas’ 
fundamental argument that Husserl’s “theoretical intentionality” 
seeks “total adequacy”. Derrida worked out at length that for 
Husserl since at least 1913, total adequacy is precisely what never 
held, even given a telos of the absolute in any fashion.348 Thus as 
to intentional inadequacy, Husserl allowed no objectification of the 
beyond simply as no evidence arises for it (rather than excluding it, as 
Levinas suggests) – formal-logical proof even in the Logical 
Investigations of 1913 cannot reach that far (LI 3 §25, (210)). Thus 
in his first part (VeM 434-436, VM 118-120), Derrida directly 
contests Levinas’ premise: 
is there a more rigorously, and, especially, a 
more literally Husserlian theme [in general] 
                                                 
348 It has been suggested (cf. Bernet et. al. 1993) that Husserl “flirted” with an 
absolute outcome to adequacy in the Logical Investigations. But the early phase 
was never Derrida’s core interest. Indeed, instead of Levinas’ view of 
commonality across Husserl’s oeuvre, Derrida suggests a division in Husserl 
between the static phenomenology of the Logical Investigations and Husserl’s 
pure bases from 1913, which latter subsequently evolved to the genetic project. 
Hence, instead of Levinas’ view of Husserl’s “obsession” (TI 122) with 
adequacy across his oeuvre, as we followed, Derrida closely addressed the 
reduced, transcendental basis primarily from 1913. 
 - 440 
- 
than the theme of [intentional] inadequation? 
(VM 120)
349
 
Indeed, Derrida had followed how Husserl’s every effort from 
1913 never allowed a final outcome, whether historicist, 
epistemological, genetic or transcendental. Insofar as Levinas’ 
progress is sequential, Derrida was never going to accept any 
transition in Levinas’ progress, even though he accepts the 
importance of the relations. Instead, he begins to assess the kind 
of ethics that can be developed from Husserl. 
Phenomenology’s right to constitute the face 
First, Derrida argues that phenomenology in general has the right 
to be deemed ethical (VeM 436-438, VM 120-122). Indeed, it is 
“in” the web of directions in the object (noema) that Derrida seeks 
justification, including the constituting of objectification (cf. 296) 
– the particular noema of ethics.  
To do so, he develops his levels and directions from 1962 (that is, 
he applies intentionality). He begins by adding the basic 
directions, from the moment furthest “behind” (i.e., the highest 
                                                 
349 Indeed, Levinas suggests Husserl’s basis was “obsessive”. Yet Derrida asks: 
“Who was more obstinately determined to show that vision [intentionality as 
space] was originally and essentially the inadequation of interiority and 
exteriority?” (VeM 436, VM 120). Derrida bluntly disagrees with Levinas, again 
on the basis of his arguments from 1962. That said, the reader might 
disapprove of Derrida’s employing Levinas’ terms – for as we explained above, 
for Levinas, interiority arises from enjoyment.  
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eidetic level (I §10). To be employed, Derrida suggests, every 
ethical concept350 (such as ethics, transcendence, infinity etc.), 
must already hold eidetically, as must the laws which guide what is 
possible amongst them (VEM 436, VM 121).351 Just so – moving 
forward, or downward – ethical relations, as particular relations of 
the eidetic must certainly arise. In turn, these relations can be 
made an object which essential relations hold a priori.  
Thus Derrida begins to justify an “ethical” noema, and applies the 
outcomes of his four arguments from 1962 (without explaining them; as 
he worked them out then).352 In the first two arguments of 1962, 
both space and time developed the movement from finite 
certainty (in this instance of the other) to the indefinite rather 
than infinite (forward), and the necessity of foundation upon the 
Idea in the Kantian sense (forward, and thus backward) (272).  
These movements are again included (and Derrida indeed calls 
them the “two intentional directions” (VeM 436, VM 120).353 This is 
not yet a second direction from an object (in particular, the face) 
                                                 
350 Note that the eidetic is deemed to be prior to the “concept”, which latter 
holds at the middle level. 
351 Derrida writes: “[N]ot only nominal definitions, but, before them, [logical] 
possibilities of essence [across and upward] which guide all concepts, are 
presupposed when one speaks of ethics, of transcendence, of infinity, etc.” 
(VeM 437, VM 121). 
352 Indeed, we suggest, these portions of “Violence and Metaphysics” (VeM 
434-437) are difficult to comprehend without considering that they build from 
Derrida’s arguments of 1962. 
353 Derrida explains: “[I]n the two intentional directions […], the Idea in the Kantian 
sense designates the infinite overflowing of a horizon which, by reason of an 
absolute and essential necessity which itself is absolutely principled and 
irreducible, never can become an object itself” (VeM 436, VM 120, Derrida’s 
emphases last (cf. 439)). 
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toward me, but the directions of an intentionality seeking to 
progress to the object which must for essential reasons pass to 
what necessarily founds it.  
For as in 1962, the Idea in the Kantian sense is deemed to be 
“irreducible” to phenomenological evidence (“behind”). Thus the 
certainty of an object remains; although as yet without a ground 
for positing a foundation, for the Idea in the Kantian sense eludes 
objectification (VeM 436, VM 120). Thus Derrida again notes the 
difficulty of distinguishing the infinite as adequate (i.e. in its 
phenomenological possibility), or even determining it as 
indefinite. Importantly, Derrida equates this with the bases he 
worked out from his first two arguments, that the progress 
implies an opening:  
[T]hat the infinity of the Husserlian horizon has 
the form of an indefinite opening [ouverture] [...] 
does this not certainly keep it from all 
totalisation? (VeM 436, VM 120-121)  
Indeed, this remains merely a certainty, and as ontology was given 
only the right to the question (349), Derrida merely asks this. He 
thus proceeds to the outcome of his third argument from 1962.  
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That is, following from the lack of ground of the Idea in the 
Kantian sense, Derrida had worked out that even genitivity 
(consciousness “of”) led to opening in progress of finite others 
(infinite inadequation). Indeed, Derrida asks: 
[I]f a consciousness of infinite inadequation to the 
infinite […] distinguishes a body of thought 
[ethics] [then] [i]s not intentionality respect 
itself? (VeM 436-437, VM 121, our 
emphasis)
354
 
Importantly, the opening of intentionality from 1962 is aligned with 
Husserl’s first basis for “respect”, in that it never even begins to 
constitute a finite object. 
Indeed, in the fourth argument from 1962, the Idea of God 
signalled the radical impossibility of constituting the object as 
absolutely possible. Derrida thus suggests that this 
“unobjectifiability” of all objects in general (tout objet en général) 
holds 
                                                 
354 This question is also phrased as a conditional, to avoid determining the 
possibility of respect. We will develop these relations as we proceed. 
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[E]ven of the intuition of a God. (VeM 436, 
VM 120)  
Next, the overall address to the four arguments, we explained, 
sought to ask how a real fact is possible, as an absolute (and 
“truth” remains a way to signify this Telos (228)). After continually 
returning to a priori truth, Derrida accepted the essential relations 
of passage as “prior” to real or external content (323) (that was 
deemed the “Absolute” as “Passage”). Yet that outcome still 
retained the absolute in this relation prior to real possibility, as 
constituted originarily (cf. 329), even though facticity led to 
passage.  
Thus Derrida again writes that  
[T]his domain of absolutely ‘prior’ truths is the 
domain of the transcendental phenomenology 
in which […] a phenomenology of ethics must 
take [originary] root. This rooting is not real 
[reell] (VeM 437, VM 122). 
Thus in particular, even an ethical phenomenology would no 
longer determine a fact, or even absolute value or truth. Derrida 
goes on that  
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it would be vain to reproach transcendental 
phenomenology for being in fact incapable of 
engendering ethical values (VeM 437, VM 122, 
Derrida’s emphasis). 
Rather, for Derrida, such incapability – lack of particular 
possibility, even though general possibility remained a priori – 
would be respectful (VeM 437, VM 121). 
Moreover, Derrida had explained that all of these relations were 
“rigorously” derived from intentionality (323). Yet in 1962, even 
though phenomenology lost its ground, intentionality retained the 
right to question the absolute fact itself (350 ff.); and Derrida asks 
whether phenomenology is “respect itself” (VeM 436-437, VM 
121). Derrida has taken his arguments from his relevant results in 1962. 
These in turn implied delay. Derrida never mobilises this, at least 
as its concerns are no longer objective, hence no longer 
convincingly allow for an ethics.  
Thus Derrida applies his right to summarise these irreal relations 
as noema. As every noema (for example, that of ethics) supposes 
the possibility of noema in general, it is “fitting to begin 
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rightfully” with a Husserlian ethics.355 To be sure, “ethics” is only 
one noema (Derrida also concedes Husserl’s concerns with the 
natural (i.e. the spatiotemporal region of Nature) and political 
(VeM 438, VM 122)). Derrida is working out how a particular sort 
of phenomenology can be ethical, and developing his relations.  
Parenthesis: Husserl’s reduction, the same and 
violence 
For an important amendment is required. The noema was 
evolved by Husserl in a reduction to the pure. For Levinas, 
Husserl’s reduction sought to allow mastery of the object, 
returning Husserl’s pure logic; it was a reduction to the Same 
(IOG 34-35):  
the neutralisation of the other who becomes 
[...] an object is precisely his reduction to the 
Same. (TEI 14, TI 43)  
As we explained of Levinas, to include the same in relation to 
particular objects: what is the same as an other is also in a fashion 
not the other.356 According to the tenets above, it would be violent 
                                                 
355 Derrida also emphasises that this ethical moment holds as the noema is 
irreal, and thus respectful (VeM 437, VM 122).  
356 This develops Derrida’s relations of the “same” from 1962 (cf. (255)), which 
only required the same word to be other to the subject itself, and univocity to 
be the same as itself (the whole). 
 - 447 
- 
(433).357 In the relations of the Same which arose in 
objectification, a reduction would preclude ethics. 
To avoid this negation, Levinas had developed from the 
intentionality of enjoyment to “command” the object (415) 
(which is particular). This command, for Derrida, borders on 
violence. Thus, Derrida adds a paragraph in 1967. He goes on 
that Husserl’s intentionality  
commands ‘nothing’ […]. It is the very 
neutralisation of this [particular] kind of 
commandment. (VeM 441, VM 125)  
We develop this “nothing” below. Note that we employ a quote 
from 1967 merely as Derrida insists upon neutralisation (cf. VeM 
441, VM 125) but has not yet explained it. 
Thus to avoid negation and this sort of “Same”, Derrida re-
interprets the reduction via Husserl’s intentional neutralisation (but 
no longer as Levinas takes the term). Indeed, Husserl suggests 
neutralisation is the intentional basis for every reduction (I 
§109).358 Husserl’s example is of the memory of a painting of a 
                                                 
357 Derrida summarises this (only in a 1967 emendation): “the same is a violent 
totality” (VM 119, cf. VeM 435). 
358 As Husserl puts it: “[N]eutralisation [...] lies enclosed [i.e. internally] in every 
“withholding of performance”, “setting out of action”, “bracketing” (I §109). 
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landscape seen in a visit to a museum. The memory can be 
doxically posited of an object as such (e.g. “I visited the museum”). 
But as to the image of the landscape “within” the memory,359 it is 
not yet believed (i.e. doxically posited) to be real in that 
intention.360 It is thus no longer even a “copy” of the external 
world, which would restore an external border to the real 
landscape (cf. esp. I §113). Yet even so it is posited; this positing 
would be a “neutralisation”. For Husserl, a neutralisation of the 
noema is so much further from positing of reality that noesis 
(which is already irreal (191)) no longer “seriously” posits even of 
what is objectified as irreal.361 Thus this ethics would no longer 
believe that the posited other is actually even other (I §109).362 
Indeed, as a correlate even of noesis, the other would contain 
nothing that can be predicated of (I §109).363 Ethics seriously posits 
                                                                                                        
Of course, this is a circularity in Husserl, for the neutralisation of the noema 
only arises after the eidetic reduction. Derrida never addresses this difficulty. 
But instead of disagreeing with Levinas that a simple reduction can respect the 
other in an “outside” – for such a thought would restore the outside – Derrida 
goes more deeply “into” phenomenology, to one kind of noetic intention as the 
act from which the reduction arises.  
359 Note that a face is certainly an image, thus can be neutralised in Husserl’s 
fashion. We address this below. 
360 Just so, if it were deemed not to be real, that would be false, for it can be 
confirmed as neither irreal nor real in that intention.  
361 As the noema is even less real than the noetic “in the most extended sense”, 
thus furthest from the outside, neutralisation of the noema holds at the very 
interior of the intention. 
362 As Husserl puts it: “[T]he belief is no longer seriously a belief, the 
presumption not seriously a presumption, the denying not seriously a denying. 
It is “neutralised” belief, presumption, denial, and the like” (I §109). 
363 That is, “[T]he neutralised positings are essentially [from behind] 
distinguished by this mark, that their correlates contain nothing that can be posited, 
nothing that can be predicated” (I §109, Husserl’s emphasis). That is, if it is no 
longer believed or taken “seriously” in the noetic phases then, for Husserl, its 
noematic correlate – which is a corresponding outcome of what is posited 
noetically – will contain nothing. 
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nothing even of the other. When nothing appears to have sense, 
nothing appears to have sense. There would be nothing of an other 
to be shut outside, letting the appearing of the other be.  
To hold for ethics, however, neutralisation would need to avoid 
both negation and the same (both of which, as noted, Derrida will 
consider only upon leaving Husserl aside (VeM 442, VM 126, 
(505)). To assess a seeming difficulty, we explain this from 
Husserl – for a neutralisation retains a negation (cancellation); one 
must first recognise that the painting is not real. But Husserl’s 
innovation combines the correlative noemata of neutralisation as 
“nothing” and as negation (I §106).364 This negation “cancels 
nothing” (I §104). That is, as negating nothing, it posits something 
(I §106),365 which for formal-ontological and essential reasons is 
no longer negative. No particular thing is cancelled.  
We have thus explained how neutralisation is compatible with an 
avoidance of negation, even though it applies a negation. In this 
fashion, Husserl can avoid negation of the ethical object in his 
ethics. Even though negation precludes respect by making the 
                                                 
364 Husserl’s every employment of “not” still refers to the correlative noetic act 
of negation (I §106 (187)).  
365 Husserl explains: “[E]very negation is the negation of something, and this 
Something points us back to this or that modality of belief” (I §106). The doxic 
belief, in turn is a positing. 
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other what it is not, intentionality as neutralisation can be 
respectful.366  
Thus, crucially, Derrida in 1964 still retains a pure basis in 
neutralised intentionality.367 As in 1962, it is essence that is 
investigated for its relations a priori. Even its whole-part and 
particular relations and content are prior to real content. Derrida’s 
“neutral level” of analysis prepares for an “eidetic-transcendental” 
analysis, thus seeks to apply at a “purely ethical level” (VeM 445, 
VM 129).368  
Derrida can thus begin to restore all of the relations of pure 
phenomenology’s passage from 1962, as yet without negation,369 and 
without further consideration of Husserl’s reduction. Derrida 
summarises the above:  
one can speak of ethical objectivity, or of ethical 
values or imperatives as objects (noemas), 
                                                 
366 Indeed, we note, although the right and certainty of facticity remain, a 
neutralised phenomenology no longer speaks of the existential facticity (the 
predication and certainty of the existence of the fact (cf. VeM 441, VM 125)). 
This accords with Derrida’s outcomes from 1962, and is the closest he can get 
to ethics as a “relation without relation” in Husserl (TI 80), while retaining the 
directions and levels. 
367 What Derrida achieved in 1962 by the “re-descent” from the highest tier of 
language to particularisation of pure relations (246), he has achieved by 
neutralisation of intentionality in 1964. We address language just below.  
368 Derrida explains after this analysis: “[I]t is difficult to see how the notion of 
violence [...] could be determined rigorously on a purely ethical level without prior 
eidetic-transcendental analysis” (VeM 445, VM 129, our emphases).  
369 In the French version, Derrida avoids employment of “not” (pas) in these 
pages (VeM 439-441, cf. VM 123-125), except for negating that Husserl 
negates the Other (“This is precisely what Husserl does not do” (VM 441, VM 
125)). 
 - 451 
- 
without reducing this objectivity to […] the model 
for what is commonly understood as 
objectivity (theoretical objectivity, political, [...] 
natural, etc.) (VeM 438, VM 122, our 
emphases).  
We will return to this “one can speak” just below. Thus far, in 
this particularised ethical noema and ethical intentionality, a 
reader should avoid deeming that Derrida’s ethics is compatible 
with Husserl overall. Derrida is furthering his concerns.370 Hence 
nor should the reader be surprised that Husserl will be left 
behind, toward the end of our chapter.  
Thus, Derrida goes on, as Husserl’s intentionality “cannot” 
(Derrida worked out this essential impossibility in 1962) address 
the object itself, it can be respectful even in addressing Levinas’ 
face, even in a theoretical intentionality:  
                                                 
370 To point out the extent of the disagreement with what Levinas takes to hold 
of Husserl, and by which Derrida diverges from Husserl too, note that it is one 
of Levinas’ central theses in Totality and Infinity that the noetic-noematic relation 
is no longer to be supported, as his own intentionality held prior to any object. 
Levinas emphasises: “[O]ne of the principal theses of this work [Totality and 
Infinity] is that the noesis-noema structure is not the primordial structure of 
intentionality” (TEI 271, TI 294). Derrida has begun from the opposite 
premise of intentionality, working up to support the neutralised as noematic; 
by emphasising merely one kind of noema in Husserl.  
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I respect [the object in general] as such, as what it 
is, in its sense [sens]. I have regard for 
recognising that which cannot be regarded as a 
thing, […] I have regard for the face itself. 
(VeM 438, VM 122)
371
 
The moment of developing this particular Husserl is also the 
moment that Derrida reverses Levinas’ critiques of Husserl, 
argues that Husserl’s ethics is no longer precluded from 
addressing Levinas’ concerns, and prepares for a progress that 
will exceed Husserl. From this juncture Levinas’ “face” is no 
longer addressed. For Husserl has no phenomenology of the face, 
but addresses the other and Other via the body.  
Part Four: toward Derrida’s second direction 
“forward”  
First, as Derrida has only been addressing “the object in general” 
(VeM 437, VM 122, our emphasis), which cannot be addressed 
itself, he must justify how particular ethical objects can be 
addressed as such (soon, the other and Other). Hence he turns to 
things in the world, which include bodies (of which faces are 
                                                 
371 Bass notes in a footnote to this paragraph that by “regard”, Derrida is 
addressing both the ethical and visual relations.  
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parts). Husserl’s phenomenology, Derrida reminds us, takes the 
“reality” of the external world “seriously” (VeM 440, VM 124). 
Even though the noema is irreal and thus respectful, and a 
neutralised noema even more respectful, the external reality must 
be determined absolutely. But in general, however seriously I take 
the existence of things in the natural world, in a neutralisation 
their reality is respected. For instance, the reality of “the landscape” 
I saw in the museum can only be neutralised (448). Thus 
something of the thing “remains hidden” (VM 124, VeM 440). 
This hiddenness of the thing holds also of bodies in the world, 
and bodies can be made the other and Other. Something of the 
other and Other remains hidden. By this Derrida begins to assess 
how Husserl’s approach can be ethical in addressing Autrui. He 
officially turns to the “Fifth of the Cartesian Meditations” (VeM 
440, VM 124). 
Parenthesis: the right to language allotted 
But in order to proceed, Derrida must add a right. He worked out 
above that in Husserl’s ethical intentionality “one can speak” of 
the object in general. Language in general for Husserl is 
correlative to logic (henceforth, the impersonal French “one” (on) 
is a form prior to a logical subject, thus basal to both logic and 
speech). Derrida must still grant a right, and thus a possibility, for 
the subject to speak of the particular other (and Other) as such. 
He thus argues that even though Levinas refuses Husserl’s kind 
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of language as arising with the (signitive) intention, Levinas in fact 
speaks of the other in language (cf. esp. TA 46, cf. TI 130, TEI 
102).372 For Derrida, since 1962, to speak of a fact I must first 
have a right (IOG 152, (351)), and even ontology retained its 
right. To combine the progress thus far: by beginning from 
(neutralised) intentionality which leave the fact as open, to 
address bodies in which something is hidden, Husserl “gives 
himself the right” to speak of the other.373  
Derrida reverses Levinas’ order. For Levinas, language and speech 
are prior to the generosity that goes to the object (416 ff.). For 
Husserl, the right to predicate of the fact is given in evidence 
(205). Only by this can intentionality begin to signify a content of 
something that appears as such. As language in general, and thus 
any language, already permits speech, this Other can be 
constituted in any possible language. Thus for Derrida  
to return, as the only possible point of 
departure, to the intentional phenomenon 
[forward] in which the Other appears as other 
                                                 
372 For Levinas’ employment of the “fact” that “there is” an absolutely other in 
language, cf. TA 46. 
373 Derrida explains that “by acknowledging in this infinitely other as such 
[infiniment autre comme tel] (appearing as such) the status of an intentional 
modification of the ego in general, Husserl gives himself the right to speak of the 
infinitely other as such” (VeM 441, VM 125, Derrida’s emphasis). Derrida has 
not yet added negation, and this is merely a right to speak. This infinitely other 
must be produced by an idea, prior to negation. 
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[l’autre apparaît comme autre], and lends itself 
[forward] to language, to every possible language 
(VeM 441, VM 125, Derrida’s emphases last). 
Derrida has added Husserl’s sort of language in its levels and 
directions, and allowed possibility (from behind, and thus 
forward).374 Henceforth, any of the relations of the other and Other can be 
spoken of in their appearing as such. Derrida concedes that such a 
language might return an ethics of respect to “violence” (VeM 
441, VM 125). But he has yet to assess what sort of violence this 
must be.  
Toward Husserl’s two directions 
To prepare, we will explain Husserl’s address to the other and the 
Other in the Fifth Meditation. We avoid suggesting Derrida’s 
approach is entirely accurate – Husserl applies a reduction in this 
work (CM §44), rather than a neutralisation; the developing 
relations are Derrida’s. Yet as Derrida did since 1962, Husserl 
proceeds by developing the transcendental subject (cf. VeM 442, 
VM 127). Even though the ego must of its essence also be 
                                                 
374 Derrida had addressed in detail earlier that, he suggests, there can be “no 
philosophical logos which must not [ne doive] first let itself be expatriated into 
the structure Inside-Outside” (VeM 428, VM 112, Derrida’s emphasis). This in 
turn arises as possibility of this “beyond” (forward) – “the possibility of 
metaphysics is the possibility of speech” (VeM 432, VM 116). Levinas’ 
employment of possibility, we noted, is far less evident. 
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“human”,375 as myself, nor is it only human; such natural and 
external affirmation is what Husserl seeks to avoid. Husserl again 
explains the transcendental ego as that which allows convergence 
upon universal a priori norms (forward, thus behind), in turn 
allowing pure eidetic law (CM §35). He 
explores the universal a priori without which 
neither I nor any transcendental Ego [in 
general, as essential] whatever is ‘imaginable’ 
[thus never neutralisable] (CM §35).
376
  
This essential basis allows positing of this “I” as noematically 
inseparable from the transcendental ego, hence as correlative (CM 
§36, (155)). This “I” in general (for Derrida “Je”, as egoity in 
general)377 includes the sense of my existence, but remains 
investigation of transcendental sense as such. As movement, 
                                                 
375 As I must be a man, then made an object, the Other must then be “my 
neighbour [prochain] as foreigner” (cf. VeM 442, cf. VM 127). 
376 For Husserl, “imagination” (Einbildung) – such as a presentation to self of a 
centaur –is not yet even an experience of a worldly object (cf. I §23). Thus this 
pure and eidetic basis of the transcendental subject is deemed “an unbreakable 
law” (CM §35).  
377 The English “I” never quite relays the essential and general sense of this “I” 
(“Je”), as it is only a singular letter, and always capitalised. “I” (“Je”) in the 
French as capitalised, for Derrida, instils the essential basis of the I (VeM 442, 
VM 126) that must be determined, which general basis is egoity. As Derrida 
summarises, “‘I’ [Je] (in general: egoity)” (VeM 442, VM 126). However, “je” in 
the lower case is the particular moment of the originary arising of myself, 
which I (“je”), as first I (“Je”) address to determine the “I” in general. Derrida 
never adopts Levinas’ “I” (“le Moi”), and treats Levinas’ use of “Je” as 
essential.  
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Husserl thus permits convergence upon the original instance of the 
ego (forward), to explore its a priori relations. This instils the 
circularity of transcendental subjectivity. 
The medium as prior necessity for passage 
Next, Husserl can make the transition to the other as “human”, in 
its directions. For essential reasons, that I can constitute an ego in 
general makes it a necessary condition that the other must have 
appeared to me (as an other human like myself). Further, this other 
certainly appears in evidence (VeM 442, VM 123), hence as an 
intentional object. Thus it is necessary that there be a particular 
content of the other as a man. Indeed, Husserl explains this by 
beginning from “the intentionality directed at what is other [als 
Fremdes]” (CM §44). He adds a note: 
[T]o men and to myself as a man. (CM §44)  
Husserl has added the levels of ideal objectivity, from the other as 
essentially a human (in general, men), to the particular other as a 
man, and thus to the other as a man (forward) posited of. But that 
Husserl has explained both men in general and in particular as 
“other” (als Fremdes) allows the instability.  
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For we have not yet added a way to pass to the other as myself. A 
fortiori, such passage must be mediated.378 To explain 
“mediumhood” overall: to take a position from the other, a content 
must be found in the particular other that is also in me in general 
(thus indeed, Husserl avoids deeming this the “same” as me, 
which would make this other not me). But a mediate intention as 
correlative arises originarily (the name for the part of origin at 
which arise the right, possibility and so on for the content of 
evidence to be spoken of). As an ego (correlatively, “I”) is 
originarily a man, then egoity can be predicated of men in general.  
But as I am first a man, Husserl thus moves the originary egoic 
“nexus” (CM §44) further “within” myself, away from the other 
itself.379 This “second ego” will develop into the level of the 
Other (der Andere), which is pulled “inward” in order to pass “beyond” 
myself:  
[I]n [i.e. inside] this pre-eminent [prior] 
intentionality there becomes constituted for me 
                                                 
378 Derrida insists: “Husserl’s most central affirmation concerns the irreducibly 
mediate nature of the intentionality aiming at the other” (VeM 440, VM 123, 
Derrida’s emphasis). This concern arises as at the last this intentionality must 
be mediated by the irreducible, the non-phenomenal, as we explain below. 
379 Husserl explains that he “delimit[s] first of all the total nexus of that actual 
and potential intentionality in which the ego constitutes within himself a 
peculiar ownness” (CM §44). 
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the next existence-sense that goes beyond 
[überschreitet] my [ego] (CM §44, our emphases). 
Note that Husserl is seeking to avoid denying that the Other 
“beyond” is a consciousness as I am (cf. §109).380 Derrida employs 
the verb “refuse” (refuser) for denial. Such a refusal – that the 
Other is not what I am – refuses that an Other is an Ego in 
general as I am.381 Derrida emphasises:  
[T]o refuse to see in [the Other] an ego in this 
sense, is, within the ethical order, the very 
gesture of all violence (VeM 441, VM 125, our 
emphases).
382
 
                                                 
380 Husserl writes, as we return to below that “neither the other Ego himself, 
nor his subjective processes or his appearances themselves, nor anything else 
belonging to his own essence, becomes given in our experience originally.” (CM 
§50) 
381 Husserl writes, this other is “a “mirroring” of my own self, and yet not 
[nicht] a mirroring proper” (CM §44). That is, Husserl both posits and negates 
this relation.  
382 By “gesture”, Derrida also refers to Husserl’s indicative sense of the sign, 
that falls short of the intentions of the other consciousness, just as no 
meanings (Bedeutungen) are yet communicated by these indications to me (for 
instance, by facial expressions (LI 1 §5, LU 38)). 
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Respect avoids this sort of violence. Indeed, note that an “order” of 
violence holds “within” ethics – and the more grievous violence is 
that of negation of the Other.383  
The setting aside of negation of Autrui 
As to Levinas, however, Derrida quotes Levinas’ earlier Existence 
and Existents (1947) and Time and the Other (1947):  
Autrui, insofar as [en tant que] it is autrui, is not 
only an alter ego. It is what I myself am not (EeE 
162, TeA 182, VeM 441, cf. VM 125 our 
emphases).
384
 
Derrida’s argument is somewhat unfair, as Levinas by 1961 is 
entirely aware that negation of the other in any sense is a violence 
(TI 198). Derrida is supporting his Husserl. He argues, first, that 
Husserl sets aside any sort of negation, and second, that Husserl 
sets aside negation of the egoity of Autrui:  
                                                 
383 By “order”, Derrida indicates at least a necessary sequence (across) as well 
as a hierarchy (upward): violence will apply in the levels. 
384 The “Other as Other” ought never to be confused with Levinas’ Other as 
Other (Autre en tant qu’il Autre cf. VeM 443)). By the latter phrase, Levinas 
seeks to avoid reference to Husserl’s appearing as such; “tant que” rather has a 
sense closer to “insofar as”, which avoids measuring an extent, an Other 
appearing as Other merely insofar as it is Other. 
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[T]his is exactly what Husserl does not do. 
(VeM 441, VM 125)
385
 
Rather, Husserl begins from the Other, which after a reduction 
includes a body, and thus is a man as I am (CM §44).386 Thus 
Husserl explains that the “Other” is somehow a “mirroring” of 
myself. This would be an appresentation (making of the Other 
and myself into one object as co-present), in which the relations 
are analogical. 
But just so, Husserl avoids a confirmation of a consciousness 
outside, for again phenomenology would cease to be respectful, 
as the Other would be confirmed as not myself. Further, this 
would deem that the problem of origin even of the absolute 
Other is solved, for it is merely an intentionality as I am (VeM 
441, VM 125).387 As Derrida emphasises, for essential reasons, 
                                                 
385 Several sections earlier in the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl deems that this 
other is “a “mirroring” of my own self, and yet not [nicht] a mirroring proper” 
(CM §44). Even so, Derrida is correct, in that this is merely not a mirroring, 
rather than not what I am. 
386 We avoid suggesting this negation of the Other as what I am is a simple 
refusal of the natural existence of the Other; Husserl seeks to proceed via a 
reduction. Husserl writes: “if I reduce other men to what is included in my 
ownness, I get bodies included therein” (CM §44). 
387 As Derrida suggests (rather than affirms absolutely) “it seems that one may 
not suppose that Husserl makes of the Other an other like Myself without 
misconstruing his most permanent and openly stated intentions.” (VeM 441, 
VM 125). 
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the Other [...] [as] Other absolute origin and 
other zero point in the orientation of the 
world [...] can never be given to me in an 
originary fashion and in person, but only 
through analogical appresentation (VeM 440, 
VM 124). 
As in 1962, Husserl as Derrida reads him has retreated from the 
absolute as “outside”. For while the Other is certainly signified 
via the other (forward), the Other as Other (VeM 440) never 
appears absolutely. Just as for univocity and the Idea in the 
Kantian sense from 1962, the Other as Other never even arises in 
originary evidence. It is indeed deemed “irreducible”. 388 But to 
work out how this holds, Derrida will seek a solution more 
intricate than a simple position that my ego and the Other’s can be 
mediated by egoity in general, for this then cannot hold of the 
irreducible Other as Other.  
                                                 
388 Cf. also VeM 439, 442, VM 124, below. 
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From mirroring to transposition 
To explain this, we address how mirroring holds in “analogical 
appresentation” so as to relate it to irreducibility.389 First, to allow 
the mediate intention, the content of the other which for essential 
reasons both I (“Je”) and the other share, must be what comprises 
egoity in general. The emphasis, then, is first upon what I find of 
the other’s world in me. For the other’s body is “There” while I 
am merely Here (CM §54); hence this holds of bodies in 
general.390 Husserl avoids making the leap simply to the body 
There; rather, to recognise this other in me as particular, a 
mediate intention of the other in this world sedimented in me 
intends a certain characteristic of the other, which appears there 
for me, as unitarily in me. I must actively constitute what is 
peculiarly “my own” (mir eigenes) of that man in the “external 
world”.  
For Husserl, at an even further remove, this occurs at least via the 
constitution of our shared bodies, where mine is more active 
(animate) than the other’s body There. That is, as particular 
                                                 
389 Derrida merely puts it that “it would be easy to show the degree to which 
Husserl takes pains to respect, in its sense, the alterity of autrui [and thus 
Autrui] [...]. he is concerned with describing how the Other insofar as it is 
Other [l’autre en tant qu’Autre], in its irreducible alterity, is present to me [à moi]” 
(VeM 439, VM 124). As Derrida does not yet explain what he takes as basic, 
we will do so. 
390 Derrida deems this an outside for me: “[B]odies, transcendent and natural 
things, are others in general for my consciousness. They are outside [for my 
consciousness]” (VeM 440, VM 124, our emphases, cf. CM §50). For Derrida 
these relations are essential, as the natural is the spatiotemporal region by 
which worldly things can be situated. 
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examples of this originarily ideal “ownness essence”, human 
others in general have bodies; and my own “animate organism” 
mirrors theirs (CM §44).391 By this act, indeed, I would constitute 
even the body of the other there (not yet the Other) in me. 
Husserl is devolving “inward” to extraordinary lengths so as to 
respect the other. He has prepared enough to suggest that a right 
(as correlative to positing) holds to converge on the (particular) 
content of the body (Körper) of the other in its appearing in me 
(CM §43).392  
For Derrida, this is the other as such. Importantly, I (in general, 
egoity) can then objectify the other’s body and my animate body as such 
“together” . Husserl calls this “appresentation”, the 
making intended as co-present (CM §50) 
Such relation to the other, then, is deemed analogical, for its 
multiple evolutions inward authorise only that I posit of myself 
what must apply to the other there as co-present. This is 
analogical appresentation of the other as such to me, by me.393 
With this arises the correlative constituting of truth, then the pure 
                                                 
391 By “mirroring”, Husserl employs a metaphor of reflection back to me.  
392 This is “intentionality in which the being of others for me becomes ‘made’ 
and explicated in respect of its rightful [particular] content – that is, its 
fulfilment content.” (CM §43, our emphases). 
393 The appresentation (Appräsentation) implies a-presentation, going to the body 
(Körper) of the Other only by means of our shared basis in the primordial world 
(CM §50). 
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possibility of affirming the Truth of the other (below, as 
“verified”) as unitarily my own.  
Given this telos, appresentation provides the right to pass across 
(trans-) to a position upon me (forward, then backward). My 
egoity in general (which already holds) can then become an other. 
I can speak of an other animate body, which is originally an ego as 
I am, thus essentially refers to the act of institution of the 
originary content to the Living Present: “the primally institutive 
original [Original] act is always livingly present” (CM §51). At this 
juncture, we emphasise, Husserl makes this moment of return 
enquiry in its levels overt. This act permits  
the [pure] possibility of verification by a 
corresponding fulfilling present (the back 
becomes the front) (CM §50). 
The possibility of the Original can be predicated of the originary 
“in front”, to verify its essential relation “behind” as a “genesis at 
a higher level” (höherstufigen Genesis).394 These “levels” – which we 
                                                 
394 Husserl in the Cartesian Meditations deems this moment of arising to be 
authentically originary as “ursprünglicher” (CM §50). As we noted, Husserl’s 
“principle of principles” is that the originary (originär, I §§141, 138, I §1, HU III 
11) provides the right and authority for such predication of the ursprünglich. 
Derrida is ever concerned with this right, and employs “originary” (originaire). 
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first noted of Derrida in 1962 (IOG 25, (244)) – will continue to 
be important.  
Developing the Other as Other 
Husserl thus develops the second direction to address the Other at 
this higher level. The other for me is thus constituted as passive 
in me (CM §51). But as for Levinas, the body of the other (des 
Fremden Leibkörpers, cf. CM §55) is “strange”, in that something of 
it is always hidden from me. The other is my alter ego (which is 
henceforth my Other).395 This develops the form of the two 
directions: I am free to pass to the corresponding position of the other, 
without yet verifying that this Other is an ego as I am.  
Henceforth, the two directions are taken as implicitly 
correspondent, thus analogical, and returning to a higher level in 
order to return to the lower. Thus, moving forward, the particular 
content of this other body which is there for me (as ego) as yet 
falls short of what must be verified of this other body as me: that 
it is an Ego as I am. For essential reasons, this psyche is “essentially 
inaccessible to me originaliter” (CM §55, our emphasis). Rather, 
                                                 
395 Cairn’s translates Husserl’s “der Andere” as either alter ego or Other 
depending upon the context. Thus at CM §54 ln. 4, he translates “des Anderen” 
as “other ego”. At §54 ln. 36, Husserl writes of “der Andere” which is also 
translated as “the other ego”. However, the translation is sometimes difficult to 
follow, as on occasion these words are also rendered by Cairns in the lower 
case in English. At §55, pg. 151 ln. 31, Cairns translates “des Anderen” as “the 
Other”, but “der Anderen” is translated as “the other”, and at §55 154 ln. 2, he 
translates “der Anderen” as the plural “of others”. However, in general, “des 
Anderen” (cf. also CM §55 153, lns. 6, 12) is translated as “the Other”, and the 
body of the other, or the other, is signalled by “des Fremden” to which we will 
adhere.  
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what is grasped “with actual originarity” (wirklicher Originalität) is 
only 
the Other’s [des Anderen] body itself, but seen 
just from my position and in respect [gemäß] of 
this aspect (CM §55). 
We have arrived at Husserl’s “respect”. The Other too can only appear 
as a body, but is seen only from my position. Husserl has again 
developed the levels. In sum, this Other by its essence must be 
inaccessible in the region of the origin of the ego. What can be posited 
“such as I should be if I were there”, by its essence must never 
enter even the origin. This is what Derrida deems irreducibility. Yet it 
certainly appears as such only insofar as it is Other (the Other as 
Other). Hence, moving downward, it can only be said to be 
grasped as me originarily, to become an ego at the lowest level. 
Derrida summarises that 
[T]he Other as alter ego, this signifies the 
Other as Other, irreducible to my ego, precisely 
because it is an ego; because it has the form of 
the ego. (VeM 442, VM 125, Derrida’s 
emphasis)  
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But we must still work out how “respect” would hold logically, 
via this “form of the ego”.  
Difference and similarity in Husserl 
For, next, taking a position merely from the other’s body for 
Husserl would indeed allow the body of the other to be 
adumbrated or explicated. However, as only from my position, 
such predication would be finite. Such a progress never attains the 
infinite determination even of the other. That is, as noted since 
1962, Derrida insists that such an “enrichment” (toward an 
infinite other) must for essential reasons always remain “partial” 
(VM 124).396 Instead, it is an originary (essential) impossibility that 
even the infinite other be determined (thus again, by “infinite” 
Derrida does not yet include negation of the finite, but merely 
what exceeds all of the finite).  
This evolves to the next moment, for movement from one to the 
other employs Husserl’s difference in progress from one to the 
other, in this peculiar sense. As in 1962, this Other to which I 
pass is no longer opposite to me as outside, but merely my other as 
similar (a predicate of sameness). Husserl deems the intentional 
                                                 
396 As Derrida puts it, such a stranger is “infinitely other” because “by his 
essence no enrichment of his profile [as a part of his body] can give me [an 
essential impossibility] the subjective face [face, aspect] of his experience from 
his perspective, such as he has lived it. Never will this experience be given to 
me originarily, like everything which [in Husserl] is mir eigenes [propre, my own, 
near] [...] always [already] inaccessible on the basis of always partial attempts” 
(VeM 440, VM 124). 
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unity of the “pairing” of myself and other is the “unity of 
similarity” (cf. CM §51). Importantly, by this Husserl is refusing the 
use of the word “same”, and also identity, (in CM §§50-55), each of 
which would determine that the Other as the same as me, and 
prevent respect (CM §50).397  
Thus in the positing of general similarity between myself and other, 
and only my position upon the Other, I can pass to positing of our 
separation, which then passes to our similarity. Reflection upon this 
separation in turn allows difference, and upon the unitary as a 
moment of similarity. This, Husserl writes,  
uncovers my own psychic life in its similarity and 
difference (CM §54, our emphasis).  
At this seeming alignment with Derrida’s concerns, we note how 
the progress was better taken as Derrida’s from the first. 
Brief critical notes on Derrida’s approach 
Importantly, Derrida has founded his ethical noema upon the 
Idea in the Kantian Sense.398 But Husserl seeks to avoid such 
                                                 
397 Husserl had explained that “[i]f what belongs to the Other [des Anderen] 
were directly accessible, it would merely be a moment of my own essence, and 
ultimately he and I myself would be the same [und schließlich er selbst und ich selbst 
einerlei]” (CM §50). 
398 In the Second Meditation Husserl does refer to an “infinite regulative idea, 
[…] as the evidently presupposable system of possible objects” (CM §22, 
Husserl’s emphasis). This is in accordance with Derrida’s address to the Idea in 
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dependence upon an ontological “beyond” in the Cartesian 
Meditations; the Idea in the Kantian sense is never mentioned in 
these pages. Second, in preferring the constituting unity of 
similarity to the constituted re-identification of the object as the 
same, the approach is never quite compatible with the Idea in the 
Kantian sense (I §143). Indeed, the Idea in the Kantian sense 
would restore negation, for what is the same as something else is 
also not identical to something else. Thus Derrida depends upon 
appresentative transposition for his particular ethics, but avoids 
admitting that it precludes his ethical and noematic basis, 
developed from 1962, by which he deemed intentionality in 
general is “respect itself”. When Derrida does address difference 
and mediation from other to other and includes predicative 
negation, he will return identity, but rather align with Plato and 
Heidegger. (VeM 443, VM 127, (530)).  
Toward non-objective mediation 
Hence, moving forward again, we begin to develop the relation of 
the Other and Autrui. As noted, even as “irreducible” (VeM 442), 
the sense of the Other must have been given, even as Wholly Other 
(Tout Autre, beyond), as particular and object (phenomenon, from 
behind). Derrida wrote: 
                                                                                                        
1962. However, for Husserl this is infinite rather than Derrida’s open, 
indefinite or irreducible Idea in the Kantian sense. 
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[O]ne could neither speak [on pourrait], nor 
have any sense of the Wholly Other [Tout 
Autre] if there was not [originarily] a 
phenomenon of the Wholly Other. (VeM 439, 
VM 123) 
But the Wholly Other (as Ego), diverges from “natural” essences, 
such as a body or stone (VeM 442, VM 125).399 By its essence, the 
Wholly Other must be irreducible to the essence that can appear 
to me. As Husserl put it:  
[T]his being there in person does not keep us from 
admitting forthwith that, properly speaking, 
neither the other ego himself, nor […] anything 
else belonging to his own essence, becomes given 
in our experience as authentically originary 
[Ursprünglicher]. (CM §50)  
                                                 
399 The Other must be able to speak to me, this is why he is an Other, rather 
than a “stone” (VeM 442, VM 124). 
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For essential reasons, positing of the Wholly Other (alter ego 
himself) in the region of what can appear must then be absurd. As 
not yet even original, it precludes the right to originary grasping 
of its sense as a body in the world (there). This is the only 
“verification” (below, as “confirms”) that Husserl allows – that 
something of the other as there for me is precluded from sense (as 
irreducible).400 It would no longer proceed via the mediate 
intention.  
Toward the transcendental relations of Autrui 
Yet, as noted, the Wholly Other certainly appears (as alter ego), yet 
in an intentional relation of respect. Thus, Derrida writes densely, 
and accurately – analogical appresentation 
confirms and respects separation, the unsurpassable 
necessity of (nonobjective) mediation. (VeM 440, VM 
124, our emphases) 
This “non-” refers all around the object, thus is no longer bound 
even to the relations of general and particular by which objective 
mediation progresses (cf. 337, 516 ff.). This develops the 
                                                 
400 As Derrida generalises, the other in general, thus further others, retain a 
moment of the other that must be “hidden” in their appearing as sign: 
“[A]nother sign of this alterity in general, which things share here with Autrui, 
is that something within them too always hides itself” (VeM 440, cf. VM 124). 
For Derrida, this is the nub of Levinas’ misreading. Husserl never assumed a 
“mastery” even over things in the world. 
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necessity of an essence irreducible to myself, an Ego as essential 
origin of the world in relation to its non-objectuality. It would thus be in 
relation to its non-phenomenality. It would thus never refer to 
anything that can appear as a real Ego for me. Yet as it remains 
certain, it certainly appears as what I can never be. Derrida goes 
on: 
[I]t is this appearance of the Other as that 
which I can never be, this originary non-
phenomenality, which is examined as the ego’s 
intentional phenomenon. (VeM 440, VM 124, 
Derrida’s emphasis)  
That is, as Husserl has no obvious version of Autrui, Derrida is 
deeming that these relations of the Other are “like” Autrui” 
(comme Autrui (VeM 441)). 401  
Rather than suggesting Husserl merely lets Autrui be,402 Derrida is 
working out the ethical relations as transcendental. The Other (i.e. alter 
ego) would be that Ego in originary relation to its non-phenomenality. It 
                                                 
401 These are likened rather than the same, for the relations are analogous 
(422).  
402 It is worth noting that “respect” evolved from the Latin “to look back”, 
which in turn instils a second direction looking back at me; making the Other 
an ego like me. The very word “respect” instils a violence or an instability that 
avoids containment into a simple sense of “letting the Other alone”.  
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would be its alter ego; thus without relation to anything that can 
be a body in the world. Like Autrui, it would thus never be 
anything I can be, or that can be a real Other for me. Such an 
alter ego can appear for me only in its form of Ego, an Ego 
founded beyond anything real (VeM 441)).403  
Derrida summarises that Husserl “wants only to recognise” the 
Other – i.e. his telos – like Autrui 
in its form as Ego, in its form of alterity which 
cannot [for essential reasons] be that of things 
in the world. If the Other was not recognised 
as [comme] transcendental alter ego, it would be 
entirely in the world and not [non], as I am, an 
origin of the world. (VeM 441) 
                                                 
403 Kant’s definition of “transcendental logic” is helpful in that, Kant explains, 
it “concerns itself with laws” “solely insofar as they relate a priori to objects.” 
(CPR A57/B82). Derrida is working out the whole-part relations and 
directions of a transcendental ego relating solely a priori.  
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Having developed the originary and transcendental basis (behind), 
we can add the telos. This alter ego must be determined by me as what it 
is – alter ego – without violence.404 We thus begin to build the ethics.  
Beginning the approach to the ethics of the Other 
Henceforth, by “Autrui”, Derrida also implies a relation like the 
Other, and it is the latter he seeks to develop. For unlike the Other 
as Other, which position I can take “such as I should be if I were 
there”, Derrida explains that,  
[T]his possibility is absolutely rejected in the case 
of Autrui [Here one finds] the radical 
impossibility of going around to see things from 
the other side (VeM 440, cf. VM 124, our 
emphases).
405
 
For Levinas it is basic that, as Autrui is prior to division, one 
cannot take a position from Autrui at “the other side” (cf. 413). 
This is an impossibility prior to logic; Levinas’ sort of radical 
impossibility. But in Husserl’s analogical appresentation, the form 
of a transcendental Ego never even allows me to take a position 
                                                 
404 Negation would no longer be respectful, as Autrui in its form of ego would 
be “inside”, and a negation would be direct violence to Autrui. 
405 Bass translates Autrui as “Others” in this sentence; we note that neither 
Autrui nor the Other can be determined as plural (or singular). 
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“from” an ego at the other side (the alter ego). Husserl’s pure logic, 
Derrida is arguing, precludes transposition in any fashion to the 
Other. To assess why this “possibility” would be rejected, thus be 
“radically impossible”, and “absolutely” so for Husserl, we address the 
italicised phrases in order.  
The subjunctive conditional as ethical 
For in the case of the other, Husserl explains in the Cartesian 
Meditations that in this positing of its body over there, it is  
as if I were standing over there, where the 
other’s body [des Fremden Leibkörpers] is (CM 
§55, Husserl’s apostrophes).
406
 
Just so, for the Other, Husserl explains that it  
must be appresented as an ego now coexisting 
in the mode There, ‘such as I should be if I 
were there’ [wie wenn ich dort wäre] (CM §54). 
                                                 
406 Cairns has capitalised “Other”. Following from Husserl’s explanation in 
§44, and in accordance with Cairn’s usual translation of the other in 
intentionality as “des Fremden”, we have retained the “other”.  
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Husserl employs the conditional “as if I were there” (wenn ich dort 
ware, cf. also CM §54, ln. 10, ln. 16)) to refer to positions from 
both the body of the other, and the alter ego (the Other).407 
The conditional has an unusual ethical status. To explain this, we 
begin from a basic conditional, of the form “If S then P”. To 
determine the truth of such a conditional, consciousness takes a 
position upon its relations. Thus, for instance, even the 
proposition “If there is any sense in speaking of an Other, it is 
determined” never commits doxically to the truth of the 
conditional. Such a form never even commits to whether the 
content of the antecedent (S) can be a possible object.408 Note, 
then, that a conditional can posit even of the beyond, wholly Other, 
Autrui etc. while never committing to its possibility. Just so, a 
negative form of such a conditional never commits to the 
negation. For instance, even hypothesising that “the Other is not 
determined” never commits to the possibility of this negation of 
the beyond. This hypothesis never commits to violence. A basic 
conditional is more ethical than the basic form of the proposition, 
                                                 
407 At §54 l. 10, Husserl writes that my body in space “[S]ie erinnert an mein 
körperliches Aussehen wenn ich dort ware” (Husserl’s emphasis). It “brings to 
mind the way my body would look ‘if I were there’”. At line 16 he addresses of 
the “ego in the Mode There (as if I were there) [ego im Modus Dort (wie wenn 
ich dort wäre)]” (Husserl’s italics). 
408 Such a form is not yet an exclusively necessary condition (“Only if... 
then...”), which doxically posits a necessity and possibility of the form and its 
consequent from the first. The latter applies the a priori exclusion for essential 
reasons of related necessary conditions, thus already applies a determination.  
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and allows address to the Other without concern for the latter’s 
possibility. 
However, the “as if” thesis has even more claim to ethicality. It 
too does not yet posit the possibility of its antecedent. Moreover, 
Husserl phrases it as a subjunctive (in English, as if I were there), a 
tense which expresses doubt.409 Note that a “doubt” is not yet a 
negation of the other. Rather, while a conditional does not yet 
posit possibility in the first place, a subjunctive conditional 
believes even less that the object posited of can be true.410 In 
Husserl’s example, it believes even less that “the ego There” is 
possible. Just so, it believes even less that any negation within the 
proposition (i.e. the ego as not There, or as not an ego etc.) can 
be true.  
Moreover, this holds even for an intention as a “mirroring” (cf. 
CM §44) of the self. Husserl wrote in 1913: 
in the ‘as if’ theses, the theses improperly so-
called, ineffectual mirrorings [are] incapable of 
                                                 
409 The subjunctive linguistic tense as Rowlinson puts it, is employed for 
“expressing doubt or unreality” (Rowlinson 1991, 39).  
410 We avoid deeming this a counterfactual conditional. The Oxford Dictionary of 
Philosophy defines the counterfactual conditional thus: “sometimes known as 
subjunctive conditional, although the terms do not exactly coincide. A 
counterfactual is a conditional of the form ‘if p were to happen q would’, or ‘if 
p were it to have happened p would have happened’, where the supposition of 
p is contrary to the known fact of not-p” (CDP 85-86). We employ the term 
“subjunctive conditional”, as a counterfactual would suppose a prior negation of 
the factual. Derrida has not yet included negation, and approaches doxically, as 
the fact is certain but the “known fact” has the form of an indefinite opening.  
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carrying on any actual thetic [objectivising] 
functions in respect of their noemata even 
when neutralised. (I §117 cf, I §113)  
As noted, what never functions (cf. 346, 346 fn.), does not yet 
provide a ground for positing even the possibility of objectivity (I 
§86). When an “as if” thesis has no such function, it does not yet 
permit consciousness of something, as respect.411 Note that this 
holds of the “as if” thesis even when neutralised in Derrida’s 
ethical intentionality, which protects from existential assertion 
anyway (it posits nothing (448)).  
Thus, within a transcendental reduction (for Derrida, 
transcendental neutralisation) in the Fifth Meditation, Husserl 
employs the “as if” to address the positions from both the body 
of the other and Other. To describe the level “beyond” the 
alterity of bodies, he neutralises appearing, doubting even the 
positing of its possibility.  
This, indeed, is the logical basis for Husserl’s respect. This is why, 
in respect, the position is taken only in believing it holds from me.  
                                                 
411 As Husserl explained of a function: “Consciousness is just consciousness 
‘of’ something; it is its essential nature to conceal ‘meaning’ within itself.” (I 
§86). This relation is respected even more so in the “as if” thesis. 
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As to Derrida, the French “as if” (comme si) requires an indicative 
verb, precluding its use in a subjunctive conditional. In this case, 
he employs “as to” (comme à) and the subjunctive (which Bass in 
1978 translates as “as if”).412  Derrida explains a little further on: 
to gain access to the egoity of the alter ego as to 
[comme à] its alterity itself is the most peaceful 
gesture there could be [qui soit]. (VeM 444, cf. 
VM 128, our emphasis)  
But nor is this exemption from violence absolute, for however 
many involutions away from the direct position it might be, it 
remains doxic. By positing even less of the Other, I predicate less 
what the Other is not; the most peaceful gesture there could be.413  
Toward the levels and the conditional 
Thus, we summarise why the Other in such a position is radically 
impossible, hence irreducible to the originary (“behind”). As noted, 
the other has a body (cf. VeM 440, VM 124). First, we note, it 
might seem obvious that the Other is originally precluded from 
                                                 
412 In this case, “comme à” plus “qui soit” implies “as one would…”, while 
expressing doubt that the action occurs. Hence we amended Bass’ translation 
of “qui soit” as “possible”. Such a gesture does not yet posit possibility. 
413 Levinas explains peace as what “absorbs the totality of beings”, without 
limitation (TI 222). Without limit, thus as without negation, Derrida takes 
peace as what would be an absence of violence (as an absence of war). 
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what can appear as originary in that by its essence it must be 
separate from the body there. Deeming this would be an error 
(CM §55),414 for it would determine something of the Other.415  
Rather, as Husserl explained above, the body of the Other can be 
seen, but only from my position. Thus it appears while hiding 
something irreducible, as non-relation even to a body. As Derrida 
puts it of this irreducibility, it adds 
a dimension of incompleteness [to] the body 
of the Other in space (VeM 440, cf. VM 124). 
Such a “dimension” is no longer wholly included to the essential 
“level”. We will develop this below.  
Thus far, to combine the above: that the Other essentially cannot 
(rather than does not) appear for me in its alterity itself makes its 
appearing an essential impossibility. The absolute Other cannot 
appear for me (cf. 468). This outcome permits Derrida’s logical 
exclusion of Autrui as “beyond” – an essential impossibility – just 
as it permits address to the other and Other in ongoing explication, with 
                                                 
414 Husserl explains: “[A]ccording to the sense-constitution involved in 
perceiving someone else, what is grasped originaliter is the body of a psyche 
essentially inaccessible to me originaliter” (CM §55). To suppose this Other is 
separate from its body as I am would make it the same as myself (CM §50). 
415 That is, the Other would thus not be absolutely Other. Even so, it would be 
absurd, and the gesture of all violence, to deny that the other (or Other) is a 
consciousness as I am. Solipsism is never taken seriously, for it refuses (denies) 
the sense of the Other. Nor can one yet affirm that the Other is only a 
consciousness. 
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even the possibility that the Other be originary withheld. Autrui 
can only take the form of an Ego, thus not even as if it were seen 
from my position. Derrida returns this shortfall from the 
absolute, summarising (although only as a conditional): 
[I]f Autrui was a real moment of my egological 
life, [...] I would perceive it originaliter. Husserl 
does not cease to emphasise that this is an 
absolute impossibility. (VM 441-2, VeM 125) 
That is, Derrida has worked out the radical impossibility of the alterity 
of Autrui. But in just this moment, Derrida has worked out a basis 
that can approach the other and the Other as respect. Henceforth, Autrui 
is precluded from consideration as “alterity” (otherness in 
general), as Derrida continues to address the other and Other.  
For note that Derrida has employed a basic conditional above. In 
French, a conditional form (“Si…”) also never employs a 
subjunctive. Rather, it applies an indicative tense in the 
antecedent, and a conditional in the consequent. A basic 
conditional does not yet doubt what it never commits to doxically 
as possible (indeed, it was then worked out as essentially 
impossible). But even so, Derrida employs a simple conditional as 
he is addressing the essential level. He is indeed progressing in 
accordance with the levels (niveaux) of phenomenology. 
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The levels in pure phenomenology 
Thus importantly, the Other remains necessary even before its essential 
possibility or impossibility. Hence Derrida generalises this loss of 
even original possibility of sense, leading to radical impossibility 
as implying a 
more profound dimension of nonoriginality 
(VeM 440, VM 124). 
This would be a “more profound” dimension all around (as a 
non-relation) even the essentially original.416 Derrida will soon call 
it a “second” dimension of alterity. As he explains further on: 
 [I]t is difficult to see how the notion of 
violence [...] could be determined rigorously on a 
purely ethical level without prior eidetic-
transcendental analysis of the relations 
between ego and alter-ego in general (VeM 445, 
VM 129, our emphases). 
                                                 
416 As more “profound”, this level would also be more foundational.  
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Derrida has indeed been proceeding on the “purely ethical level” 
by the analysis of ego and alter ego in general. Thus far, this 
highest and essential level is addressed as a simple conditional.  
But to address the level “beyond” appearing at the furthest eidetic 
level in pure phenomenology, Husserl neutralised appearing even 
further “inside”, doubting even the possibility of its positing. 
Derrida deems this ethics the  
neutral level of transcendental description 
(VeM 441, VM 125). 
This led toward positing of the Other as a more “profound” level 
irreducible even to the eidetic (general). This is indeed deemed a 
“pre-eidetic level” (VeM 443, VM 127).417 But Derrida must yet 
find a way to address it in a fashion comparable to Husserl’s 
subjunctive conditional.  
The addition of “supposing” the further level 
Thus Derrida avoids affirming this oppression, or more profound 
level, in that he only supposes such irreducibility: 
                                                 
417 For Levinas’ employment of the “more profound level” (“un niveau encore 
plus profond”) of Autrui exceeding the cogito, cf. TEI 65, TI 93. For Derrida, the 
relations are worked out eidetically. The sense of such a pre-eidetic level is only 
in question, and thus supposed, as we address below. 
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supposing [à supposer] [...] that there would be 
any sense [qu’il y ait] in speaking of preethical 
violence (VeM 444, cf. 441, VM 128, cf. 125). 
Crucially, “supposing” is a form of conditional that avoids 
committing even to the validity of a proposition (cf. ODP 86)). 
For example, “Suppose that ‘if there is any sense in speaking of 
an Other it is determined’” also avoids positing the possibility 
even of the form of the conditional, let alone its components. 
Moreover, in French, “suppose” can be employed with an 
indicative or subjunctive tense; Derrida has employed a subjunctive, in 
the mode of doubt. He supposes what he doubts can even have a 
valid essential form (at the highest level). Henceforth, as Husserl 
employs a subjunctive conditional in his “respect”, Derrida 
employs “supposing”. By this means he addresses the level 
beyond the highest essential level.  
The question as means to address the Other 
However, Derrida is also constraining positing of this level beyond 
via the question. Since 1962, both pure phenomenology and 
ontology have a right to the question (349), but in 1964 Derrida 
allots only the former a right to constituting without an object in 
general, and in particular the other. Moreover, as noted, a 
question is a modality of position that avoids doxic positing of 
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the truth of the object. But for Husserl, a question also expresses 
doubt (I §103, EJ, §78); for the level (beyond the highest) is not 
yet believed to be possible.  
Thus, in accordance with this essential logic and spatial reasoning, 
this beyond is deemed a question of (and merely supposed to be) 
a zone irreducible to the essential relations and levels of the origin: 
in question then is an irreducible zone of facticity, 
an originary and transcendental violence, previous 
to any ethical choice. (VeM 441, VM 125, our 
emphases)
418
 
As such a zone (or dimension) is previous to ethical choice, this 
permits assessment of irreducibility as violence. This will be the first 
kind from which we began, that of “oppression” (405, 432). 
The ethics of respect as sequence 
For it is important to note that there has not yet been an 
affirmation of irreducibility or pre-ethical violence; the progress 
moves via necessities even prior to possibilities. In the ordinal 
sequence, beginning from the demand to determine the object (the 
                                                 
418 As to its facticity, according to the progress from 1962, the irreducible 
Other is dependent upon (pure) essential necessity, thus contingent upon those 
relations, even prior to its certainty as a fact (235 ff.). 
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noema of ethics), and the possibility of its objects (other and 
Other), it then becomes necessary that the Other be irreducible. It 
must be supposed that the Other as irreducible is oppressed even 
from the sense (directions) of origin (VeM 444, cf. 441, VM 128, cf. 
125, above). The condition of possibility of an ethics of respect is that it then 
violently oppress the Other from all possibility of entering the origin. In order 
to be ethical, a phenomenology of respect must then be unethical. 
Moreover, this irreducibility is prior to any choice, thus prior to 
ethics. That is, ethics already arises from an essential source of 
unethicality.419  
The culmination in oppression as ethical  
Thus we can also explain this as a culmination of the ethics of 
respect. As ever, we move from furthest behind. First, we began 
from ethics as a necessity to encounter the Other without 
violence. Thus far, this sense of this supposed Other would be 
oppressed from the originary, as violence. Yet even so, 
encountering this Other as originary must have occurred; I could 
never speak or have a sense of it unless it had appeared in 
evidence.420 This allows a first basis in Derrida’s oeuvre for 
institution (the necessity of what must be supposed, and is certainly 
                                                 
419 It is well-known in assessing Derrida’s reading of Levinas that in 1987 
Derrida already needed to give “ingratitude” to be grateful to Levinas (cf. 
Critchley 1991, ATVM) – we have worked out, we suggest, a basis for why it is 
beginning to hold.  
420 As Derrida put it above: “[O]ne could neither speak [on pourrait], nor have 
any sense of the Wholly Other if there was not [originarily] a phenomenon of 
the Wholly Other.” (VeM 439, VM 123) 
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instituted), which in turn will be a basis for the trace. Derrida only 
addresses this after having included negation (505).  
Thus – moving forward – this appearing is certain, the 
constituting of which object is then possible (as “tied to 
phenomenality”) as other and Other. Such a position from the 
other is as yet indefinite. However (forward again), by only 
positing address to the Other “as if” to its radical alterity, this 
conditional would be “the most peaceful gesture there could be” 
(VeM 444, VM 128, above). A possibility of the Other (the Other 
as Other) is not yet posited, but merely supposed (below, 
“alluded” to).421  
As in 1962, where the four arguments arrived at the Idea as 
irreducible “beyond” within a Logos without limits, as the 
essential relation of correlative uttering, thought and asserting 
(FTL §1).422 In this ethics as objectual, the other and Other must 
be thought and said as the logos. Derrida can thus ask if the pre-
ethical violence instils the sense of the Other in the logos. He 
summarises:  
                                                 
421 Bass translates “qui soit” as “possible”, which we have amended. The Other 
in this peaceful gesture (i.e. indication) is not yet supposed to be possible.  
422 The Logos, as developed over our chapters since our explanation of Husserl 
(307) is the general basis of passage in every originary element: reason, 
position, signifying (speech), right, ground, and predication – with the telos still 
that of convergence on the other to determine it as absolutely what it is (i.e. as 
a Truth). 
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[I]s there any sense in speaking of a preethical 
violence? [….] If [a conditional] the 
transcendental “violence” [of oppression] to 
which we allude is tied to phenomenality itself, 
and to the possibility of language, it would then 
be embedded in the [originary] root of sense 
and logos. (VeM 441, VM 125, our emphases)  
Derrida’s positive ethics of respect of the Other has been 
developed, as encountered in the logos. Before following why the 
progress must include negation, we summarise it thus far.423 
The basic directions summarised  
We explain this from furthest “behind” within the Ego (where 
“in” has the sense of neutralisation of an outside). First, that there 
be an Other for me remains necessary, even supposing it is pre-
eidetic and never originarily possible.424 Moving forward, it is 
indeed so that the eidetic bases are then taken as general, but this 
                                                 
423 When negation is added to this moment of the Logos in the “negative 
economy”, we note, its contradiction of the beyond will “stifle” even the 
necessity of originary appearing (545). 
424 Henceforth, we employ “supposing” with a conditional tense, to avoid an 
odd English grammar. The sense of subjunctive doubt is expressed by the 
verb. 
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Other is radically impossible as an eidos ego (ego in general). For, 
(moving forward to a lower level, and by analogy), its particular 
content yet holds, even as originary or original (thus the Other is 
irreducible, behind). Yet it remains necessary that it must already 
have held originarily.  
This is also to write that the condition of the resultant alterity 
(body of the other and Other) depends upon the first (earliest) 
alterity (irreducible Other). As Derrida puts it,  
without the first alterity, the alterity of bodies 
[…] the second alterity could never emerge. 
(VeM 440, VM 124) 
By “first” and “second”, Derrida instils the ordinal sequence to the 
levels that we are developing. For next, we move forward to the 
certain moment. As necessity applies, and right and certainty of 
what is tied to phenomenality hold, I can and must constitute the 
object in general.  
This constituting of the other and Other instils two directions 
“forward”. First, the particular content of the object in general, 
takes the form of the other as human. This can be given to me in 
a circularity of the two levels (originary and original, ideal object 
and essence). Thus I can and must pass to a position from the first 
alterity, as other (VeM 440, VM 124). However – as the necessary 
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founding act is still upon the irreducible rather than an objectual 
infinite (VeM 439, VM 123) – this content is radically impossible 
in phenomenological evidence. From the other side, its content is 
irreducible to the ego. This regulative evidence in 1962 was 
deemed “infinitising” evidence rather than the positing of finite 
evidence. Such a progress from one to the other cannot yet attain 
an infinite (or even a finite) other (l’autre, VeM 440, cf. VM 
124).425 Thus, forward again, this otherness (alterity) of bodies can 
be generalised but as yet falls short of unity. Even the possibility 
of determining the infinite (thus the unity of this infinite other) in 
the indefinite is in question.426 That is, thus far the outcome of the 
objectual relation to alterity is “open”.427  
However, second, the form of the ego as appearing certainly 
refers to a mediate relation to the Ego, which is supposed by 
analogy to be co-present in the Other. Just so, the body of this 
Other certainly signifies the Other as Other, even if the latter is 
absolutely hidden from me originarily (irreducible, behind), and I 
radically cannot take a position “from the other side” (VeM 440, 
                                                 
425 Husserl’s progress must be via “a consciousness of infinite inadequation to 
the infinite (and even the finite!)” (VeM 436-437, VM 121), as the institutive 
infinitisation arises as irreducible. 
426 As noted, there is not yet a negation in this positive employment of in-finite. 
427 Derrida explains: “in the case of the other as transcendent thing, the 
possibility in principle of an originary and original presentation of the hidden 
face is always open in principle and a priori” (VeM 440, VM 124). 
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VM 124).428 Moreover – which in turn is certain – the Other must 
speak (signify) to what appears to me as phenomenon (above).429 
Such appearing of the body of the Other too (its alterity) can be 
generalised. This is essentially what makes it an other Ego for me 
(VeM 412, VM 124).430  
But again, to take a position from the Other as Other, furthest 
forward, this certainty must pass to non-objective mediation of 
one and Other (again, by everything irreducible to the levels of 
ego and ego in general (eidos ego)). As Derrida puts it, this is this  
the phenomenon of a certain non-
phenomenality which is irreducible for the ego 
as ego in general (eidos ego) (VeM 439, VM 
123). 
To be sure, this “non-phenomenality” that exceeds the originary 
and essential levels no longer refers to a simple “outside”) one 
must at least try to think this irreducible Other, by essential 
reasoning, as “beyond” essence and directions, as a 
                                                 
428 This “more profound” level instils a non-originarity, as the “radical 
impossibility of going around to see things from the other side” (VeM 440, 
VM 124).  
429 As Derrida puts it: “[T]he Other as alter ego signifies the Other as Other, 
irreducible to my ego, precisely because it is ego, because it has the form of the 
ego” (VeM 412, VM 124). 
430 Derrida writes: “[T]he egoity of the Other permits him to say ‘ego’ as I do, 
and this is why he is Other, and not a stone.” (VeM 412, VM 124). 
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“transcendence of Infinity rather than [non de la] Totality” (VeM 
441, 124).431 But, as one demands (desires) the Other as Other, 
such a progress of finite positions from the other must also pass 
to “indefinite inachievement” (VeM 440, VM 125) of the Other, 
as open. This second passage to the indefinite returns us to the 
necessity of the irreducible, as circularity. As Derrida explains, this 
alterity 
is thus irreducible by a double power of the 
indefinite. (VeM 440, VM 124) 
Thus far, both “movements” to the indefinite develop from an 
ordinal sequence, as much as taking the form of levels and 
directions. We deem these the basic “movements” (VeM 442, VM 126).  
From the demand toward autrui 
For in each passage, the demand remains to determine the absolute 
other, without “limitation”. The other must be determined as the 
absolute unity of finite conditions (Derrida still calls this telos the 
“absolute other” (VeM 442, VM 126)). As no longer oppressed, 
the absolute other would avoid violence. Just so, while the Other 
as Other must be thought without limit, were it attained 
                                                 
431 Bass has translated “non de la” as “not”, we have changed this as the 
former refers all around the object, and Derrida is not yet employing negation. 
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(affirmed) in this fashion absolutely, it would cease to be Other.432 
Thus Derrida in 1967 amends the explanation of the two 
indefinite directions, adding this phrase: 
[T]he system of these two alterities [...] must be 
thought together [ensemble] […] (ED 179, VM 
124, our emphasis).
433
 
This works out how the demand and teloi of epistemology and ethics 
coincide. Thus, next, Derrida assesses whether the “two alterities” 
can be thought together in this positive progress, as determined 
absolutely.  
Part Five: the positive economy 
The symmetry of economy 
The progress will evolve an “economy”. When this leads to 
absurdity (non-sense) rather than an absolute other, it will imply 
the two directions (senses) must be thought as autrui, thus no 
longer as a positive progress. First, as Derrida heeds the demand 
to assess whether the two alterities can be thought together 
                                                 
432 It is worth emphasising that this remains a telos, and were this an absolute 
determination, it would be absolute violence. A telos is a mere necessity 
following from the demand or (for Levinas) desire. 
433 We will not yet call this a “system” in 1964 as, in these pages, Derrida 
deems the progress a system (three times) only in the emendations of 1967 
(VM 123, 124, 125). Thus far, we remain with “progress”, “logic”, and 
“movement”.  
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(ensemble), this returns to unidirectional passage to a single object (the 
ethical relations in the neutralised noema). This telos is no longer 
that of the human other, but the relations of the progress (in 1967, 
“system”). The two passages must be thought together, in one 
object. Thus Derrida avoids the mediation of first and second 
alterities (of other and Other as Other) by irreducibility. The 
address to alterities for me requires mediation by the Ego, thus for me 
(that is, “me” refers to the transcendental “I” made object). 
Derrida takes it as implicit that each moment of the Other must 
first arise in the body of the other, hence leaps from the telos of the 
absolute other to the telos of determining the Other absolutely.  
Thus he summarises this first “symmetry” (he will develop a 
second (561)): 
[T]he Other, for me, is an ego which I know to 
be in relation to me as to an Other. (VeM 442, 
VM 126) 
Derrida still excludes negation; the components arise as two 
“sides” (our metaphor), to which my knowing acts as the mediate 
position.  
We will explain each moment. First, upon one side, “the Other, 
for me” is first a positing of the Other as it certainly appears for me 
(rather than an Other as Other). Second, predicating “is an ego” 
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permits the mediate intention that will allow similarity. That is, 
third, “which I know” returns to the moment of constituted 
activity of this ego as mediating (“I know”, of course, is a moment 
of positing rather than absolute knowing).  
Passing to the other side, the further moment of this mediation, 
“to be in relation to me”, refers to the particular moment of being 
of the Other (“to be”) of which I can predicate its egoity (cf. 
above), and taking the position as if from the Other, positing that 
for this Other I am its Other. But to know this, the Other must 
again be an Other for me.434 The transcendental symmetry sets up 
a circularity (we deem this “movement”).  
But in the symmetry the sides must be thought together. A 
fortiori, Derrida deems each side to be an “asymmetry”, as the 
relations to an Other that exceeds me nevertheless place me in 
relation to the Other.435 The two sides mediated by my knowing 
imply two asymmetries which can be made a symmetry. The latter 
returns to the unidirectionality as positing of a possible and 
necessary noematic (irreal) object, thus without real content. This is a 
                                                 
434 Derrida explains that “[T]he movement of transcendence toward the Other 
[…] would have no sense if it did not carry within it, as one of its essential 
significations, that in my ipseity I know myself to be Other for the Other” 
(VeM 442, cf. VM 126). 
435 As noted, Levinas’ asymmetry arises from the first rupture of the Other into 
enjoyment, obligating ipseity prior to opposition to the other. Derrida has 
arrived at this moment by beginning with opposition and egoity.  
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symmetry, which is not of the world, and which, 
having no real aspect, imposes no limit on 
alterity – makes them possible, on the 
contrary. (VeM 442, VM 126, our emphasis)  
We will return to this “on the contrary”. But note that this is a 
first employment of negation, although not yet of alterity.  
Rather, the movement is deemed “economy”. Its first hallmark is 
positing that I – as transcendental subject – take a position upon the 
asymmetries together.436 Such movements are no longer worldly, for 
their object is merely the passage as such. This allows the second 
hallmark of economy: my deeming that the directions which 
seemingly addressed the irreducible beyond, objectified as a 
whole, returns to essential, general and formal law as a circularity “inside”. 
The progress has developed Derrida’s “economy”.437 
Thus, the return to eidetic law permits an outcome. While the 
unidirectional passage of thinking the two symmetries is irreal 
(the ethical noema), each side retains general and particular 
relations (e.g. the Other for me), which latter (only) certainly instil 
                                                 
436 The transcendental subject, as we have explained, is never a determined 
objectual “I”, but a continuing and teleological movement. 
437 The word “economy” is derived from “oikos” and “nomos”, the law of the 
home (or hearth) (CD 473). 
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content (as factual, real and so on, but also empirical). Derrida 
summarises: 
despite the logical absurdity of this formulation, 
this economy is the transcendental symmetry of two 
empirical asymmetries. (VeM 442, VM 126, our 
emphases) 
A fortiori, this is deemed to be absurd.438 As noted, “absurdity” 
arises for Husserl when a proposition can be constituted but is 
then excluded from logical sense,439 as no longer in accordance 
with a priori and essential law (for instance, “a square is round” 
(LI 4 §14)).  
Derrida’s symmetry avoids the absurdity of contradiction, for 
negation has not yet been included to the irreal (inside). 
Moreover, without negation, the content of the “sides” avoid 
opposition (I know the Other to be in relation to me, as my 
                                                 
438 We return to this positing below – it is the judgment (or first, positing) of 
dissymmetry as negative. 
439 Husserl writes: “[T]he consistency or absurdity of meanings [Bedeutungen] 
expresses objective (i.e. a priori) possibility (consistency, compatibility) as opposed 
to objective impossibility (incompatibility) [i.e. at the side of the constituted 
object, originarily]: in other words, the possibility or impossibility of the being of 
the objects meant [bedeuteten] [...] to the extent that this depends on [as whole-part] 
the intrinsic essence [i.e. essential, general and formal logical relations] of 
meanings” (LI 4 §14, our emphasis first).  
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other).440 Indeed, contradiction is never mobilised in this positive 
ethics of 1964.441 Rather, the economy is inconsistent (LI 4 §14). 
For indeed, the irreal position of thinking the two together 
“makes them possible, on the contrary” (above). As Derrida is 
applying these terms, contraries are relations that can be posited as 
essentially necessary “together” only at the cost of absurdity, even 
though neither need to be true in this particular instance.442 For 
instance, to assert “It is dawn” and “It is noon” can hold together 
would be absurd; moreover, it might be evening. The content of 
contraries can be opposites, but opposition is never necessary 
(“This object is black”, and “This object is white”, although the 
object may be grey, or coloured). Contrariety can hold as a 
criterion for absurdity in relations of otherness (alterity in 
general). 
Thus as to how this transcendental symmetry of empirical 
asymmetries is essentially absurd:443 I must think of the other and 
Other, which as yet passes to the indefinite, yet in the symmetry I 
                                                 
440 The negation of the symmetry as “of the world” is not yet contradictory, for 
the symmetry is thus merely made irreal (noematic). 
441 Derrida in 1967 adds a note that “temporalisation” contradicts alterity, but 
that he “emphasise[s] this elsewhere” (VeM 124, cf. VeM 437). 
Temporalisation is never addressed in this positive economy in 1964. 
442 As particular content, neither of a contraries needs to be true – here and now, it 
might be evening. Derrida employs “contrary” in a constrained fashion, both 
must be true in that everything must be true, their facticity must be a fact. For 
as we noted, the essential necessity applies to determine everything, and such 
positing makes everything possible at first. However, in particular, they can still 
be contingent, but must be determined as true. 
443 Derrida may also want this to hold of content: that I know the body of the 
Other is originarily other for me (as predicatively possible), and also that I know 
it as Other (as radically impossible) thus never other for me, thinks contraries 
together absurdly. In such an instance the outcomes still follow. 
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must think the two particular objects together, which must render 
them definite. Such a necessity leads to absurdity. Thus, “despite” 
having arrived at an absurdity, and an outcome then precluded from 
Husserl’s formal logic, Derrida deems this “double power of the 
indefinite” implies that of autrui (ED 179, VM 124). Derrida will 
only address this in our next chapter, when the progress evolves 
to but must exceed the Same and the Other. 
For even so, a general possibility of sense holds a priori, and 
position still makes the object in general possible. The two 
alterities (other and Other, noon or dawn, etc.) can still be thought 
together.444 The progress can continue despite its absurdity. Yet, 
and as a notable evolution in his oeuvre, Derrida has worked out an 
implication that no longer allows for with Husserl’s logic. Indeed, 
precisely as this positive Husserlian logic is let go of, he asks: 
[W]here have these movements been better 
described than in [Hegel’s] The Phenomenology of 
Mind? (VeM 442, VM 126).
445
 
                                                 
444 This progress turns out to be a “pure” form in an unusual sense, as worked 
out above; as they implied absurdity, such necessities ought to be without even 
irreal phenomenological content. 
445 This sentence at the culmination of the argument of the positive economy 
from 1964 is why we have employed the term “movement” to signal the 
progress. 
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As noted, Hegel does include a negation of the other, which no 
longer arises subsequent to positing (cf. 382, 580). Even so, the 
progress will remain Derrida’s. To prepare for it, we note the 
third moment of positive economy, as transition to the negative. 
From dissymmetry toward negation  
For this symmetry in turn must be determined, which again takes 
a unidirectional position upon the object – in this instance, 
economy as such. Derrida calls the outcome “dissymmetry.” This 
word, we suggest, signifies the further position that the economy of 
symmetry of asymmetries is absurd. It has followed sequentially – 
Derrida emphasises that dissymmetry can be possible only if there 
was first a positing of symmetry (VeM 442, VM 126).446 For 
indeed, rather than the “a-” of the asymmetries, as indefinite and 
open, or “syn” of a symmetry as positing together, the “dis-” 
signifies a negative moment applied to symmetry. Importantly, some 
prefixes are treatable as negation of the particular object, non-relation (all 
that is not the object), or both, and one such is “dis-”. 447 
The possibility of negation of the proposition has arisen. But this is 
still not yet a negation of autrui. For even the latter, Derrida 
explains, must still appear as a body despite its absurdity. But this 
                                                 
446 Derrida writes: “no dissymmetry would be possible without this symmetry” 
(VeM 442, cf. VM 126).  
447 As noted, Nolt et. al. explain that “prefixes such as ‘un-’, ‘in-’ and ‘ir-’ may 
also express complementation [non-relation]” (cf. Nolt et. al., 2011, 114).  
 - 502 
- 
body appears as an essence of another kind to “economy” (or 
“stone” (VeM 442, VM 125)); the two directions have been 
developed only for the other and Other rather than an object in 
general. “Dissymmetry” is rather the possibility of a negation of 
the telos of symmetry. Positive ethics has not yet succeeded in 
determining the absolute.  
Just so, as “economy” is an essence of another kind to the 
human, a reader should avoid deeming it is a harmonious 
circularity upon the inside, where in “dissymmetry” the other with 
name of man or even autrui are found again as an object, even as 
negative, to return the two directions. The positive economy is no 
longer compatible with a telos of ethics, signalling that the 
progress must go further, for the overall telos has not yet been 
met. However, this progress to economy is indeed Derrida’s. As 
he admits in an addition of 1967, he arrives at 
an economy in a new sense; a sense which 
would doubtless be intolerable to Levinas (ED 
185, cf. VM 125). 
In Levinas’ economy, beginning from the intentionality of 
enjoyment led to autrui, which “tolerated” no relation to a first 
moment of positing, and the asymmetry to Autrui (beyond). For 
Derrida, beginning from theoretical intentionality and this 
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positing led economy toward two asymmetries, with Autrui 
holding only in its form as Ego, which must address autrui. Thus 
nor has Derrida even allowed Husserl’s respect to be a relation of 
the Same. 
To think these two “indefinite” systems together, Derrida will 
need to develop their interrelations. We have noted that a robust 
explanation of Husserl and ethics would need to include negation, 
but would then preclude (Derrida’s version of) Husserl’s respect. 
However, Derrida’s progress by this juncture must include an 
overt negation, for position alone has not yet thought the two 
directions (infinitely other and Other) together. The addition of 
negation will return the same, and thus the relations of the Same 
and the Other, to address autrui. Only at that juncture will 
Derrida’s begin to exceed these relations to determine a beyond in 
a more developed ethics. However, that progress too will raise 
difficulties. We follow this in our next chapter. 
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Chapter Six: Negative Economy, 
(“Violence and Metaphysics”, 1964, 
pt. 2) 
Introduction 
This chapter continues the assessment of “Violence and 
Metaphysics” of 1964, as Derrida adds negation. This will lead to a 
negative counterpart to each positive direction “forward”, then to each moment 
of the positive economy. The directions will evolve the relation to the 
other, and then to the Same and the Other. They will be mediated 
by the eteron, as nexus of Difference and otherness that permits 
both movements. The eteron will be necessary even for autrui, 
which latter will be set aside as Derrida develops his implications. 
Thereafter, the movement of Same and the Other permitted by 
this original source of Difference will arrive at contradiction, and 
stifling even of the originary, so as to imply a nihilism. Derrida 
will resist this outcome to develop four outcomes for ethics. As 
Levinas’ trace is only nascent, Derrida will return to his 
conservative outcomes from 1962: questioning why of finitude, 
and God. Our next chapter follows Derrida’s progress as he 
develops his version of the trace, in 1966, as a better solution.  
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Part One: the two directions evolved 
The possibility of negation 
As ever, we begin from behind – for note that an essential 
negation of formal law was implicit, in essential impossibility, thus 
in particular, radical and originary impossibility. These essential 
and originary negations remain problematic, as they already 
predelineate what must be determined absolutely. Thus, just after 
introducing dissymmetry and briefly mentioning Hegel, Derrida 
indeed moves “forward” to include predicative negation 
(henceforth, negation or “not”) of content.  
First, Derrida adds the possibility of negation to the propositional 
form: 
one can [peut] invert [inverser] all of these 
propositions without difficulty (VeM 442, cf. 
VM 126).
448 
 
Inversion, in logic, arises from including negation to the 
proposition (PDP 282).449 In so doing, Derrida makes it overt that 
                                                 
448 We have amended Bass’ translation of “peut inverser” from “can be 
reversed”, which implies a change of direction to “can be inversed”.  
449 As the Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy puts it: “[I]n propositional logic the 
inverse of a conditional is obtained by negating its components” (PDP 282). In 
traditional categorical logic, inversion implies obversion by just this inclusion 
of negation: “All” becomes “Not All”, thus “No”, which “is” evolves to “is 
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all the positive moments that he has developed can be negated: 
the object in general, and thus the other, Other, their relations, 
and even economy. 
Second, Derrida aligns with Parmenides’ On Nature. For 
Parmenides, we note, the “that is” (οπως εστίν) and “that not is” 
(ως ουκ εστίν) can be thought, but never as separate from thought 
(Parmenides, B 2.3 and 2.5, cf. TA 42-43). As the Greek words 
emphasise, this is no longer only Husserl’s negation after positing, 
but a negative arising bound to thought, where neither “is” or “not is” 
are given primacy.  
Third, in aligning with Parmenides, Derrida questions my ability to 
separate from the other. For – we explain – Parmenides admitted 
no external “other” or object, but “that is” (or “not is”) only as 
intransitive. Thus in particular, 
[O]ther than must be other than myself. (VeM 
442, VM 126)
450
 
                                                                                                        
not” etc., which also introduces non-relations (cf. ODP 199, 267). Hurley 
explains how such relations are worked out in these classical (categorical) 
forms (cf. Hurley 218). Husserl developed his sort of mereology, and we 
develop these bases as Derrida employs them, basically.  
450 As Levinas explained of the relation of otherness to Parmenides, most verbs 
are transitive, such as “I see the other”. However, the verb “to be”, is 
intransitive when emphasis is placed on the “am”; “I am not the other” (TA 42, 
Levinas’ emphasis). Thus he seeks to “break, if this can be dared” with 
Parmenides, cf. TA 42-43, TeI 36). This “break” was doubtless a central “aim” 
of Levinas book of 1947. Derrida has rather settled upon the “other”, in the 
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Parmenides is employed to mobilise Derrida’s formal-logical 
basis.  
The movement from “I” to “me” (“my”, “myself”) signals the 
particular versions of the directions “in” the Living Present. Just 
so, “Ego” and “ego” signal these directions in general, made 
object in the subjective a priori, proceeding as transcendental-
subjective circularity. As most formal, “one” and “other” signal 
these unitary and impersonal directions as yet without egoic 
content. Hence this “myself” is generalised from “I” to the 
essence of egoity: 
[H]enceforth [the other] is no longer absolved 
of a relation to an ego. (VeM 442, VM 126)
451
 
Of course, “no longer absolved” avoids confirming (subsequently 
affirming or denying, which latter still affirms) the other, which 
would make it external.  
Thus as ever (and Derrida moves forward again), rather than an 
object denied as absolutely outside, this is a shortfall in itself (256). 
Hence, this other is not absolutely other:  
                                                                                                        
sentence, rather than the “am”. Other must be other than myself (VeM 442, 
VM 126).  
451 Derrida’s employment of “henceforth” (dès lors), or “from then on”, signals 
that from this juncture he will take this necessity to hold. This is also why we 
have employed the term to signal what will hold as the progress continues.  
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[T]herefore, it is no longer infinitely, absolutely 
other (VeM 442, VM 126, our emphasis last). 
Following from this egoic generality and retracting from the 
absolute (external) to myself, Derrida can include the mediate 
intention that allows passage. That is, I must share the 
characteristic of egoity that is predicated of my other.452  
Yet I still begin with position. It is important to avoid confusing a 
lack of primacy of position or negation in certainty, or affirmation 
or refusal thereafter, with the telos of ethics. We explained that its 
basic telos is that the object be encountered without violence, i.e. 
without negation or limit, and thus as absolute. In particular the 
other and Other are objectual, and in a relation to the subject. 
This also includes the necessity of the mediate relations. The telos, 
hence the first necessity, is to make either the other or Other absolutely what it 
is for me.453  
This evolves the first direction from our previous chapter, the 
passage from one to the other to affirm the finite other, which in 
avoiding negation as yet passed to the indefinite. For indeed, as 
                                                 
452 From this juncture, as I am never absolved of relation, Levinas’ clear 
division between the Same and the Other, which Levinas (Derrida quotes) deems 
the “ultimate structure”, in a closed totality set against infinity, is no longer 
supported (VeM 443, VM 127, quoting TeI 247).  
453 Derrida will explain this necessity as the Other “appearing-for-me-as-what-
it-is”, an “appearing” which hyphenations are without distance (VeM 444, VM 
128). 
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Derrida has included negation and set aside such respect, only at 
this juncture does Derrida include the same (in the lower case) (438). In 
1962, he worked out that what is the same for a subject is not yet 
its negation (258). However, an other has been added. For essential 
reasons what is the same as what is other must also in some 
fashion be “not what is” other (cf. Parmenides B 8.34-36).454  
In particular, what is the same as myself is then not myself. Thus, 
crucially, Derrida summarises: 
[T]he infinitely other cannot be what it is – 
infinitely other – except by [unless it is] being 
absolutely not the same. That is, in particular, by 
being other than itself (non ego). Being other than 
itself, it is not what it is. Therefore, it is not 
infinitely other etc. (VeM 442, VM 126, our 
emphases) 
                                                 
454 Thus, for Parmenides (Derrida takes this as implicit), the “same” is thought in 
relation to the “not”, as never separate from what is. For example: “[T]hinking and 
the thought that it is are the same; for you will not find thought apart from 
what is, in relation to which it is uttered.” (B 8.34-36). 
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We emphasise that Derrida proceeds by general and particular 
relations. For ease of comprehension, we will repeat each portion, 
as we explain it in sequence. 
Evolving the first direction with negation 
Derrida begins: 
[T]he infinitely other cannot be what it is – 
infinitely other – except by [unless it is] being 
absolutely not the same. (VeM 442, VM 126, our 
emphases) 
Importantly, in having included negation (376 ff.) and thus 
evolving from 1962, relations between particular objects must be 
restored as bivalent. When one finite object is what it is, it must 
then be not the other.455 Thus in this reasoning, what cannot be 
one must be the other. This first moment then sets out the 
particular relations in accordance with the necessities of formal 
law. The infinitely other is not yet given absolutely (as outside 
upon this inside) as finite and thus what it is. But it must be what 
                                                 
455 With the “except by” and “cannot”, Derrida begins by investigating 
conditions of possibility. These avoid a positive affirmation should these 
conditions be met. They are merely necessary for the relations to be possible – 
yet more conditions might be required. To avoid rendering the phrases exactly 
as Derrida does, we employ the word “when”. These relations are necessary in 
general provided that a condition holds – even though there may not yet be 
such instances, such relations are possible. 
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it is absolutely (essentially, even to be determined as infinitely other 
is to be what it is, for if it is finite, it is not infinite and no longer 
itself).456 Thus it cannot (an essential impossibility) be what it is 
unless it is absolutely not the same, for the same instils a negation 
to again make the infinitely other not what it is. Note that this 
nevertheless instils the essential and originary absolute, from our 
previous chapter. 
However, continuing with Husserl’s involution to what the other 
is for me, this infinitely other (such as I should be if I were there 
(cf. 467)) must be constituted as in me (in particular, as ego).457 
Thus, to be what it is, it must be other than itself. However, a 
fortiori, as absolutely without negation, this particular moment must 
refer “all around” itself in the ego; that is, to the particular content 
as non-relation (non-ego). Thus Derrida went on: 
That is, in particular, by being other than itself 
(non ego). (VeM 442, VM 126, our emphases). 
This progress is evolving the “non” relation, which we introduced 
in Chapter Four (337). In 1964, it allows for negation of the finite 
                                                 
456 We avoid writing that this would make the infinite other as not what it is 
into the finite, for what is “not the infinite”, as we will develop, is never 
necessarily two negations turning back to identity.  
457 Note that this has still required a mediate moment – the other can only be me 
by our shared relation of bodies; this appearing of other and Other is 
henceforth taken as implicit by Derrida. 
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object (and thus the infinite), and also the necessity of relation 
“beyond”.  
Preparing to develop the levels of the non-relation  
Indeed, to explain the whole-part relations, Derrida equates the 
progress with the Sophist, in which Plato introduces the non-
relation. As affixed to the ideal object, a non-relation is a nexus of 
both kinds of spatial reasoning – across, as the object in 
particular, and toward the whole (outward). Thus, “non” signifies 
all that is around the particular ideal objectivity.458 The non-relation 
in this instance refers all around the ego. That is, rather than 
merely relating to ideal objectivity, by referring to all around the 
ego and other, it permits the possibility of going further “outward” 
(forward) even than the ego in general or essence. This develops 
how a non-relation can no longer be confined even to essential 
generality. 
It thus modifies the finite object in relation to what can be 
beyond even essence. Indeed, we explained this relation via 
Hyppolite (337), who summarised that “Non-A [Non-A] signifies 
all that is not A” (LeE 145, cf. LE 113, our emphases). Hyppolite 
too developed this basis from these paragraphs in Plato (LeE 145, 
                                                 
458 At its simplest, one can think of non-A as the originary whole of what is not-
A. Of course, to think the infinite other as the absolute whole (at once) is the 
telos, and such a conception as yet leads to shortfall. This is another way to 
write that the ideal object is not yet given absolutely.  
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cf. LE 113, our emphases). Thus – as Hyppolite translates – Plato 
also explained the whole-part relation to the infinite spatially,  
[a]round each form, there is therefore [...] an 
infinite quantity of non-being. (Sophist, 256d, 
translated by Hyppolite in LE 112, our 
emphases) 
We are indeed addressing this finite object, which must be what it 
is. “Around” it is signified an infinite amount of otherness as 
non-relation, thus this finitude for Derrida must be explicated 
toward the whole (the infinite other as what it is).459 As a non-
relation; as all around a particular negation, thus as a positive term 
(337), our aim is to assess how for Derrida this can be absolutely 
                                                 
459 Plato, in this section of his Sophist (253D-259B), explores the relations 
amongst whole and part, general and species, Form, Sameness, Difference, 
non-relation, etc. in assessing what is and is not. As we follow Derrida’s basic 
“law”, we only summarise some alignments; and opt for one reading of Plato 
(Cornford 1964, 262-298)). A first major divergence from Cornford’s reading 
of Plato and Derrida (as developing from Husserl) is that for the latter the 
whole is never extended as far as the “whole of wholes” (Plato’s “All” (cf. 
Cornford 1964, 271)). For Husserl, such a whole must be but has not yet been 
confirmed (cf. LI 3 §25) – it is the telos of the absolute. The second divergence 
is a shift in emphasis from the approach we have taken from Hyppolite, to the 
visual relations of naming. Cornford never includes a “non-” relation as an 
infinite amount around the object, but translates “not-A” as a “collective 
name” which can be “distributed over the whole field” (Cornford 1964, 290). 
This possibility holds for Derrida too, although the whole field is not yet 
wholly signified. Plato has merely noted that this the pre-fix “non” implies an 
“infinite” quantity, rather than a fixed field, and this relation to “All” is never 
quite so obviously a fixed whole. For Derrida, what is outside as everything is 
infinite, but even this falls short from the whole as indefinite, and refers 
beyond, to the Other that must be absolute. 
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without negation. What follows is helpful in order to appreciate 
Derrida’s ongoing progress. 
The levels and directions of the non-relation 
We thus begin by emphasising that all of what is not-A is negated. 
“Non” can refer to the general or particular, but as to the latter 
(which Derrida addressed above), these are not yet all of what is 
not-A, thus not yet negated. Take, for instance, a forest of trees 
that surrounds a castle. One can say that the castle is not outside 
the forest (it can be inside the forest). However, one cannot say 
that the castle is not outside one of its trees, which would be 
nonsense, as it would then be inside a tree. Such particular objects 
escape negation. 
However, nor is negation of the object in general and particular 
precluded – one can still say this castle or a castle in general is not 
a tree. The relation from tree to castle is still positive (the non-
relation as positive). As non-relations, even a particular or general 
other can thought as an object without negation, thus as still a 
positive relation that can be negated.460 It is the in-finite around the 
finite originary part.  
                                                 
460 In particular, it also allows the other to be spoken of without negation. We 
employ “allows” henceforth without allocating this as a possibility within the 
logic we are developing from Derrida (for whom possibility is signalled by 
“can”, and “makes possible” by “must”) – what is allowed is merely not yet 
precluded.  
 - 515 
- 
Further, one can say the non-relation allows the particular object 
outside to be other. That is, one can say a castle as not outside the 
forest is the opposite of outside the forest (inside the forest), but 
one cannot say the castle is opposite to one of the trees. That is to 
say, the particular object that escapes opposition is other. Hence – 
the non-relation allows thought of an other without absolute 
opposition.461 To be sure, ego and other remain “originarily 
opposite” – to suggest opposition is dispelled would do away with 
the other as first not me. However, the non-relation allows 
thought of a particular other that is no longer opposite, while 
retaining position and its negation.  
Indeed, without this non-relation, there would be no movement, 
for (as non-ego) it avoids determining that only the general 
surrounds the particular – which would determine the general as 
absolute (outside) and thus its part “inside”. Even so, in a non-
relation, the relation to the object must necessarily reside 
“outside”, but this whole remains to be determined. This allows 
for an infinite other. This will also allow the relation to difference 
from others, without opposition.  
Finally, we move beyond even the general and infinite. For note 
that even when the castle is opposed to a “world”, or a (infinite) 
                                                 
461 Lawlor suggested of Derrida in 1962, that all the “negative” terms (“non-
problematicity”, “non-history” etc.) should be treated as positive. This accords 
with accepted logic. We are working out how this holds by adding general-
particular relations, and developing the implications.  
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“universe” outside the world, then the above relations must still 
hold. But when the relation is “between” a castle and a non-
castle, as everything outside the castle, then the non-relation is no 
longer confined even to general relations. Importantly, even the 
irreducible and indefinite “beyond” would be a non-relation. This will allow 
for the Other in the second direction.  
Continuing with the first direction 
The above instilled, we continue with the first direction. For the 
relation between ego and other must still be permitted by a 
commonality between ego and alter ego (for instance, the other as 
body in my world). But instead of a shared relation of the 
particular ego to egoity in general, Derrida has preferred a mediate 
moment from the ego to all around itself (non-ego). As to how 
this permits this first direction – in particular, the non-relation 
would escape the relation of the same (which makes the infinite 
other what it is not, i.e. finite), thus a particular (i.e. finite) other 
would escape negation. The finite other would be absolutely without 
negation. Hence we can summarise what was needed above; where 
the “infinite other” is a positive object – for the “infinite other” to be 
what it is for me, as absolutely without negation, it must be non-ego. 
Thus as to the third moment: and to continue this necessity: for 
the infinitely other to be what it is, it must be non-ego. As other 
to the ego, the particular infinite other (which can be negated, cf. 
just above) must then be not what it is itself (in general, ego):  
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[B]eing other than itself, it is not what it is. (VeM 
442, VM 126, our emphases) 
Given the telos of being what it is without limit, the infinitely 
other must then be not what it is.  
Fourth, with the above demonstrated, Derrida merely compresses 
the next transition. He substitutes “what it is” (not other) by 
“infinitely other”: 
[T]herefore, it is not infinitely other etc. (VeM 
442, VM 126, our emphases). 
The “etc.” develops the fifth moment. In particular, something 
“remains over” (ceterus) and continuation is allowed.462  
The brings the first direction “forward” to a more developed 
form. In our previous chapter, the first direction merely followed 
from the demand to affirm the other absolutely, but passed to the 
indefinite (as open). When such a position is mediated internally to 
ideal objectivity, as no longer absolutely other (as above), this 
necessitated a progress to infinity which does not yet fall short even in 
the indefinite (opening). Following from the addition of negation, this 
first direction can and must proceed in infinitum (an ordinal necessity 
                                                 
462 For this employment of “Et Caetera”, cf. also DLG 1019.  
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rather than temporal guarantee). The necessity and possibility of 
repeating the progress toward the infinite still applies, even 
though a transcendental negation has been added, and Husserl’s 
respect left behind.463 Thus Derrida evolves the “non” to the 
second direction forward, to the Other (and the Same).  
Toward the second movement 
For the first direction as movement in infinitum has not yet 
exceeded the one-ness of Parmenides to encounter the Other in 
its exteriority. Derrida thus addresses how division could occur 
inside this oneness (which will occur in the essential region of egoity (Ego)).  
To do so, Derrida turns directly to Plato’s Sophist. The Stranger, in 
dialogue with Socrates, sought to break (rompre, cf. TA 42, TeI 36) 
from “Eleatism”, i.e. from Parmenides’ approach in general, “in 
the name of alterity” (VeM 443, VM 127). That is, he sought to 
speak (i.e. also think (307)) of the other (or Other, as we come 
to). But this Stranger, 
knows that alterity can be thought [i.e. in 
general] only as negativity, and above all can be 
                                                 
463 As noted, for Derrida, Husserl’s sort of negation has “no transcendental 
status” (PG 205-206, fn. 47 (379)). 
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said [in particular, and correlatively] as 
negativity. (VeM 443, VM 127) 
These relations (as “can only”) are thus formal and essential.  
The next negative “relation” has evolved. This is negativity, as the 
characteristic (i.e. predicate) of the lack of positivity of the Other. To exceed 
the first direction, the particular Other can essentially be said only 
as a negativity (rather than a negation of the other). Henceforth, the 
Other has a dual function (what we deem an “instability”). It 
signifies what must be thought of as essentially related to the 
inside, as negativity, yet of its essence must be thought as Other 
to positivity – the Other as Other (l’autre comme Autre). The 
parallel movement to the first direction forward thus occurs as 
essential. Even “other”, “ego” etc. as particular objects in the lower 
case are assessed for their essential relations. In this “pure” 
movement, no choice can yet be made between what the object is 
and the essential relations which already predelineate what it is. 
The second movement as play of the Other  
To develop this second movement, it is helpful to recall that in 
the positive system the basis of respect was to posit the Other 
only as if from my position, in a conditional without negation. We 
return to this “as if”, but begin with the demand.  
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This remains a positive teleology in the region of my Egoity – 
even before I posit it, the Other as Other must appear for me as 
what it is. As Derrida explains, this is 
the necessity of speaking of the Other as 
Other, or to the Other as Other, on the basis 
of its appearing-for-me-as-what-it-is (VeM 
444, VM 128). 
This appearing must be without distance (hence the 
hyphenations), thus without limit or negation (violence). Thus, as 
the demand to think of the outside absolutely still holds, this Other 
must still be “absolutely other”. Yet, as this Other certainly 
appears as such, it must be the Other appearing-for-me-as-what-
it-is, i.e. the Other as Other.  
Thus to determine the Other as Other (appearing as such without 
distance, which must essentially be Other) this Other must be said 
as a negativity. As essential, these are treated as an instance of the 
Same. Thus the telos can also be phrased as the necessity that the 
Other appear for me as absolutely what it is, exterior to the Same. 
Henceforth, “exterior” signifies an “outside” without limits (soon 
“beyond”). 
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Thus Derrida continues to consider the instability in the essence 
of the Other: 
the Other cannot be absolutely exterior to the 
Same without ceasing to be Other (VeM 412, 
VM 126). 
To explain this version of the progress in general and particular 
relations: in the first necessity, to think (or in particular, speak) of 
the Other as Other, it must be in some fashion the same as I (an 
ego). But in general, as I and other are mediated by egoity, the 
Other is no longer Other, but a mere alter ego, another ego the 
same as myself. Thus Derrida goes on:  
the Other, thus, would not be what he is (my 
neighbour [prochain] as foreigner) if he were not 
alter ego. (VeM 443, cf. VM 129) 
However, as the necessity is to make the Other appear (absolutely) 
as what it is, it can only be said as negativity. But for the negativity 
of the Other to be absolutely Other it can only be not what I am, 
otherwise it would cease to be Other (above). As not what I am (Ego), 
it is essentially not an Other (alter ego). But then the Other is in 
some fashion the Same as me,  
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[T]he Other is only absolutely Other in being 
an Ego, that is to say in a certain fashion the 
Same as me (VeM 443, cf. VM 127). 
But again, as the Same as me, the Other is Other to itself – Other 
as Other. This evolves the second direction as what Derrida 
deems the “play of the Same”, which in turn would lead to a 
progression. However, Derrida avoids appending “etc.”, which 
would return a progress in infinitum, to the infinite other. This is just 
the difficulty, for the infinitely other would no longer be absolutely other 
(Other).  
This leads to the next comparable moment; the two directions of 
respect needed to be thought “together”. Having added negation, 
Derrida evolves this to “at once” (à la fois), as no longer two objects 
both thought in one object, but as two “movements” (VeM 442, 
VM 126) – to the other in infinitum and also the absolutely other 
(Other) – which must be determined as what it is. Derrida 
summarises: 
this exercise is not just verbiage, or dialectical 
virtuosity in the ‘play of the Same’. It would 
signify that the expression ‘infinitely other’ or 
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‘absolutely other’ cannot [ne peut pas] be said 
and thought at once. (VeM 442, VM 126) 
This exercise would signify that the teloi of the two directions cannot 
be thought and said at once.464 The relations of what is thought 
and said, develop the levels and directions of the logos from the 
positive two directions. We explained that the Logos implies the 
uttering (and thus speech) of what is thought as well as correlative 
predicating or asserting of the object, but as objectual in this 
ethics, they are thought and said as the logos (FTL §1, (307, 488 
fn.)). 
This evolves the next moment. For they must be thought and said 
at once in the logos. That is, in Literary French, “ne peut” signals 
“cannot”. Yet in a divergence from his almost ubiquitous habit, 
Derrida has added “pas”. It is feasible that “cannot not”, also 
signifies “not necessarily not”, a modal version of “must” (cf. VM 
131).465 Derrida must yet assess whether the two directions can be 
thought at once.  
                                                 
464 To avert a confusion: thinking and saying are correlative in the logos, hence 
Derrida employs a conjunction (“and”), rather than a disjunctive “or”. Had it 
been the latter, the relations would have evolved in two paths, as the instability 
between what can be thought and said; Derrida has avoided this. What is 
thought and said will develop as the logos. 
465 As the Oxford Dictionary of French Grammar explains it: “Pas is omitted in 
literary French with the verb […] pouvoir” (ODFG 162). In his translation in 
Writing and Difference of this paragraph the 1967 version, Bass omits to translate 
this second “not” above, but does translate “ne peut pas” as “cannot not” in a 
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Part Two: difference and the Same 
The division in the Same instilled  
To do so, Derrida again returns to furthest behind. For such a 
relation of two directions is already and essentially necessary, thus 
(moving forward) certainly (doubtless) “inside”. Thus Derrida asks: 
[H]ow could there be a ‘play of the Same’ if 
alterity itself was not already in the Same, with 
a sense of inclusion doubtless betrayed by the 
word in? (VeM 442-443, cf. VM 126-127) 
As explained, such an undoubted “in”, also signifies “no longer in 
opposition to the outside”. It is necessary that the Same be Other 
to its self-identity in itself, in its progress “forward”.  
Thus, at first, these can be thought together, but not yet absolutely 
so (at once). Henceforth, the first direction (the infinite other, as 
what it is, is not etc.) is equated with the Same, for it as yet 
remains within formal law in infinitum. As to the second direction, 
the Other as Other is taken as a necessary instance in the Same, 
                                                                                                        
1967 addition by Derrida to VM 131. It is worth noting that in his reading of 
our dissertation, Professor Geoffrey Bennington queried our suggestion that 
Derrida’s inclusion of “pas” might imply a second “not”.  
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thus also as Other to the Same. Derrida addresses them together, 
as “the Same and the Other”.  
Thus far, the progress has not yet exceeded the inside (to infinite 
or absolute other (Other)). To think the directions at once from 
this certain “inside”, Derrida assesses the “division” in the Eleatic 
One (Being) between the Same and the Other. Derrida asks: 
[W]hat is the division of Being [Être] between the 
Same and the Other? (VeM 443, cf. VM 129) 
As to what will mediate “between” the directions: we noted that a 
non-relation signifies all that is not the object (whether infinite or 
absolute other). Put spatially, the non-relation refers all around the 
object, yet no longer necessarily confined to essential and general 
relations. Thus Derrida develops the non-relation into essential 
difference.  
The evolution of the levels of Difference 
To do so, Derrida continues with the Sophist,466 where the 
Stranger, in order to break away from Eleatism and support 
“alterity” said: 
                                                 
466 Derrida is referring to the paragraph just following the excerpt translated by 
Hyppolite. Derrida’s paragraph develops the non-relation (which mediates the 
first direction, above). 
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[S]o when it is asserted that the negative signifies 
an opposite, we shall not agree, but admit no 
more than this – that the prefix ‘not’ indicates 
something different from the words that follow, or 
rather from the thing that is designated by the 
word pronounced after the negative. (Sophist, 
257b-c, quoted in LE 113, our emphasis, cf. 
Cornford 1964, 290).
467
 
This evolves the next relation. The Stranger admits the “prefix 
‘not’” (i.e. non-) in relation to the word (or thing) only as without 
opposition. Such parts are indeed merely other without negation. 
The “non” indeed refers to the infinite amount of particular things 
around and relative to a word’s Being in general (Sophist, 256d, 
LE 112, (337)). The non-relation without negation of the other is 
what Plato wants to explain by different.  
                                                 
467 Cornford translates this as “[S]o when it is asserted that a negative signifies 
a contrary, we shall not agree, but admit no more than this: that the prefix ‘not’ 
indicates something different from the words that follow – or rather from the 
things designated by the words pronounced after the negative.” (Sophist, 257b-
c; Cornford 1964, 290). 
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Indeed, Difference, in its general and particular relations, accords 
with each level and non-relation,468 as a nexus of these 
movements. As noted, the non-relation – as signifying all of what 
is outside the object – can refer both to what is outside it as 
essential (eidetic, general etc.), or “beyond” essence. Derrida thus 
adds difference as mediating “between” the negation of the other 
and negativity of the Other. For 
in its difference from Being, the other is always 
relative, is stated pros eteron (VeM 443, VM 
127).
469
 
We note that “pros eteron” – as accusative – signifies a movement 
to the other (across), but also what is “over and above” (Feyerabend, 
325). Thus – objectually put – this relativity of the particular other as 
non-relation is never excluded (as non-conceptual) from the eidos. 
As eteron, this 
does not prevent it from being an eidos ([…] in 
a nonconceptual sense) (VeM 443, VM 127). 
                                                 
468 Husserl too, in explaining his levels of essence in the Ideas did so via 
Differences (Differenzen), which descended to the lowest specific difference (I 
§12, (154)). 
469 Derrida usually employs the modern alphabet to transliterate Classical 
Greek terms. We have rendered them in the version he employs at each 
juncture. 
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Such a Difference never prevents the sense of relations around the 
concept (thus exterior to the differences of particular things, others 
etc.), in the first direction. It thus allows relations “included” to 
the eidetic levels, which signify what for essential reasons must go 
beyond essence (as Other), as the second direction. Difference of 
the latter sort would hold between the Same and the Other. Hence 
Derrida deems this  
the difference between the Same and the 
Other, Difference (VeM 445, cf. VM 127).
470
  
But a difference “between” also relates two objects. As to how this 
Difference could permit the Same and the Other to be thought 
together, Derrida appeals to an instability in its senses. The 
adjective “different” (ετερος) in Classical Greek signifies both 
different from an opposite and “of another kind” (Feyerabend, 169). 
In the first case, this is different as what is not the other, thus is 
the other, etc. (the first direction as the Same),471 and in the 
second, the non-relation of the other (also permitting relation to 
the Other, the second direction).472 In what is “said” or predicated 
                                                 
470 This usage of Difference is amended in 1967 to différance, which we reach 
below (600). 
471 Hence Plato writes of all of the kinds of Form: “the nature of Difference 
make each one of them [i.e. in particular] different from Existence and so 
makes it a thing that ‘is not’” (Sophist, 256E, in Cornford 1964, 288). 
472 Again, as Plato puts it, “in the case of every other Form there is much that it 
is and then an indefinite number of things that it is not. [...] And, moreover, 
existence itself must be called different from the rest” (Sophist 256E, our emphasis).  
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of as the eteron, no absolute difference is yet instilled, but a nexus 
between the two directions.  
As to how these pass to one another: the non-relation (outward) 
must mediate the (essential and) general relations of the particular 
ideal objectivity (forward), between the other as what it is, is not 
etc. (as the Same) and negativity of the Other (as the Same and 
also Other). For, as noted, “eteron” also designates “other in general”, 
the constituting moment of the other as essence. Thus even the 
essential “Other” is certainly thought in relation to the “eteron in 
general”.  
In turn, these imply a progression. In one particular moment, the 
other (and Other) is spoken of or predicated in real (reell) “logical 
objectivity” (VeM 443, VM 127) as other. Hence, as different 
from me (in general, egoity) it must be the Same, thus the other in 
general must be what it is not. But as what it is not, this must in 
turn be intended as an identity (what it is). It is thus not, and 
other to, me. Yet as to the non-relation, the ideal object as other 
in general must also be spoken of as “of another kind”, a difference 
no longer negated, where the “negativity” of other and Other in 
its alterity in general no longer relate to me, but around itself, a 
difference without opposite (non-other). Thus far, as absolutely not me, 
the Other would simply be the Same as itself, thus the kind of 
difference which is not me, returning to the first direction. Derrida 
explains: 
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‘same as itself’ already supposing [...] 
mediation, relation and difference (VeM 443, 
VM 127).
473
 
We have, we suggest, begun to work out how this holds. 
Parenthesis: the furthering of Heidegger 
Before proceeding, we emphasise again that the progress is 
Derrida’s, in accordance with his progress since 1954; related 
thinkers are mentioned only as his progress aligns with them. 
Indeed, Derrida refers to Heidegger’s Identity and Difference at this 
juncture. In address to the paragraphs of the Sophist to which 
Derrida is referring (254d), Heidegger writes “Plato [...] has the 
Stranger say at this point: [...] ‘Each one of them is different 
[ετερον, ein anderes] from the (other) two, but itself the same for 
itself.” (ID 24). Heidegger goes on:  
[S]ameness implies the relation of ‘with,’ that 
is, a mediation, a connection, in synthesis: the 
unification into a unity. (ID 25, 87).  
                                                 
473 In Husserl’s terms, this “mediation” would be more exactly rendered as 
“mediate”, but mediation is what holds in general. Derrida also deemed this 
the “irreducibly” mediate intention, and indeed, the relations above are merely 
supposed. We are working out this irreducibility. 
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Derrida, we note, has followed rather the certain connections and 
separation in sameness, to include the relations of difference as 
mediation and also other, the general-particular and non-relation. 
These are not yet found in Heidegger’s analysis. Heidegger also 
writes  
to get to the point where the relationship of 
the same as itself emerges as [...] mediation 
within identity, Western thought required 
more than 2000 years. (ID 25)  
Derrida’s procedure is also developing the necessary relations at 
the origin of thought (“Western” or otherwise), which permits 
this relationship of movement of the same, identity etc. Derrida, 
we suggest, is going “further” in this project for Western thought 
than Heidegger did in Identity and Difference.  
The exceeding of Levinas in difference 
Indeed, at this juncture Derrida seeks to make even Levinas’ 
“metaphysics” dependent upon this progress. For having 
permitted a further thought of all around this relation (“beyond”), 
Derrida can return to autrui by which, for Levinas, I must begin to 
address the radically impossible origin of Autrui. As autrui 
“resists” (TEI 95, TI 123-124) singularisation or generalisation 
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(428), it resists relation to the Same, thus relation of the Same and 
the Other; it thus resists relation to the eteron. Derrida reminds us 
that Levinas would “refuse to assimilate autrui to the eteron” as the 
Same and the Other (VeM 443, VM 127).  
But Derrida argues that the eteron in general, in mediating the Same 
(which already supposes mediation etc.) thus the Same and the 
Other, resists confinement to either. As supposing what resists 
the Same and the Other in particular requires a difference in 
general, then the eteron in general, Derrida suggests, is necessary 
even in speaking of autrui. He asks, 
how [can one] think or speak of autrui 
without reference [...] to the alterity of the 
eteron in general? (VeM 443, VM 127) 
The eteron in general is no longer necessarily confined to 
opposition even to autrui, thus no longer restricted to the inside 
of thought. Derrida summarises that 
the alterity of the eteron in general [...] no longer 
has the restricted sense [at the inside] which 
permits its simple opposition to the notion of 
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autrui, as if it was confined to the region of real or 
logical objectivity (VeM 443, VM 127, our 
emphasis).  
Henceforth, autrui and Autrui are set aside (VeM 443-450), as 
Derrida works out his movements. Indeed, the use of “as if” to 
address this alterity begins to do so. To develop this, we add the 
next moment; for the eteron in general nevertheless permits such 
relations. As to difference, the eteron retains its link to other in 
general and Other via the non-relation (non-ego). It is necessary 
that both are different from me. Thus the eteron in general permits the 
movement of negation of the other, sameness, identity and so on 
(the Same), and also permits the essential negativity in the 
objectual Other (the Same as Other). Second, however, the eteron 
avoids opposition even to that which exceeds the movement of 
the Same and the Other, yet it makes the relation of their 
difference and otherness in general possible. Thus, third, the eteron 
in general in turn mediates the relation between the Same and the 
Other.474 This origin must be an irreducible level “beyond”, which 
mediates the two lower levels. Put logically, it must be the radical 
impossibility which nevertheless holds originally, and thus appears 
                                                 
474 To be the same as the Other, the Same must be other to the Other etc., thus 
mediated by everything outside it (non-Same and non-Other). 
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originarily. This outcome accords with the three levels of the positive 
progress.  
That is, for the latter, the internal relation to the Other (beyond) 
was attained “as if” from its position on the condition that the 
latter’s undeniable possibility became the radical impossibility ([pgs]) 
of entering origin in the first place (as irreducible). This was 
deemed the “more profound dimension of nonoriginality” (VeM 
440, VM 124). Just so, Derrida indeed explained above that this 
other in general is only approached “as if” no longer restricted to 
an inside as opposite even to autrui. Thus, directly linking the 
positive levels in our previous chapter to the negative, the  
eteron, here, belongs to a more profound and 
originary zone (VeM 443, cf. VM 127, our 
emphasis). 
Derrida has developed the levels from the two negative directions 
too. Even so, he is in the process of bringing it toward a 
difficulty.  
Part Three: the stifling of the logos 
Toward the Same and the Other 
Thus far, the basic progress from the positive economy in its 
directions still holds – the supposition as if from a beyond (cf. 
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555), as founding the essential (original) and general level that 
must devolve to its particular, originary moment. Such a content, 
already becoming apparent, provides a right to think (and speak, 
predicate and constitute) of it as object; thus as other, and Other.  
However, the two positive directions have evolved – first, to the 
telos of the infinite other as what it is, is not, etc., falling short in 
the opening (henceforth, as within totality, this first direction is 
also deemed the Same). The second, as the necessity this 
embodied Other be absolutely what it is, led to the instability of 
the negativity of the Other as essential (the Same), which must of 
itself refer to a non-relation beyond, as a more profound level 
even than the Infinite. As Derrida explains it, this must be a 
transcendence of Infinity, and not [et non] of 
Totality. (VeM 441, VM 124, Derrida’s 
emphases) 
To transcend Infinity, the Other must essentially – i.e. within the 
Same – be Other to the Same. Henceforth, that second direction is 
also deemed a movement of the “Same and the Other”. 475  
                                                 
475 Note that “the Same and the Other” are thus posited together. We develop 
this moment below. 
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Thus far, the two directions are mediated by the eteron, as 
movement of other, other in general, and Difference. By this 
movement, the second alterity is only referred to as beyond 
(Other) insofar as it returns to internal essence, thus to what 
already holds (within the Same) to instil the necessity of the 
beyond.  
But this “beyond” as non-relation remains certain, prior to what can 
be said of a logic (as positing, right, predicating, negating etc.) that 
begins to constitute the object. Derrida emphasised earlier (via an 
important summary) that:  
[I]t can be said only of the other that its 
phenomenon is a certain nonphenomenon, its 
presence (is) a certain absence. Not [non pas] 
pure and simple absence, for there logic could make its 
claim [to refusal, position, right, etc.], but a 
certain absence. (VeM 336, VM 91, Derrida’s 
emphasis) 
This leads back to the necessity of constituting, “forward”, and 
circularity. Indeed, we suggest, even “non pas” (not!) develops an 
extra kind of negation. It signifies an instability between negation 
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(pas) and all around negation (non), avoiding negation of “what is” 
in circularity (n’est… pas) (cf. IOG 171, DLG 1023). It signifies a 
negation and non-relation prior to a fixed position “inside” to 
which logic has a claim. 
The setting aside of transcendental symmetry 
Thus Derrida begins to assess the outcomes, which do not yet 
arrive at economy (cf. VM 444, VeM 127). To wit, the necessity in 
the positive system was to think other and Other together. To do 
so, Derrida privileged the Other, mediated for me by egoity, in 
the transcendental symmetry of two asymmetries: “[T]he Other, 
for me, is an ego which I know to be in relation to me as to an 
Other” (VeM 442, VM 126, (495)). In the negative version, the 
necessity is to think the Same and “the Same and the Other” 
together; but this can no longer be posited as a simple “symmetry”. 
To explain: the first direction proceeds in the Same, in that the 
infinite other must proceed by what it is, then is not etc. mediated 
by the same, non-ego etc. Derrida also notes that particular 
difference (in the lower case) thus can be said to apply only in 
movement by which the infinite other can be what it is and is not (for what 
is not itself must also be different from itself). This particular kind 
of difference between one and other will remain important (cf. 
889). 
But in turn, as the demand is to determine these particular others 
as the whole, these relations must hold of the other in general – 
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as Difference – only which can mediate the “division” between the 
Same and the Other. As Derrida summarises: 
[T]he difference between the Same and the 
Other, which is not a difference or relation 
among others, has no sense [sens] in the infinite 
except to speak [...] of the infinite which 
determines and negates itself. (VeM 445, cf. 
VM 129) 
But in turn, the Other can pass to its Difference from the Same 
only in referring to the Same, thus as movement from one to the 
other in difference. In sum, Derrida can never speak of a 
symmetry “between” the Same and the Other. Derrida made this 
overt: 
[F]inally, let us confess our total deafness to 
propositions of this type: ‘Being [...] is divided 
into Same and Other. This is its ultimate 
structure’. (VeM 443, VM 127, quoting TeI 
247, our emphasis) 
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This is also to note that Derrida can no longer simply oppose the 
Same and the Other as if both are constrained to an ideal 
objectivity (explained above (532)); rather they are set into 
movement by the non-relation, as a Difference avoiding 
opposition.  
For despite his deafness, Derrida (or in this movement, “I”) must 
still speak of the object as absolute, thus of the Same and “the 
Same and the Other” at once. Further, I can do so. The 
movements have developed from the positive directions, which 
first hold. Merely their confirmation has (thus far) fallen short, to 
return to the Same. To attempt a unification of the two 
directions, Derrida returns the Ego to Husserl’s sort of positive 
mediation. 
From avoidance of symmetry to stifling of origin  
As each positive direction has a negative, there are two such 
moments (we deem them “mediations” rather than symmetries), 
each with two sides, in relation to each other. First: as in the 
positive economy, the demand (thus the necessity) is again that 
the Other be absolute. Derrida sets out the first necessary 
mediation thus:  
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the Other is absolutely Other only if he is an 
Ego, that is, in a certain way, if he is the Same 
as I (VeM 443, VM 127). 
As a relation to me from a more “profound and originary” level, 
this relation is not yet mediate but is merely necessary (signalled 
by “only if”), and assured only as certain. Next, we add a crucial 
evolution (from which even Derrida’s explanation of Levinas’ 
“trace” will develop in 1964). Following Husserl rather than 
Levinas, Derrida is nevertheless making it essentially necessary that this 
Other “prior to” essence must be an Ego as I am (alter ego). Such a 
relation does depend upon mediacy.  
Derrida justifies this via the logic. An alter ego, certainly, must 
have appeared as a thing in the world (essentially, as Res). This 
must apply even insofar as it is an alter ego (Other). That is, it 
must appear for me as an alter ego, even if this is only supposed to 
hold at a level prior to (beyond) the eidetic. The Other, then, 
must be a real ego (or subject) for me, even if only supposed at a 
pre-eidetic level. Even if it were never an Ego. We explained this 
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use of the subjunctive conditional in address to a level “beyond” 
essence in our previous chapter (485).476 Indeed, Derrida asks, 
 [D]oes not Levinas treat the expression alter 
ego [Other] as if alter were the epithet of a real 
subject (on a pre-eidetic level)? (VeM 443, VM 127, 
our emphases)
477
 
An epithet fixes a characteristic (or predicate) of an object. This is 
a feasible question to pose, in that Levinas aligns the real and the 
subject merely with the Same (and only these does he deem 
correspond to Husserl’s eidetic levels (TE 48, TI 76)). Thus, for 
Levinas the Other (l’Autre) is not the same as the subject, hence is 
thus not eidetic (cf. 425).478 But these were never Levinas’ primary 
considerations; the ethical relation to Autrui is beyond the Same 
and pre-eidetic relation to the alter ego. Derrida is developing his 
argument.  
                                                 
476 As Derrida puts it: “[T]he Other, then, would not be what it is [...] if he 
were not alter ego” (VeM 445, VM 129, Derrida’s emphasis). This employment 
of the necessary and subjunctive conditional (i.e. compare it to “the other can 
only be what it is if it is an alter ego”) nevertheless instils the circularity; for this 
is also to note that the Other, then, would be not what it is, if it were not alter 
ego. 
477 Derrida asks this as such a supposition of the pre-eidetic would only hold 
“as if” it were true. 
478 Derrida notes that he proceeds “in terms of a formal logic that follows for 
once, at least when Levinas refuses to call [denies] the Other alter ego” (VeM 
443, cf. VM 126, Derrida’s emphasis). Derrida is following the formal logic 
that Levinas rejects, by making these relations essentially necessary.  
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Hence, according to Derrida’s essential progress, this certain Other 
can be what it is, absolutely Other (exterior), only if it is an Ego 
(in general). However, as an Ego it is the Same as I, and is then not 
what it is (not absolutely Other), and returns to the Same. But 
“inversely” (VeM 443, cf. VM 127) – the negation of the first 
mediation above – for the Other to be what it is at once 
(absolutely Other as inside (510 ff.)) it must appear first as Res 
(essentially: Thing, Body or Other) thus less the same as me: 
the Other as Res is at once [à la fois] less other 
(non absolutely other) and less the same as I. 
(VeM 443, cf. VM 127) 
As explained (511), this is mediated by the non-relation (hence as 
the other is the part, by the non-absolutely Other).  
Note, however, that Derrida has avoided writing that this Other is 
“not the same” as me, which would return only to the relations in 
the first direction. That is, rather than an unsustainable symmetry 
and opposition “between” the Same and the Other (cf. above), 
Derrida deems all around the absolutely other to be “less other”. 
The predicates “more” and “less” avoid opposition – for 
example, that a tree is more tall or less so, at different stages of its 
growth never fixes it as “not tall” or “not short”. Thus “more” 
and “less” allow for the relation of each in the other (more tall is 
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less short of itself, and vice versa). However, both must still be 
thought at once, as one object. A fortiori, Derrida summarises: 
[A]t once [à la fois] more and less other, which 
signifies again [signifie encore] that the Absolute 
of Alterity is the Same. (VeM 443, cf. VM 127) 
The demand for the absolute has again led – for the first time in 
these pages – to the Absolute in passage. However, in 1964 these 
are indeed two movements as the Same (cf. 375), rather than the 
unidirectional movement of 1962.  
The necessary contradiction and stifling of origin  
However, this too is only a moment along the way. For as we 
noted, contradiction in the positive progress was not yet 
admissible, as no negation was yet included (498). The negative 
progress does indeed include and develop contradiction. To explain 
– as the characteristics “more” and “less” allow relation of one in 
the other without opposition of their content, these are contraries 
rather than permitting contradiction (498). Second, crucially, 
Derrida evolves the bases of the positive economy; these must hold 
“at once” rather than “together”. That is, two asymmetries thought 
together would allow a symmetry between essentially 
incompatible objects thought as one object. Hence, these contrary 
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predicates (“more” and “less” Other) can be thought at once only 
if mediated by the instability in a Difference that avoids opposition.  
This evolves the basic kind of contradiction (cf. 190), to a relation 
already holding (“behind”) between two essentially incompatible 
but not yet opposite contents which must be thought (or said) at 
once.479 Indeed, it is diverging from a classical sort of 
contradiction (forward) of positing a contrary characteristic and 
its negation of an object “at the same time” (PR §28, (188)). This 
is rather an essential and necessary contradiction (“behind”) arising 
from a teleology as yet without opposition. Moreover, an essential 
contradiction implies an essential impossibility. That which is 
essentially contradictory (behind), is precluded from any particular 
sense that can then already be an originary content.  
Thus, to continue, both of Derrida’s mediations, led to a passage 
and its negation, then to a circularity. When each side is first 
thought (and said) at once, the outcome must be an Other that is 
the Same as me and not me, and an Other both more and less other than 
me (cf. above). This leads to the next comparable moment. As we 
worked out, the logos became the overall telos by which thought 
and logic combine in order to speak of the Other. In the positive 
economy, the necessity of oppression of the Other as originary 
                                                 
479 To be sure, these can be contraries or contradictories, but avoid the 
necessity to be one or the other so long as they are not yet posited at once. We 
also avoid writing “thought or said of the same object at once”, for in this 
contradiction the same would introduce a play rather than a stasis. 
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signalled the optimal moment of an ethics of respect in the logos; 
as the most peaceful way to address the Other. That is, Derrida 
had worked out how it was nevertheless necessary (from behind), 
and as the most peaceful gesture there could be, to speak of an 
Other oppressed from origin (“behind”), supposing there is sense 
in speaking of such oppression; and thus to posit the Other only 
as if from its position thereafter (forward) (VeM 444, VM 129). 
A fortiori, in the negative economy, the necessity of an Other in 
the origin has rather implied a contradiction even prior to the 
certain moment of content in the logos. It has followed that the 
Other can be thought and said to be absolutely Other only if an 
original contradiction and impossibility precludes speaking to the Other, and 
precludes any speech in the logos. Crucially, this progress implies that 
the sign 
is stifled [souffle] in the [essential and Absolute] 
region of the origin of language as dialogue 
and difference. (VeM 444, VM 128, our 
emphasis) 
Rather than a support for the necessity of the beyond at origin, 
this “stifling” appears to be the sign that the Other may no longer be 
spoken of: 
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this contradiction and this impossibility […] 
are the sign, rather, that one no longer 
breathes here, inside [dans] the coherence of the 
Logos (VeM 444, cf. VM 128, Derrida’s 
emphasis).
480
 
These relations imply the stifling of the logos in accordance with 
eidetic necessity, and thus hold even of the Logos. Derrida’s telos 
of the absolute Other has led, “in terms of a formal logic” (VeM 
442, VM 126), to the essential necessity that the absolute Other 
no longer even be admitted as originary content, thus must be 
excluded from thinking and saying “what it is”. It ought to 
necessitate the terminus of all possibility of ethics, and indeed of 
any thought at all.  
The impetus for wariness of truth  
At this juncture, critics might have found an impetus for the 
wariness of the absolute truth taken as a telos by the history of 
philosophy, by which Derrida is said to have inspired Post-
                                                 
480 Derrida is also working with metaphors of signifying (speaking) as 
correlative to logic. He noted at the outset that he would be investigating how 
language “seems to run out of breath” (s’essoufler, VeM 350, VM 113). In 
address to the other and the Other, Derrida has worked out the contradiction, 
which has the sense of both a breath and stifling at once, when – certainly – 
one breathes (respire) even though this “breath” is stifled. 
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Modern thinkers since the 1960s (cf. Grenz 5, (31 fn.)). Derrida 
has worked out logically how positive logic then no longer can 
speak of the Truth of the absolute Other, even though it remains 
certain. Indeed, we suggest, we have in some measure worked this 
out, across Derrida’s work since his “law” of 1954. However, we 
caution against hastiness. Every moment still arises from the first 
demand for a truth of the Other as absolute. Derrida will seek to 
avoid nihilism. 
Part Four: the negative economy 
For nihilism is indeed the danger. Beginning from logic has led to 
the necessity to preclude the possibility of rationally speaking or 
predicating of something (i.e. in the Logos (307)). As a content must 
no longer enter the origin or have sense to be spoken of, the 
necessary object of phenomenology ought to be “pure Non-Sense 
[nonsense]” (VeM 446, VM 130). This would necessitate that 
nothing be spoken of, a telos of nihilism. It would no longer even 
allow positing of what is or is not, or negation, or even (posited) 
supposition of the sense of irreducibility. This oppression from the 
originary would necessitate what Derrida deems a “worst 
violence” (568). Derrida will seek to avoid this in two fashions481 – a 
retraction to the a priori, and return to thinking the relations 
                                                 
481 A trace holding despite contradiction even of the originary would dispel 
Derrida’s difficulty, but Derrida’s address to the trace has not yet developed. 
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together, leading to negative economy. The latter – as we will 
support below – will be Derrida’s conservative moment in 1964. 
Toward negative economy – the retraction to the 
pre-eidetic 
Instead of irrationality, Derrida returns to the certainty of 
evidence,482 and thus the possibility of the reduction of the 
empirical to real content. This no longer follows in the sequence, which 
ought to have conceded that when speech is stifled in the Logos, thought and 
appearing are too. We deem this Derrida’s first “conservative” 
moment in 1964. However, it could be argued as legitimate 
insofar as one begins again from evidence of the certain, in Husserl’s 
progress, which first of all restores the possibility of determining 
objectivity (i.e. eventuality (343)). Derrida goes on that 
every reduction of the Other to a real [réel] 
moment of my life, its reduction to the state of 
empirical alter-ego, is an empirical possibility, 
                                                 
482 Derrida never lets go of certainty and its possibility of empirical content. He 
goes on soon afterward: “[V]iolence, certainly, appears within the horizon [of 
possibility] of the infinite” (VeM 445, VM 129). 
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or rather eventuality (VEM 445, VM 129, 
Derrida’s emphases).
483
 
“Reduction” first has the sense of bringing of the empirical Other 
into my sphere, and in this sense all thought is reduction. But 
Derrida slips to Husserl’s bases, for with the reduction to the real 
come the pure essences that “already” hold. Hence when 
speaking or positing of something rational (i.e. from within the 
Logos) is stifled, even that of supposing the irreducible, Derrida 
concedes that this stifling is “nothing less than irrational” (VEM 
444, VM 128).  
Importantly, the necessary relations without content then merely 
move “backward” to the “purely eidetic level” (VEM 444, VM 
129).
484 A necessary contradiction of the Logos remains eidetic 
and merely stifles the originary. Phenomenology, then, must 
become pure, eidetic, and transcendental again (i.e. without reference 
to real relations, as a priori alone). In a retreat to an a priori level 
prior to originary content, the relations of Reason, Speech and so 
                                                 
483 As we explained, eventuality is the possibility associated with an object or 
content (even empirical), thus facticity and contingency (343). 
484 Derrida re-emphasises: “[I]t is difficult to see how the notion of violence 
(for example, as the [...] oppression of the Other by the Same, a notion which 
Levinas employs as self-evident, and which, however, already signifies 
alteration of the Same, of the Other as what it is) could be determined 
rigorously on a purely ethical level without prior eidetic-transcendental analysis of the 
relations between ego and alter-ego in general” (VeM 445, VM 129, our 
emphasis). 
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on are also thus rendered essential again. Derrida thus goes on 
straightaway that this progress 
presupposes [présuppose] the necessary eidetic 
relationships envisaged in Husserl’s 
descriptions (VeM 444, VM 128, cf. VeM 445, 
VM 129, our emphases).  
“Presupposed” is not yet a logical positing of supposition of 
irreducibility, but refers to a prior dependence. In this case, what 
is presupposed is eidetically necessary but prior even to originary 
content; thus not yet direct positing (or negating) of a real alter 
ego. Essentially, Nothing is posited of alterity. Hence Derrida 
indeed appeals to the “as if”, as Husserl did, which doubts even 
the possibility of the real alter ego. Derrida goes on: 
to gain access to the egoity of the alter ego as if 
to its alterity itself is the most peaceful gesture 
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possible. (VeM 444, VM 128 our 
emphasis)
485
 
Derrida has turned what seemed to be a difficulty into his most 
ethical relation – so long as the implications which led to these pure 
necessities are accepted. Moreover, Derrida has developed this as 
a single chain of implications. Even the presupposed essential 
relations are implied by what is first supposed. Derrida makes this 
link to the earlier basis overt: 
supposing, as we said above, that there would 
be any sense [qu’il y ait quelque sens] in speaking 
of preethical violence. (VeM 444, VM 128) 
A reader might be unconvinced. The implications of supposition 
made Husserl’s formal logic absurd (countersensical), in arriving 
at economy. yet Derrida has appealed to a supposition of its 
sense. Derrida wants to return rationality to an eidetic level prior 
even to what Levinas deems the Same. Yet Derrida has excluded 
the progress from the Same to which he seeks to return.  
                                                 
485 For Husserl, this positing of nothing also occurred in a neutralisation (448), 
with which Derrida has aligned. 
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Derrida is aware of this. Facing this muteness inside the Logos, 
Derrida seeks to found the relations at a further level, and appeals 
to Levinas’ “there is” (il y a). As Levinas put it in 1947: 
[T]he fact of existing imposes itself when there 
is no longer anything. […] Existing returns no 
matter with what negation one dismisses it. 
There is, as the irremissibility of pure existing. 
(TA 46, cf. 46-50, our emphases) 
Levinas makes it explicit that he never employs “there is” 
unwarily. For Derrida, there is (il y a)486 an origin of the Same 
before the originary. It is a fact in Levinas’ sense of 1947, the 
brute fact of existence. The transcendental and pre-ethical 
violence of oppression must be the moment there is an irreducible 
origin even of the Same. Importantly (cf. DLG 30), Derrida calls this 
the archia (the Greek “archi” has the sense of the primitive origin, 
the beginning, but also power and authority (Feyerabend, 63)).487 
                                                 
486 The capitalization of the first letter is merely grammatical. On the previous 
page Levinas explains that when everything is set aside, what remains “of 
everything is not something, but the fact that there is.” (TA 46).  
487 This term “archi” was developed quite directly in the fashion that Derrida 
applies it, in address to Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity, by Funke in 1957, 
as “the condition of the possibility” of the “absolute beginning”, in an “enquiry 
back to the origin” of the logos (Funke 1981, 74-75).  
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The primitive origin as irreducible violence of the 
Same and the Other 
In turn, the archia of the Same is thus Other to the Same. But 
given that there is the Same, and thus the Same, and the Same and 
the Other made essential object, Derrida again returns to economy. Its 
hallmark is again that it no longer addresses the real other, but the 
relations of Same and “the Same and the Other”. Note that this 
eidetic level is no longer referred to by lower-case letters; there is 
relation only prior to the originary. 
However, we note a second polemical moment; thinking even the 
archia of the Same and “the Same and the Other” at once even as 
pure would necessitate contradiction and stifle pure sense, leaving 
only that there is. Instead, Derrida will subtly return to the 
necessity of thinking their relations together.  
Thus, as in the positive economy (in dissymmetry), as certain and 
possible, Derrida takes the stifling of the progress leading to the telos 
as having been negated (501). But rather than the negation of a 
simple transcendental symmetry of asymmetries (both directions 
together), Derrida deems this a “general dissymmetry”. For 
Derrida, even though this evolved from (and returns to) the 
Same, it avoids negation of a simple symmetry, which in the 
positive economy held of particular objects mediated by egoity (the 
two asymmetries).  
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Rather, even this foundation upon the eidetic by the archia of the 
Same must be merely pre-supposed (cf. 484), as an irreducibility; 
there is a pre-violence of oppression.488 Derrida summarises the 
above: 
there is a transcendental and pre-ethical 
violence [oppression], a (general) dissymmetry 
whose archia is the Same (VeM 444, VM 128). 
Moreover, in letting go of the relation between the Same and “the 
Same and the Other” as particular object, Derrida has let go of 
the mediation by relations of Egoity.489 The archia is prior even to 
the eidetic origin, thus the egoic and mediate. But as noted, it is 
also the power and authority. Derrida begins to return originary 
content. 
The necessity of institution by irreducibility 
Thus instead of foundation upon the mediate to allow passage of 
Same and “the Same and the Other”, the necessity of foundation 
is authorised by a pre-supposed basis of irreducibility. For although 
there is a violence of oppression even from the eidetic and a 
                                                 
488 Note again that Derrida employs the subjunctive conditional (485), as 
explained in our previous chapter: this no longer posits even the possibility of 
the irreducible.  
489 Derrida will return a mediation by the necessary irreducibility constituted in 
egoity below, as a level necessarily further beyond upon the inside.  
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priori, an instituted content even to the pure and originary remains 
certain (note that this also permits the finite other). Instead of the 
“mediate” relations by egoity, Derrida refers to the necessity of 
the institutive act.490 He summarises: 
[T]his transcendental violence [i.e. 
irreducibility] [...] originarily institutes the 
relationship between two finite ipseities. (VeM 
444, VM 128). 
Note, that there are thus “two” finite ipseities (the Same, and “the Same 
and the Other”, or any finite content again). However, Levinas’ 
intentionality allowed ipseity only prior to division, thus not yet 
two; Derrida’s applies a division prior to ipseity (it will evolve to 
irreducible Difference).  
Toward completion of economy, and basis for the 
trace 
For – importantly for Derrida’s oeuvre – these two finite ipseities 
must somehow be spoken of as they appear for me, even though 
this cannot be via their shared egoity (as Ego). Thus, in a 
divergence from Derrida’s first direction, this telos never arises as 
                                                 
490 For Husserl, as noted, the institutive act arose from the Original (205). 
Derrida has supposed an origin further “beyond” the essential origin. 
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the infinite that must be what it is via egoic mediation. Each 
finitude (which arises certainly) is rather confined to its relation with itself, 
related by the supposition of irreducibility. 
Hence instead of a “symmetry” as in the positive economy, 
Derrida will deem it a “strange symmetry”. The former arose as a 
doxic positing mediated by egoity, which led to an absurdity that 
essentially cannot have sense (from behind). The latter is more 
extreme: it must be related rather by a supposition of what must be 
originary but is then irreducible even to the sense of the origin 
(further behind), and thus absolutely Other. Derrida summarises 
the above that, “supposing there is any sense in speaking of pre-
ethical violence”, then 
the necessity of speaking of the Other as 
Other, [...] on the basis of its appearing-for-
me-as-what-it-is: these necessities are [...] the 
transcendental origin of an irreducible violence 
(VeM 444, cf. VM 128). 
Derrida’s demand for the absolute since 1954 has evolved to this 
moment, just as a relation that will be important in later years 
begins to develop (the initial basis of the trace). 
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The two directions set aside 
For there has been an evolution to a necessary moment of what 
must institute the two directions of finitude, which is irreducible 
even to origin. That which never enters origin in the first place (the 
absolute Other) must institute both directions for me. But just so, from 
inside, a finitude must be produced. Derrida will thus work out a 
third direction to this strange symmetry: the Other to which I 
know I am its Other. To do so, he tests both directions, (the Same, 
and “the Same and the Other”) by addressing them as ipseities. 
But as noted, Derrida has retreated from thinking both directions 
at once to thinking them together. Thus as to content, as the Same, 
and “the Same and the Other” as finite ipseities avoid opposition in 
their symmetry, they cannot be contradictories at once (which is just 
what Derrida wants to avoid).491 But as one of them must hold,492 
given the demand that the Other appear absolutely as what it is 
for me, Derrida can apply the exclusive disjunct to the directions: 
either there is the Same or there is the “the Same and the Other” 
(but never both, which would preclude an absolute). By this, 
Derrida assesses the outcomes of this telos: 
                                                 
491 Derrida wrote, to repeat “[O]n the contrary, to gain access to the egoity of 
[Husserl’s] alter ego as to its alterity itself is the most peaceful gesture there 
could be.” (VeM 444, VM 128). 
492 Note that we avoid suggesting “the Same” and “the Same and the Other” 
are contraries, as it is never necessary for both contraries to hold at once. 
Above, for essential reasons, given the demand for the positive absolute, one 
of these must hold. 
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either there is only the Same, which can no 
longer even appear and be said, nor even 
exercise violence (pure infinity or finitude) 
(VeM 444, cf. VM 128, Derrida’s emphases). 
As we explained above, the Same was the pure (neutralised) logical 
and positive moment which evolved to the play of the infinite 
other as what it is and is not, in infinitum (cf. 510). But this has not 
yet made the absolute Other appear (or be said) as what it is. 
Rather, thereafter, the condition of the Other is that it then imply 
the Same and the Other, which led to stifling of the originary. The 
Same then can no longer appear and be said. Note that if only the 
Same and the Other hold, then this is no longer pure finitude. 
However, this not yet an impurity as negation of the purity of the 
first option (finitude or infinitude). Derrida is not yet concerned 
with negation of purity, but is seeking to demonstrate the 
difficulty of symmetry.  
Thus as to the second direction, the implications of the instability 
of the Other (which must for essential reasons (as the Same) be 
Other to essence (Other to the Same)) are applied: 
or indeed there is the Same and the Other, and 
then the Other cannot be the Other – of the 
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Same – except by being the Same (as itself: 
ego), and the Same cannot be the Same (as 
itself: ego) except by being the Other’s Other: 
alter ego (VeM 444, cf. VM 128, Derrida’s 
emphases). 
As to the second option above: the Other can be absolutely 
Other (ego, rather than ego in general, which is excluded) to me 
only if it is itself (ego), thus in some measure the Same (i.e. the 
same as me, ego). But the Same, in turn, can be what it is (ego) 
only if it is Other to the Other.  
An important evolution has occurred. According to the two directions, 
to return to an alter ego, Derrida should have written the Same as “the 
Other’s other”. But that would be a symmetry mediated by what I 
(in general, Ego) know of the ego. Instead, in the retraction to the 
eidetic, Derrida has written “Other’s Other”. In this outcome, the 
Same is no longer other to the Other via the mediate (and thus no 
longer related by a shared alterity in general). Instead, the Same 
and the Other must indeed be related by the irreducible. The Same would 
be Other to the Other. Derrida has included the necessity of a 
position from the Other to its Other. Taking such a position 
would be in excess of the first and second movements; it implies 
a third direction as what must be institutive yet is irreducible even 
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to the Other. Such a position is unjustifiable even as a 
supposition.493 To begin to assess it, Derrida addresses its relation 
to me.  
Parenthesis: Other Others, and preparing for the 
trace  
To prepare, note that such a necessity avoids supposing a relation 
from Other to Other holds in general. The Other must be an origin 
of the world, and there must be many more such “origins of the 
world” (VeM 445, VM 129); but only in general for me. One 
would avoid supposing I can know if an Other communicates to 
an Other other than me.  
However, for essential reasons, for the Other to be Other for me, I 
must know of at least one other Other to it – its Other, me. Thus 
in the third direction, this must in turn be known by me, even 
though no longer mediated by a position in egoity. This is no 
longer merely the necessity of knowing the body of the other or 
Other of Derrida’s two directions – as mediation by egoity. 
Rather, it develops the eidetic necessity of my knowing of an 
Other to which I am its Other, of an institution produced without 
relation by egoity as eidetic. A position is thus taken upon this 
                                                 
493 A supposition is still a sub-position, and thus a position. At least in its basic 
relations, the Other to the Other would be absolutely Other to me, and beyond 
position.  
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strange necessity of relation of myself to the beyond, and my knowing 
this relation of the beyond to myself, in the final symmetry: 
[T]hat I am also essentially the Other’s Other, 
and that I know I am [que je le sache], is the 
evidence of a strange symmetry whose trace 
appears nowhere in Levinas’ descriptions. 
(VeM 444, VM 128) 
The trace as yet undeveloped 
Note that we have come to the ethical “trace”. It follows from 
the implication that what never enters origin in the first place (the absolute 
Other) must institute both directions for me. However, in 1964, the trace 
is mentioned only once in the argument (above), and only in noting 
that it “appears nowhere”. At worst, it is excluded from the 
appearing anywhere; at best, it appears only nowhere. The only 
further mention of the trace in 1964 in these pages is in a footnote 
(597). Instead, “Violence and Metaphysics” develops the 
outcomes of economy to arrive at Derrida’s two best outcomes 
for ethics, and two best outcomes for philosophy in general, 
which latter two evolve the outcomes from 1962. The rest of our 
chapter summarises this. We return to the trace only in closing, to 
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assess why it was not yet included, and why and how it must 
develop as a better solution.  
Part Five: Derrida’s first two outcomes in 1964 
Thus, to continue with economy, Derrida emphasises that this 
particular evidence of the irreducible (i.e. as institutive) is a 
necessary condition for the resultant ethical (general) 
dissymmetry.494 That is, as noted, two finitudes were permitted by 
the irreducible, but neither in the disjunct resulted in the Other 
appearing for me on the basis of what it is (as positive absolute). 
This led to the negative outcome of the strange symmetry, in 
general dissymmetry. The latter completes those moments 
comparable to the positive economy.  
The first outcome – permitting ethical 
nonviolence  
Derrida can thus evolve his ethical solutions. As general 
dissymmetry has not yet met the telos, this leads to inversion 
(negation) even of general dissymmetry. General dissymmetry 
then [ultérierement] permits [i.e. makes possible] 
the inverse dissymmetry, that is, the ethical non-
                                                 
494 Derrida writes: “[W]ithout this evidence, I could not desire (or) respect the 
other in ethical dissymmetry.” (VeM 444, VM 128) 
 - 563 
- 
violence of which Levinas speaks. (VeM 444, cf. 
VM 128 our emphases)
495
 
The telos of ethics which Derrida accepted was encountering the 
other or Other without violence (i.e. without opposite or limit). 
As we have developed the non-relation, this telos can be put as 
ethical non-violence.  
As to how general dissymmetry permits this telos, note that inverse 
dissymmetry never necessarily turns back to a (strange) symmetry, 
in a double negation. Rather, “dis-” can be a negation or 
complement (i.e. or both (337 fn.)). In the first case, “dis” negates 
the particular object. Though still violent, this avoids violence to the 
Same or “the Same and the Other”. It merely negates that the 
relations of the two finite ipseities have been determined 
(henceforth, it is implicit that the relations are addressed). Hence it 
merely negates that general dissymmetry has met its telos. Inverse 
dissymmetry permits ethical violence.  
 
                                                 
495 We have changed Bass’ translation of “ultérierement” as “eventually” to our 
term “then” which emphasises an outcome dependent upon a necessary 
sequence. Derrida deems that “éventualité” (as a possibility of constituting an 
object (343)) is a word that signals possibility as a violence. He is at this juncture 
seeking to allow nonviolence. (VeM 444, VM 128). 
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In the second case, “dis” negates all that is not the object (i.e. a non-
relation, all around the particular object without opposition). That 
object can be the Same and “the Same and the Other”, but in 
turn their relations address the other and Other. Each of the 
other and Other can appear as what it is, which positive term 
refers beyond itself, but as yet without negation (avoiding 
violence, in nonviolence). This permits ethical nonviolence. 
Third, both imply a circularity. We will develop the eidetic 
relations first. That is, in this passage the (relations to) the object 
can be negated, but its non-relation refers to everything outside 
the object. The lack of particular outcome again implies negation, 
returning the necessity of circularity without cessation. As without 
particular or general relation, the relation is open, but as 
constituting without simple distance to an Other again implies an 
opening. Henceforth, “dis” implies this opening of relation in an 
instability. 
As to particular content in this, pure, a priori and transcendental 
relation: first, the “dis” refers again to negation of the relation 
“between” the two transcendental finitudes (i.e. negation of the 
irreducible relation of violence). However, in this case, the 
“inverse” of the negation of symmetry makes the first relation 
what it is (inside). As no longer a negation of the Other, this is 
again ethical violence. Second, the “dis” then opens this relation, 
as ethical nonviolence. Derrida summarises that 
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this transcendental origin, as the irreducible 
violence of the relation to the Other [behind], is 
[…] [also] nonviolence, since it opens the relation 
to the Other [forward]. (VeM 444, VM 129, 
our emphases) 
In this circularity that opens the relation, a non-relation is again 
returned, as the possibility of ethical nonviolence.  
The second outcome – least possible violence 
However, it remains to assess how this ethics proceeds. Thus far, 
the most peaceful gesture possible was to gain access “as if” to 
the alterity of the Other, in the positive economy. But the 
relations of negation have been added, in the retraction to the 
eidetic. The Other must and can be spoken of, but this possibility 
already includes originary negation – originary violence. This 
transcendental region of speaking to the infinitely other and the 
absolutely Other is deemed Discourse.496 Thus discourse is treated 
as the essential content that must appear as absolutely what it is to 
permit ethics. Derrida goes on: if this relation is originarily violent 
(for the transcendental violence arising from irreducibility must 
                                                 
496 In 1962, Derrida aligned Discourse with the essential relations of speaking 
to others, in the community (348). He had not yet begun to address the Other. 
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merely be supposed), then discourse can only be violent to itself. 
He explains famously: 
Discourse, then, if it is originarily violent, can 
only do itself violence [se faire violence], can only 
negate itself [se nier] to affirm itself (VeM 446, 
VM 130, our emphasis) 
By this, Derrida at yet only instils one finitude. Discourse enters 
the first direction, where what it is and is not proceeds toward the 
infinite other (forward) to determine its origin (“behind”) without 
violence.  
Thus we caution against misunderstanding that this violence is 
absolute. This play is still that of what is and is not etc., rather than a 
negation of negation. Discourse can only “negate itself to affirm 
itself”. That is, given the telos of determination in transcendental-
subjectivity, it is only possible to negate itself; and “itself” is first a 
positive moment, proceeding in infinitum. But moreover, in such 
negation of position, Discourse 
[n]ever has the power [pouvoir] to recuperate this 
negativity, to the extent that it is discourse. 
(VeM 446, cf. VM 130, Derrida’s emphasis) 
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That is, Derrida worked out above, a negation of itself (discourse) 
can never turn back to itself as an identity, for the same as itself 
already supposes mediation and Difference (VeM 443, VM 127). 
By this Derrida returns the second direction as second finite 
ipseity: for essential reasons, the telos of determination of the 
Other as Other (in its negativity), never can turn back to Identity, 
but can only proceed in the first direction, negating itself to affirm 
itself in infinitum. For as explained, the Same and “the Same and 
the Other” are contradictories. Thought at once, as both the 
Same and Other to itself, these would return essential 
contradiction, stifle the Logos in its origin, and prevent any sense 
in speech.  
Such stifling, then, would even preclude contraries, which latter 
would allow the essential possibilities a priori, even when neither 
must be spoken of (forward). Without opposition or 
contrarisation, it would stifle even the possibility of speaking of 
negation, and the least possible violence in infinitum. As Derrida 
summarises, such recuperation would imply 
[t]he worst violence, the violence of a primitive 
and prelogical silence, [...] an absolute violence 
which would not even be the contrary of 
nonviolence. (VeM 446, VM 130) 
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This would be worst violence pre-supposed as irreducibly prior to 
the eidetic logic – indeed, Derrida deems it “previolence”. Thus 
far, of the negatives, the negation and affirmation of the two 
directions are the only way to avoid worst violence. Thus 
“within” the “order of philosophical discourse”, Derrida 
summarises, the “infinite passage through violence” of discourse 
affirming itself to negate itself is 
the least possible violence, the only way to 
repress the worst violence (VeM 443, VM 130, 
Derrida’s emphases) 
It is indeed worst violence (stifling of the Logos) that Derrida in 1964 
seeks to “repress” by his directions and levels.  
Nihilism as outcome and avoided 
Hence it is important to avoid supposing that Derrida in 1964 is 
antithetical to retaining sense. His ethics follows from the most 
direct insistence upon retaining its possibility. As worst violence 
would prevent even the essential relations of the Logos, it would 
preclude sense and necessitate a pure non-sense (i.e. as all around 
anything that can have sense, rather than an opposite to sense). It 
would preclude intentionality as consciousness of Something, 
necessitating only Nothing. Derrida summarises the second 
outcome, and makes the telos overt: 
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[T]hus discourse chooses itself violently 
against Nothingness and pure non-sense, and, 
in philosophy, against nihilism. (VeM 446, VM 
130)
497
 
However, note that even this outcome, as insisting upon evidence 
and Discourse rather than stifling, still leaves Nothing to think. A 
rigorous ethics would leave only the necessity of nihilism. But 
ethical nihilism would be the contemplation merely of the 
instability between what is not Nothing (being given Nothing to 
think) and non-sense (being given Nothing to think). A demand 
for the absolute as positive never excludes even nihilism. 
The positive absolute as difficulty 
Thus we develop Derrida’s difficulty – he resists absolute violence 
because in 1964 he insists upon retaining a positive absolute.498 
                                                 
497 Bass translates “contre” as “in opposition to”, which we have changed, as 
merely supposing a worst violence would not yet constitute it to be an 
opposite.  
498 We employ this word “resists” in relation to Derrida in these early years as 
he did so in analysis of a “beyond” to univocity in 1962, to first arrive at 
passage. Derrida worked out that if the beyond is irreducible, then words 
cannot be absolute objects, with no “resistant” and permanent absolute 
identity. (IOG 104, IDG 106/107). Confronted by an absolute violence 
implied by this supposition of the beyond in 1964, Derrida affords such a 
resistance to the sense of a positive absolute. He thus compromises the 
implications from 1962, to preserve the absolute possibility of sense in 1964. 
Derrida will only arrive at a better outcome in 1966. Note that Levinas employs 
“resistance” in a relatively unrelated fashion, to refer to what resists (and is 
difficult to) return to the Same, as the Other, autrui and Autrui (cf. TI 123-
124)); and we have employed the term in this fashion at those junctures. 
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But in an absolute without limit, as defined and applied since 
Chapter One, there should be no opposition between an outcome as a 
positive or a negative absolute. Insofar as they are irreducible, absolute 
violence and peaceful irreducibility ought to be indistinguishable.  
To be sure, it is ever so that one begins with this demand that the 
absolute first be positive. However, in a willingness to accept only 
positive outcome, seeking to “repress” absolute violence, the 
demand excludes the negative as absolute outside. Despite all of 
Derrida’s ministrations in insisting upon finitude, still an absolute 
opposite re-imposes a limit upon the outcome.  
Derrida’s conservatism 
At this juncture we particularise our approach to the philosopher 
as yet conservative (and Derrida in particular). The latter term 
signals the adherence to the necessity to conserve sense, even when the 
outcomes of the logic then necessitate its refusal. The Derrida 
from 1954 who plangently insisted upon an outcome for 
philosophy in general remains. Indeed, instead of insisting upon 
anomie, Derrida is revealed as dedicated to the positive as 
outcome, even though his progress implies it no longer be so; and 
even though it never escapes solipsism in its resistance. But 
Derrida knows this. Backed into a corner, he  quotes (without 
quotation marks) from Husserl: 
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for philosophical children this may [peut] well 
be the dark corner to which the ghosts of 
solipsism [...] or relativism return (VeM 448,  
VM 131). 
In 1964, such solipsism must be kept outside – whatever the 
consequences. As noted, this process began when Derrida 
retreated from stifling of the originary content of the Logos to 
the eidetic basis, and set aside the necessity of thinking the Same 
and “the Same and the Other” at once. “Violence and 
Metaphysics”, we note, is riven along this fault-line. Even so, 
Derrida must go further. Thus far, even least possible violence 
has not yet made an object appear as absolutely what it is, to 
prevent solipsism.  
Part Six: brief comparison to Hegel 
Before following how Derrida continues to develop his 
outcomes, we are able to assess his alignment with Hegel. Derrida 
began to address the two directions by aligning the “movements” 
with Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind (henceforth, “Phenomenology”499 
                                                 
499 Upon adding negation to his movement and having left Husserl aside, 
Derrida asked: “[W]here have these movements been better described than in 
[Hegel’s] The Phenomenology of Mind?” (VeM 442, VM 126). 
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(VeM 442, VM 126). Moreover, having evolved to his relations of 
least possible violence, he deems that 
this infinite passage through violence is what is 
called history. (VeM 443, VM 130) 
The latter too is an implicit reference to Hegel, which relations we 
will also summarise. By no means do we suggest that we exhaust 
even the fragments of Hegel that we address; we aim merely to 
explain that Derrida’s progress adopts selected bases from Hegel. 
As ever, the progress will be Derrida’s.500 
Preparing for alignment with Hegel’s “war” 
As to Hegel’s Phenomenology, Derrida is referring to its initial 
segment, which proceeds from the Introduction to just short of 
                                                 
500 Our aim is never to situate debates about Hegel as they might pertain to 
Derrida. Notably, we refer to the recent and widespread debate as to whether 
Hegel’s work is “metaphysical” as a sort of Spinozist monism, or an extension 
of the Kantian critique of address to conditions of possibility (cf. Kreines 2006 
for a summary). A corollary of this debate has also been concerned with 
whether Hegel’s logic pertains to “things”, or to “modes of thought” (cf. de 
Boer 346, who opts for the latter, or Lawlor’s account of Hyppolite (2002, 98) 
which opts for the former in a phenomenological sense of “things”). As to the 
first issue, Derrida takes Hegel’s progress to be an extension of an approach to 
conditions of possibility, and an evolution of Kant’s critical project. As to 
whether Hegel’s logic pertains to things or modes of thought, Derrida opts for 
both, suggesting Hegel’s is a “living logic which reconciles formal tautology 
and empirical heterology” (VM 153, VeM 473). Whatever the status of Hegel’s 
overall aims, or how to interpret or situate his system, we assess how Derrida’s 
explanation of Hegel’s transitions (in these segments) work. That is to say, we 
do so according to those basic relations by which Derrida assesses them. In 
this we are closer to Houlgate’s recommendation that readers “look in the 
main body of [Hegel’s] texts at the many particular analyses” and from this 
develop a broader sense of Hegel’s “pattern” (Houlgate 2006, 5). Houlgate 
takes Derrida to be antipathetic to Hegel, and we are prevented within our 
scale from addressing this. 
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“the dialectic of Master and Slave” (PH 144-227). In this 
subsection we will summarise some of Derrida and Hegel’s 
commonalities. First, Derrida explains that Hegel’s is a “science 
of the experience of consciousness” (VEM 446). Derrida is 
referring, without quotation marks, to the Introduction to the 
Phenomenology “Preface” (PHG, PHM 88). Second, Derrida also 
deems this a “necessary” progress (cf. PHG, PHM 88) in the 
“structure” of its “movement” (cf. PHG 141, PHM 230).501 
Third, for Hegel, the progress begins from “certainty” as the 
“poorest kind of truth”. For Hegel, certainty merely “says”, “it is” 
(PHG 80, PHM 150). Fifth, in proceeding from signifying of 
certainty and the basic evidential form “it is”, Hegel develops his 
movement via essential relations. Sixth, this proceeds as far as the 
moments in which the Ego [Ich] is not “object”. Rather, the  
object is just as much ego as object (PHG 139, 
PHM 227).  
For Hegel, this is the first moment of “self-consciousness”, by 
which the Ego is made other to itself. Seventh, this moment then 
proceeds via relations of self-consciousness as a relation to “the 
other” (das Andre). As the ego is also object, importantly, this 
develops a “double” relation of others within self-consciousness (PHG 141, 
                                                 
501 This necessity is also a logical sort, as Hegel explains, this is “a logically 
necessitated process” (PHG 90, PHM 162). 
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PHM 230). That is, the movement progresses as “the action of 
one alone” (PHG 141, PHM 230). Eighth, as what is common to 
the necessary sequence, it then proceeds from certainty of the 
other, via position, seeing sameness as the other, opposition, 
mediation, and negation of each other from its other (PHG 141 
ff., PHM 230 ff.). Each of these and the cumulative progress are 
easily comparable to the relations that Derrida developed from 
Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity.  
The beginnings of divergence from Hegel 
However, we will begin to note some divergences. For Hegel, the 
double relations then arrive at a moment of reflection (a position 
upon each movement, in relation to the other, and thus upon 
both movements). In this relation, one is essentially independent 
and for itself (it posits itself against itself) and the other is 
dependent (it posits itself as not itself, thus dependent upon the 
other) (PHG 144-145, PHM 234). Only at this juncture do the 
movements above develop into the essential relations of Master 
and Slave (PHG 144, PHM 234). Continuing the movements of 
the ego within itself, the Master and Slave go on to mutually define 
and separate from one another in an ongoing evolution until the 
slave attains a measure of autonomy in work (PHG 144-149, 
PHM 234-240). However, it would be easy to take it that a 
“Master” and “Slave” equate to the “human” other and Other. 
Derrida expressly sets aside such comparison. 
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First assessment of Hegel – alignment with war 
Rather, it is only after developing his two directions (VEM 441-
444) that Derrida aligns with the “Master and Slave” 
movement.502 Before doing so, he aligns with Hegel via the first 
direction of violence in infinitum as an approach to “war” across 
“history” (VEM 445). These are implicit references to Hegel’s The 
Philosophy of Right.  
To situate this: Hegel had often been reproached for advocating 
the benefit of war in the development of political States in 
history.503 For Hegel, states that are at war with each other thus 
“reciprocally recognise” each other (H PR 215), and by this gain a 
measure of self-identity. Second, warring states avoid the 
stagnation and moral corruption which for Hegel had arisen in 
empires throughout history during prolonged periods of peace. 
Third, Hegel took it as evident that war is an inevitable fact of the 
passage through history. He was thus deemed to be opposed to 
“perpetual peace”, and welcoming of the inevitability of war (cf. 
H PR 210). 504  
                                                 
502 Derrida avoids calling the movement “dialectic”. 
503 Hegel wrote, “War has the higher significance that by its agency, […] ‘the 
ethical health of peoples is preserved in their indifference to the stabilization of 
finite institutions; just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the 
foulness which would be the result of prolonged calm, so also corruption in 
nations would be the product of prolonged, let alone ‘perpetual’, peace’” (H 
PR 210). 
504 This was a relatively common point extracted from Hegel’s approach to 
history, in that he was taken to be opposed to Kant’s suggestion in The 
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We will address these in the order above, as an interrelated 
sequence. First, Levinas argues that war makes persons no longer 
recognise themselves. That is, as we explained, in war beings hold 
themselves outside of the totality. For Levinas, I am only in view 
of myself after opposition arises with the Same. Persons merely 
arise with the Same. As persons no longer recognises themselves 
in war, which for Levinas is a violence of oppression, war 
“destroys the identity of the Same” (TEI ix-x, TI 21). War in 
history has destroyed the possibility of peace. Note, also, that it 
follows that war destroys identity. Indeed, second, Levinas argues 
that empires (which are comprised of totalities of persons) are 
never returned to their self-identity as peaceful by the passage of 
war across history. Hence nor is such identity restored by war to 
any beings that hold themselves outside of the totality (cf. 434). 
War “does not restore to the alienated beings their lost identity.” 
(TI 22). Third, to escape the fact of this inevitability, Levinas 
argues that a relation with what is “beyond” totality is required, 
and returns to the ethical relation. Levinas deems that Hegel’s 
approach to war arises “wrongly” as a “judgment” of the 
“objectivity” of the evidence of history (TI 24). Hegel’s war 
begins from the objectifying intentionality that Levinas rejects. 
For Levinas, in ethics I am obligated to Autrui, to whom I desire 
                                                                                                        
Metaphysics of Morals that the “highest political good” is “perpetual peace”. For 
an assessment of commentary and discussion upon this issue from around the 
time of writing of Totality and Infinity, cf. “Hegel on War” (Smith 1965). 
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to go to exceed objectivity. He rather mobilises the ethical 
relation to autrui, which escapes objectivity to allow the “gleam of 
exteriority” (we explained how this holds for Levinas (428)). 
Hence such a negation is never “purely negative” (TI 23-24) in 
the fashion of Husserl’s (or Hegel’s) objectifying approach. 
Instead, the idea of infinity permits an orientation toward the 
infinite passage to peace beyond totality, as the horizon of the 
logos as a final peace to come. We suggested above how, for 
Levinas, the infinite idea arises from autrui and language in its 
progress in the Same. That is, Levinas’ progress above follows in 
a structured fashion. Indeed, he explains that the relations were 
“rigorously developed” in a fashion that “resembles what has 
come to be called transcendental method” (TEI xii-xiv, TI 24-25).  
Derrida too opts for assessing Hegel upon these basic lines, as a 
phenomenological and transcendental analysis. However, he does so in 
accordance with the implications developed from objectifying 
intentionality, as we followed in detail. These implications led to 
Derrida’s refusal of worst violence. As we have worked out these 
bases, our assessment can be summary. First, Derrida argues that 
– following the basis he developed via Parmenides to what we 
explained as the “second direction” – the Other cannot be 
absolutely Other to the Same (VEM 445, VM 129). War cannot 
yet result in the “destruction” of the Same, and retains the 
possibility of passage to peace.  
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Thus Derrida retains the possibility of the interior progress from 
one to other, in infinitum (the first direction). Hence he argues that 
violence certainly appears on the horizon (VEM 445, VM 129). 
However, as we explained of the movements of the Phenomenology 
of Spirit, above, Derrida notes that Hegel deemed “war” is the 
ongoing movement as the “infinite absolute” of history. That is, 
war proceeds by position and negation from one to other in 
infinitum, and without external distance from self. The movement merely 
“determines and negates itself”. Yet as its telos is the absolute 
without limit, it requires a telos without violence. The telos of this 
infinite movement is “absolute pacification”. This “infinite 
passage through violence” in history preserves the telos of 
absolute peace (VEM 445, VM 129).505 For Derrida, the telos of 
least possible violence is peace. A state defines itself against itself 
(and the other state as constituted in itself), in order to avoid the 
risk of the worst violence of utter annihilation, from the stifling 
of the Logos.506 Even so, nor is Derrida giving up on escape from 
                                                 
505 Derrida has justification for this approach. For Hegel the “finite and 
indifferent” institutions of States imply the necessity of their infinite passing 
away, and that the relations of states to each other in history is “absolute”. For 
instance: “[t]he fact that states reciprocally recognise each other as states 
remains, even in when […] a bond wherein each counts to the rest as 
something absolute. Hence in war, war itself is characterised as something 
which ought to pass away. It implies therefore […] that the possibility of peace 
be retained.” (H PR 215).  
506 Thus, as to how a least possible violence of Derrida’s sort could apply even 
in war: for Hegel, for example, war should never impact upon civilians, or 
intrude upon “the peace of family and private life” (H PR 215). War is never 
without restraint or limit, avoiding the danger of unrestrained and utter 
annihilation. To be sure, Hegel was writing prior to a century when modern 
warfare regularly endangers or engages family life, and utter annihilation is a 
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violence; we will address this below. First, we will assess how 
Derrida diverges in his more basic relations. 
Toward the second assessment of Hegel – away 
from the human other 
Thus far, note that Derrida’s is a phenomenological analysis, and 
he follows its basic relations. This, for Derrida, is an essential 
movement of a self-consciousness aware of the difficulty of 
objectifying the absolutely exterior in general, no longer even 
necessarily a human reality. Importantly, these directions are no 
longer applicable to the human other alone; the latter (insofar as it 
is human) and history are each content in the “movements”.  
Hence at this juncture Derrida notes that it is “not by chance” 
that Hegel avoids “anthropological reference” in the movement 
of Master and Slave, which is also an “example” of war. Derrida 
never subscribed to the readings of the Master-Slave movements 
as “anthropological” popularised in France by Kojève’s lectures in 
the 1930’s (Kojève 1954). Moreover, Derrida works this out via 
his two directions.507  
                                                                                                        
real possibility. Levinas thus rather argues that war “establishes an order from 
which no one can keep his distance; nothing henceforth is exterior” (TI 21).  
507 Derrida in 1968 explained his reservations about such “humanist” approach 
in general were that the “origin of the concept of (human) reality, and the 
reality of the real, no questions are asked.” (TEOM 116). Derrida prefers to 
question the origin of this reality. However, as we explain below, nor is Derrida 
applying Hyppolite’s approach (LE, 1953), which initiated a turn in France to 
read Hegel as logical. This progress is Derrida’s. 
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Second assessment of Hegel – overall divergence 
Hence, we suggest, to compare Derrida’s movements with Hegel, 
the progress requires doing so via just what Derrida explains: the 
developments in the Phenomenology of Spirit, as they align with 
Hegel’s relations to war in history. Derrida’s progress is never 
compatible with Hegel’s well-known relations in his oeuvre.  
To explain this, we begin by developing alignments into 
incompatibility. For Hegel, and contra Husserl, negation is the first 
“power” which makes One relate to itself (PHM 92, PHG 165).508 
For Derrida, as noted, this power of origination arises from what 
it is irreducible even to the negative relation between the Same and 
the Other. Nevertheless, Hegel’s movement proceeds by means 
of position and negation of one and other. Derrida too proceeded 
from one to other by a teleological progress that to be what “it 
is”, the other must be mediated by an essence, to then be “not 
what it is […] etc.” (510 ff.).  
However, in what seems to be a first divergence, Hegel in the 
Phenomenology arrives at an absolute by means of negation of itself 
(PDG 91-93; PHM 163-165, 174). For example, the negation of 
the One to itself permits the essence “Thing” to be itself. Hegel 
                                                 
508 Cf. “[T]he ‘One’ is the moment of negation, as in a direct and simple 
manner, relating itself to itself, and excluding others (Anderes): and is that by 
which ‘Thinghood’ is determined qua Thing.” (PHM 165). 
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develops it to be absolutely itself by the negation of the thing from 
all otherness: 
[T]he thing is set up as having a being of its 
own, […] as an absolute negation of all 
otherness; hence it is absolute negation merely 
relating itself to itself. (PHG 100, PHM 174) 
Even so, we note, a mere absolute for Hegel too is never a turn 
back to identity, but a locus of essential movement on the way to 
a highest telos, which for Hegel in the Phenomenology is Absolute 
Knowledge as Subject (PH 789). Hence Derrida’s progress from 
one to other is still compatible in that he never allows negation to 
“recuperate” itself to an absolute that stifles movement.  
However, at this juncture compatibility to Hegel’s overall work 
stops. First, Hegel is often noted to employ negation of negation 
(cf. Lawlor 2002, 99; LeE 130-131, LE 101-102; de Boer 2010, 
370). As far as we can tell, Hegel in this section (Two) on 
Perception (PH 161-178) does not yet employ negation of 
negation.509 Moreover, Derrida in the pages that we read never 
                                                 
509 The next section, on Force, prior to that of the “Master and Slave” 
movement is not yet compatible with Derrida, who employs no relations of 
force in these pages of “Violence and Metaphysics”.  
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employs “not not”. 510 His only employment of two consecutive 
“negatives” has occurred in emphasising that the two directions 
“cannot not” be thought at once, a modal version of necessity 
(VeM 442, VM 126, cf. VM 129, (523)). 
Second, crucially, for Hegel, this leads to a “sublimation” (or 
better, Aufhebung (PHG 100, PHM 174)). The word “Aufhebung” is 
famously without English equivalent, but implies a sort of 
“downlifting”, a lifting up from below. For Hegel,511 sublimating 
(Aufheben) thus has a twofold sense, as “to negate and to 
preserve,” (PHG 91, PH 164), and also to supersede these 
relations.512 Derrida in the pages in 1964 that we followed never 
arrives at a moment of sublimation to rise to higher sense. The 
progress from one to other must rather continue in infinitum, implying the 
opening.  
Third, to that end, Lawlor and Hyppolite also stress (and it is 
accepted by modern readers of Hegel’s logic),513 that contradiction is 
the crucial means by which Hegel in his oeuvre arrives at 
sublimation. Hegel does employ contradiction (Widerspruch) in this 
                                                 
510 This avoidance of double negation holds for both the 1964 and 1967 
versions of “Of Transcendental Violence”.  
511 Hegel goes on, and we employ the English translation by Baillie “this kind 
of negation is the cancelling and superseding of itself” (PHM 174). 
512 This for Hegel leads to a verbal “non-relation”, as “a distinction which 
exists only in words; the non-essential which has nevertheless to be necessary, 
cancels its own meaning, or is what we have just called the negation of itself.” 
(PH 175, Hegel’s emphasis). We are not yet developing the relations of 
signification in Hegel, which Derrida only addresses in “The Pit and the 
Pyramid” (1966). 
513 Cf. Longuenesse 2007, 39-84; de Boer 2010, 363, 366. 
 - 583 
- 
case in the Phenomenology, prior to arriving at this sublimation. He 
explains that the thing is for itself (as explained above), and thus a 
unity for itself, yet its unity is also “disturbed” by its relation to 
“other things”. Thus it is at once (zugleich) both the preservation 
of its unity and the preservation of what is outside itself (PDG 99, 
PHG 173). As to how this implies a contradiction, it seems to us 
that, when reflected upon together, “other things” are made a 
unity that is opposite to the thing. This opposition of unity and 
disunity at once is a contradiction which retains an outside to the 
thing. It is the basis that allows the thing as negation of itself to 
rise above itself in sublimation (Aufhebung). The contradiction 
maintains and continues the movement, but allows for an 
“outside” by which the relations can be reflected upon.514  
Yet whatever the fashion by which Hegel’s contradiction permits 
sublimation, Derrida’s only employment of contradiction in the movements 
implied the “stifling” of the Logos rather than a sublimation. As Derrida 
noted later, he had a “critical wariness” of Hegel’s sort of 
contradiction even in these years (P 101 fn. 3).515 That is to say, 
                                                 
514 How contradiction applies in Hegel is still a relatively controversial issue (cf. 
de Boer 2010 for a detailed assessment). Even so, by our brief explanation 
above we believe we are in accordance with at least the basic form of Hegel’s 
contradiction as explained by Longuenesse and de Boer. For example, de Boer 
explains that contradiction arises “between, on the one hand, the unity of its 
contrary determinations, which it is in itself, and on the other, the one-sided 
content to which it has been reduced” (de Boer 2010, 367).  
515 Derrida explains: “If I have more often spoken of conflicts of force than of 
contradiction, this is first of all due to a critical wariness as concerns the 
Hegelian concept of contradiction” (P 101 fn. 13.). Derrida explains that this 
wariness arises from Hegel’s explanation of contradiction in the Doctrine of 
Essence in the Science of Logic (which, we add, is basically an address to essential 
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Derrida aligns with selected portions of Hegel – as he did with 
Husserl, Levinas, Parmenides, Plato and Heidegger. He is able to 
do so insofar as these portions are common (basic). Yet Derrida 
does so to further his concerns.  
In sum, Derrida’s two sorts of relation to Hegel above were 
alignment of the movements with violence as war, and the more 
basic relations. Derrida sets each aside by his next two arguments. 
As to the basic relations, for Derrida since 1962, the a priori 
subject had accepted the responsibility to demand a response to 
the question of the absolute. Derrida sets aside the “impersonal 
‘absolute Logic’” of “Hegelianism”, and returns to the “subjective 
a priori” – the a priori region of subjectivity – that he developed 
at length (VEM 448, VM 132), and that led to his two best ethical 
outcomes thus far.516  
Second, nor has Derrida given up on avoiding even least possible 
violence; he had developed ethical nonviolence above. He will 
deem that God’s signalling of radical impossibility will be the “Idea 
of Peace”, “beyond history” (VeM 446, VM 130), and thus also 
                                                                                                        
Difference), in which Hegel “lifts” Contradiction up into Ground (H GL 2 58-
62). Derrida worked out in 1962 that phenomenology cannot ground itself. 
However, to include this 1968 reference to the Greater Logic into our main 
argument would be anachronism. 
516 Derrida writes further on: “[L]et us note in passing that the ‘subjective a 
priori’ recognised by transcendental phenomenology is the only possible way to 
check the totalitarianism of the neutral, impersonal ‘absolute Logic’ that is 
eschatology without dialogue [with the Other] and everything classed under the 
conventional – quite conventional – rubric of Hegelianism.” (VeM 448, VM 
132, our emphasis). 
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beyond Hegel’s sort of war. Derrida develops these in order, and 
we henceforth set Hegel aside. 
Part Seven: Derrida’s final two outcomes in 1964 
The third outcome as evolution from 1962  
After arriving at the necessity of choosing philosophy against 
nihilism, and the alignment with Hegel, Derrida asks again 
[H]ow are we to interpret the necessity of thinking 
the fact of what is first of all [i.e. certainly] in 
sight, in occurring as that which one calls, in 
general, the end of history [...]? This question 
returns to asking what the thought of the Other 
as Other means [signifie] (VeM 445-446, VM 
129, Derrida’s emphases). 
As we explained, what certainly appears (in front) – and history is 
such a content too – “returns” to the necessity of thinking of the 
irreducible origin, the Other as Other (although as no longer 
necessarily anthropological). Thus far, phenomenology merely 
implies the necessity of the Other appearing “as such” only as 
absolutely exterior to appearing. Thus, Derrida asks: 
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whether or not the light of the ‘as such’ in this 
unique case is not dissimulation (VeM 446, cf. 
VM 129).
517
 
As before, the “dis-” of dissimulation restores the instability of 
negation and non-relation to an originary simulation of the Other 
itself for me – circularity.  
Derrida in 1964, however, refuses to give up phenomenology – it is 
the sense of the other in its appearing which is first the sense of its 
“disappearing” to the irreducible (cf. IOG 93, (263)). He opts for 
sense over nonsense, continuing: 
[N]o, it is necessary to reverse the terms: 
‘Other’ is the name, ‘Other’ is the sense of this 
unthinkable unity of light and night. (VeM 446, 
VM 129, our emphasis) 
Given the instability in the sense of the term “Other”, implying 
what must of its essence be thought by me as un-thinkable, 
Derrida opts for the appearing of sense. He still prefers the basis 
                                                 
517 Note that we have taken this “as such” to support that by the “Other as 
Other” Derrida refers to the Other appearing as such as what it is for me 
(absolutely Other), which we developed from Husserl. 
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of “transcendental phenomenology” (and its subjectivity) to 
address the sense of the beyond.518  
Thus, he returns to the (pure and transcendental) thinking and 
speaking of the Same and “the Same and the Other”, and 
officially returns to Husserl’s questioning of finitude from 1962. 
That progress arose with reason, right, certainty, and ground.  
Derrida worked out how phenomenology cannot ground its 
positing (285), yet deemed that Husserl give himself the right to 
speak of the Other in an ethics of respect (VeM 441, VM 125). 
No such right is argued for in the two directions of violence.  
Rather, only a mere certainty (e.g. of violence) remains in this 
horizon. For, as certainty is the first and bare fact, it must be prior 
to the necessity of affirming the fact of the ideal object (as 
beyond, the irreducible Other). But in such an ethical attempt, in 
accordance with this formal-logical basis, only two finitudes must 
be the outcome (of the two directions). To think of the beyond, 
these must in turn be made one object (in general dissymmetry), 
which latter possibility is negated (in inverse dissymmetry). Such a 
negation returns the basis of egoity in its address to the fact as 
irreducible to the essential relations of the finite (even though such 
production is instituted). 
                                                 
518 The “name” was developed by Derrida in 1962 in address to Husserl’s 
levels of language, as what must first have been encountered in order to have 
been named (IOG 70). Everything, for Husserl, is nameable; even the Other. 
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This evolves a turn in 1964 in Derrida’s ethics. Instead of a right 
of convergence of the finite toward the beyond (Other), Derrida 
instils an archia as irreducible facticity (behind) even as egoic: 
Husserl knew this. And he called the 
irreducibly egoic essence of experience […] 
‘archi-facticity’ (Urtatsache) (VeM 448, VM 131)  
Hence, as to this confinement for essential reasons to a finite ego 
founded on an irreducible fact (from behind as certain), which 
must nevertheless question this beyond (Other, forward), but 
which possibility of progress forward is negated (impossible) 
Derrida summarises that 
‘this impossibility for the ego [le moi] to not [ne 
pas] be itself’, even when it ventures out 
toward [sortir vers] the Other, and without 
which it could not depart from itself ‘marks 
the tragedy of the self, the fact that it is riveted 
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to its being’ (VeM 447, quoting EeE 143, cf. 
TA 46, cf. VM 131).
519
 
As arising from irreducibility (beyond), we note, this impossibility 
governs all of the essential and a priori impossibilities (eidetic, 
originary and predicative). This develops the tragedy of a finite 
ego. Bound to an irreducible facticity (contingency), yet it must 
question (forward (vers)) this irreducibility (beyond, Other, 
behind). For, as the impossibility to not be itself, the ego must be 
itself, which is necessary for it to depart from itself (forward). But 
as “riveted” to itself the radical impossibility prevents its even 
constituting this first object. 
Thus as in 1962 (cf. 345), rather than questioning the “what” of a 
constituted object in ontology, to which it can no longer proceed, 
the philosopher must ask why of finitude: 
                                                 
519 Bass, it seems to us, would agree with our employment of necessity and 
negation. Derrida writes (in 1964 and 1967), also quoting Levinas: “‘cette 
impossibilité pour le moi de ne pas être soi’ même quand il sort vers l’autre, et 
sans laquelle il ne pourrait d’ailleurs sortir de soi; ‘impossibilité’ dont Levinas 
dit fortement qu’elle ‘marque le tragique foncier du moi, le fait qu’il est rivé à 
son être’” (VeM 447, ED 192, quoting EeE 143, cf. TA 56-57). Bass translates 
this as “‘the impossibility of the ego not to be itself’ is not dissolved. The ego cannot 
not be itself even when it ventures out toward the other, nor could it venture 
forth without this impossibility, which thus ‘marks the innate tragedy of the 
ego, that fact that it is riveted to its own being’ (VM 131, our emphasis, cf. 
EeE 143, TA 46). Unless Derrida inserted this italicised and quite central 
phrase, Bass interpolates what Derrida explains. The “cannot not” agrees with 
our basic modal terms – when the ego (or rather, “the me”) cannot not be 
itself, it must (i.e. necessarily) be itself. 
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[I]n other words, why finitude, [...] Why the why? 
(VeM 447, 449; VM 131, 133) 
Even so, for formal-logical and essential reasons, even the 
irreducible must certainly be instituted in my Ego, and questioned 
as such, even though the ego remains confined to finitude, and 
possibility of progressing to the Other is negated. Hence, as to 
this essential Reason, Derrida asks, quoting Schelling: 
[I]n other words, why finitude, if, as Schelling 
has said, ‘Reason and Egoity, in their true 
Absoluteness are one and the same thing’ [...]? 
(VeM 447, VM 131) 
The outcome of Derrida’s work in 1964 has been an evolution 
from 1962 – the constriction into a moment of irreducibility as 
ongoing questioning of finitude, in pure phenomenology. 
The constriction from the beyond 
This has again led to the winding “inward” (riveting, 
confinement) even for this eidetic-transcendental approach to the 
Absolute from 1962. As I (the essential and general I) then never 
extend to speak of the possibility of what I certainly “experience”, 
 - 591 
- 
but must rather question beyond my finitude in general, I must 
ask why it is impossible to think of it absolutely. Derrida thus asks 
[W]hy is an experience which could not be 
lived as my own (for an ego in general, in the 
eidetic-transcendental sense of these words) 
impossible and unthinkable? (VeM 443, VM 127, 
Derrida’s emphasis first) 
As, Ego, Reason, egoity, ego in general, Absolute, and eidetic, this 
has returned to a highest level of pure phenomenology, a 
questioning of the Absolute, essentially without any content that 
can be absolute, even my own experience. Of course, given the 
sequence from the certainty of evidence, the instituted moment (i.e. 
of the phenomenon, thing, object as such, etc.) still appears 
unthinkable.520 The originary content is certain, first possible, and 
instituted, but the primary necessity of the philosopher is ask 
“why finitude?” of the Absolute.  
Indeed, this has been a progression. As we worked out, Derrida’s 
insisting upon keeping the rationality of the Logos by retracting 
to the eidetic-transcendental purity (548) led to the inversion of 
                                                 
520 The “un” of the unthinkable again refers to the circularity, as what can be 
said to include either complement or negation. 
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general (i.e. transcendental) dissymmetry. That opened and 
permitted relation to the absolute Other as ethical nonviolence 
(562). This progress continues to allow address even in the 
Absolute, as the opening of a question. Derrida ends off:  
[T]his opening is thus a question posed, in the 
inversion of transcendental dissymmetry, to 
philosophy as Logos (VeM 450, VM 133, our 
emphases). 
Even so, the reader might find Derrida’s outcome in 1964 
dissatisfying. He has constricted questioning of finitude “inward”, 
prior even to constituting the other (forward), to a foundation 
only upon the “subjective a priori” (VeM 448). But in so doing, it 
seems no room remains even for constituting an ethical object or 
a system “outward” (or “forward”), let alone the “beyond”. In 
asking why, I no longer ask what. In terms of the demand, even a 
prospect of an Other that can appear on the basis of what it is for 
me cannot hold. I can only ask why. But Derrida too may be 
dissatisfied. He adds one more outcome (i.e. réponse), which also 
develops an argument from 1962 – that of God. 
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The fourth outcome – God as best solution 
For even God, in 1964, can be what he is only in this subjective a 
priori. That is, 
the subjective a priori is what precedes the 
being of God and of all that which, without 
exception, exists for me (VeM 448, VM 132). 
Thus Derrida again appeals to the scission developed from the 
Idea as regulative principle without evidential content (from 
beyond). That infinitising principle impelled finitude to intuit the 
object, and Derrida’s fourth argument evolved that responsibility 
to God. But rather than merely Husserl’s transcendental God that 
signals the possibility of an essential impossibility (IOG 147, 
(312)), Derrida in 1964 has worked out his further levels. God 
signals the essential necessity that this radical impossibility 
(irreducibility) have sense.  
Thus, for essential reasons, the subjective a priori must hold before 
any production of content. It must hold prior to God who signals 
what holds for me “beyond” the subjective a priori, if that is 
possible. By this, Derrida re-creates a relation to egoity in this 
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subjective a priori.521 For essential reasons, God would no longer 
have the sense of a “third party” as absolute Other with the name 
of man, to which I know I am its Other, but would instil a 
“supreme transcendence” (VeM 448, VM 132). Rather than 
appearing for me as a content, God  
has sense only for an ego in general. (VeM 
448, cf. VM 132). 
Hence the responsibility to save philosophy in general is divine 
(from beyond), yet never impinges upon my responsibility as a 
finite philosopher to question why. Derrida explains this in a 
sentence added in 1967 (we employ it only as support). The 
delegation of this responsibility to God is not 
an abdication, God not being a finite third-
party: thus conceived, divine responsibility 
neither excludes nor diminishes the integrity of 
my own responsibility, the responsibility of the 
finite philosopher. (VM 130, cf. VeM 447)  
                                                 
521 This is an “intentional relation” (VeM 448). 
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“Violence and Metaphysics” has evolved in a progression: from 
Husserl’s intentional inadequation as respect (443) to the 
inadequation with God’s responsibility and my own, as “the 
inadequation of these two responsibilities” (VM 130, cf. VeM 
447). This brings Derrida’s argument toward its best conclusion 
in 1964. 
But whatever the outcomes, Derrida’s difficulties remain. First, he 
retained the telos only of the Other as absolutely positive.522 
When contradiction led to stifling, Derrida turned back to 
certainty to resist worst violence. He thus developed the division 
in “two finite ipseities”, but no longer sought to think them at 
once, which would have led again to stifling. That God was made 
the irreducible foundation and final authority, to permit 
“philosophical children” to ask “Why finitude?”, holds only in 
that Derrida had to retreat from the implications of the reasoning 
to save philosophy from nihilism. A better way to think of the 
issue only began to appear in Levinas’ work of 1963. 
Part Eight: what must yet develop 
Levinas’ “trace” of 1963 
For Levinas in an article of 1963 had allowed the beginnings of a 
way for Derrida to avoid his difficulties. The article, “The Trace 
                                                 
522 Thus Derrida goes on that his outcome “defines the unthinkable as the 
limits of reason” (VeM 449, VM 132). 
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of the Other”, began to develop the beginning of a further 
direction from the beyond that Levinas had excluded from Totality 
and Infinity of 1961. Thus Derrida adds a late inclusion in 1964, 
again in a footnote, that the “unthinkable” 
does become a theme in the meditation of the 
trace announced in Levinas’ most recent 
writings. (VeM 449 fn. 1, cf. VM 132) 
We will summarise why a trace would solve Derrida’s difficulty, 
but also why it is precluded from development in “Violence and 
Metaphysics”, as it would be incompatible with the outcomes of 
1964. We then turn to how it will develop, via Derrida’s additions 
of 1967. Levinas explained this further direction to the beyond 
thus:523  
                                                 
523 Levinas’ “The Trace of the Other” was published in September of 1963. 
The two articles “Violence and Metaphysics” were published in July and 
September of 1964. Thus Derrida notes in a footnote that he only became 
aware of Levinas’ “The Trace of the Other” (and also the essay “Signification 
and Meaning”, which Derrida does not yet mention in these pages), when 
“Violence and Metaphysics” was at the presses. Thus, as Bernasconi explains, 
“in consequence there could only be brief allusions to [the essays and the 
concerns with the trace], added when the proofs were […] corrected. [Thus] 
references to these publications are confined to the notes of “Violence and 
Metaphysics’ [of 1964]” (Bernasconi 1988 15). Bernasconi also notes, correctly, 
that even in 1967, Derrida’s additions “did not seem to reflect the more 
positive attitude to the trace revealed in other contemporary essays by Derrida” 
(Bernasconi 1988, 15). We explain the impetus for this just below.  
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Beyond being is a third person, which is not 
definable by the oneself, by ipseity. It is the 
possibility of this third direction of radical 
unrightness which escapes the bipolar [i.e. 
bivalent] play of immanence and 
transcendence proper to being. (TA 356, 
Levinas’ emphasis on “unrightness”)
524
 
Such a “third direction” from a “beyond” accords with Derrida’s 
basis of a “beyond” that was irreducible to the relations of the 
first two directions (for Derrida, from one to other (immanence), 
and to the Other (transcendence)).  
Yet that this would be a third person would institute its relation to 
me. Thus Derrida turns to the trace in a footnote, after retreating 
from contradiction. He goes on in the footnote: 
[I]t is possible to say [on peut dire], as Levinas does 
in The Trace of the Other that it concerns [il s’agit] 
                                                 
524 “Unrightness” evolves from the relations of straightforwardness and 
“uprightness” (droiture) by which, we explained, Levinas began the directional 
movement to the other in the Same (TE 134, TI 62). 
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a ‘third route excluded by these contradictory 
ones’ (VeM 446 fn. 1, our emphasis)
525
  
Derrida has worked out the necessity of this relation of the 
irreducible moment as institutive (as if I am Other to the Other) 
of the two contradictory directions (of the Same, and the “the Same and 
the Other”). However, he has only partly developed its logic. 
First, in 1964, Derrida suggests that such a trace can be spoken of 
as institutive (forward), even after the first two directions 
necessitate contradiction (i.e., as contradictories), and evolve as 
irreducible to the eidetic.  
Such a more profound moment must rather be supposed or 
questioned, prior to its possibility (484).526 However, Derrida goes 
on: 
[B]ut it can [peut] only appear and be said as 
third. If one calls it ‘Trace’, this word could 
only appear as a [...] philosophical elucidation 
                                                 
525 Levinas had argued that the third way avoids contradictories. He explained 
in the article: “[T]he relationship which goes from a face to the absent is outside 
every revelation and dissimulation, a third way [troiesieme route] excluded by these 
contradictories.” (Lawlor 2002, TA 344, L TdlA 618, my emphases). Derrida in 
1964 is not yet able to agree. 
526 Hence, in 1967, in his only emendation to these sentences, Derrida changes 
the “It is possible to say […] that it concerns a third way”, to the question 
“Does it concern a third way […]?” (ED 190, cf. VM 129).  
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[that] will ceaselessly call on ‘contradictories’ 
(VeM 446 fn. 1, cf. VM 129, our emphasis).  
Derrida has begun to work out the relations. As he put it, “if one 
calls it Trace” (our emphasis), this would allow me in some 
measure to know that I am Other to the Other, and a Trace of 
the Other as what it is for me. However, this trace was not yet 
acceptable to Derrida’s main argument for at least six reasons. 
How the trace was not yet a solution 
First, Derrida needed to adhere to his meticulous argument in 
1964; that had implied the contradictories led to a stifling of the 
Logos, and retraction to the eidetic. Notice, indeed, the 
capitalisation of “Trace” above (“Trace” is no longer capitalised 
in 1967, again making the reasoning difficult to follow (ED 190)). 
A Trace does not yet return originary content. Second, the Trace 
could appear only when contradictories necessitate the stifling of 
the Logos, which for Derrida in 1964 would necessitate worst violence and 
nihilism. Third, crucially, a trace does not yet permit the Other to appear 
absolutely-for-me-as-what-it-is; but only as a trace.527 A trace is 
incompatible with the telos of ethics in 1964. That is, when the 
                                                 
527 Derrida thus merely notes that such a trace “appears nowhere” in Levinas’ 
work (561). In Totality and Infinity, its appearance could never be tolerated, simply 
as Autrui is already prior to the limitation that allows its constitution. Nor do 
we suggest that Levinas’ work suddenly undid itself. Even in the article, 
Levinas never directly says that this third person “beyond” leaves a trace; a 
trace would rather appear in the face. 
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telos is that the Other be absolutely what it is, even if a trace appears 
to escape contradiction as third, the Logos in its two directions is stifled and 
prevents the telos.  
Instead, in 1964, Derrida had set the trace aside to proceed to his 
best outcomes. But just so, fourth, nor are these yet compatible 
with a trace – for if a trace holds, the philosopher is no longer confined 
to asking only “Why finitude?”. The argument in “Violence and 
Metaphysics” never could have accepted a trace. The latter 
impasse will no longer be applied in works after 1964, as Derrida 
develops the relations. 
Différance not yet included 
To do so, Derrida will also need to develop différance and 
contamination. Neither are components of the reasoning in 1964. Each is 
mentioned only in an addition of 1967 (VM 127, 129) and only 
once in these pages. However, the relations are preparing for their 
development. As to différance: while the two movements remain 
certain, the play of the Same and the Other in negation and the 
eteron etc. led to the necessity of a contradiction, and stifling of 
difference prior to the Logos, logic, possibility, other, division, 
play of the Same and the Other etc. This retracted to a 
transcendental Difference; but the supposed Difference 
“between” the Same and “the Same and the Other” would arise 
from an irreducibility. Difference would no longer permit an 
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essentially valid logical form to their division.528 Hence Derrida 
explains that what “certainly appears” is first of all 
a reign in which the difference between the 
Same and the Other, Difference, would no 
longer be valid. (VeM 446, VM 129) 
Thus in 1967, Derrida alters essential “Difference” to “différance” (ED 
186, VM 129 cf. VeM 445). A source as not yet originarily even a 
Difference – hence a basic sort of deferral – must be institutive 
(of difference). Derrida includes no alignment with deferral as it 
occurred in 1962, nor several of the other components of différance 
(e.g. temporising) that he develops from 1965. Moreover, he 
develops no relation as yet to the trace. 
Contamination not yet included 
As to “contamination”, we worked out from 1954 that it arose 
insofar as terms were related by a shared basis upon the problem 
of origin (as originary). By 1964, this evolves in that 
contamination would depend on a supposition of a relation of 
two ipseities by the irreducible. Thus in 1967, Derrida adds this to 
the former footnote upon the trace: 
                                                 
528 As noted (179), validity arises with right, certainty etc., as a necessary 
condition to then constitute the object as possible. 
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[A]nd the phenomenon supposes its originary 
contamination by the sign. (ED 189, VM 129, 
cf. VeM 446 fn. 1) 
For Levinas, the sign of Autrui expresses the relation of ipseity in 
language (409 ff.), prior to appearing. Derrida’s right to language 
occurs with objectification of things in the world (the 
phenomenon) (454), and in turn its movement from one to other 
implies an institutive moment from what is supposed as 
irreducible. Yet even by 1967, the originary contamination by a trace 
must only be supposed. We will develop this avoidance of 
affirmation of contamination in our Conclusion.  
Derrida’s later developments set aside 
The above demonstrates how “Violence and Metaphysics” is  as 
not yet a mature work (by Derrida’s later standards). Proceeding 
via a logical absolute, it is riven by a difficulty: first seeking the 
positive absolute at once in the logos, then aiming for ways to 
retain its relations after the Logos is stifled. Hence, second, this 
“conservative” moment proceeded by subtly avoiding the 
necessity to think the two together that should stifle the Logos. 
Instead, third, Derrida’s four arguments in 1964, which evolve 
from economy and inverse dissymmetry, return to his questioning 
of finitude from 1962. However, fourth, these preclude his more 
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mature relations. In our next chapter, we begin to assess how 
Derrida will develop the trace, différance etc. in 1966, by way of 
Saussure. Before doing so, we will briefly situate and suggest 
some contributions of our previous two chapters.  
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Contribution of Chapters Five and 
Six 
The contribution to reading Levinas  
Our main aim has been to work out Derrida’s development of his 
concerns in “Violence and Metaphysics”. This required a first 
situation of Levinas’ approach – in Totality and Infinity alone – 
according to the whole-part reasoning that Derrida applies. We 
do suggest that our approach is beneficial in reading of Levinas, 
for four consequent reasons. First, it seems to us that mentioning 
all of Autrui, autrui, the other and the Other is relatively rare in 
reading of Levinas (we are aware of only Peperzak who has done 
so (Peperzak, 1996, xiv)). Most employ merely other and Other, 
following Lingis’ translation of Totality and Infinity. Second, most 
who refer to the terms omit at least one of them.529 Third, the 
                                                 
529 As to omission of some of the words: Lingis, in Totality and Infinity, 
translates both autre and Autre as “other” and autrui and Autrui as “Other”. He 
is thus also “forced to drop the capital” in translating “Same” and “same” (TI 
26 fn.). Peperzak’s To the Other of 1993 – refers to the terms “autre”, autrui and 
Autrui merely at the outset. However, autrui and autre are both translated as 
“other” (Peperzak 1993, 19-20). Autrui is mentioned once, only capitalised at 
the beginning of a sentence, which might refer to autrui (Peperzak 1993, 20). 
Davis in 1996 omits autrui, as does Llewellyn in 1998 (Llewellyn 1998, 145). 
Fryer in 2004 omits Autrui (Fryer 2004, xii). Saghafi, in 2005, addresses autrui, 
Autrui and autre in detail, but is following Derrida’s “Violence and 
Metaphysics” of 1967 and omits Autre. In 2009, Bergo mentions Autrui and 
autrui, without mention of autre and Autre (Bergo, in Hofmeyr et. al., 39, 43, 50, 
51). Peperzak in that year mentions autrui without Autrui (Peperzak, in 
Hofmeyr et. al., 60). Anckaert mentions only autrui (Anckaert, in Hofmeyr et. al, 
151). Zeillinger addresses only l’autre and autrui (Zeillinger, in Hofmeyr et. al, 
2009, 95, cf. 107).529 Duyndam, Lingis, Zeillinger, Topolski, and Hand make no 
mention of autrui or Autrui in that compilation. In 2011, Hand omits autrui 
(Hand, 2011).  
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terms “other” and “Other” are often “mapped” to some or all of 
Levinas’ terms in incompatible fashions.530 Fourth, the logical 
relations by which Autrui resists logic have only been noted by 
one reader of whom we are aware, and in that case of only three 
of Levinas’ terms (Llewellyn 1998, 145).531 Fourth, our approach 
might help to settle the worries of those who deem that Levinas 
wants to confuse us.532 Combining the above, we are aware of no 
readings of the sort we have suggested, following from the 
implementation of Levinas’ signs of Autrui, autrui, the other and 
the Other. Hence the way we have related the terms in one 
progression to develop the ruptured “structures” of asymmetry, 
we believe, is novel.  
                                                 
530 Lingis’ “other” applies to both “autre” and “Autre”, and “Other” to “autrui” 
and “Autrui”. Davis translates both Autre and Autrui as “the Other” (Davis 
1996, 43). Zeillinger deems “the other” refers to “both senses implied by the 
French terms l’autre and autrui” (Zeillinger, in Hofmeyr et. al, 95, cf. 107). 
Bergo translates autrui as both other, and “the other person” (Bergo, in 
Hofmeyr et. al., 39, 43, 50, 51). In 2011, Hand suggests that “Other or other 
[…] denote the French terms autre, Autre and Autrui.” (Hand 2011, 39). 
Peperzak notes in 1996 that it had become a convention to employ “the 
Other” for any form of Levinas’ reference to a “human other”, whether Autrui, 
autrui, autre, or Autre (Peperzak 1996, xiv); this convention requires 
interpretation by every reader on each occasion. 
531 Only Llewellyn in 1998, to our knowledge, noted that Autrui for Levinas is 
“the singular plural” and thus “epekeina tes ousias” (beyond being) (Llewellyn 
1998, 145), although Llewellyn does so without mentioning autrui. Llewellyn’s 
approach (which is in accordance with Derrida’s) seems to have been set aside 
thereafter. Zeillinger deems that autrui is “the concrete particularism of the 
personal other” (Hofmeyr et. al, 95, cf. 107), which is no longer compatible 
with Llewellyn (and Derrida).  
532 Peperzak deems the terms are “unsystematic” (Peperzak 1996, xv). Hand 
suggests that each term “somehow” and rapidly evolves to the next as Levinas 
“does not want” the relations to “add up”, and “the other must not be 
categorised” (Hand 2011, 40). 
 - 606 
- 
Suggestions and summary 
We believe our approach to Levinas is at least helpful to assess 
“Violence and Metaphysics” in that until all of Autrui, autrui, the 
other and the Other are employed, and their relations assessed, it 
will be difficult to assess the argument in “Violence and 
Metaphysics”. To that end, we believe our approach is also novel 
in employing all four of the terms to read Derrida. Part of the 
reasons that these have not yet been noted, we suggest, is that in 
the amended French version of “Violence and Metaphysics” of 
1967 Derrida’s references to both l’autre and l’Autre are rendered 
in the lowercase (for reasons that must yet be established by 
assessment of his transition to 1967). This difficulty of 
applicability to Levinas transfers to the English version of 1978.  
The contribution to reading of “Violence and 
Metaphysics” 
As to assessment of “Violence and Metaphysics”, a further 
impediment is that Bass’s translations of the terms vary quite 
considerably.533 It seems to us that the argument that Derrida 
                                                 
533 As some examples: Bass translates Autrui in some instances as “other” (VM 
125, ED 180, cf. VeM 441), and in some instances as Other. But he also writes 
“l’autrui [the Other]”, and then translates “l’autre comme Autrui” as “other as 
Other [autrui]” (VM 105, ED 155, cf. VeM 350). Thereafter, when rendering 
the terms in English, Bass relays the relations inconsistently. As only some 
examples, he translates autrui as “Others” but also “other” (VeM 440, cf. VM 
124; ED 183, cf. VEM 127). He then translates a quotation by Derrida of 
Levinas’ Autrui as “other”, but just thereafter, Bass translates Derrida’s 
employment of Autrui as “the other as Other” (VM 125, ED 184, cf. VEM 
441). 
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developed in 1964 is very difficult to work out from the later 
version in the French, and more so in the English. 
To that end, addressing the work in 1964 is rare (we are aware of 
only Bernasconi (1998) who has done so). However, Bernasconi 
seeks to compare Derrida to Levinas; we have sought to explain 
how Derrida diverges from Levinas, and also Husserl, in 
developing his concerns.534 Of those we have read, we are the first 
to note that Derrida employs all of the relations of the other, the 
Other, autrui and Autrui. It seems to us that it has not yet been 
even been noted that Derrida employs these in the version of 
1964.535 Saghafi’s beautifully-written article of 2005, purports – as 
a central thesis – to treat of “Violence and Metaphysics” of 1964, 
but deems “other” (autre) is “always written in the lower case” 
(Saghafi 2005, 43).536 Thus while our concerns overlap with 
Saghafi’s,537 none of our elements or relations would co-incide.538 
                                                 
534 Berlusconi supported our comment that that trace was a late inclusion 
(Bernasconi 1998, 15). 
535 Lawlor refers to the 1964 version on one page (Lawlor 2002, 152), and then 
works from the 1967 version. The primary quote from which he develops 
différance (that “[p]ure difference is not absolutely different (from 
nondifference)” (Lawlor 2002, 155) is an addition of 1967 (ED 227 fn. 1), and 
Lawlor only mentions “other” in the lower case.  
536 For example, Saghafi writes that it is crucial to “address the expression 
‘infinitely other’ or ‘absolutely other [absolument autre]’ which, Derrida is to have 
stated, cannot be said and thought at the same time. This has led certain 
commentators, who hold steadfast to this as an iron-clad rule, to claim that 
what distinguishes Derrida from Levinas is that for the former the other can 
never be said to be ‘absolutely Other’” (Saghafi 2005, 50, our emphasis). We 
have worked out the relations in our fashion, but it is heartening to note that 
we proceed in accordance with a growing concern for these relations.  
537 Saghafi writes: “[I]n what follows, I would like to suggest, that from very 
early on (certainly, as early as 1964, perhaps even earlier), what has been at work 
in Derrida’s writings is a sophisticated notion of the other (l’autre]. [...] Always 
written in the lower case, the other, for Derrida, can designate the alterity of Autrui; 
 - 608 
- 
As Saghafi is writing of what he takes to be “canonical” of 
“Violence and Metaphysics”, we take it that awareness that 
Derrida’s later version diverges from the early holds of the canon 
of which Saghafi is aware.  
Overall summary 
To our knowledge, thus, we are the first to suggest “Violence and 
Metaphysics” in 1964 proceeds in a sequence, as it develops these 
terms. It also seems to us that we are the first to work out how a 
progress develops, from the positive relations of economy to the 
negative, and to ethics. We think that each of our relations (such as 
the first direction, second direction, economy, negative economy, 
eteron, ethical nonviolence, contradiction and retraction to the 
subjective a priori) is novel. In turn, we developed these via 
whole-part logic as well as predicative directions (as a basic 
eidetic-transcendental analysis), which we also believe is novel. 
We developed those from Derrida’s first engagement with 
Husserl, and should this novelty also hold then our working out 
                                                                                                        
as weIl as encompassing what has traditionally been understood as a formal or 
logical sense of alterity (for example, in the Hegelian and Husserlian sense) 
without being reduced to it.” (Saghafi 2005, 43) We agree with the explanations 
of the formal-logical relations, address to Husserl (at least), and that Derrida’s 
relations retain their own progress; we have sought to explain how this occurs.  
538 Thus, for instance, Saghafi takes the alter ego to be the other as other: 
“Husserl understands the other as alter ego to mean ‘the other as other’ [l’autre 
comme autre] (ED 184/125, my italics)”. We noted that Derrida in 1964 wrote 
this as “Other as Other” (Autre comme Autre” (VeM 444). As this was 
irreducible it implied Husserl’s Other (beyond) led to a “more profound” level 
(VeM 440, VM 124, cf. VeM 443). There are many more such relations, which 
we followed in our chapters. 
 - 609 
- 
how the relations develop from 1954, and from Derrida’s “law”, 
ought also to be a contribution.  
How this sort of approach is helpful 
We also suggest this sort of approach is helpful, although what 
follows is tangential to, and applicable in each case merely to 
fragments of, our sequential progress. First, there has often been 
disagreement about what platform to take to begin to read 
“Violence and Metaphysics”. Critchley in 1993 deemed “Violence 
and Metaphysics” to be a critique of Levinas, by which Derrida 
follows the ethical imperatives (begun by Levinas) that one must 
be ungrateful to be grateful (Critchley 1991). Derrida indeed 
developed these concerns in “At This Very Moment, Here I Am” 
of 1987. We have worked out an early basis for this, in that a 
respectful ethics must oppress the Other, as “most peaceful 
gesture possible”, and discourse can only negate itself to affirm 
itself, as “least possible violence”. That said, Derrida in 1964 has 
not yet arrived at address to an authorial position where 
“Derrida” can be ungrateful to Levinas. Thus we have begun to 
develop a way to work out Derrida’s evolution into his later 
ethical works. To that end, we have sought to demonstrate how 
Derrida in 1964 is concerned with his progress, rather than with 
reading Levinas violently. 
Next, Critchley and Bernasconi suggest that it is a 
misunderstanding to deem that “Violence and Metaphysics” is a 
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critique of Levinas (Critchley and Bernasconi, eds., 1991, xii, cf. 
Davis 64). Rather, they propose that it ought to be read as an 
example of Critchley’s “clôtural” reading (Critchley 1991, 26-27), 
as a moment of deconstruction arising from a first constructive 
interpretation, and a second reading which finds “blind spots” 
and then opts for a space “between” the two metaphysics. By 
working from the version of 1964, we are able to note that in the 
section “Of Transcendental Violence” such double movements 
have not yet developed. Rather, Levinas was set aside from the 
first as Derrida follows his concerns.  
Hurst (2008) deems the core of “Violence and Metaphysics” is a 
comparison of Husserl and Levinas, in which Derrida prefers 
Husserl. Hurst also deems this is “canonical” (Hurst 2008, 18).539 
We have noted how Derrida diverges from Husserl too, and at 
what junctures, to develop bases as they evolved since 1954. We 
have thus followed how the sequence is a progression, as Derrida 
builds a basis of ethics from his selective reading of Husserl, then 
sets Husserl aside to continue evolving an ethics, while 
developing his concerns from earlier years.  
                                                 
539 Hurst first writes: “[T]o begin with, there is hardly a Derridean who would 
not immediately point out that when Derrida painstakingly lays out the 
disagreement between Husserl and Levinas concerning the question of the 
Wholly Other, he hardly comes up on the side of Levinas.” (Hurst 2008, 18) 
To be sure, we will agree that Derrida hardly comes up on the side of Levinas, 
but follow how Derrida thus follows his concern, rather than “painstakingly” 
(and implicitly, for Hurst, thus accurately) explaining Husserl. 
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Even so, Hurst aligns Derrida’s approach – as do we, and every 
other systematic reader of Derrida – with the difficulty of division 
between the inside and outside when offered only an absolute 
choice (Hurst 2008a, 18), and to that extent we have sought to 
explain a way by which such approaches can be engaged with.540 
In turn, we can help to assess readings that take opposing 
positions. Hurst criticises Zizek who (Hurst suggests) takes it that 
Derrida aligns with Levinas, in insisting upon an “abyssal divide” 
from the Other. Saghafi too deems it an “ironclad rule” for 
readers of Derrida that what “Violence and Metaphysics” is 
“about” is that “the other can never be entirely separate from the 
absolutely other” (Saghafi, 50)).541 By following the progress, we 
can note that each of these approaches has merit (although the 
essential relations of other, Other etc. must yet be accounted for), 
as Derrida does arrive at the “riveting” to finitude too. The 
difficulty is that the readers are each referring to divergent 
segments of the text, and assume the work is homogeneous rather 
than an evolving argument. That is, in following the progress, we 
have suggested how Derrida’s argument by turns aligns with each 
                                                 
540 Hurst explains: “[F]irstly, [Derrida] criticises Levinas precisely because he 
[Levinas] orders his thinking around a fundamental dichotomy or binary 
opposition [...] which turns inwards towards “closure” (totality, sameness, 
immanence, history, philosophy [...])” (Hurst 2008, 18). 
541 This can also be put in the progress as language. Faron, Davis has noted, 
has suggested that “[T]he essential point of Derrida’s argument consists in 
recognising that philosophical discourse can only say the Other in the 
Language of the Same” (Davis, 64). We worked out how this holds during the 
course of our overall progress. 
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of these approaches (in working out the interconnections of 
Other, Same etc.), then arriving at the subject “riveted” to itself, 
asking “Why finitude?”. We have done so in accordance with 
working out Derrida’s concerns from earlier years, via a progress 
that is still developing. 
Thus, rather than opting for “Levinas”, or “Husserl” (or 
Parmenides, or Plato, or Heidegger, or Hegel), we have assessed 
in a more basic fashion how Derrida adopts a shared telos of 
ethics, but begins from an incompatible premise of intentionality, 
then employs relations that are basic to the tradition. We were 
thus able to demonstrate how he rarely agrees with Levinas or a 
fuller approach to Husserl, and aligns with related thinkers only in 
passing.542 Hence, we suggest, our approach can help to settle 
seemingly irresolvable disagreements by assessing at what juncture, 
and working out how, the transitions occur.  
Assessment of demonstrability –Hegel  
To assess whether the sort of reading that we are suggesting allows 
demonstrable engagement without polemics, we will briefly 
                                                 
542 W thus support Davis’ early suggestion that Derrida’s work goes “far deeper 
than simple critique”, in that “his intense and ongoing studies of Husserl and 
Heidegger put him in an almost unique position to assess Levinas’ relationship 
to his most evident sources. Most importantly, Derrida’s essay is also to some 
extent an act of philosophical self-recognition, as Levinas’ ambiguous 
relationship to the language and values of the philosophical tradition is a 
reflection of Derrida’s own position.” (Davis 64). Again, we have sought – and 
are seeking – to work out how this “self-recognition” occurs. Thus we have 
worked out how the “reflection” in this case is a reversal of Levinas’ sort of 
intentionality rather than an emulation. 
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address the issue of whether Derrida is “Hegelian”. Lawlor 
followed Gasché to suggest Derrida was “very close to Hegel” in 
a tradition developed from Hyppolite (Gasché 1986, Lawlor 
2002). We will first summarise Lawlor’s elegant explanation of 
Hyppolite’s version of Hegel’s logic. For Hegel, to think of 
language as univocal (the Logos), the knowing subject animating 
“empirical reflection” negates the external and empirical origin 
(Lawlor 2002, 97, 93). This leads to a turn to “internal” (or 
speculative) negation, which is then a negation of itself (Lawlor 
2002, 98). In turn, this implies an internal moment as a 
contradiction between opposites in itself (speculative reflection is 
self-contradictory (LeE 131, 154; LE 102, 119)) in stasis, and 
relation of mediation between others in its internal difference 
from itself (an essential difference) (Lawlor 2002, 98)). In the 
latter case, the internal absolute in difference from itself will be 
mediation (thus, for Lawlor, Derrida’s arrival at the Absolute as 
passage is analogous to this progress (LeE 74, LE 61)). But in this 
difference from itself, position can turn back to the “absolute 
position” via a negation of negation (Lawlor 2002, 99, LeE 130-
131, LE 101-102). The Logos thinks the univocal “beyond” of 
Nature (the other to the Logos) only in its self-contradiction and 
difference from itself (Lawlor 2002, 99).  
To assess this: Derrida in 1962, had set aside negation, and 
permitted no absolute opposition or contradiction (Lawlor agrees 
with this (Lawlor 2002, 140, cf. LE 113, LeE 145, our emphases)). 
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Hence it is very difficult to deem Derrida’s approach to Hegel in 
1962 is compatible with Hyppolite, or with Hegel.543 In 1964, we 
summarised that Derrida avoids negation of negation, and then 
worked out how contradiction leads to “stifling” of the Logos, 
rather than its thinking of the “beyond”. Derrida was doubtless 
inspired by Hyppolite and Hegel (as he was by Husserl and 
Heidegger); 544 we merely note that to the extent that a reading 
seeks external influence, to that extent address to Derrida’s 
concerns is precluded, as is how they impel his transitions and 
development.  
To that end, we have not yet chanced upon readers who have 
mentioned, thus nor who have demonstrated, that “Violence and 
Metaphysics” is still a developing work (by Derrida’s standards). 
That is, we noted that “Violence and Metaphysics” is situated on 
a cusp, as the philosopher began to get a sense of how the trace 
(and différance, which he must yet develop) might align with the 
                                                 
543 Lawlor summarises the “system of totality”: “if this difference is one that 
breaks through to the other as other – finite and not the same – and also at the 
same time one that makes the other be the same -- infinite and not not the same -- 
then this difference must be understood as negativity. [...] But also at the same 
time, insofar as the totality must be infinite sameness, it must negate what is 
not the same (not not the same)” (Lawlor 2002, 155, our emphases). It does 
seem to us that Lawlor develops a further “level” in negativity, as did we via 
the Other. However, in sum, in working from 1964, we employed the levels of 
“the other” and “the Other” (but also “autrui” and “Autrui”), to develop our 
whole-part levels, along with the general and specific relations (such as the 
eteron), and the divergence between “at once” and “at the same time”). Even so, 
this relation was merely one moment upon the way, in what we developed as a 
progression from positive economy to the responsibility of God in the 
subjective a priori. 
544 Derrida referred in a footnote of the “Introduction” to Logic and Existence as 
allowing the “profound convergence” of “Hegelian and Husserlian thought to 
appear” (IOG 67, fn. 62). 
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levels and directions of 1964 to imply a new way to address these 
concerns; indeed, an approach applicable to any such attempt in a 
“history of metaphysics”. The breakthrough work to do so was 
“Of Grammatology” of 1965 and 1966. To prepare for it, we will 
first need to address Saussure. 
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Chapter Seven: Saussure, semiology 
and form 
This chapter turns to selected portions of Saussure’s 
posthumously-collated Course in General Linguistics (henceforth, 
Course) of 1916. We will develop the sequential progress of the 
“system” by which Saussure sought to prepare the way for 
“semiology” as the science of the social relations of signs. The 
progress will develop hierarchies and directions comparable to 
Derrida’s basic approach from earlier years. However, Saussure 
will begin from a psychological study of speech in consciousness, 
with formal bases, but devolve to a formalism alone. Our final 
part briefly notes some of the difficulties that these bases raise. As 
we select the portions to prepare for Derrida’s reading, little role 
for Saussure the practising linguist will be allowed, which we will 
explain as we progress. 
Part One: from a linguistics of speech to 
semiology 
Saussure too begins with an object that must be addressed. 
Moreover, “object” (objet) also refers to what must be addressed 
in order to determine it. Hence, a fortiori, every moment of 
address to this object will be teleological. The object is first that 
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“system” of “language” (langage) (C 33, 45, Ce 13, 24).545 
Importantly, the parts of language are writing and speech. 
Linguistics can take both speech and writing as its object. However, 
for Saussure, the optimal linguistics would be a study of speech. Its 
particular object is the “spoken word” (C 45, Ce 24). As Saussure 
explains:  
[T]he linguistic object is not defined by the 
combination of the written word and the 
spoken word. The spoken word constitutes its sole 
object. (C 45, cf. Ce 24, in DLG 1033-1034, 
Derrida’s emphasis) 
In this way, Saussure seeks to invert a tradition of linguistics in 
which writing has “usurped” the authority of speech. This 
occurred, Saussure explains, for at least two reasons. First, the 
written form of a word seemed “permanent” and hence more 
fitting to “persist through time” (C 45, Ce 25). Second, as writing 
“conveys visual impressions”, these seemed to be “clearer and 
more lasting than auditory impressions” (crucially, note that 
                                                 
545 Following Saussure, this chapter employs “is” uncritically, as Saussure never 
employs a critical language in the fashion that Derrida developed from Husserl. 
Derrida will not yet employ “is” in assessing Saussure (in the second article) 
until he has made Saussure’s psychology imply necessary contradiction, and 
aligned with the transcendental (DLG 23-25 (768 ff.)). He will then begin to 
employ “is” (and “must”, “can” and so on) in systematic fashions, as will we. 
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Saussure takes writing to appear visually) (C 46, Ce 47). Hence 
many took the written word as more reliable. Many, for example, 
took spelling from the written rather than spoken word (C 47, Ce 
26)). Thus, for Saussure, this visual and persistent writing, 
codified in written grammars, was deemed wrongly to be more 
important to linguistics than speech. Writing claimed an 
“unmerited” authority546 and the “natural” relation between 
writing and speech was “reversed” (C 47, Ce 26, DLG 1038).547 
From the privilege of speech to phonetic writing  
The crucial reason that this privilege ought to be amended arises in 
that linguistics for Saussure – as for Derrida and Husserl – is a 
science of “consciousness” (C 140, Ce 98). Yet, Saussure 
emphasises, 
we learn to speak before learning to write (C 
47, Ce 26, in DLG 1038). 
For Saussure this had been overlooked to egregious effect. 
Moreover, for Saussure, one had to learn to speak before writing 
                                                 
546 Saussure writes that “the written word [...] manages to usurp the principal 
role.” (C 45, Ce 25). 
547 We will return to this word “natural”, as it will signify both a telos of 
sensible presence in a psychology (as speech), and the restoration of the 
privilege of this speech to a linguistics. When Derrida has nearly evolved to 
include a transcendental basis (DLG 25 ff.), the “natural” will also have come 
to be equated with Husserl’s pejorative employment of this term as signalling 
an uncritical “natural attitude” (cf. 796 fn.). 
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even in history (backward). Indeed, nor are these directions 
confined to a single consciousness. Spoken or heard language for 
Saussure also has a “tradition” historically independent of and 
thus prior to any single consciousness.  
Next (and moving “forward” from history), for Saussure as for 
Husserl and Derrida, language bestowed by the tradition must be 
available to a consciousness, thus able to be accessed by particular 
communities (C 112-113, Ce 77-78). By this Saussure begins to 
instil the whole-part relations to language. For what permits 
communication first is also “language in general” (langage) (C 31, Ce 
14). In turn, the particular language which arose in history and is 
shared in a community is deemed a tongue (langue) (as, for example, 
various communities have a “native tongue” (C 44, Ce 24)).548 A 
tongue is one dialect permitted by language in general. Again, 
moving “downward” (to the most interior), as for Husserl’s 
intentional act, this tongue is produced only in “an individual act” 
(C 31, Ce 14) of speech. Saussure’s pun on the tongue as the 
physiological member that produces sound is considered (langue), 
as it emphasises the necessary equation, given Saussure’s telos, that must 
occur between the tongue and speech. Combining the above, 
speech as the tongue must be more fundamental to linguistics than writing 
                                                 
548 We translate langue as “tongue”, as a dialect of a nation or culture, rather 
than translating this as “linguistic structure”, “language system”, or “the 
language”, as occurs in our English version of the Course. Each of these 
obscure the connotation to the “tongue” employed in production of speech. 
Confusion is easily caused when referring to both “langue” and “langage” as 
“language”. 
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in its history (DLG 1038). The “natural” historical privilege 
(implicitly, “behind”) of speech over writing must be restored in 
the tongue (forward). For Saussure, only speech must be addressed 
in the tongue as the object of the study of linguistics in history. This study 
would be “phonetic”, as “the study of the evolution of sounds” 
(C 55-56, Ce 33) in history.549  
Thus Saussure’s concerns are practical – it is important to avoid 
taking from this “only” (seul) that Saussure does exclude writing 
from phonetics. Writing is acknowledged as an “independent” 
system, thus is “comparable” to speech when Saussure requires it 
(C 33, 165; Ce 13, 117, DLG 28).550 However, when he is 
concerned with a linguistics of speech, Saussure refers to writing 
unwillingly (cf. C 44, Ce 24), as he seeks to restore the privilege of 
speech.551 Writing must rather merely be a subordinate system in 
this phonetics of speech. 
To begin to assess how this could occur: first, writing is also an 
“independent part” of language in general, which also holds as a 
part of the tongue (i.e. the tongue in general). Hence, first, writing 
must also hold as an independent part in history, in the study of 
phonetics. As Saussure puts it: 
                                                 
549 The word “phonetics” derives from the Greek “phonetikos”, as “relating to 
speech” (the Greek phone) (CD 1130). 
550 Saussure explains that “in that other system of signs, writing […] offers a 
useful comparison.” (C 165, Ce 117). 
551 Saussure in the Course also complains: “[E]ven in the case of our native 
tongue, the written form constantly intrudes.” (C 44, Ce 24). 
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the tongue thus has an oral tradition 
independent of writing (C 46, DLG 1038).
 552
 
However, as Saussure wants linguistics to be the study of speech 
(C 56, Ce 33), in order to determine it as the tongue, he deems the 
only purpose of writing to be that of “representing” (or “figuring”) speech. 
Saussure calls this “phonetic writing” (C 47, Ce 26).553  
The whole-part relations at work 
These introductory bases in place, we begin to explain how, for 
Saussure, restoring speech as the primary object ought to occur. 
First, instead of merely inside-outside relations as objectual, a 
general-particular (and more basically, whole-part) system is applying 
in this teleology. Saussure calls this a “Course in General 
Linguistics” (our emphasis). As Husserl knew (cf. Ch. 2), whole-
part relations of dependence and independence arise whenever 
objects are arranged inside or outside one another in order to be 
determined. Saussure writes: 
                                                 
552 The page numbers that Derrida provides in his article diverge from those 
we have found in our French version. We have listed the page numbers for his 
quotes as we have found them in our version. 
553 Saussure summarises our progress thus far: [T]he concrete object of our study 
[is] […] the tongue. But this product differs from one linguistic community to 
another. What is given to us are tongues [langues]. […] The tongue [langue] and 
writing are not two distinct systems of signs; the sole reason for the existence of 
the latter is to represent the former. The linguistic object is not defined by a 
combination of the written word and the spoken word. The spoken word alone 
constitutes that object.” (C 44, Ce 24-25, our emphases). 
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[T]he study of language in general thus 
comprises two parts. The essential part takes for 
its object the tongue, which is […] independent of 
the individual. […] The subsidiary part takes as 
its object the individual part of language, that is to 
say, speech, including phonation. (C 37, Ce 19, our 
emphases) 
We return to “phonation” and the “individual” below. Thus far, 
as for Derrida and Husserl, the address is to an object (i.e. in front of 
a viewer), which also retains its whole-part relations. The initial object 
(of study) is language (langage). For Saussure’s whole-part 
arrangement, the relations “in” this object allow for independence. As 
for Husserl, what is individual is made “distinct” in the visual 
field. The tongue for Saussure “is independent” of speech, as a 
tongue can be thought without speech (it could be an act of 
writing, for example). 
Note, however, that Saussure makes the object the tongue (which 
Derrida will take to be a tongue in general (DLG 1039)). One never 
speaks in every tongue, but only in a tongue (cf. C 44, Ce 24). Thus 
the tongue is also independent of the individual. An “individual”, 
as for Husserl, is that made distinct in the visual field. Saussure 
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wants only speech to be distinct, hence the tongue is 
“independent” of speech. However, speech is never made 
independent of tongues (C 44, Ce 24-25), for the former cannot 
occur without the latter, even though every tongue has not yet 
occurred. Speech also depends upon the tongue. As Saussure 
explains: 
[D]oubtless, these two objects are linked and the 
one supposes the other (C 37, Ce 19, our 
emphases). 
That is, speech is also a part of the tongue. 
The three levels, and the direction “across”  
In order to develop the hierarchy, we add the direction “across”. 
Saussure explains again that the acts of speech are “individual” (C 
38, Ce 19). Crucially, these are never “collective”, they are never 
“united” into a greater whole. Rather, each is merely an “aggregate” 
(“somme”). In turn these can be put formally. The relations of 
speech are “no more than an aggregate [somme] of particular cases” 
(C 38, Ce 19, our emphases). Saussure explains this “formula” 
thus: 
(1 + 1' + 1'' + 1'''…) (C 38, Ce 19). 
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Note first that, as for Husserl and Derrida, “individuals” are made 
“particular” when formalised. Second, a fortiori, Saussure formalises 
these particular cases in a direction “across”, which we will also 
deem “forward”. We do so in that a prior moment (e.g. 1' ) is 
necessary before the next (e.g. 1'' ) in every case.554 As Saussure 
puts it of individuals, these are the “acts of phonation […] 
necessary for the execution of these combination of words” (C 
38, Ce 19). Third, the ellipsis (“…”) signals that the progress is 
not yet limited. To combine these: particular relations of 
aggregates of speech can continue in this direction, even though 
not yet united.  
Moreover, the dashes signal that these particular cases are 
dependent. That is, each act of speech is an instance of a greater 
whole that appears partially, although not yet wholly.555 At this 
juncture the dependence of speech upon both language and the 
tongue is made obvious. Rather than language in general, such 
dependence of a particular moment of speech is first upon the 
tongue (i.e. the tongue in general (DLG 1039)). The directions of 
the tongue too are thus formalised “across”: 
1 + 1 + 1 + …. (C 38, Ce 19). 
                                                 
554 Saussure seems to take this origin of speech (e.g. 1') to be unproblematic, 
which Derrida will avoid doing. 
555 The employment of the word “instance” is ours, in that the moment of the 
tongue is “in each individual, but is none the less common to all” (C 38, Ce 19, 
our emphasis), cf. our next page. 
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Importantly, Saussure adds no parentheses to this sequence, for 
the tongue does not yet arise in any speech act, which in any 
“linguistic community” is rather a tongue (C 44, Ce 25). Hence 
the tongue is not yet even aggregated. It appears only “in” individual 
acts of speech as “common” to all acts of speech in any 
community (C 38, Ce 19).  
Thus far, a moment of speech has been instilled by a greater 
whole of the tongue. However, the tongue is a part of language in 
general (langage), Saussure goes on that “language in general, as a 
whole [le tout global]” is “unknowable” (C 38, Ce 20). Language in 
general is so removed from the relations of speech that Saussure 
never even allows it to appear as formal.556  
The lowest level as psycho-physical 
Hence to these whole-part relations we introduce Derrida’s term 
“level” (DLG 1022, 1039, 30). Henceforth, each part is also 
treatable as a lower “level”, and each whole a “higher”. As for 
Derrida and Husserl, there are three levels: from lowest to highest. 
The lowest, most particular, and thus “interior” is that of speech, 
the next that of the tongue, and highest that of language in 
general.  
                                                 
556 Language in general is deemed “heterogeneous” to that language which is 
homogeneous and can be made a “language system” (C 31, Ce 14). Derrida 
never overtly takes Saussure up on this heterogeneity of language in general as 
an irreducible difference, although it is worth noting this further extreme of 
what cannot appear as an object in the first place. 
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We begin with the lowest level. As speech can be made an 
individual, it too can be an object of study. However, in an 
important divergence from Derrida and Husserl, for Saussure this 
begins as a “psychological” (psychique) study. By this Saussure implies, 
along with the typical sense of psychological, a study of what is 
grasped in consciousness (C 98, Ce 66).557 The necessity of 
grasping in consciousness holds even when such objects are seemingly 
physical (sounds, syllables, etc.);558 they are to be assessed for their 
relations to one another as objects in consciousness. Crucially, 
[T]his is a psycho-physical study. (C 37, Ce 20) 
Thus at the lowest “level”, the object of study is speech (parole). In a 
psychology, the term “speech” implies the physiological production of an 
individual sound by organs such as the larynx, tongue etc. (Ce 67, C 
42 ff.). The latter is deemed phonation (C 38, Ce 19). Each such 
individual act is in accordance with an act of the “will” of the 
speaker that produces a “spoken word” (C 45, Ce 24-25). At this 
lowest and most particular level, the object of study of the 
phonation of a spoken word as act of speech (parole) is produced as 
sound. This characteristic would be phonic. We will develop these 
                                                 
557 Saussure opts for “psychique” (psychological) rather than “psychologique” 
(psychological). This will nevertheless still have the sense of “psychological” as 
Derrida takes it, following Husserl, as naively natural, but also the relation to a 
“psyche”, which Derrida will relate to the history of metaphysics.  
558 Saussure writes “[S]peaking of the sounds and syllables of a word need not 
give rise to any misunderstanding, provided one always bears in mind that this 
refers to the acoustic-image” (C 98, Ce 66). We will develop these relations as 
we proceed. 
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relations as we go along. As an object of study, each act of speech 
proceeds “across”, as per Saussure’s formula above. 
The tongue as telos of speech, at the second level  
Next, we add what this progress must proceed across to (i.e. its 
telos). As both speech and the tongue are “objects”, the 
combinations of spoken words must be studied (C 37, Ce 19). 
Saussure wants to study more than one tongue, however, as 
linguistics would address what holds across many tongues, thus 
the tongue (the tongue in general).  
To do so, indeed, the spoken word is phonated in a tongue, but 
proceeds according to the grammatical codes, “passively” 
available to the conscious act (C 30, Ce 13), provided by language 
(behind) and the tongue. But while language itself is unknowable, 
a tongue is “given to us” (C 44, Ce 24-25). Each act of speech 
occurs as a moment of a tongue. Thus the study of relations of 
speech are grasped only by a tongue arising inseparably with each 
act of speech (C 44, Ce 24). Hence Saussure deems that only the 
tongue is satisfactorily “graspable” by consciousness.559 A fortiori, 
according to this “formula” (as Derrida will take it, “form”), a 
linguistics of speech must proceed across toward and be aggregated into the 
relations of the tongue. The tongue is the telos of study as a 
                                                 
559 Saussure explains: “linguistic structure seems to be the one thing that is 
independently definable and provides something our minds can satisfactorily 
grasp” (C 25, Ce 9).  
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“linguistics of speech” (C 38, Ce 20), which is henceforth 
Saussure’s preferred “linguistics”. Completely determining the 
tongue in a linguistics of speech would result in the optimal 
“linguistics in general” (DLG 1039).  
In turn, as language in general has not yet appeared even formally, 
the study of the tongue must be employed to determine language 
in general (forward), even though it is unknowable. There is, for 
Saussure, “only one solution”: 
[I]t is necessary to make the prime concern 
that of the terrain of tongue, and take it for the 
norm of all the other manifestations of 
language. (C 25, cf. Ce 25, Saussure’s 
emphases) 
In accordance with Derrida in early years, the tongue (second 
level) must be addressed first to determine those relations that 
have not yet appeared.  
Continuing with the whole-part relations 
Next, we address how such a study of psycho-physical acts of 
speech can proceed “across” to an aggregate in the tongue. The 
word “terrain” above is helpful; this object will be addressed as a 
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visual “field”. Moreover, the relations of the tongue are deemed a 
system of signs (C 33, Ce 15). We will begin to develop the 
directions of the tongue in the overall system, in order to relate it 
to the field of signs. 
First, as noted, speech furthers the telos of the system (to determine 
the tongue, forward). But the system also has the sense of a 
beginning (“starting point”), as Derrida’s original whole (DLG 33). 
It is thus necessary to begin from the whole in order to grasp the 
“elements” of this system. Saussure emphasises that 
it is from the system as a whole [solidaire] that it 
is necessary to begin to grasp the elements by 
analysis (C 157, cf. Ce 112).
560
 
This allows for possibility too. Only beginning from the whole 
makes it possible (peut) for the “elements” to be “grasped” (C 
157, cf. Ce 112). 
As the directions “across” to parts arise from the whole as a 
“starting point”, we also deem that the relations of the system as a 
                                                 
560 Every element thus far can be aligned in this fashion. As we noted, the 
formal sequence of speech began “(1' + …)”, rather than as “(… 1' + …). 
Speech is assumed to hold at the origin. In turn, it holds in accordance with 
“grammatical” rules which are “passively” received. As these are instituted by a 
tongue, this allows the progress to be “possible” (C 38-39, Ce 19-20, C 30, Ce 
13). 
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whole hold “behind”.561 Such a whole includes the relations of 
history and phonetics as objects, although the whole exceeds it 
and is never necessarily temporal. The progress is formal, hence 
what holds “behind” does so as a prior necessity.  
Next, we combine the above with the directions of history. A 
linguistics of speech would reverse the privilege of writing and 
restore the “natural” relations to speech, from behind. As noted, 
such a natural relation of history must be available to a 
community. It would be the tongue available to this community. 
Study of the tongue in turn is the aim by which to restore the 
“natural” privilege of writing (in the ordered progress, forward). 
That is, concern with the tongue “introduces a natural order” (C 
25, Ce 10) to the study.  
The parallel whole-part relations of the sign 
As to how the progress can continue in the system as a whole, 
Saussure begins from the word. As noted, Saussure seeks to make 
the “spoken word” the sole object, rather than the written word 
(C 44, Ce 24-25).562 Thus the word holds as necessarily prior to any 
division between writing and speech, in the united whole.563 
                                                 
561 This “behind” refers to a direction in a teleology, as ever, as what is first 
necessary in order to achieve a telos, rather than a reified structure. 
562 As we explained it above, the spoken word arises as the psycho-physical act 
of speech phonated according to the will of the speaker. It is important to note 
that the progress is cumulative. 
563 As Derrida puts it (quoting and emphasising Saussure, as we did above), as 
to “‘the combination of the written word and spoken word; the latter alone 
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Hence Saussure turns to the “sign”, which is made a particular 
word. The spoken sign can thus be the sole object in a linguistics of 
speech. We thus add the whole-part levels and directions of the sign. 
Saussure 
propose[s] to retain the word sign to designate the 
whole and to replace concept and acoustic image 
[image acoustique] respectively by signifier 
[signifiant] and signified [signifié] (C 99, Ce 67, 
our emphases).
564
 
A fortiori, Saussure’s word “sign” must be a whole divided into its 
parts, the signifier as acoustic image and signified as concept (C 99-100, 
Ce 67).  
The first alignment of signifier and speech 
(across) 
The word “signifier” can thus be the sole object of study, as an 
acoustic image. In turn, we are concerned with how the 
                                                                                                        
constitutes that object.’ Derrida goes on “the word is already a unity of sense and 
sound, concept and voice, […] or signified and signifier” (DLG 1034, quoting 
C 44, Ce 25, Derrida’s emphasis). 
564 “Signifier” and “signified” are translated as “signification” and “signal” 
respectively in our English translation of Saussure’s Course. We have preferred 
the latter, as is standard, and as Allison has done for this quote in “Speech and 
Phenomena” (SP 46 fn. 5, VP 51 fn.). 
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relationsof the sign can further a teleology of the linguistics of 
speech, and align its whole-part relations with those of speech 
and the tongue. First, at the lowest level, Saussure deems that even 
sound has a form (to provide an Husserlian example, a melody can 
be formalised). It thus can form an acoustic image, as visual. 
Importantly, the acoustic image 
can translate itself into one constant visual 
image. (C 32, Ce 15) 
As a sound can take a visual form as a “constant” image, Saussure 
then allows for a continuing progress of such constant acoustic 
images (signifiers). The signifier and speech align with the particular 
form and order of the directions of speech in a psyche. 
Hence, Saussure also depicts the movement in the form of the 
“horizontal” directions across: 
 
 
 
As for speech, Saussure explains the “order of signifiers”, in the 
form of one signifier at the lowest level, proceeding to the next 
signifier signifier signifier 
signified signified signified 
Diag. a. (C 159, Ce 113) 
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possible part as object, thus the next signifier without terminus (C 
159, Ce 113, cf. DLG 24).565  
Note that the progress has evolved from the act of speech, which 
began its formal sequence with “ 1' ”. However, the order of 
signifiers is no longer taken as, or requires, a terminus at the 
origin. These directions can proceed forward and backward (this 
will allow application of signifiers also to a history and origin in 
the system as a whole). We will return to this lowest level of form to 
assess how it allows “elements”. For the moment we take it that 
Saussure allows these forms to align at this level. We will continue 
to develop the whole-part parallels. 
Aligning the signified and tongue (across) 
Next, as he did with speech and the tongue, Saussure relays the 
relation of signifier to signified visually by levels “upward” or 
“downward”: 
  
 
Note that whether a relation arrives from “upward” or 
“downward” is of little concern. Each merely refers to an 
instantiation of a particular relation from “outside”. Even so, we 
                                                 
565 Both Saussure and Derrida employ the term “order” that allows for the 
ordinal necessity of a progression (the “order of signifiers”), a necessary 
hierarchy, and a coherent aggregation.  
signifier 
signified 
Diag. b. (C 159, Ce 113) 
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will develop this level “from underneath” later (695), as a helpful 
way to appreciate such basic relations. Thus far, a relation from 
the signified (from upward) arises with each signifier; this aligns 
with the form of speech and the tongue.  
Moreover, each signifier “depends on the simultaneous 
coexistence” with its signifier and all of its signifieds (C 159, Ce 
113). This merely implies a dependence, not yet a determination that 
these relations exist (for Derrida these must hold “at once”). It is 
rather implicit that they must hold as the whole of these relations, 
by means of the unity of directions “across”. This accords with 
the form of speech and the tongue. Importantly, the signified as 
concept is aligned with a tongue. That is, a signified arises with each 
signifier, as a tongue occurs in each act of speech. The telos of 
unity with all the signifieds aligns with that of the tongue. 
The sign as telos at the third level 
In turn, this telos of unity of signifier and signified (across, 
outward, upward etc.) would then also be a further whole in the 
sign. Saussure indeed does not yet suggest that this sign is made 
distinct. Indeed, he never allows the sign to appear in the diagrams at all, 
whether as a whole, behind or forward. As we noted, he merely 
“proposes” (hypothetically) to “designate” (refer to) the word 
“sign” as a whole (cf. DLG 1020, 1021). He thus merely 
“proposes” to designate it as a whole (behind, and forward). 
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Aligning the sign and language in general 
Just so, the greater whole of the tongue is that of language in 
general. Language was made unknowable; and Saussure elided the 
sign from appearing. These too align at the third level (or whole) 
in that they have not yet appeared yet remain foundational. 
Moreover, as this proposed sign is prior to a signifier, the signifier 
would need to signify and unite with its signified in a sign. The 
telos of the linguistics of speech has evolved to that of the 
necessity of the study of the sign.566  
Toward semiology by study of the particular sign 
(upward) 
It follows that, in this study of the spoken word, signifying must 
signify every concept as a sign. The relations of the tongue too 
must be a sign. Unifying the signifiers and signifiers as a sign, or 
comparably, speech and the tongue as a sign would determine (i.e. 
complete) the tongue as a linguistics in general, and indeed the 
sign of language in general.  
At this juncture, Saussure works toward making the telos of a 
linguistics in general subsidiary to the telos of a greater “science”. 
                                                 
566 Note that these remain merely necessities, and teloi. That the determination of 
the tongue will not yet have occurred will imply that the progress toward 
language in general will never really begin in Saussure, it will remain 
unknowable. As Saussure explained above, the tongue will come to be the 
major concern. Just so, the progress of determining signs in Saussure will never 
really begin, as he will not yet determine signifiers and signifieds in a unity. 
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For the tongue in turn is comparable merely to one sign, in a field 
of social signs, which include writing. The comparable whole-part 
relations must be made a unity. This will be possible insofar as 
these are objects in the field. That is, a tongue must be studied as 
a part of the whole “field” (champ) of social signs (forward) (DLG 
1039). We must be cautious, in that the relations of a field are 
never a whole, or levels, themselves, but the possible relations of 
an object visualised “forward”. To this field Saussure thus 
includes systems of signs that are neither spoken nor written, 
such as  
the alphabet of deaf-mutes, symbolic rites, 
forms of politeness, military signals (C 33, Ce 
15, cf. DLG 28).  
The tongue “is only the most important of these systems (C 33, Ce 13, 
cf. DLG 28, our emphasis). Thus to “discover” what can be said 
of a tongue in a linguistics of speech, what is common in “all 
other systems of the same kind” must be studied (C 35, Ce 17).567 
                                                 
567 Saussure explains that “[i]f one wishes to discover the true nature of 
tongues, one must first consider what they have in common with all other 
systems of the same kind” (C 35, Ce 17). Note that these are merely the 
“same” in a teleology; Derrida will employ his relations of the same. 
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The highest telos of semiology “beyond”  
This brings us toward the highest telos. It would be the 
determination (or “seeing in a new perspective”) of these signs and 
their relations in the whole field of social signs. Saussure emphasises that:  
 [B]y considering writing, customs, etc. as 
signs, it will be possible, we believe, to see 
them in a new perspective [...]. [This will be] in 
terms of the laws of semiology (C 35, Ce 17). 
A fortiori, the study of the field of signs and their relations would 
allow the development of the laws of a science of semiology (from the 
Greek “sign” (semeion)) (C 33, Ce 15).  
However, while every level is a telos in this progress, in a 
divergence from speech, the tongue, and language, semiology is a 
telos of a sort that does not yet exist. Even its laws must yet be 
determined. We avoid deeming such a telos a “level” (or a whole) 
at all; it will rather be aligned with a “beyond”.  
Henceforth, the highest telos must be the study of the sign of the 
field of signs, as semiology. Indeed, this has developed in an 
ordered progress from the lowest particular level of speech and 
signifying, to the possibility of the conception (i.e. as a signified) of 
this science. Hence 
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it is possible to conceive [concevoir] of a science 
which studies the role of signs (C 33, Ce 15, 
our emphases). 
However, we must still develop a comparable moment to a “sign” 
“beyond”, that aligns with semiology. 
The alignment of the “beyond” also as idea 
For in turn, as the telos of signification, Saussure also adds the “idea”, 
of which even the sign is a part, at the highest level. As we 
explained, a part remains formal; a sign is still not yet individual 
or physical. As this sign does not yet appear, we deem this further 
level – as it is for Derrida – to hold “beyond”. In turn, the telos 
of semiology as a science is deemed the “ideal semiological 
process” (C 101, Ce 68); these too hold “beyond”, as teloi yet to 
be realised. Derrida will take this as the idea of a science that studies 
the field of social signs by means of the spoken word alone (DLG 1040).  
The teleology of the levels of psychology 
Thus far, beginning from psychology as the study of speech, linguistics 
must proceed “forward” to the tongue (second level) to arrive at a 
linguistics in general. In turn, as the tongue is a system of signs, it 
must be studied in the whole field of signs in order to determine 
the greater whole of language in general, to develop the laws of 
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semiology. Saussure wants a psychological study of speech, at the most 
inside, to be the way to determine the tongue (and thus linguistics 
in general), language in general, and semiology, at the higher levels 
outside. It is “for the psychologist to determine the exact place of 
semiology” (C 33, Ce 16, cf. DLG 1040).568 Yet thus far, even the 
tongue is not yet known, nor a linguistics in general attained. The 
sign and language in general have thus not yet begun to appear, 
and even less so has semiology as a science. Saussure’s is thus far 
a hierarchising progress of levels and directions as a teleology.  
Part Two: the address to semiology from the most 
interior 
The devolution to the most interior 
Thus we turn to how psychology at the lowest level of the 
signifier would need to proceed toward semiology. It is important 
to note that the progress must begin from the lowest level. Yet 
Saussure wants to avoid overt external dependence as founded “already” upon 
a “beyond” (in the fashion of Husserl’s “Idea” in the Kantian 
sense). For Saussure this would assume the idea of a semiology in 
order to found a semiology, as it would assume what exceeds a 
sign. Crucially, the basis for any progress must remain interior to the 
linguistic system. Saussure explains that  
                                                 
568 As Derrida also puts it: “all of linguistics, at the interior of semiology, is 
placed under the authority and surveillance of psychology” (DLG 1040, cf. 
ClG 33, Ce 13). 
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instead of ideas given in advance, we find values 
emanating from the system. (C 162, Ce 115, 
Saussure’s emphasis, cf. C 157, Ce 111) 
For Saussure, as for Husserl, values hold when truth or falsity no 
longer apply to an object. That is, the progress of the directions at 
the inside must be withdrawn from affirmation of positive terms, 
and notably from the idea of truth. In turn, the lowest level is that of 
the signifier. The first implication is that the telos of thinking 
signifiers and signified as a unity that exceeds value is deemed a 
(seeming) impossibility (C 159, Ce 113).  
Hence Saussure refers to the diagrams of the signifier and 
signified (632). He asks: 
[S]o how does it come about that value, as 
defined, can [a possibility] be equated with 
sense, i.e. with the counterpart [signified] of the 
acoustic image [signifier]? For it seems 
impossible to assimilate the relations represented 
here by horizontal arrows to these other 
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relations represented [...] by vertical arrows (C 
159, Ce 113, our emphases). 
It might be helpful to note the form by which Saussure is 
proceeding. The necessity and possibility of movement from one 
to the other is first possible, yet this telos of truth is then negated, as 
it falls short of the outside and its unity with the signified 
(forward). It then seems impossible – rather than false – that the 
aggregates of signifiers can be united as their greater wholes. It 
seems that the unity of signifier and signified, distinct sign, and 
idea are impossible. 
This begins to develop how semiology must be addressed. As we 
noted of the whole-part relations of language, semiology did not 
yet relate even to the sign of the field of signs yet remained a 
telos. The relations align with the levels of the sign. Given this 
right to speak of semiology, and its first possibility, linguistics can 
study the relations of the signifier to develop this idea of the 
science of semiology. Even should semiology then become 
impossible.569 Even when one cannot say it will ever exist. Saussure 
summarises:  
                                                 
569 As Derrida worked out of the relations of Husserl, even when expecting 
only a value, and even if the Idea is then impossible, Husserl retained a right to 
question the object (for Saussure, to study the object). 
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semiology […] does not yet exist, one cannot 
[an impossibility] say that it will be, but it has a 
right to existence (C 34/15, in DLG 27). 
Hence we turn to the solution by which Saussure proposes to 
retain the possibility of this idea of a science, by means of the value 
of signifiers, which fall short of unity with the signified. 
Falling short from the idea in value 
Importantly, this holds by insisting upon the arbitrariness of 
relation between the sound (thus the signifier) and the idea, etc. 
As Saussure explains:  
[V]alues remain entirely relative, and that is why 
the link between idea and sound is radically 
arbitrary. (C 157, Ce 111)  
Values are entirely relative to values, and thus without external 
relations. As to how such values can progress toward the unity of 
signifiers via arbitrariness (which will allow for negation) etc., 
Saussure adds the “principle of difference”. Even though still 
psychological, these will instil a difference from outside and 
inside.  
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The general and internal difference 
We begin from furthest behind. First, importantly, just as he 
never allows for a founding “Idea” in the fashion of Derrida, 
Saussure never develops an irreducible difference, which must 
found even the difference; as a difference “beyond”. However, he 
assumes a relation in general. By this, he assumes “a difference” 
that already holds (behind): 
in general, a difference presupposes positive terms 
between which the difference holds (C 166, Ce 
118, our emphases). 
As Derrida will take this to allow consonance with his 
development, the original difference (as “anterior”) already 
“founds” the system (DLG 33).570 Such a difference in general is 
taken to be possible. Thus, to move forward, it permits a 
particular and originary difference in the tongue and its signifiers. 
Forward again, it permits the differences amongst signifiers (cf. C 
166, Ce 119). Indeed, as semiology has a right to exist, a right is 
retained for the movement of different signifiers to progress in 
order to determine semiology.  
                                                 
570 For Saussure, what is “presupposed” merely refers to a dependence upon a 
prior term. He never employs this term or “supposing” in the logical fashion 
that Derrida does. As with “is”, Derrida will not yet employ “suppose” until 
after his first alignment with a transcendental basis (cf. DLG 32-33 (cf. 809)). 
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However, moving forward, and as we develop below, insofar as 
its telos is speech at the most inside, this difference from one to the 
other – henceforth, an internal difference – does not yet permit a 
relation to the signified, even though this remains necessary (Saussure 
retains value for this movement, and allots relation to the 
signified to arbitrariness (C 157, Ce 111)). Hence, moving forward 
again, it does not yet permit signifying a difference from the sign (or the 
greater wholes of the idea, language in general etc.), from which it 
falls short.  
Thus, as Derrida summarises of the essential “originality [originalité] 
of this difference”, its 
possibility is anterior by rights to all that which one 
calls sign (DLG 33, our emphases).
571
  
The anterior difference in general is taken for granted, as 
permission for his internal difference. Next, to move forward, note 
that such a difference in general (“behind”) could not yet be 
distinguished as all of a sign (forward). Relations of the value of 
difference must be particular, thus prior to the distinction of any 
whole term. 
                                                 
571 As noted, for Derrida, originality is a predicate of origin of the ideal object 
that must already found the originary, as essential. 
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Devolving from opposition to internal difference  
Thus Saussure’s internal difference seeks to proceed further 
“inward” to its parts. To do so, Saussure deems that the whole 
relations are “positive terms”, which he will separate from 
difference. For, at the level of the whole, the sign is deemed to be 
positive: 
[T]he moment we consider the sign in its 
totality, we encounter something which is 
positive in its own domain. (C 166, Ce 118) 
This develops the relations of distinctness rather than a difference. 
The former applies to a sign united into a totality of its 
components. This totality alone is in opposition (DLG 33) to related 
signs. For  
[T]wo signs […] are not different from each 
other, but only distinct. They are simply in 
 - 646 
- 
opposition to each other. (C 167, Ce 119, 
Saussure’s emphasis)
572
 
Opposition is reserved only for distinctness, which is not yet included to the 
partial relations of the signifier and signified. To be sure, Saussure notes 
that the “combination” of signifier and signified is positive (C 
166, cf. Ce 118-119), indeed, it is a fact. Indeed, for Saussure, this 
is the “sole species of facts comprising the tongue” (C 166, cf. Ce 
119).  
The progress of differences at the most interior 
Thus while the totality of a sign, as signifier and signified, is a 
positive fact, Saussure is concerned with the particular relations. 
He famously seeks an internal difference without relation to 
positive terms (which latter are distinct signs). He writes: 
[A]s soon as one compares between signs – 
which are positive terms – one cannot any 
longer speak of difference; the expression 
would be improper, in that it applies only to 
                                                 
572 Saussure employs a negation, although this is not yet the systematic 
employment of negation of signifiers that he will emphasise below (cf. 646). He 
is merely separating distinction from difference. 
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the comparison between two acoustic images. (C 
166, Ce 199, our emphasis) 
Distinction would allow only a relation of opposition, by making 
even signifiers distinct, rather than a difference without 
opposition. Thus it is for the signifier as acoustic image alone (at the 
most interior) that Saussure reserves the lowest level of 
“difference”:  
the term ‘difference’ [...] is suitable only for 
comparisons between acoustic images (C 166, 
Ce 118). 
At this juncture the difficulty has arisen. Saussure seems to have 
constricted difference so far “inside” the tongue that no relation to any 
external concept (signified), sign or idea seems to be possible.  
Developing Saussure’s internal relations 
To attempt to restore this relation via difference without 
opposition, Saussure seeks to reproduce all the general-particular 
relations, negation and the non-relation; but as only upon the inside and its 
value (C 160, cf. Ce 114). 
First, that signifiers must be related by “value” (C 158-161) allows 
for divergence from the telos of truth of an idea (C 162, Ce 115). 
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The relation of signifiers rather allows for “coverage” across 
signifiers; that is, no longer a particular relation between signs. 
For example, 
[T]he difference in value between sheep and 
mouton is that in English there is also another 
word mutton for the meat, whereas mouton in 
French covers both. (Ce 114, C 160, our 
emphasis last) 
Value – and thus difference – is spread “around” (autour) multiple 
signifiers (cf. C 166, Ce 118).573 This develops how a “coverage” 
no longer instils the particular signifier in bivalent opposition to 
other signifiers. In turn, Saussure is able to retract from the positive – 
which he associates with distinct, opposite, and positive signs.  
The arrival at negation 
In so doing, Saussure is able to move to the relations of negation 
(also expressed by “not” (n’est pas)). As for Derrida in 1964, what 
each signifier “is not” no longer pertains to an opposite. As noted, 
opposition requires two distinct relations that can be opposed to 
                                                 
573 Saussure’s ongoing employment of visual metaphors such as “next to” and 
“around” (C 166, Ce 118) is consistent with the formal approach as visual that 
Derrida will first assess. Both the English translator and Derrida (Ce 114, DLG 
25) employ the metaphor of “covering”. 
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each other, and Saussure expressly allows distinction only for 
signs as a whole. However, upon the “inside” he has allowed the 
relations of negation by systematically developing the internal 
progress of value. Such a lack of relation to an opposite holds 
precisely insofar as the negation refers to a coverage dispersed 
across the relations in (dans) the sign, even though the sign is not 
yet determined. Just so, these relations hold of signifiers as 
parallel to speech “in” the tongue. In the tongue each signifier 
thus no longer relates to any positive term. Each is rather addressed by 
other signifiers in their value (inside), rather than negating the sense 
of a single or objectual sign at the highest level.  
Saussure writes of such sorts of relations: 
[w]hat characterises each most exactly is being 
whatever the others are not. (C 162, Ce 115, our 
emphases) 
Thus, importantly, what is not the signifier must be only in 
“contrast” to other signifiers, as the non-relation. Saussure 
summarises: 
it will never be possible for a fragment [part] of 
the tongue to be founded upon anything other 
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than its non-coincidence with the rest. (C 163, cf. 
Ce 116, our emphases) 
As we explained, the term “non” develops general-particular 
relations. A particular object can be “not” other particular objects 
(the castle is not the tree), but only in non-relation to every object 
around it (336, 514-516). That is, a non-relation refers from a 
particular object to others “around” itself, without opposition. 
Indeed, Saussure summarises that  
in [dans] a sign, that which matters more than 
any idea or sound associated with it is what 
there is around it in other signs [autour de lui dans 
les autres signe] (C 166, Ce 118, our emphasis). 
Crucially, Saussure summarises the approach above: 
[E]verything we have said so far comes down 
to this. In the tongue, there are only [particular] 
differences. Even more important than that is 
that, in general a difference presupposes positive terms 
[from behind] between which [and thus opposite 
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to] the [general] difference holds, in the tongue there 
are only [particular] differences, without positive 
terms. (C 166, Ce 118, Saussure’s emphasis 
first).  
However, we have not yet addressed how, for Saussure, the 
movement from signifier to signifier can proceed via internal 
difference toward unity in the concept of a tongue (as linguistics), 
without positive terms.  
The necessity of arbitrariness  
Thus far, the internal difference and negation amongst signifiers 
without opposition, prevents the opposition of truth and falsity. 
Each signifier retains only a value for the goal of determining the 
tongue. Its value develops by means of the coverage of each 
signifier, or the network of relations to related signifiers. The 
greater the coverage, the more progress has been made toward 
determination of a tongue. But for greater coverage to avoid 
making a signifier distinct, which would render it a positive fact 
again, the relation of signifier to the outside must be arbitrary. 
Hence Saussure deems this his “fundamental principle”:  
[T]he link between signifier and signified is 
arbitrary [arbitraire] (C 100, Ce 67).  
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Note that it is only the “link” between signifier and signified (rather 
than other signifiers) that must be arbitrary (cf. DLG 23-24).574 
Putting this via the levels: it is the relation between a particular 
acoustic image becoming itself “at the interior” (DLG 24) and the 
signified (as exterior) that must be arbitrary. Moreover, this holds 
of a signified in particular or general.  
Thus indeed, Saussure explains the relations of difference as only 
holding internally in comparison of signifiers. He provides an example, in 
that the “French sequence of sounds s-ö-r” (inside) and the idea 
“sister”, have no “internal connection” (C 100, Ce 67) (i.e. as 
“beyond”). Rather, the relation of each such acoustic image to its 
outside is arbitrary. And first of all, for Saussure, this relation to 
the outside as arbitrary must be the concept (signified). Saussure’s 
related example is from the sound to the concept “father” (C 100, 
Ce 67). Hence, further outside, the relations from the acoustic 
image to the “idea” (beyond) is without relation even between 
arbitrariness and difference, and Saussure refused such relations 
of an “idea” outside. 
Even so, this does not yet preclude a relation from the signified. 
We can thus begin to explain how this movement of internal 
difference of signifiers can retain only value, to avoid a relation of 
difference to the signified. For as Saussure explains: 
                                                 
574 Note that the relation between signifiers must avoid arbitrariness, which 
would make the outside arbitrary – this is very far from a relativism. 
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Arbitrary and differential [i.e. different] are 
correlative qualities (C 163, cf. Ce 116, 
Saussure’s emphases)
575
 
Saussure, like Husserl, takes “correlative” to express two certain 
terms which are first related, and provide a right for, but do not 
yet converge upon truth (rather, what arises from the correlation 
of difference and arbitrariness is value). Internal difference retains 
its value amongst particular signifiers (inside, across), as permitted 
by arbitrary relation to the general or external whole. 
Thus what seems like a difficulty in Saussure is the moment his 
system matures at the most interior. As internal difference 
depends upon arbitrariness as instilling an immotivated relation to 
the signified (“outside”), the reader might suspect a strange division 
that would restore a difference between signifier and a signified, 
outside, undoing Saussure’s internality. But it is just this that 
Saussure seeks to address, and “outside” expresses a direction 
rather than constituting an external object. The relationship to the 
                                                 
575 Given Saussure’s telos, we take “differential” between the signified and its 
others to signify an internal and constituting “difference”. Saussure never 
needs to clarifies the relations of “differential” or “different”, also writing, for 
example that signs are “constituted solely by differences” (C 117). For Derrida, 
this is important, as Saussure’s differential and arbitrary “properties” are 
predicates. They only become “difference” in intentionality as objectual. 
Derrida will begin with arbitrariness, but will only arrive at difference once he 
has instilled the relation of the trace, which can signify the relation of objectual 
difference, to some degree, without absolutely objectifying it. This will be a 
difference as such. 
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signified is arbitrary insofar as difference and arbitrariness are 
“co-relative”: the more the difference between signifiers, the 
relatively more the arbitrariness between signifier and signified.576 
But such arbitrariness of a signifier in coverage avoids opposition to 
all the other signifiers.  
Thus the movement of differences between signifier and signifier 
avoids referring to all the other signifiers (and a signified in 
general), as thought “outside” in a simple sense. Both difference 
and arbitrariness must be internal, and each difference of signifier 
to signifier (inside) must signify an outside in general “without 
difference” (DLG 31) upon the inside.577 That is, as a signifier in 
its coverage avoids opposition to all the other signifiers, the “difference” 
between signifier and signifier would be a non-difference from 
signifier to signified (as Derrida will put it, this implies that the 
difference is “nothing” (cf. DLG 1029)).  
Summary of Saussure’s internal teleology in 
psychology 
In this moment, we suggest, Saussure’s psychology in its part-
whole levels and directions accomplishes an involution 
comparable to Derrida’s turn to the Absolute from 1962 and 
                                                 
576 That correlativity requires moments of “more” and “more” will be 
important in Derrida’s approach to contradiction. The contradiction in 
Saussure’s outcome will be between a relation that opposes the “more” and 
“more” at once (769). 
577 As Derrida explained it, this is “the desire [demand] for speech without 
writing, that is to say without difference.” (DLG 31). 
 - 655 
- 
1964. Saussure develops a most interior without limit to the 
exterior. As Derrida summarises:  
[A]t the inside of the ‘natural’ relation between 
the phonic signifiers and their signifieds in 
general, the relation between each determined 
signifier and each determined signifier would be 
arbitrary. (DLG 24, our emphases)
578
 
Moreover, we have arrived at how the system at the most interior 
would allow internal difference, and thus semiology. When each 
signifier is different to, not but no longer opposite to all the other 
signifiers, its value provided merely by coverage with other signifiers, 
while its relation to the signified in general is arbitrary, then movement 
as a series of different signifiers, toward a telos of the signified as 
unity of a particular sign can and has a right to occur.  
But this does not yet determine the relation to the signified, hence 
nor its relation to the greater unity in the idea of a sign. Thus, to 
make these relations individual: as noted, speech proceeds at the 
most interior as a signifier. Hence to achieve this telos of a 
linguistics in general, this movement of the signifier must signify 
                                                 
578 We will return to Derrida’s employment of the conditional tense. 
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the tongue at the lowest level to determine the particular sign of 
the (total) field of signs at the highest. This would determine the 
relations of the sign, thus of the laws of semiology. To do so, for 
Saussure, it must begin from the movement of signifiers, without 
yet determining a difference from (or relation to) the signified, 
sign or idea of semiology. Only this allows Saussure to speak of a 
semiology which has a “right” to exist but remains only a telos. 
Part Three: the “second” Saussure, and the formal 
relations of the signifier 
The transition to the elemental sound 
However, a difficulty remains – that of the origin of these 
relations. It must be asked how the highest moment of the idea 
can arise at the most particular level of a signifier, and in turn the 
idea of the sign etc., each of which would be contained by it. To 
do so, Saussure seeks to appeal to sound. For even the idea first 
arises as a sound. Thus 
[E]very linguistic signifier is a part or a 
member, […] where an idea fixes itself [se fixe] 
in a sound, and a sound becomes the sign of an 
idea. (C 157, Ce 111, our emphases) 
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Note that this is no longer a “comparison” (C 33, 165; Ce 13, 117, 
DLG 28). The idea of which the sign is a part fixes itself in a sound. 
It might well be suspected that whatever allows this fixation of 
sound would found the overall system. To prepare to address 
this, note that sound applies at the particular level as the signifier. 
Yet sound comprises merely a part of the signifier (as acoustic 
image). Saussure also develops these part-whole relations.  
From this juncture, a reader would be justified in finding a second 
“Saussure” in the Course in General Linguistics. That is, although the 
directions and levels of speech, signifier, etc. had their formal 
bases, from the moment that Saussure devolves to the partial 
relations of the signifier, Derrida sets aside phonation, and the 
physical. Indeed, it is important to note that from that juncture the 
progress will no longer be concerned with psychology. Rather, 
Saussure in these whole-part relations seeks to found the formal 
relations of the signifier upon the elemental base of the phoneme. 
Yet, the relations will nevertheless found the signifier, which in turn would 
proceed toward chains of signifieds. These relations too are necessary 
for a semiology. Hence we turn to the formal relations of the 
signifier, as the necessarily elemental relations even of speech.  
The formal relations of the signifier made partial 
First, note that the signifier is never anything sensible or 
psychological per se. Rather, Saussure proposes to apply the word 
“signifier” to designate the “acoustic image” (C 99, Ce 67). The 
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word “signifier” refers to a form by which the acoustic and the 
image relate as speech. That is, the signifier in this case takes the 
form of a unity rather even than the psycho-physical phonation. 
Thus Saussure seeks to unite the chains of the aggregates of 
speech with the signifier in the form of the acoustic-image. He 
thus adds a form that aligns with speech, and a particular form of 
speech, which together will comprise the acoustic image. This will 
develop the crux of his linguistics of speech (at the most inside).  
The first partial relation of the signifier 
To begin to explain this: note that forms are nevertheless forms 
of relations, which can be investigated. That is, even though the 
laws of semiology have not yet been developed, the relations of 
form hold, as that of which they are a form (Derrida will take the 
relations as essential (cf. C 37, Ce 19)).579  
Thus, to investigate these formal relations: first, to proceed in the 
psyche toward a tongue, a psyche must be able to understand 
what is spoken.580 It must thus be able to hear what is spoken, and 
must be able to hear a sound. Importantly, Saussure calls the formal 
relation that allows this the “psychic imprint”. It formalises how the 
acoustic is heard by a psyche. Thus as what is spoken is heard, the 
                                                 
579 Saussure made the “essential relations those of the tongue” (C 38, Ce 19, 
Cb 37). That it could be extrapolating too much to develop essential relations in 
Saussure will be addressed below. 
580 In French, “entendre” has the sense of both hearing and understanding. 
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unit of hearing too occurs in a psyche. Note that Saussure is 
never concerned to ask whether an external hearer perceives the 
sound, as he assesses the object of speech in linguistics. The 
concern is with a psyche hearing the sound that is spoken. Hence, 
as the imprint is required for the acoustic and the spoken, it 
subdivides into two chains. 
The particular chains of acoustic impression and 
articulation 
Thus, just as speech proceeds as an aggregate of chains (623), so 
“acoustic chains” too proceed in aggregate (somme, (C 6, Ce 41)). 
However, for Saussure the two chains of speech and hearing are 
made into a unity (unité) in the form of an “acoustic impression”. 
Note that an “impression” also remains formal, as a visual image 
of the acoustic. To explain how this would progress from the 
chains of acoustic impressions to the signifier: the impression 
makes an imprint that can be a visual image of the acoustic, 
permitting one of the relations of an acoustic image (signifier).  
Second, the form of the produced unit of speech (rather than the 
phonation) is particularised to what Saussure calls “articulation”. 
Saussure takes this from the Latin “articulus”, which he aligns with 
a “part” (C 26, Ce 10, DLG 35). Moreover, an articulation also 
has the sense of a division of an act of speech. However, as 
formal and particular, it refers rather to “the subdivision of the 
spoken chain in syllables” (C 35, our emphases). That is to say, a 
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syllable is the smallest unit (part) of a spoken word, which 
particular syllables can be formalised as a visual chain into a 
spoken word. Hence, articulation is formal, and not yet the sense 
of an individual or physical act of phonation. The chain of 
particular syllables is aggregated into the form of an “articulatory 
movement” as a spoken word. Moreover, Saussure privileges the 
latter chain. Addressing the acoustic impression can occur only via 
the articulatory chains; for the “acoustic unities taken in their own 
chains are unanalysable” (C 66, Cf. Ce 42).581 
The elemental unity of the phoneme  
Thus articulatory chains are the most particular (lowest) level that can be 
made an object of study, even in the signifier. However, for Saussure, 
each of the aggregated chains of acoustic impression and 
articulatory movement can be unified, and then both unified (or 
rather, for Saussure they are “already” unified) into a phoneme. 
Saussure explains that  
the phoneme is the aggregate of acoustic impressions 
and articulatory movements, the heard unity and the 
spoken unity, the one conditioning the other: 
                                                 
581 Derrida might well accord with this, as he will address the articulatory 
chains alone. 
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thus it is already a complex unity, which has a foot 
in each chain. (C 65 cf. Ce 41, our emphases) 
Saussure makes no overt appeal to this moment as a unit of 
meaning in the psyche (for Saussure, the psyche is an object of 
study). Rather, the “phoneme”, as the complex unity of the 
articulation and the acoustic impression, refers to the smallest 
possible unit of speech which allows the linguist to “know 
[connaître] and classify” (C 66, Ce 41) these relations as objects of 
study.582 The phoneme is thus deemed an “element”. We have 
arrived at the elemental unity that allows these partial relations to 
permit linguistics. That is, as objects, phonemes in turn allow for 
the acoustic (i.e. acoustic impression) and the visual and most 
particular form of speech (as an image) to be a “constant visual 
image”. Phonemes are the elements of signifiers. In turn, the 
latter can proceed as chains at the most interior, on the base (sur 
la base) of the phoneme.  
However, from the diagram above, an aggregate of signifiers is not 
yet determined in a unity with the signified. The elemental unity 
of the phoneme nevertheless remains a basis for the signifier of 
which the telos is the tongue. Thus, in a teleology of the linguistics of 
speech (i.e. of the formal relations of speech and hearing), the 
                                                 
582 Derrida will thus proceed by means of sense (rather than Bedeutung in 
Husserl’s fashion). 
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interior of the psyche is comprised only of signifiers. In turn, only 
signifiers comprise a tongue, and “[I]n the tongue […] there are 
only acoustic images” (C 32, cf. Ce 15). Saussure has united the 
parallel whole-part relations of the signifier at the lowest level, by these formal 
relations of the signifier. In so doing, he unites the basis of the 
linguistics of speech upon these formal chains. 
Temporality as internal form 
Next, in this devolution to form, Saussure aligns with temporality. 
To explain this, we begin from speech and devolve to the 
phoneme. As noted, Saussure allotted (psycho-physical) speech a 
form in its ordinal progression from the first (i.e. in the “formula” 
“(1 + 1' …)”, (623)). That “formula” is a visual and formal necessity of 
ordinal progress (for example, “ 1'' ” must occur after “ 1' ”). 
Psycho-physicality in turn evolved to the form of the signifier (as 
acoustic image), which must allow for translation as “one 
constant visual image” (C 32, Ce 15). In the alignment of 
particular sequences of signifiers, however, Saussure explains that 
in the Greek word “barbaros” (barbarian), each sound 
“corresponds” (correspond) to a letter:583 
B  A  P   B  A  R O  Σ  
                                                 
583 Thus Saussure takes the classical Greek alphabet as optimal (C 64, Ce 64). 
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As for speech and the signifier, the progress is formally 
directional. The “horizontal” line “represents the phonic chain”, 
and the “vertical” lines represent the movement “from one sound 
to an other [un autre]” (C 64, Ce 40). Note that, implicitly, such 
sequences in turn must be united into signifieds in these chains. 
However, note also that there are multiple “vertical” lines in the 
direction across. Saussure deems that this form represents a 
temporal movement.  
Saussure then avoids an incipient difficulty. It follows that to 
unite sound as a constant visual image requires a temporality that 
does not yet allow divided units of time (we avoid yet writing 
“different”, which word Saussure does not yet include to this section. 
Indeed, Saussure explains that each of the letters occurs “in a 
homogeneous time” (temps homogène) (C 64, cf. Ce 40).584 That is, 
he goes on, the “duration” of a unit of sound is of little import, 
the important relation is the “impression” (C 64, Ce 40). Hence, 
we note, the formal relation is no longer that of actually (and 
materially, and psycho-physically) divided times. 
In turn, the partial relations of the acoustic image evolved into the 
unity of the chains of acoustic impression and articulatory 
                                                 
584 Saussure explains that “the acoustic chain does not divide itself into equal 
times, but into homogeneous times, characterised by the unity of the 
impression” (C 64, cf. Ce 40). Saussure’s “not” is not yet employed in the 
fashion by which he relates it to difference, for no relation to difference is yet 
developed in this section of the Course (668). 
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movement follows (659 ff.). Saussure explains that the unit of the 
chain of the acoustic impression “corresponds” to the unit of the 
articulatory sequence: 
b (auditory time) = b' (articulatory time) (C 65, 
cf. Ce 40). 
Saussure deems this sequence the elemental basis for the phoneme as 
“spoken chain” (C 65). We have devolved to the most elemental 
relation. That is, our chapter has developed the relations of this 
teleology from a psycho-physical linguistics (upward) to its goal of 
semiology. It also proceeded downward to the elemental and 
formal relations of the signifier. In turn, the relations of the 
former to the latter develop some difficulties for Saussure.  
Part Four: the difficulties of alignment between 
the first and second Saussure 
The first difficulty: the retraction to form 
First, we explained that Saussure began by opting for psychology 
as the means by which to develop a semiology. Those 
psychological relations were also formalised. Yet to arrive at the 
elemental unity of the acoustic image in the phoneme, Saussure 
needed to appeal to multiple relations of form alone. The latter arose from 
the complex unity of articulation, and the acoustic impression. 
Indeed, to allow both bases, Saussure dissociates psychology (the 
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study of sound in the psyche), from phonology (the study of the 
form of the “physiology of sound” (C 55, Ce 32, C 63)). 
Moreover, he emphasises that the relation between them can be 
thought only by “abstraction”, in his reformulated sort of 
“linguistics”. However, he also emphasises the preference for form: 
[L]inguistics, thus, works at these limits [le 
terrain limitrophe] where the elements of two 
orders combine; this combination produces a form, 
not [non] a substance. (C 157, cf. Ce 111, 
Saussure’s emphasis)  
Saussure’s telos of psychology is set against his formalism. The 
tongue, comprised of acoustic images, is a  
form and not [non] a substance (C 169, Ce 
120).  
The issue thus arises as to how form could allow any individual 
speech as psychological. That is, the latter began from a study of 
phonation. However, an articulation formalises the particular 
relations of syllabification, but never formalises the vocal 
production of sound by the larynx etc., in phonation. We deem 
this Saussure’s “first difficulty”.  
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The second difficulty: the dependence on writing  
However, Saussure is aware that these “chains” of phonemes never 
quite allow for such relation (C 65, Ce 41). His solution might be 
surprising. To opt for form in the phoneme, he sets aside 
phonation. He concedes that the physical production of the 
movements of speech would be “infinite”, and argues that 
“phonemes” are elemental in that there are only a finite (limited) 
number of forms. That is, he argues that there are merely a 
limited number of phonemes (i.e. a language allows only a limited 
number of syllables).  
Thus, a fortiori; it is at the lowest level of the phoneme that Saussure also 
locates the basis of “writing” A sign of writing thus “corresponds” to 
these lowest elemental forms of the phoneme. Each phoneme can 
be represented by a corresponding sign of writing. Saussure 
summarises the above:  
[i]n [dans] the tongue […] there is only the 
acoustic image, and that can translate itself into 
one constant visual image. For when one 
abstracts the multitude of movements 
necessary required to complete it in speech, 
each acoustic image […] is the sum of a limited 
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number of elements or phonemes, susceptible 
in their turn to being evoked by a 
corresponding number of signs of writing. (C 
32, cf. Ce 15, our emphasis) 
The acoustic image, and thus relations in the tongue, depend 
upon the system of phonetic writing, arising at the level of the 
phoneme, for its “tangible” form:  
the tongue is a repository of acoustic images, 
and writing the tangible form of these images. 
(C 32, Ce 15) 
Writing is the form upon which the tongue, and thus the 
linguistics of speech, linguistics in general, and semiology depend 
for their tangibility.  
The outcome has led to a second difficulty. Saussure sought for 
his psychology to exclude the relations of phonetic writing – the 
study which must “represent” and “figure” the formal relations of 
speech in history. Yet the phoneme at the lowest level depends 
upon a corresponding moment of writing for its tangible form 
(Derrida will call this the grapheme). It might well hold that the 
grapheme allows for phonetic writing to figure speech as a 
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phoneme.585 However, what began by seeking to exclude a 
psychological sort of writing has come to depend upon writing as 
formal. We deem this the second difficulty. 
The third difficulty: the status of temporality 
Next, we add a difficulty that pertains to both psychology and 
formalism. First, Saussure’s psychology accepts that phonation 
(by the larynx, and so on) occurs in an unexamined sort of 
temporality. A psychological moment of space too was implicit. 
However, the temporality that Saussure made “elemental” was the 
formal. This occurred as the “spoken chains” in phonemes (such 
as the aggregate of syllables “barbaros” (C 64, Ce 40 (662)).  
Second, that time was “homogeneous” (temps homogène) (C 64, cf. 
Ce 40). We noted that even the formal relations ought not yet to 
allow heterogeneity as temporal difference. Saussure indeed set aside 
the importance of “duration” in favour of the “impression” (C 
64, cf. Ce 40), and never mentioned “difference” at that juncture 
(C 62-64, cf. Ce 39-40). Third, for Saussure as its elemental 
“base” of spoken chains, the phoneme depended upon the 
correspondence of the units of auditory and articulatory 
movement (C 63-66, Ce 39-41). Those relations were explained as 
                                                 
585 It might be argued that the difficulty is formal too: that of necessary 
contradiction; speech was made an independent part of writing, yet speech 
depends upon writing for its tangibility at the lowest level. Derrida will assess 
these relations in detail, to develop a trace from the necessary contradiction. 
 - 669 
- 
correspondent at base (i.e. as “ b = b' ”). A series of sequential 
difficulties arise, in the order above.  
First, as formal – is the temporal relation to be psycho-physical or 
formal? Second, in a homogeneous time without duration, would 
temporality apply to difference in any psychological sense? Third, 
the basal temporal correspondence of “b' (auditory time) = b" 
(articulatory time)” (C 65, cf. Ce 40) is no longer even overtly 
temporal. Should the spoken chain depend upon a temporal 
sequence at base that never appears even formally, could 
temporality have a role in the system?  
The fourth difficulty: the phoneme and difference 
The final difficulty applies to the relations of the overall system. 
In the section that emphasises that arbitrariness and difference 
are correlative, Saussure also retracts from substance. However, 
he goes on that  
the linguistic signifier is incorporeal, 
constituted not by [non par] its material 
substance, but uniquely by the differences that 
separate the acoustic image from all the others. 
(C 165, cf. Ce 117) 
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Yet at this juncture, he also explains that  
this fundamental principle applies to every 
material element used by the tongue, which 
comprise of phonemes. […] Phonemes are 
above all contrastive, relative and negative 
entities. (C 164, cf. Ce 117) 
The first implication is an opportunity. The progress of 
differences, negations, contrast, etc. that applied to signifiers 
pertain also to phonemes. It is thus implicit that the relations of 
difference etc. apply to the particular relations of the phoneme, as 
articulation. Thus, although – we noted – Saussure never overtly 
relates articulation to difference, negation etc., the above would 
allow the relations to be common in this teleology, from the 
progress of articulation up to the telos of semiology. 
However, the difficulty is again that of formalism versus psycho-
physicality. Saussure made the phoneme a formal unity. He then 
disqualified the formal from relation to substance. Yet Saussure 
has just equated the phoneme with the material (i.e. physical and 
substantial) relations. At issue is whether the phoneme ought to 
be treated as psycho-physical or formal. This pertains to its 
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particular relations. Are the relations of difference, negation, non-
relation, articulation etc. to be taken as formal or psycho-physical?  
These bases developed, we turn to Derrida’s approach. The first 
part of our next chapter will summarise how Derrida will engage 
with Saussure. In so doing we will prepare for how Derrida will 
develop his concerns.  
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Chapter Eight: From Saussure to 
Metaphysics (“Of Grammatology”, Pt. 1, 
1965) 
This chapter is preparatory, and turns to the first of Derrida’s 
French articles “Of Grammatology”, published in 1965 and 1966. 
We will summarise how Derrida aligns his concerns and relations 
from earlier years basically with Saussure. As these bases are 
common, Derrida will also begin to align them with the relations 
of a “history of metaphysics”. By such parallels the implications 
that might follow from reading Saussure will be made applicable 
to that history. At the more basic level, when such relations are 
deemed to remain merely internal, they will preclude a trace. This 
will develop the necessity of working out the trace that Derrida 
will follow in “Of Grammatology” of 1966, by beginning to test 
Saussure’s psycho-physiology and its telos of semiology. We will 
turn to that second article in our next chapter. 
Part One: preparing for our next three chapters  
To prepare the reader, we will situate how Derrida will proceed. 
First, it might have been noted that Saussure’s system, developed 
in our previous chapter, conforms very basically to Derrida’s approach as 
he had developed it since 1954. Each approach begins from address to 
a particular object, which needs to be determined as a whole (or 
outside, or absolutely). Each seeks to address relations both of an 
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origin in consciousness, and an origin of history. Each then 
developed directions “forward”, which allow for relations 
“backward”.  
In turn, that a right to an ideal science holds even without the 
latter’s existence allows comparison. So too does that value arises 
prior to and retracted from even truth and impossibility. Just so, 
the progress of signifiers is comparable in its directional form to 
the progress from one to the other (Derrida’s first direction). 
Importantly, each in turn proceeds by means of an internal negation, 
without opposition to the external. Each allows for a non-relation as 
both general and particular, referring around itself.  
Thereafter, each developed three sorts of levels in this approach. 
In sum, the relations from signifier to signified align with a telos 
of unity of the other in general as Other. The sign as further 
inaccessible whole basically parallels the level of the Other as 
Other. The telos of an idea of semiology that does not yet exist 
aligns with Husserl’s telos of the ideal of science, and a 
foundational relation upon an idea. In general this applies to the 
necessity of relation to an idea, which for Derrida in earlier years 
held as “beyond”. Finally, the teloi would be comparable in that a 
unity of acts of speech without writing would be without distance 
or spatial limit. Derrida in earlier years had deemed the latter the 
absolute. 
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We expressly caution against simplification; the alignments are to 
basic relations common to each approach (telos, whole, part, level, 
difference, direction, negation, etc.), rather than a simplification 
between the approaches. The relations are never identical even 
basically. For example, Saussure assumes relations of fact as 
positive. Since 1962 Derrida had taken a positive fact “behind” to 
hold merely as certain, and the determination of facticity as a 
telos. Second, Saussure never develops the general and particular 
relations of mediation; Derrida’s in 1964 were intricate and 
rigorous. Moreover, third, while Saussure on occasion does refer 
to “essence” and relations in general, Derrida’s essential relations 
in 1964 were much more detailed. Fourth, Saussure is concerned 
with a telos yet to be attained (forward), and a restoration of 
relations in history. However, he never developed the elaborate 
philosophy of history and the origin that Husserl did. The 
relations are as little “identical” as are those of any thinker in 
history.  
However, we are noting basic “parallels” in that an opportunity is 
developing. A philosopher born (Derrida) has been applying such 
systematic relations and finding them applicable to selected 
relations of multiple thinkers – Husserl and Levinas, and more 
selectively to Parmenides, Plato, Hegel, Heidegger. Thus 
Derrida’s approach holds as common to the history of such 
attempts. Derrida is beginning to suspect that these are the kinds of 
relations that pertain to any such thought. Insofar as these relations are 
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“common to all” (cf. DLG 25), then any such thought begins 
from a telos of what has not yet been attained. Derrida will deem 
these relations “metaphysics”. He is beginning to assess whether any 
such attempt in metaphysics begins by establishing a border to 
the outside, and thus develops difference, part-whole relations, 
and negation. In turn, he is preparing to assess whether any such 
thought thus develops “degrees” (or levels) – a progress to 
infinity, a thought of what exceeds infinity, and a relation 
somehow resisting any such thought.  
However, as we caution against simplification, we begin to note 
divergences from Saussure, after which we will align the bases 
again. First, Derrida in earlier years – and most metaphysics – had 
proceeded by means of seeking to attain the “outside”. Saussure 
has insisted upon remaining upon the inside. Saussure’s relation 
of arbitrariness is peculiar to his progress. Next, how Saussure’s 
progress develops into its internal and formal relations of 
articulation are notably his. However, such bases – address to 
signification, signs, by means of the voice in the psyche – also 
accord with a segment of thinkers and works in history (as we will 
touch upon, these will be at least Aristotle’s On Interpretation and 
Hegel’s Aesthetics). Yet more basically, insofar as each pertains to 
basic relations, a telos of speech is nevertheless applicable to a 
telos of an absolute. An absolute would be neither inside nor 
outside. Moreover, Saussure – implicitly – allowed these to 
proceed by means of negation, units of value and so on; it thus 
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seems that the entire progress of difference, negation, non-relation etc., at 
least by implication, is applicable even to the internal and formal relations. 
That is, even such relations are at first applicable in their basics to 
metaphysics.  
Moreover, the necessity to remain internal offers an unusual 
methodological way to assess this opportunity. Derrida in earlier 
years, had sought to consider an absolute as first “outside”. So 
too has most metaphysics, such as theology and epistemology 
(which Heidegger will call “onto-theology” and Derrida will take 
to be a part of metaphysics). By assessing Saussure’s progress as 
to whether an outside can be kept from the inside, Derrida will be 
assessing whether Saussure’s progress is impossible, and thus 
whether a metaphysics that seeks the outside is possible. 
Hence, we caution, nor should it ever be taken that these relations 
are Saussure’s, even in address to semiology. Derrida will develop 
the implications of the relations more rigorously than the Course 
does. To that extent, he will be developing what is possible for a 
semiology in general, whatever the extent of Saussure’s aims. 
Thus Derrida will note from the outset that Saussure’s  
linguistics is not general [which the title of the 
Course claims] so long as it does not rigorously 
distinguish the essence and the fact in their 
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respective degrees of generality [i.e. levels] 
(DLG 1041, Derrida’s emphasis).  
Derrida will seek to do so. As we will explain en route, his 
approach will only barely be applicable to an assessment of the 
relations of the Course to itself. 
Rather, the above allows for at least four teloi, holding in 
particular and general levels. Most obviously, Derrida will be 
concerned with the particular relations of determining speech in 
preference to writing. That telos will be called “presence” (707, 
731 ff.). He will thus be concerned with developing a progress to 
a science which can assess such relations. In general, Derrida will 
thus be considering what holds for any such approaches in 
history. These are easily comprehended as an “upper level” of his 
telos. However, more basically, Derrida’s progress will be 
preparing to assess what can hold of his particular concerns, as 
they applied since 1954, to determine the absolute. This will be 
his basic telos. In turn, insofar as the relations and teloi are 
common, and common to such attempts, then each of the teloi 
above will be applicable to the history of metaphysics. This will 
be Derrida’s overall telos. Thus even the term “history” must be 
treated as systematic first. Derrida will never begin from uncritical 
realism, of which his approach had been wary since 1954. Just so, 
he will evolve to set aside the psychological concept of history. 
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Thus most basically, the demand and the progress will be 
Derrida’s, and Saussure’s system will be employed to attain 
Derrida’s aims. Hence, in accordance with his more basic telos – 
the applicability of what is possible for address to speech, and for 
a metaphysics in general – Derrida will develop the implications of 
the progress. Hence these will diverge in increasing measure from 
Saussure, just as they did from Husserl and Levinas. 
The progress over our next three chapters 
Derrida will first align these sorts of relations – very basically – 
with Saussure. He will then proceed to associate Saussure with 
thinkers in history who sought to privilege speech. Yet nor do we 
suggest that Derrida’s approach will be a structuralism or an 
imposition upon Saussure. He will align with Saussure, rather 
than vice versa; the outcome will be dependent upon the reading 
of Saussure. A strategy of “risk” (from rischiare, to run into 
danger) will apply rather than a structuralism. We will follow that 
alignment in this chapter. 
Derrida will then begin to assess Saussure. In accordance with his 
basic telos, he will only address the first two difficulties. As to 
whether semiology is to be addressed as a psycho-physiology or a 
formalism, Derrida will begin by testing psycho-physiology to 
bring it to necessary contradiction. It will follow that semiology 
can only be addressed formally. As to Saussure’s second difficulty, 
the relation of dependence upon phonetic writing, Derrida will 
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test this by his address to psychology. He will ask whether writing 
must exist only to figure or represent speech in a psychology. As 
did Saussure, Derrida will devolve to the lowest level of the 
phoneme and its relation to writing in order to assess this. In so 
doing, Derrida will be preparing for his divergence. When the 
teloi of psycho-physiology and writing as only phonetic imply 
necessary contradiction, this will imply that the formal relations 
must include the relations of writing. This will broaden the field 
of Saussure’s idea of a science of semiology to what Derrida will 
call grammatology. In so doing, it will develop the first sort of 
trace. This will occur in our Chapter Nine. 
By that juncture, the progress will be Derrida’s, and he will never 
quite assess Saussure’ third or fourth difficulties. That is, Derrida 
will only assess arbitrariness of the signified, and the resultant 
necessity of contradiction will imply a trace; thus difference will only 
be conceded as necessary after Derrida has allowed for a trace. From the 
first, it will no longer be confined to the inside. Moreover, psychology 
will have been precluded, and difference aligned with the formal, 
as difference “as such”. The contradiction of psychologism will 
allow Derrida to align the formal relations of difference with a 
transcendental approach. Yet the trace will imply it is no longer 
confined to the interior of such approaches. Thus Derrida will 
allow for the relations of temporality (Saussure’s third difficulty) 
only upon having allowed for the formal and a trace. That 
temporality may not appear even formally will then be important 
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to his progress in developing the trace and its relations to 
difference. As to Saussure’s fourth difficulty, that of the status of 
the phoneme, Derrida will have considered it only as 
psychological, and will set it aside. He will develop only those 
formal moments that allow for the progress of difference as such. 
These will be the chains of articulation. By working out the trace, 
difference, form, articulation, temporality and so on, Derrida will 
be developing his contribution to the difficulty that beset the 
history of metaphysics, in accordance with his concerns. We 
address this progress in Chapter Ten. 
“Of Grammatology” as contribution 
Thus it is important to note that the most general intent of “Of 
Grammatology” is extraordinarily beneficent. To situate this: it 
might be tempting to critique Saussure’s formalism. For example, 
it might be argued that the acoustic image is merely an image – at 
best, the form of a prior articulation. In turn, a psychic imprint is 
doubtless amenable to being heard and imprinted upon by 
speech, yet this form would never represent the physical 
phonation. Such a form severs a speaker from understanding of 
the sound he makes, or has made. Indeed, Saussure argued that 
the phoneme is “already” a complex unity (C 65 cf. Ce 41). But 
then the psyche is already separated from the production of 
speech. Just so, articulation and acoustic impressions are already 
separated from their unity. That is, one could pick a path to argue 
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that the speaker cannot hear or understand himself. Psychology 
would be severed from phonology, there could never be a valid 
linguistics, or any form of signification in general. Consideration of 
“Of Grammatology” emphasises that these are precisely the sorts of questions 
that Derrida will avoid. That is, while it would be feasible to develop 
a shadow work that would genuinely be the approach that critics 
of that era feared (20), “Of Grammatology” will be its very 
contrary. Derrida will continue to emphasise that he never doubts 
Saussure’s phonologist necessities (cf. DLG 30). He will rather be 
seeking to overcome the confinement to finitude which had beset 
him since 1964, and thus to protect metaphysics in general and 
philosophy against such a scission (DLG 1025).586 That is to say, 
Derrida will develop the trace. More generally, Derrida will thus be 
seeking a science of grammatology. How this might develop 
remains to be assessed. 
Part Two: the alignment with phonocentrism 
Derrida’s notification of what he risks 
Derrida signals from the first that he endangers his approach 
from earlier years. This process “risks” 
                                                 
586 Derrida explains of this history of metaphysics that he will seek “first, to 
keep it from all relativism [d’abord les soustraire à tout relativisme]” (DLG 25). 
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for essential reasons, to never see the day as such 
[in phenomenology] and under that name [as 
language, but also at a level beneath naming]. 
To never have the possibility [ne pouvoir] of 
defining the unity of its project [...] and of its object, 
[…] or describe the limits of its field [as absolute 
beyond] (DLG 1018, cf. 1019, our emphases). 
The teleology develops in its progress forward (as a pro-ject, from 
the Latin to throw forward). Yet it risks falling short of definition 
of unity upon an inside, and also of the limit as absolute (the two 
directions), in appearing as such. This would indeed hold for 
essential reasons, as never possible of an object. 
From ideal object to first direction as writing 
Thus Derrida begins from the object. The telos is no longer to 
determine the beyond insofar as it is human, “Other” is no longer 
mentioned in the articles. The “other” (l’autre) is developed 
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merely in the lower case, as Derrida aligns the finite and infinite 
other with the signifier, and develops the levels via the sign.587 
As to the first direction, this “movement” (DLG 1020) is indeed 
more basic and impersonal, as the  
passage from ones to others (DLG 1022, 
Derrida’s emphasis, cf. 1025, C 64)  
The evolution does not yet include negation from one to the 
other. As in the negative first direction (510 ff.), this passage 
would proceed from one to the other, in infinitum. Derrida asks  
why is this situation on the way to make itself 
known as such? This question would name an 
infinite analysis. (DLG 1022, Derrida’s 
emphasis)  
The addition of the conditional tense 
Note that Derrida has employed the conditional tense along with 
the question. That is, thus far, Derrida has employed the question 
and supposition in order to address the irreducible. However, we 
                                                 
587 As noted, “autre” in French need never necessarily apply to a human. 
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noted that since at least 1964 he was aware that a conditional does 
not yet posit the possibility of its antecedent. Importantly, from 
this juncture, Derrida also begins to employ the conditional tense 
to avoid positing the possibility of that which exceeds the 
inside.588  
Yet a first possibility of determination of the object remains. 
Thus, moving forward, such an infinite analysis retains the 
possibility of application from the particular predicate “one” to 
the “other”. As has held since 1962, anything can be made a particular 
object. Indeed, even the directions of ethics can align with this 
progress. To be sure, although the telos of determining the Other 
is no longer the basal concern, even a face (face) and gestures can 
still be particular objects with a telos of the infinite. The unity of 
such objects, as in 1964 and in accordance with Saussure, is still 
deemed the “totality”.589 
The broad sense of “writing” and “speech”  
However, even more basically than the address to Saussure, this 
totality of objects is said – “saying” is correlative to the basic and 
impersonal positing of “one” (cf. 457) – to be “writing” (forward 
in general, and behind). Derrida explains:  
                                                 
588 For Derrida’s emphasis of this relation in Of Grammatology, cf. OG 243-244, 
DLGb 345-346. Derrida aligns “language thus described in the conditional” 
with the “ideal” of the “language of origin” (OG 243).  
589 Saussure too employs “totality” in this fashion, deeming that the “totality” 
of language is unknowable (C 38, Ce 20, above). 
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one holds [on tend] now to saying ‘writing’ for all 
other things [and things as others]: to designate not 
only those physical gestures but also the totality of 
that which makes these possible, then also, the face 
[face] as signifier, the face signified (with its 
infinite complexity): by this all which can give 
place to an inscription in general. (DLG 1021, 
our emphases)
590
 
Importantly, “writing” designates that essential region signified by 
any particular object that can appear (forward), in accordance with general 
relations (Derrida avoids claiming this for speech, which for 
essential reasons cannot appear (cf. 302 ff.). Even so, in preparing 
to align with Saussure, yet still “on the way” to appearing as such, 
writing and speech still allow for a psychological sense.591  
                                                 
590 As in 1964, the “face” (face) also refers to one aspect of the other that must 
be addressed in the movement from one to other (cf. DLG 46), rather than a 
human face. This is nevertheless a face involved in signifying of physical 
gestures to me (Husserl’s “indication” (252)). 
591 The writing in these levels and directions can still be deemed “vulgar”, as 
still psychological and objectivist (cf. DLG 38 fn. 14, cf. esp. BT 372, SZ 405). 
We will address this below (855 fn.).  
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The alignment with the sign 
The basic first direction is soon aligned with Saussure. The 
appearing of an emptiest “one” (cf. 689) is aligned with the 
signifier, and its infinite object the signified (concept) (cf. C 99, Ce 
67). The signifier arises as a finitude, appearing in movement from one to the 
other, with the telos of unity of signifiers. The telos of the signified is aligned 
with the infinite, as exterior to the signifier. Thus far, any of these 
signifiers, in particular, is first named a metaphor of writing (such 
as “inscription”) insofar as it can appear and “give place” to 
others.  
This telos, in turn, would be to signify the writing in general 
(forward), which in turn is necessary to determine the sign 
(further forward), and the sign of the idea (cf. 661) (furthest 
forward). As Derrida explains, in the movement “from one to the 
other”, 
[T]his exteriority of the signifier is the 
exteriority of writing in general […]. Without 
this exteriority, even the idea of the sign falls to 
ruin (DLG 1026). 
As noted, Saussure instilled a whole-part hierarchy of teloi, from 
signifier to signifier (one to the other), signified (other in general 
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as a unity, further forward, exterior), to the sign and then the idea 
of the sign. So too does Derrida, but he includes the necessity of 
writing to the relation of both the signifier and its exteriority, the idea of the 
sign.  
The whole-part relations of language  
Next, to advance the overall telos, Derrida develops these whole-
part relations via language. For as a signifier at the most interior, 
speech is essentially a way to signify a particular language, or a 
tongue. As Derrida explains, 
one would say “tongue” [langue] for action, 
movement, thought, reflection, conscious, 
unconscious, experience, affectivity, etc. (DLG 
1021, our emphasis). 
For essential reasons, all thought is only made possible by 
signifying in a tongue, permitting consciousness (and even 
unconsciousness, further behind). Yet one merely would say this, 
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as an implicit conditional, for the tongue is merely a telos of such 
signifying in thought.592  
Indeed, this implies that thought, consciousness etc. have not yet 
appeared in what is said. As the telos is to determine the origin of 
writing in general (forward), this would be a part of the tongue 
(behind), as originary. Thus Derrida can work toward the overall 
telos of determining a science of the essential origin of writing 
(behind) – this would be grammatology.  
The sign as basis rather than Idea in the Kantian 
sense 
To begin to address this science, Derrida introduces the necessity 
of the furthest level “beyond”. This arises as the consciousness of 
the idea, which appears merely “in front”. In particular this telos 
is the essential idea of science, and indeed, in particular a science of 
writing which can thus be investigated in its origin. This telos as 
yet only appears as an object and goal. 
Second, note that Derrida also no longer appeals to the regulative 
evidence of the Idea in the Kantian sense as producing content. That 
sort of evidence led only to questioning of finitude, Derrida is 
seeking a better way to exceed finitude. He rather appeals to the 
                                                 
592 “Saying” has no relation yet to Levinas’ employment of the term in Otherwise 
than Being (cf. Levinas, 1974, 5 ff.), which latter was published in French nine 
years later, in 1974.  
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necessary institution of the sign (behind) as certain, thus in 
particular as already and certainly a concept (i.e. signified, “behind”) 
of the idea of science. Thus, forward, the maxim remains that 
anything can become an object, including an idea. Derrida goes 
on that 
[t]he idea of science and the idea of writing – 
and thus also of the science of writing – has 
sense for us only since an origin at the interior 
of a world to which a certain concept of the 
sign has already been assigned (DLG 1019, our 
emphases). 
The concept (signified), as yet without content, has been made the 
prior nexus by which the certain sense of the idea of science arises 
and must be united (forward) by means of the progress from one 
to other.593  
                                                 
593 As to the history of metaphysics: while Husserl (as does Saussure), explains 
the “concept” as a telos of the unity of particular parts (cf. LI 3 §11), he never 
overtly instils its relation to the Idea (cf. I §143). Kant does. For Kant 
(A508/B536), the regulative principle of the Reason applies – for Derrida, 
already applies – as a rule by which the understanding must judge upon the 
totality of the series of finite conditions (forward). Such a judgment would be a 
“complete concept of the object”. As we explained, for Kant too such a 
regress in the understanding is never complete (CPR A508/B536) (279, 216 
fn.).  
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The whole-part relations of the sign aligned with 
Indeed, Derrida overtly aligns with Saussure to proceed. Moving 
forward, he works out the necessities of this empty form. For  
the notion [concept without content] of the 
sign always [already] implies in itself the 
distinction of signified and signifier (DLG 1024, 
our emphases).
594
  
As noted, “distinction” makes a particular relation “stand out” as 
an individual, and thus as separate. But importantly, Derrida 
explains that this is merely implied. It arises as merely necessary, 
following from a certain concept of a unity of signifier and 
signified that already holds (behind). Derrida is still proceeding by 
implication, which in earlier years had led to the involution to the 
transcendental approach.  
Indeed, to forestall a reader deeming this a simple idealism, or 
progress in a natural attitude, we note that the signifier for 
Derrida instils the telos of a signified as unity. This is thought 
                                                 
594 Following from our short alignment with Kant in the footnote above, we 
will relate “notion” only to the formal “notion”: “A pure concept, in so far as it 
has its origin in the understanding alone, and is not the concept of a pure 
sensible image, is called notio. A concept formed from notions, which 
transcends the possibility of experience, is an idea, or concept of the reason” 
(A320/B376). The notion is not yet a determination of the content of an image 
(for Derrida, signifier) concept (signified) or idea (or a sign). 
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“outside” a signifier, to be sure, but still by reference to the 
“interior”, rather than to a thing in any natural sense outside 
(DLG 33, cf. CPR A514/B542). Derrida retains this inside-
outside kind of approach, but a concept (signified) would be a 
unity of signifiers rather than an empirical content.595 Rather, the 
signifier (in interiority) refers to the certain sense of reality etc. as 
comparable to Husserl’s noema. As Derrida summarises the above: 
the signifier (sense, thing, noema or reality etc.) 
(DLG 1027, 1028). 
Derrida seeks to retain a basic compatibility of levels, directions, 
and critical approach with Husserl.596  
The divergence from Husserl’s sign 
Hence we must avoid a confusion straightaway – Saussure’s 
whole-part relations of language, writing, speech and word 
conform to Husserl’s as Derrida treated them in 1962. However, 
Derrida avoided mention of Husserl’s “sign” in that work, and 
does so merely in 1967 (cf. SP, FM). Derrida never does compare 
these relations in Saussure and Husserl in the 1960s, except to 
                                                 
595 Nor is this relation confined to Husserl. For example, a condition in a given 
series is never an empirical content. For Kant, as for Derrida, the regression of 
conditions as mere appearances is never given “in the object” (CPR 
A514/B542), developing a transcendental-logical internality of the sort that 
Derrida evolved in the Absolute of 1964. 
596 The relation of the transcendental to Saussure will only be worked out by 
Derrida’s second article. 
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note in a footnote of 1967 that Husserl’s are much more 
complicated (SP 46 fn.).597 Derrida is rather applying his levels and 
directions from earlier years insofar as they are basic; and to that 
extent common to such approaches. 
Toward the deeper level as parallelism 
Given these caveats, we can summarise the levels that are 
developing, as basically evolved from the two directions of 1964. 
In this teleology, the sign holds as one basis for what was 
previously a foundation only upon Husserl’s regions and pure 
categories (Something, One etc.). In turn, the sign implies a 
concept (behind), which was formerly the originary and particular 
concepts. Moving forward, the signifier will be parallel to signifying 
(or thinking) of the progress from one finite condition to the 
other as speech, and also as writing (698) (the first direction from 
earlier years). Then (moving forward), this unity with the signified as 
infinite will again be parallel to the concept. Further, the exteriority 
of the signifier at the lowest level again refers to that of the sign 
                                                 
597 Derrida explains in a footnote in 1967: [T]he equivalencies 
signifier/expression and signified/Bedeutung could be posited were not the 
bedeuten/Bedeutung/sense/object structure much more complex for Husserl than 
for Saussure.” (SP 46 fn. 5). Cf. our pages 244-245 for a brief summary of 
these relations in Husserl. 
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(even the sign of the idea) beyond, which telos remains that of the 
idea, which does not yet exist (second direction).598  
However, the relations of writing too are aligning with these at 
each level. In particular, we emphasise, writing in turn becomes a 
particular moment of the signifier, in its movement from one to the 
other. Writing in general is then aligned with what must be 
signified. As we noted, the relation of “parallelism” is the 
difficulty – that is, a difference as no longer internal or a simple 
passage from one to the other. Derrida summarises that, in this 
progress at the lowest level 
of writing thought […] in the exteriority of sense, 
belong thus the difference between signifier and 
signified, or at least the strange divergence of their 
parallelism, […] from the one to the other. (DLG 
1024-1025, our emphases)
599
 
We will return to this “difference”. Thus far, note that the “at 
least” emphasises that no such relations are identical; they 
                                                 
598 As Derrida is preparing to align the historico-metaphysical epoch with 
Saussure, he continues of this “certain concept”: “[We] will be able to say 
further on the [distinct] concept of the sign” (DLG 1019, Derrida’s emphasis). 
599 Derrida avoids deeming that speech parallels the movement from one to 
other, as it will be his contention that speech itself cannot appear (cf. 767).  
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proceed insofar as they are “parallel”. To help to explain how this 
occurs, we develop the level “underneath” in the manner that 
Saussure added to his diagrams. This ought to simplify how each 
such parallel must be “content”.  
The psychologistic explanation of levels  
Derrida explained this level even in his “Introduction” of 1962. 
He summarised the progress “across” to the logical relations 
sedimented in the noema (forward), which already hold 
(“behind”), as 
[T]he image of level […] – what is deposited by 
an inroad or a progression after the radical [i.e., 
originary] novelty of an irruption or upsurge: 
every advance, every proposition [Satz [position]] 
of a new sense is at the same time a leap [Satz, 
forward] and a sedimentary [satzartig] fall back of 
sense (IOG 98-99, Derrida’s emphases) 
A level holds as anything can be made an object, thus anything can be 
content. Yet the origin of this progress according to levels is as yet 
“concealed”, it escapes naming (sous le nom (DLG 1018, 1020)) 
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insofar as each content is no longer the original content. Rather, this 
content moves at an “upper” level (IOG 98-99).600  
Hence, indeed, the particular level “underneath” is signified as the 
“more profound” foundation of the region of the level itself. That is, what is 
“behind” even essence can be said to found instantiation from 
“underneath”. Yet as never appearing as content, it must then 
essentially be irreducible to the region. From the reasoning 
developed thus far (484 ff.), it ought thus only to be supposed. 
Indeed, Derrida refers to it as 
the image of the substantial permanence of 
what is then supposed or situated under the surface 
of actually present evidence. (IOG 99, our 
emphases) 
Any relations which essentially conform to the levels can be 
instantiated as content to this movement (forward) as sedimented in 
the noema, for they already hold furthest “behind”. Yet they can 
be instantiated merely by what is supposed. Derrida in 1965 has a 
fortiori availed himself of this permission. All of the moments 
                                                 
600 As Derrida explains, this region of the level implies “the image of the 
concealed presence that an activity of excavation can always [already] re-
produce aboveground as the foundation […] of higher stratifications.” (IOG 
98-99). 
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thus far (the whole-part relations of sign, Idea, writing, and all of 
the latter’s particular objects etc.) proceed as content of the levels 
and directions, by means of which one must distinguish the “system”. As 
Derrida explains in 1962, the level 
brings all this together in the structural and 
internal unity of a system, of a ‘region’ (IOG 
98-99, Derrida’s emphases).
 
 
For Derrida, Saussure’s “system” also arises at the deeper level, by 
eluding appearing as an instance of structure.601  
Note, however, that it is helpful to take the movement from 
signifier to signifier, and of writing and speech, to hold more 
basically as one and other. Even so, a “level” is a metaphor. 
Contents are rather “parallel” insofar as they conform to a system 
that has not yet appeared as such. 602  
                                                 
601 That this level is deemed an “image” will continue to be important, as a 
basis for the acoustic image, and the trace as grapheme.  
602 Note that these levels (or parallels) begin from a psychologism. Upon 
aligning with a transcendental basis, Derrida will suggest that these relations are 
separable merely by abstraction (779). It might be helpful (merely as support) 
to note Derrida’s explanation of Husserl’s “parallel” of the transcendental 
relation of the regions of the worldly and the “psyche” (SP 12-13), that “[t]o 
conclude that this parallelism is an adequation is the most tempting, and most 
subtle, but also the most obscuring of confusions: transcendental psychologism” 
(Derrida’s emphases). The approach is still on the way to the transcendental, 
we begin from compatibility with these relations.  
 - 697 
- 
The preparation for metaphor 
That is, in signification, as each moment is certainly the 
production of a signifier at the level “upward”, the particular 
instances as movement from one to the other (thus signifier to 
signifier, or speech and writing) begin to develop via metaphor. 
Each metaphor is a particular instance of a signifier in general, 
permitted by language in general, as what certainly “carries over” 
(from the Greek meta-pherein) its concept, but thus far falls short 
of its referent. We caution that no metaphor is identical to any 
other, thus each “novel” metaphor in this first direction must find 
similarity and then difference in its progress from one to the 
other (across), toward unity with the totality (Derrida also deems 
the progress a “metaphoric” (DLG 1041)). The teloi of writing 
and speech will conform to this, each of which will have their 
particular yet specific metaphors (cf. 730)).603 
The logos and logocentrism  
Thus the basic movement inside thought, as speech and logic is deemed 
the Logos, as it was since 1962. As noted, logic as asserting or 
predicating is henceforth usually signified by correlative speech, 
or deemed thought. That is, “Logos” refers to the moment of 
grasping the object in thought or speech. In 1965 this appears as 
                                                 
603 Derrida will explain that “[A]s one does not have a non-metaphorical language 
to oppose here to metaphors, it is necessary […] to multiply the antagonistic 
metaphors” (DLG 35, our emphases). 
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the “logos” in particular, which as object is always other to itself. 
But as since 1964, no choice can yet be made between signifying 
of the logos as noema (forward) or progress of the logos as a 
priori. Each moment from one to the other arises in this certain 
appearing of the sign then signifying of signifying in its address to 
truth in infinitum:  
sign signifying a signifying signifying an eternal 
truth, eternally thought and said in the 
proximity to the logos. (DLG 1026-1027) 
However, the signifier (acoustic image) has developed the 
alignment of hearing with speech. Henceforth the logos also 
signifies the parallels of hearing and speech, as a proximity, a 
closeness nevertheless separated from itself. Proximity is not yet a 
unity; the chains of signifiers in the first direction are still “open”. 
Even so, the object must be affirmed (thus thought and said) as what 
it is, so as to think its object beyond (sign, idea etc.). This 
orientation to determining the truth of the object is deemed a 
“logocentrism” (cf. DLG 1041).604 We emphasise, however, this is 
a basis to which Derrida is never opposed (DLG 26). Rather, to test 
                                                 
604 In 1966, Derrida writes of the “conditions of grammatology” that the 
fundamental condition is the “solicitation” (appeal to and undoing) of 
logocentrism (DLG 40, cf. OG 74).  
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this metaphysics, he must begin by accepting it, to risk the 
implications. Logocentrism takes its beginning in thought to 
determine the Logos in passage. As it has been since 1962, this is 
the inevitable starting point and initial destination of philosophy 
(DLG 40, 1028).605 
A parallel to the sign – language as telos 
This orientation developed, we add the next “parallelism” (DLG 
1025) in accordance with the level “underneath”. To unify this 
signifier of writing as writing in general, thus a sign itself, Derrida 
adds the telos of determining language in general as sign, as 
inflation of the sign ‘language’, as much as 
inflation of the sign itself (DLG 1019). 
In a logocentrism, language and the sign (of language), as further 
forward, are necessarily parallel teloi.606 
The parallel necessities of writing added  
Importantly, this instils the necessity of writing as a part of language in 
general (rather than a part of the logos). Thus we will summarise 
                                                 
605 As Derrida puts it: “[T]he logos of being, ‘the Thought obedient to the voice 
of Being’, is the first and last resource of the sign, and the difference between 
the signans and the signatum” (DLG 1028, Derrida’s emphases). Derrida is 
quoting Heidegger’s Was ist Metaphysik, (Heidegger 1930, 46). 
606 Derrida emphasises that these are necessary conditions, for: “[w]ithout this 
exteriority, even the idea of the sign falls to ruin.” (DLG 1025). 
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the “diverse concepts of writing”607 at each level, which must 
determine language (and the sign of language, for the idea of a 
science). Derrida explains the necessities of this passage 
(circularity): 
[E]verything comes to pass [Tout se passe] as if that 
which one calls language could be in its origin and 
in its end only a moment [i.e. a dependent part], 
an essential but determined mode, a phenomenon, an 
aspect, a species of writing, […] only in the course 
of an adventure [forward] (DLG 1021, our 
emphases).
608
 
Note that Derrida is retaining the alignment (“as if”) to essential 
relations. As for the Other in 1964, this progress holds only as if 
language in general could be derived from specific writing 
(“behind”), to be a phenomenon (ideal object, forward). Only this 
hypothesis would in turn permit the sign. For even though it is 
                                                 
607 “Diverse” relations avoid opposition, as concepts, they thus avoid a 
difference holding between two distinct poles.  
608 Derrida summarised his levels in 1962 (cf. IOG 149) as changes of direction 
also by means of the word “adventure”, which has the sense of coming to (as 
“ad” and “venture”) and setting out toward. 
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certain, affirming this “beyond” requires that such a furthest level 
be supposed. As Derrida explains,  
[T]o affirm thus that the concept of writing 
exceeds and understands [i.e. as concept] that 
of language supposes […] a certain definition 
of language and writing. (DLG 1021) 
In turn, one should avoid deeming that writing is given primacy. 
Writing in general, thus far, is the way to address what certainly 
appears, to exceed this writing and distinguish the sign of 
language in general. 
Levels and directions as historical language 
To do so, beginning from the supposition and moving forward to 
the originary, we note that it is ever implicit that the regress of 
conditions is a regress through the finite acts of history. Derrida 
emphasises often that this progress occurs in the “epoch” of 
historico-metaphysical directions, that is, to determine the 
progress forward, thus certainly impelled from behind, with the 
demand to determine the beyond.609  
                                                 
609 The historico-metaphysical directions are not yet the historico-transcendental 
movement in Husserl’s sense, which Derrida will never quite impose, as even 
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To determine this language in general as an idea of science (forward), 
Derrida seeks to return to the first necessary instance of writing in 
its history. This must have been made possible by the essential 
relations of language and writing in general (further behind). 
Preparing for Saussure, Derrida begins from the origin of Western 
philosophy, taking the original model of language to be the Greek 
alphabet (cf. 748). Importantly, the instance of the first act at the 
origin which produced even the letters of the alphabet at the 
highest level would be named a gramme (DLG 1022). In Greek, 
gramme, founded upon the verb “grapho” (to write), signifies what 
forms the lines of the letters of the alphabet. Second, and hence, it 
refers to a source that first develops a boundary from the outside 
and thus, third, it would be an “origin” of language in living 
consciousness, as a metaphor of life (Liddell and Scott 1869, 325). 
Liddell and Scott define gramme thus:  
1. the stroke or line of the pen, a line, as in 
mathematical figures, also in forming letters, 
an outline; 2. the line across the course, to 
mark the starting or winning place, hence 
                                                                                                        
when he progresses to a transcendental basis as such in 1966 he will no longer 
seek to be “naïve” in an objectivist fashion. 
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metaph. of life, a boundary-line, edge (Liddell 
and Scott 1869, 325). 
According to its etymology, the first letter (gramma) in history 
(behind) must have originated from the outside of thought, and a 
writing even before the letter. However (according to its 
etymology), “gramme” as the forming of a line would not yet have 
the sense of the drawing of a letter; which extension is rather 
accorded by another derivative of “grapho”, the graphie. Both a 
gramme and graphie would be essentially necessary for writing to 
appear as spatial (as a line or drawing); however, the graphie is 
necessary for writing as a graphic symbol as well as a letter. We 
will develop these relations as we proceed. Thus far, Derrida 
seeks to instil these as necessary conditions for symbols and writing 
at the most interior of thought.  
Thus, as an instance of appearing at the most interior is certain 
(across), one can say something must first have appeared in 
history; and this particular moment of appearing of the graphie is 
deemed a grapheme. Derrida writes in the conditional tense of 
these moments:610 
                                                 
610 Note that we do not yet deem that this originary moment of writing is 
“archi-writing” (although the former is a condition for it), as Derrida will 
develop the latter only after developing the originary trace. 
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the gramme – or the grapheme – would thus 
become the name of an element. (DLG 1022, 
Derrida’s emphasis) 
To address Saussure’s phoneme as an element (which Saussure 
related to writing at his lowest level), Derrida will be assessing the 
relations of the gramme; yet this is phrased merely as a conditional, 
for that the gramme “becomes” an element at the lowest level is 
not yet affirmed.611 Rather, in particular, such a moment of 
writing follows from its essential levels in history; Derrida calls this 
“derived” writing. To affirm (DLG 1021) this certain concept of 
writing as language in general (forward) will depend on the graphie 
and gramme (behind). Derrida will make these fundamental to his 
investigation of Saussure.612 
The necessary kinds of speech  
However, as noted, writing is never given priority when the telos 
is first the tongue (and thereafter, language in general). In also 
beginning from logocentrism, a moment of speech must also hold at each 
level of this progress. To begin from the above: for the logos too, the 
                                                 
611 Derrida’s inclusive “or” develops an instability as to whether the gramme 
appears as a grapheme at the elemental level. 
612 Derrida summarises the circularity of these relations in his second article: 
“the name of language begins [i.e. originarily] to [...] at least resume under the 
name of writing [...], ceasing to designate a particular form, derived, auxiliary to 
language in general [...] which writes on the contrary even the origin of language” 
(DLG 1020). 
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telos is first that of determining the tongue. Thus, from behind, in 
the first institutive moment of history, there must already have 
been an original possibility of speech. Just so in my living present, 
I learn to speak before I write, and Derrida supports Saussure upon 
this issue. Thus, just as for the instances of the gramme and graphie 
in originary space, there must have been an originary instance of 
the phonation of sound as sensible speech (soon, the voice). Derrida 
calls this necessary part the phone (from the original Greek for 
both “sound” and “voice”). 
Thus, moving forward again, the relation to the phone as originary 
remains certain. Derrida summarises: 
in this logos, the originary and essential 
relation to the phone has never been severed 
(DLG 1023).  
Yet, for Saussure’s psychological (psychique) approach, speech is 
available as part of a tongue available to the community, and 
permitted by language in general. Again, such a phone merely 
remains necessary, but as signifier is certainly instilled in its 
becoming, as phonation upon the inside; thus it is predicated as 
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phonetic (forward).613 As in 1962, Derrida deems this necessity a 
phonetic “production” (327). Next, this phonetic production 
must be determined “forward”, as the tongue, and language in 
general. Just as each level of writing must found a moment in 
Derrida’s progress from signifier to signifier, these necessities 
apply to speech.  
The instability of presence 
However, as in 1962, a crucial divergence from writing applies. 
The latter certainly appears in space, yet speech by its essence 
cannot appear; it is not yet seen. That is, with the relation of the 
phone as sound arises the merely parallel possibility of hearing (as 
acoustic).614 The original speech, of its essence must be unheard. It 
must be without relation to the originary phone (“a-phone”, DLG 
1028) and its production of the phonetic. Just as for the Other in 
1964 (cf. 533), for Derrida this instils the instability in essence as 
hallmark of irreducibility, of a voice heard merely when excluded 
from the originary (DLG 1028).615  
Thus, a fortiori, this indeed “supposes” a synthesis which occurs  
                                                 
613 Saussure deems the phonetic the “physiology of sounds” (C 56, Ce 32, our 
emphasis), which would hold as a predicate at the most interior. 
614 The phone, as voice and sound, is not yet of its essence related to hearing, as 
acoustic (cf. the Classical Greek “akoustikos” (CDWH 6)). 
615 Derrida adds in a footnote, commenting on Heidegger’s Was ist Metaphysik, 
that “the voice of being […] is silent, mute, unheard, originarily a-phone” 
(DLG 1028). 
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at an other level [niveau] or where one hears more 
profoundly still the passage from one to the other has 
never been absolutely tied to a phonetic 
production (DLG 1022, our emphases). 
As for the sign, idea, and language in general, speech is equated 
with the more profound level of the irreducible, for of its essence 
it must never appear; it must merely be heard at a profound level. 
Yet the telos of linguistics is the determination of speech.  
Derrida calls this telos presence (praes-ens, a speech prior to even the 
appearing of the thing). That is, “presence” by 1965 signals an 
instability, of what must appear as proximity of hearing and 
speech without distance or border, only insofar as it is supposed 
to be heard at a level irreducible to hearing.  
Why address to Saussure must occur – the trace 
Thus far, Derrida has prepared his teleology and levels for 
alignment with the sign so as to apply to Saussure, along with the 
telos of presence. We thus begin to summarise why he does so, in 
order to develop the necessity of the trace, and then how; toward 
the telos of a grammatology. First, the necessity still remains to 
determine movement from one to the other, then as a unity with 
the signified (forward), and then the more “profound” level of 
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the irreducible. Thus Derrida develops difference and the non-
relation.  
As we have explained, since 1964 Derrida allowed for difference 
as mediating relations from one to the other, other in general, and 
Other, via the eteron (527). The term “eteron” is no longer 
mobilised in “Of Grammatology”. However, just as the Other in 
1964 appears in the movement of negativity only in this 
complicated difference, in 1965 the progress implies that 
fundamentally [underneath], the difference 
between the signifier and signified is nothing. 
(DLG 1029, Derrida’s emphasis) 
As noted, Saussure allowed only difference from signifier to 
signifier, never between signifier and signified (651). Just so, 
Derrida’s “is nothing” implies a difference without opposition to 
its signified. This as yet falls short of consciousness of something, 
and also of the positivity of anything. Yet it remains a pole of 
certainty; even without opposition, the difference also “is 
nothing”.  
Derrida could not yet lay claim to a difference from the signified. 
He can thus go on, when 
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the sign must [doit] be the unity of a 
heterogeneity [of difference between signifier 
and signified], then the signified (sense or thing, 
noema or reality) is not in itself a trace, is not 
constituted in its sense by its relation to a 
possible trace (DLG 1027, Derrida’s emphasis 
on “trace”). 
A crucial evolution has occurred. Given the telos of unity of one 
and other (the first direction), it is then impossible that any 
relation to the outside can hold. In an internal difference a trace is not 
possible. Derrida concedes that his every attempt developed over 
the years cannot exceed interiority. 
Indeed, only at this juncture, after ten pages, has Derrida added 
his first negation;616 in the first employment of the present 
indicative “not” (cf. DLG 1017, 1021)).617 He negates the telos of 
a relation to the outside. Yet this is still an external negation, a 
refusal of the possibility of exceeding the inside (459).  
                                                 
616 The first article is twenty-six pages long. 
617 Derrida’s earlier employments of “pas” were as “not only”, “not been able 
to not” (i.e. “necessarily must have”), and an employment of “not” in a 
conditional phrase (DLG 1021). 
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The operative trace as establishing a task 
Importantly, however, nor is a trace yet excluded, Derrida rather 
introduces the operative trace. The term “operative” is taken from 
Fink in 1957, who distinguished between it and the “thematic” 
(i.e. for Derrida, the objectifying).618 The “thematic” is concerned 
with “thinking” as “understanding of the reality of the world” 
(Fink 1981, 59). For Fink, such relations “remain in the milieu of 
the concept” (i.e. for Derrida, they remain within the progress of 
signifiers not yet attaining to the signified). The operative 
concepts, however, are employed even though not yet justified: 
in the formation of thematic concepts, creative 
thinkers use their concepts and patterns of 
thought, they operate with intellectual 
schemata they do not fix objectively. (Fink 
1981, 59) 
For Fink, these relations “form, metaphorically speaking, the 
shadow of philosophy” (Fink 1981, 59, our emphasis).619 Thus, for 
                                                 
618 Fink had read this paper at a lecture, which Derrida referred to in 1962, 
along with its explanation of operative concepts, as “admirable” (IOG 69, fn. 
66). 
619 Fink briefly suggests that thematic concepts hold in Plato, Aristotle, 
Plotinus, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Nietszche and the “transcendental subjectivity” 
of Husserl (Fink 1981, 59). 
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Derrida, the trace is operative (even though not yet certain) in 
essential relations; it will be so even should it be impossible. The 
issue is how such a trace can be determined in particular (DLG 
1030). Thus Derrida tells us he will “try to demonstrate”  
the essential necessity of the trace written in 
philosophical discourse (DLG 1030). 
Derrida will indeed seek to do so via writing, and that in turn via 
more basic relations.620 For, as noted (208, 230), essential 
necessity applies levels and directions, in order to determine an 
objective content (forward) that is not yet fixed.  
Turning to the “beyond” in the second direction 
To prepare for this, this relation of the outside to exteriority must 
be assessed at a more basic level. Derrida turns to the second 
direction, so as to exceed the inside toward that beyond 
(forward). This telos of the being of the beyond is deemed “onto-
theology”, a term taken from Heidegger. The term refers to the 
commonality amongst ontology (i.e. also classical metaphysics), 
theology, anthropology and psychology, each of which have a 
                                                 
620 That Derrida will “try to demonstrate [essaierons de […] montrer]” (DLG 
1030) the trace is relevant in that the articles will proceed in very rigorous 
fashion. 
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“missing foundation” (cf. BT 46, SZ 49).621 For Derrida, none yet 
exceed the interior to a founding whole without difference. 
That is, as we worked out in address to Saussure, the difference 
between a particular signifier and all “around it” must be thought 
as a non-difference, exceeding objective relations and their basic 
outside, to the “beyond”. Thus  
[O]nce more it is necessary to pass by the 
question of being, as it is posed at and beyond 
onto-theology, to accede to the thought of this 
strange non-difference. (DLG 1029, our 
emphases)  
A difference without limit even from the beyond must occur in internality. 
Note that the “strange symmetry” of 1964, and its third direction 
which allowed institution by the beyond to make being possible, 
applies in 1965. But Derrida is aware by this juncture that this 
non-difference of the irreducible allows a basis for the trace. 
                                                 
621 In Being and Time, Heidegger explains the “missing ontological foundation” 
for theology, anthropology and psychology; in their fixation on the “objective”, 
being remains undetermined (BT 46, SZ 49). Derrida will address this 
objectivism in relation to Heidegger upon generalising his outcomes (DLG 38, 
fn. 14). 
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The advent of writing 
Derrida can thus return to the circularities of writing and speech 
in order to work out how to proceed. That is, as developed from 
Husserl, the Logos is certainly an object in the Living Present 
which essential relations must be “sedimented” (115) in its 
history, whose telos is that they be determined absolutely 
(forward). Instead of “Logos”, Derrida employs “logos in 
general”, which includes all of the essential levels. Just so, the 
logos is the particular “instance” (DLG 1023) of the object 
thought or spoken of. Moreover, these relations still necessitate 
the unity of signifiers upon the inside as signified, then the 
distinction of the sign (beyond). As noted, this consciousness of 
sedimentations in the logos also parallels the directions of the 
history of metaphysics, in its address to truth. Thus, Derrida 
writes, 
[A]ll of the metaphysical determinations of 
truth, [in history] […] are more or less 
immediately inseparable from the instance of 
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the logos […] in any sense by which one hears 
it (DLG 1023).
622
 
Note that only when it has been heard could the logos be a truth. 
Those approaches in history that demanded to speak and hear the 
truth of the “beyond” are deemed metaphysical (as Saussure’s 
linguistics has been added, this term exceeds “philosophy”). As 
one sense of “logos” is that of an original act of speech in history, 
to the “logos” we include the etymology sedimented in its 
historicity. The logos is what must have predetermined the sense 
of the truth of language as speech since the Greeks (in the phone). 
The basic alignment with historical psycho-
physiology 
However, the relations of speech must be unified as this truth – 
formally and essentially put, as the signified. This telos of the 
logos signifies a privilege of the phone in history as presence. It 
would speak and hear the truth. Thus 
[T]he formal essence of the signified is presence, 
and the privilege of its proximity to the logos 
                                                 
622 Derrida continues that this holds of “the pre- or post-Socratic, […] the 
Hegelian or post-Hegelian sense.” (DLG 1023) He does not yet explain in 
these articles how the logos would be interpreted relative to these styles of 
interpretation.  
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as phone signifies [signifie] presence (DLG 1027, 
Derrida’s emphases). 
Yet, we note, it seems that this privilege no longer allows anything 
to appear to be true. Hence Derrida begins to explain his famous 
difficulty, that in the history of metaphysics, the telos of speaking 
(i.e. and hearing) the truth as phonocentrism was privileged over 
writing. However, in beginning from alignment with Saussure in 
these essential relations, the logos and phone, allow for a beginning 
in psychology. Even the “history of metaphysics” refers to 
philosophers situated in an uncritical sort of temporality, which 
Husserl deems “natural” (DLG 1037 cf. 109).  
Thus, Derrida notes that Aristotle had deemed that the “voice” 
symbolises the states of the soul. Writing was taken merely as 
what symbolises those states in the voice (DLG 1023). Derrida 
quotes:  
the sounds emitted by the voice are the 
symbols of the states of the soul, and the 
written words the symbols of the words 
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emitted by the voice (DLG 1023, De 
Interpretatione 16a, 3-5).
623
 
The alignment with Saussure is obvious. For Aristotle, the word 
for “voice” was “phone”, and for soul was “psukhe”. Moreover, the 
voice for Aristotle is a sound (phone), that is “produced” by a living 
being that has a soul.624 Third, for Aristotle, the voice is produced 
in the “windpipe” by the soul.625 What applies of Saussure’s 
phonation of sound in a psychological (psychique) study aligns with 
Aristotle’s basic concerns, at the origin of the approach to speech 
and writing.626  
Indeed, Derrida notes (DLG 1024) – without explaining – that 
Hegel’s telos of speech is absolute “proximity”. Hegel too is 
aligned with Saussure (C 157, Ce 111 (656)), as production would 
be the idealisation of a sound arising along with the voice.627 
Hegel’s telos is 
                                                 
623 This translation is ours, from Derrida. Ackrill translates the above as: “Now 
spoken words are symbols of affection in the soul, and written marks symbols 
of spoken sounds” (Aristotle, De Interpretatione 16a, 3-5, in Ackrill, 1963).  
624 “Voice is the sound produced by a creature possessing a soul” (Aristotle, de 
Anima, 2.8.420b5-6, our emphases, trans., Svenbro 1993, 139).  
625 “The voice consists in the impact of inspired air upon what is called the 
windpipe under the agency of the spirit [psukhe]” (Aristotle, de Anima, 
2.8.420b27-29, our emphases, trans. Svenbro 1993, 139). 
626 Aristotle privileges the phonic symbol; Derrida will assess the relations of 
the graphic symbol in Saussure and Hegel, to develop a trace. 
627 Saussure deemed the relation the “idea” rather than the idealisation (C 157, 
Ce 111 (656)). 
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[the] absolute proximity of the voice (Hegel 
shows very well the privilege of the sound in 
the idealisation and production of the concept 
[signified]), determination of sense in general 
as pre-sence (DLG 1024).
628
  
Absolute proximity would be presence, a proximity without 
distance, in a unity of the concept and idea.  
For, as far as we have come, Derrida notes that Saussure’s telos is 
also that of the phonic as pre-sence (DLG 1024 (cf. 711)). From 
these inevitably sparse examples, the history of metaphysics as 
logocentrism is aligned with phonocentrism. A fortiori, Derrida has 
endorsed this privilege of speech for the truth of “presence” in Hegel, above. 
This telos remains necessary for a history of metaphysics (cf. DLG 
1025 fn. 8).629 Phonocentrism is a necessary telos of 
metaphysics,630 just as for Saussure’s linguistics. Derrida 
emphasises: 
                                                 
628 For Derrida’s explanation of Hegel’s “idealisation” in line with Saussure’s 
privilege of speech, signifying, arbitrariness, etc. cf. PP 82-84.  
629 Derrida writes in a footnote of the relations of metaphysics and its telos of 
exteriority, “[O]nce again, it would not do here to ‘reject’ these notions: they 
are necessary and today at least, nothing more is thinkable for us without 
them.” (DLG 1025). 
630 For example, the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy deems that “In de la 
Grammatologie (1967, trans. Of Grammatology 1976), Derrida argues against the 
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we think that Saussure’s reasons are good, and 
do not concern ourselves here with placing 
into doubt, at the level at which he says it, the truth 
of that which Saussure says with such accents 
(DLG 1039, cf. 30 Derrida’s emphases).  
We will develop this “level” as we proceed. Thus far, when the 
content is speech, it is undoubted (certain) that there must have 
been a relation of the signifier to speech (“behind”), which must 
be a determination of the relations (and thus even the privilege) 
of speech, forward.  
Thus crucially, Derrida accepts this telos of only speech as presence. 
He goes on:  
for it must be believed that there is an inside to 
the tongue (DLG 1035).  
Yet it is the deeper “level”, which includes the necessities of 
writing, that Derrida is addressing. For he has worked out that 
both writing and speech in their original levels must be teloi. A 
                                                                                                        
phonocentrism that privileges speech above writing” (ODP 100). By working 
from 1954, then through the articles of 1966, we are demonstrating how such 
approaches to Derrida can be evolved. 
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reformulated kind of reason must apply to include the telos of 
writing in an attempt to exceed the interiority of the logos as 
speech (DLG 1023).631 For 
[t]he rationality […] which commands writing 
in the sense thus enlarged and radicalised no 
longer issues from a logos (DLG 1023). 
Hence, by investigating Saussure’s linguistics as a “privileged 
example” (DLG 1032, ff.), Derrida will begin from phonocentrism (with 
its corollary of a writing as merely phonetic (621)) so as to test its 
consistency and to assess its impact upon the tradition of such 
thought. But “underneath” this, a system will be implied which furthers 
Derrida’s concerns as developed over the years. Indeed, Derrida deems 
that upon the “inside”, these necessities relations form a “certain 
system” (DLG 1030); that is, a system which first appears but does 
not yet appear absolutely in this circularity.  
                                                 
631 It might be thought that the classical notion of reason is abandoned – it is 
rather amended. As Derrida notes, it might no longer be applicable to employ 
the word “rationality”, yet another kind of reason must instead arise as a telos 
(end): that which includes this further necessity that exceeds the logos. As he 
puts it of “rationality”: “it would perhaps be necessary to abandon this word for 
the reason which is going to appear at the end of this phrase” (DLG 1023, our 
emphases). It will be the telos of deconstruction that develops this revised sort 
of reason (DLG 1023). 
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The origin of deconstruction 
Before proceeding, Derrida allots a name (but merely one name) 
to how this circularity must proceed. Since 1962 he had 
questioned the necessity to choose between the consciousness of 
relations sedimented in the history of the object (noema), and the 
progress of consciousness in my Living Present according to 
those relations (326, 329 fn.). This object has become the logos 
(in front), but in this progress the logos is first certain and 
undoubted, and must include necessities that exceed it. The logos 
must then refer all around what is sedimented in itself, without 
negation or opposition. This is deemed a “de-sedimentation” of 
the logos. Derrida worked out that even the noema, as part of the 
logos, is still “internal”. Hence it does not allow signifying of what 
exceeds and radicalises it (beyond), which negation also makes the 
logos what it is.  
But as we noted, the relations sedimented in the noema arise as 
already a structure (cf. 177), and a negation structures it as what it 
is. The instability returns the circularity to the certain structuring 
relations of the logos that must refer beyond itself, as non-
relation. The telos inaugurates a deconstruction. Put via language, 
“de-” signals the instability between the particular negation (pas) 
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of a word and the complement (non), referring to the beyond 
which must return to the origin of that word (DLG 1023).632  
Derrida also deems this return a “destruction”, probably taking this 
from Heidegger’s “de-structuring” (Destruktion (BT 19-24, SZ 22-
27)).633 However, the reference is, we suggest, a privilege of 
neither Husserl nor Heidegger, but an alignment by means of 
their commonality, to apply to such relations of signification 
insofar as they are basic. To summarise, the necessity 
inaugurates the destruction, not [non pas] the 
demolition but the de-sedimentation, the de-
construction of all of these significations which 
have their source [origin] in that of the logos. 
(DLG 1023, Derrida’s emphasis first) 
How “deconstruction” develops the application of contradiction 
to a text has not yet been assessed, and we will do so only briefly 
                                                 
632 As noted, we suggest that Derrida employs “non pas” (not!) to emphasise 
this instability, a strong form of negation which juxtaposes both the particular 
negation (pas) and complement that refers to all that is not, and thus all around 
the object (non). 
633 We merely note the basic commonalities of Heidegger and Derrida (for it is 
merely such commonalities that Derrida is developing). Heidegger too puts it 
that “if” the “question” is to achieve “clarity regarding its own history”, then a 
“de-structuring” of the “primordial” (ursprüngliche) and “traditional content” is 
“necessary” (BT 20, SZ 22). Heidegger too begins from “positive possibilities”, 
rather than seeking an entire “negative” sense to this conditional enquiry into 
the original history of the tradition.  
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(cf. 886)).634 However, we suggest, the word “deconstruction” for 
Derrida was first a name for this formal circularity developed since 
1954 into an instability in logic (thought) and language.  
As a name for this formal circularity of necessities, deconstruction 
in turn can refer to particular content (such as the structural 
relations of “psychology”). It can name a movement that must 
signify its particular content, then pass beyond predication, thus 
negating it. One such way can be to make the object contradictory. 
In our next chapter, Derrida will bring Saussure’s psychological 
system to such necessary contradiction, to evolve his instituted 
trace in a difference as such. 
A preparatory guide to the levels and directions  
Before following this progress, we summarise a “general 
template” (DLG 27) that has developed over the years and will be 
applicable to Saussure. We do so at the level of the signifier, 
parallel to the object. As ever, anything can be made an object, 
which must be determined absolutely. We begin by supposing a 
beyond, which for essential reasons must be irreducible to 
essence, yet must in turn found essence. The highest level would 
be that of essences, which in turn would be composed of specific 
parts. When the origin is in question, the essential region is 
                                                 
634 Our dissertation will address in passing how the systematic relations of 
deconstruction begin to develop in Chapter Two of Of Grammatology. Derrida 
will address the text as an interweaving via a contradictory archi-trace (885).  
 - 723 
- 
original. Its parts, of essential necessity, correspond to the form 
of originary content. Such content in turn is already and thus 
certainly given (including as any signified or concept). The 
originary moment develops the nexus in which grasping of the 
object arises in its forms (for instance, becoming, signifier, one, 
other etc.). Provided that a right to do so is accorded, such 
contents must and can be constituted as ideal objects by means of 
position, negation etc. toward the telos. The latter again seeks to 
determine the beyond. Hence the ideal objects in turn must be 
thought of in the first direction, in the progress from one to 
other, in order to arrive at a unity. This progress can occur in 
particular by means of signifiers, with the telos of unity with the 
signified as concept. In turn, the necessity is to think or speak of 
this unity in order to exceed the first direction and at the last to 
determine the non-objectual and absolute (beyond). Such a 
necessity would return us to the necessity of relation to the 
irreducible that must found essence.  
To this form we add particular content (and importantly, writing 
and speech are content too, as are their particular relations in the 
signifier; acoustic image, phoneme etc.). The telos from which 
Derrida began above is the idea of a science of semiology in 
general. To signify the logos (forward) by means of the enlarged 
and radicalised sense of writing (in the levels from behind) would 
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necessitate a broadening of the field of semiology in general to 
grammatology.635  
The conditions of grammatology as circularity 
The relations that Derrida requires to permit a grammatology (i.e. 
its conditions) thus progress in a circularity. Before beginning his 
analysis, Derrida asks what it signifies if (i.e. he poses a question as 
a conditional of this irreducibility):  
1) From beyond to behind, then to appearing as certain: 
even the idea of science was born in a certain 
epoch of writing (DLG 1030). 
2) From the relations behind to certain content: that this “task” of 
determining the idea must proceed via a language in general, that 
implies certain kinds (i.e. as specific) of relations between speech 
and writing (DLG 1030).  
3) From furthest behind to behind, and then preparing to move 
forward to determine the content: that the idea of science is first 
“tied to the concept” (signified) and to the “adventure” (from 
behind, and then forward) of phonetic writing, as to the “telos” of 
determining “all writing” (DLG 1030, our emphasis).  
                                                 
635 Derrida attributes the word “grammatology” to Gelb (1952) (DLG 1018 fn. 
4). 
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4) To proceed forward, from this certain moment: that this idea 
of the science of writing in general arises at the origin “in a certain 
determined system” of relations between particular living speech 
and inscription (a metaphor of writing) (DLG 1030).  
5) Preparing to explain that the content in turn would determine 
the general relations: that writing (from behind) is the condition 
of possibility of “ideal objects”, as “in particular” developed by 
Husserl (DLG 1030).  
6) Developing this telos forward as seeking to proceed furthest 
forward, thus behind: that the directions of history are tied a 
possibility of writing beyond (au delà) the particular forms of writing 
(DLG 1031), and thus to the idea of a science.  
These conditions would make a “grammatology” possible. Yet 
these too are instances of a more basic form that has developed 
from the demand to determine the absolute. To assess these 
possibilities, Derrida begins the address “rigorously” (DLG 1041). 
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Chapter Nine: The Instituted Trace (“Of 
Grammatology” Pt. 2, 1966) 
Introduction  
This chapter turns to the second of Derrida’s French articles “Of 
Grammatology” (henceforth “1966”). Derrida will begin from 
Saussure’s telos of a psycho-physiology that must allow a 
semiology, and rigorously assess it. His assessment will develop in 
one progressive argument to imply the instituted trace. The latter 
will imply the avoidance of confinement to the internality 
common to all such systems of signification. The progress will 
also imply the necessity of a grammatology. In turn, these 
relations will imply difference appearing as such and 
temporalisation, to prepare for address to a transcendental 
system. However, it will not yet develop a relation of différance, 
which will be the culmination of the second article. We address 
these in our next chapter. 
Part One: the requirements of the progress  
The benefit in approaching Saussure
 
 
The opportunities for Derrida in approaching Saussure are 
multiple. To explain this relevance, note that speech and writing 
are instances of content, thus less “basic” than the relations of unity 
and difference. Put via content, Saussure’s is 
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the desire [demand] for a speech without 
writing (DLG 31). 
We caution that Derrida will still work these relations out, but we note as 
an aid that writing first arises as a visual difference, which is a 
condition for an inside and outside (cf. 793). Speech for essential 
reasons no longer allows visible difference, thus nor does it yet 
allow the outside or inside as a limit. At the level “underneath”, 
Saussure’s goal aligns with Derrida’s since 1954, a demand for 
unity with the object without limits. In earlier years, this was 
Derrida’s absolute (97, cf. 313).  
Acceptance of Saussure’s hierarchy of teloi 
This develops a hierarchy of interrelated teloi at their levels. First, 
as noted, nor does Derrida doubt Saussure’s “phonologist” 
necessities at its “level” (DLG 1039, cf. 30, (718)). Such relations are 
certain, and determining speech produced by phonation remains 
the first necessity of such a linguistics of speech. Hence Derrida 
begins by accepting that linguistics must be a psychology. That is, Derrida 
begins by accepting that in a linguistics, psychology must take as 
its object the spoken word alone, in phonation of the 
psychological concept of the sound. In turn, he begins by 
accepting the necessity to proceed by means of speech to 
determine the tongue, as a linguistics in general. Thus he accepts 
the necessity of developing semiology as the idea of a science, from 
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a determination of the tongue. Put via signification, Derrida is 
assessing the parallel system to speech, that of signification in 
general. He accepts the necessity that the progress of signifiers (as 
speech) be united as a signified (tongue), and thus as a sign of the 
whole field of signs.  
The condition that Derrida assesses 
To assess this telos, Derrida considers further necessities, as a 
necessary condition. Following from above, as it must be believed 
that there is an inside to the tongue (DLG 1035 (718)), it must 
also be believed that there is an outside to the tongue (i.e. an 
outside to speech).636 Indeed, Derrida worked out the necessity to 
speak of writing at each level, in our previous chapter. This 
establishes how Derrida can address Saussure. Crucially, given the 
telos of psycho-physiology, Derrida is also accepting the necessity 
of a subordinate writing which exists only to represent speech 
(phonetic writing). What we deem a “converse telos” arises (164). 
That is, for speech in general (and thus the tongue) to be the sole 
object, it must be possible for speech to be independent of 
writing. Just so, it must thus be possible for a writing that exists 
outside speech, and which exists merely to develop a linguistics of 
speech. Derrida is thus accepting the telos of a writing as only 
phonetic is a condition for Saussure’s telos of semiology (we 
                                                 
636 The verb “believe” arises from Husserl, to express doxic positing (200). 
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develop this “only” below). To do so, it must also be possible for 
speech to keep every sort of writing outside itself.  
In general, Derrida explains, of the telos of speech as the tongue 
(concept), that Saussure seeks 
to restore the internal system of the tongue in 
the purity of its concept, against the most 
serious contamination [...] [T]he contamination 
by writing (DLG 1036)  
We have arrived at the necessity to avoid “contamination” (in 
general, an instance of one part inside another, when the telos is 
to keep the parts separate). In assessing contamination, Derrida 
can begin to assess what holds of “purity” for the instances of 
speech and writing at the inside.637  
Hence Derrida notes why he tests what Saussure requires of 
phonetic writing. Crucially: if writing at the lowest and particular 
level exists only to figure the tongue (phonetic writing), there 
would then be a “right” to exclude it from the interiority of the 
                                                 
637 “Purity” is employed in a fashion that is not yet phenomenological, yet 
compatible – as the characteristic of lack of content. In this case, Saussure 
seeks “purity from”, purity is merely a telos of a lack of certain sorts of content 
(Husserl claims that pure content is irreal, thus pure per se). 
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teleological “system” of speech (DLG 1035).638 To attain this, 
Saussure requires (requiert (DLG 25)) at least two elements.639 
First, that there must only be a phonetic writing implies that 
Saussure must retain the purity of speech by keeping every other 
level of writing outside both speech and phonetic writing. Writing 
must only figure speech.  
Thus, at the lowest level and most interior level, should a 
phonetic writing as only existing to represent speech be impossible, 
then writing must be re-included to the telos of speech as the 
tongue, hence to a linguistics of speech. It would then be 
necessary to expand semiology at the highest level to Derrida’s 
“grammatology” (cf. DLG 27 ff.). Just so, at the highest level, 
should the necessities of writing exceed the field of semiology in 
general, then grammatology would be necessary.  
Derrida’s hint as to what will occur 
But thus far Derrida can only “suspect” (DLG 1036) that in the basic 
relations, 
[T]he sense [direction] of the outside has 
always [already] been inside the inside, that is to 
                                                 
638 Derrida writes: “[I]f writing [in particular] is only the figuration of the tongue 
[that is, at this lowest level], one has the right to exclude it from the interiority of 
the system” (DLG 1035, our emphasis).  
639 We employ “requires” (as does Derrida) as one verb to signify what is 
necessary for Saussure to attain the telos. 
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say imprisoned outside the outside [as 
irreducible] and vice versa. (DLG 1036, our 
emphases)
640
 
Confirmation of this suspicion would solve all of Derrida’s 
difficulties. Put via the content of speech and writing, Derrida as 
yet merely suspects that, for essential reasons, 
the system of writing in general [outside the 
outside] is not exterior to the system of the 
tongue in general (DLG 1041).  
Thus he only suspects that, given his telos of distinguishing a 
semiology in general (DLG 24, (676)), that a relation to writing 
outside will hold that necessitates a grammatology.  
But Derrida gives a strong hint as to how he will begin to assess 
his suspicion, in the telos of phonetic writing as a converse 
condition. For 
                                                 
640 These quotations are from the closing pages of Derrida’s first article, where 
he makes it overt what needs to be achieved in the second. The articles 
develop a considered progression. 
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one already suspects that if writing is ‘image’ 
and ‘figuration’ outside, this ‘representation’ is 
not innocent. (DLG 1036)
641
 
Derrida merely suspects that a psychology that seeks a pure 
phonetic writing will imply contamination of purity, and also that 
it will imply difficulties for a psychology of speech.642 
Part Two: preparing for the argument  
Summary of the preparation to follow 
In our first part, we follow as Derrida begins from the necessity 
of arbitrary relation to the signified. He will devolve from the 
most exterior level to the interior of the phoneme as sensible, in 
order to work out the necessities of a writing at each level. This 
will allow for institution of writing at the lowest level (most 
interior). Derrida will then need to allow for a relation of both 
writing and speech at the most interior. He will do so by means of 
the concept of the graphie, which relation of the image permits the 
                                                 
641 By “innocent” Derrida is referring to Saussure’s tone of moral indignation 
at the oppression of speech from writing in the tradition of linguistics. For 
Derrida this aligns with the first kind of violence from 1964, which is deemed the 
“violence of forgetting” (DLG 1038). The reference to “forgetting” is to 
Heidegger’s Vergessenheit (cf. BT 1, SZ 1 ff.), which Derrida in 1968 also 
assesses by reference to Heidegger’s “The Anaximander Fragment” (D 155, cf. 
Heidegger 1975, 51). As Derrida explains in 1968, when one forgets, in such 
amnesia one no longer even knows if one knew something originally (cf. OAG 
66); one forgets even that one needed to remember. 
642 Derrida also employs “not” as it signals the violence of negation. 
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relation of both the signifiers of speech and writing. Third, 
Derrida will thus develop the difficulty – that Saussure’s relations 
of the natural symbol preclude the thesis of the arbitrariness of 
the signified. Derrida will then work out the relations of the 
instituted trace, and the necessity of grammatology. 
The instance of the levels to be addressed 
Importantly, in order to allow phonetic writing, writing must be 
kept outside of speech. Derrida opts for the relations of signifiers 
which pertain to this exclusion of the exterior. The particular 
relations of signifier to the signified must thus be arbitrary (across). 
Derrida addresses 
the necessity of those relations between 
signifiers and determined signifiers. Only the 
last relations are regulated by arbitrariness 
(DLG 23-24, our emphasis). 
Moreover, as speech must be independent, it must be possible 
that this relation is entirely arbitrary. Only this would allow the 
telos of a linguistics of speech in the tongue, and the idea of 
semiology. Derrida quotes, summarising the above:  
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[O]ne can thus say that the entirely [entièrement] 
arbitrary signs realise better than others the ideal of 
semiological procedure: this is why the tongue 
[...] is just so the most characteristic of all [signs in 
the field]; in this sense linguistics can become the 
general template [patron, i.e. as prior and 
essential form] of all semiology, even though the 
tongue would only be a particular system [at the 
lowest level] (C 101, Ce 68, DLG 27, our 
emphases).  
We have explained the italicised relations as we proceeded. They 
also explain how this progress can occur (as “becoming”). Thus, 
Derrida summarises, semiology in general 
would remain commanded by linguistics […] 
at its centre [most interior], at once and in its telos 
[forward]. (DLG 27, our emphases) 
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Yet such linguistics at the most interior and as a teleology,643 
remains commanded by psychology: 
all of linguistics, at the interior of semiology, is 
placed under the authority and surveillance of 
psychology (DLG 1040, cf. ClG 33, Ce 13). 
To further the telos of a psychological tongue as speech, Derrida must 
assess whether the field of linguistic signs remains internal alone. He 
never needs to include the “deaf-and-dumb alphabet, symbolic 
rites, forms of politeness, military signals, and so on” (C 33, Ce 
15) – from the greater field of signs – to Saussure’s psychology.  
Avoiding a first methodological trap  
Next, Derrida turns toward Saussure’s first requirement, that 
phonetic writing only be a figuration. He will thus develop the 
necessity of an instituted moment of writing to each part of the 
linguistic field of signs.  
Note that by beginning from testing figuration, Derrida avoids 
the methodical trap of arguing for the importance of a writing in 
general in history, and thus for an institutive act of writing, and 
                                                 
643 This quote is the impetus for employing the word “telos” (cf. also DLG 
1030), although we could employ “demand”, as what impels the constituting of 
the telos, in each case. Note also that the telos in turn must be thought “at 
once” (à la fois), which will imply a necessity of contradiction. We develop this 
toward the end of our chapter. 
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the inability of speech to escape originary contamination. 
Saussure acknowledged that writing has an independent tradition 
(C 45, Ce 25, DLG 1038, above), hence that there must have 
been such a moment. Moreover, that a written sign endures over 
time in the absence of the first speaker, and thus that the modern 
linguist is dependent upon its historical origin, is one of the issues 
that Saussure complained had misled linguists to privilege writing 
(617). Saussure countered that an oral tradition can retain the 
“features” of a language even more durably than a written one (cf. 
C 45-46, Ce 25).644 Arguing for dependence upon a writing in 
history merely polemically opposes Saussure’s phonologist 
necessities, the value of which Derrida also never doubts (DLG 
30). It begins, indeed, from the privilege that Saussure rejects. 
Derrida never privileges writing at the outset of his address to phonetic 
writing, but continues to work with Saussure’s telos.  
The institution of writing to the levels 
Given that speech must be signified to distinguish the sign (of the 
field of signs, thus semiology), Derrida notes that this institutive 
moment of writing in general must have held for the originary 
instance of the sign. By this the “system” as a “structure of return” 
                                                 
644 Saussure provides the example of the Lithuanian “which is still spoken 
today in Eastern Prussia and parts of Prussia is attested in written documents 
only since 1540; but at that late period it presents on the whole as accurate a 
picture of Proto-Indo-European as Latin of the third century BC. That in itself 
suffices to show the extent to which language is independent of writing.” (C 
45, Ce 25). 
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(or circularity), as developed by Derrida by 1965, is included in all 
its moments (cf. DLG 25, 25 fn. 3). Moreover, Derrida turns to 
the sign to work out in his third moment how each instituted 
instance is a signifier (Saussure’s first requirement) – including 
writing. This will prepare to assess the conditions for phonetic 
writing at the most interior. The approach begins from the sign 
(“behind”), hence from the original kinds of writing. 
The necessity of institution by writing 
Thus, Derrida notes, to appear in history (in particular), the sign is 
certainly “inscribed”, thus must already have been originarily 
written. The latter implies the concept of a (original cf. DLG 33) 
writing in general (further behind). Writing by its essence signifies what 
appears and endures, as “instituted” (cf. 620, 777). As the unity into a 
whole (a sign in general) is the telos (across), and the entire field 
composed of signs, Derrida goes on: 
[I]f ‘writing’ signifies inscription, and firstly the 
durable institution of a sign (and this alone is the 
nucleus of the concept [signified] of writing) 
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[then] writing in general covers the whole field of 
linguistic signs. (DLG 24)
645
 
It is indeed Saussure’s field of linguistic signs, addressed via 
language in general (734) that must be covered. However, the 
necessity to exceed this overall field of signs must still be 
established. Indeed, Derrida puts the above as a conditional: as in 1964, 
this necessity is prior to positing even the possibility of the sense 
of its object (writing in general) upon this inside. However, as 
noted, as institution is certain, Derrida argues for the necessity of the latter, 
hence a founding moment for what is henceforth called the 
“possibility of writing”.  
This instils the circularity. For, moving forward, to heed the 
necessity to found this institution, Derrida situates this even 
further beyond the particular idea. Even the idea itself of an instituted 
moment would depend upon this profound possibility of writing: 
                                                 
645 “Durable” should never be confused with “permanent”. Saussure insists 
that durability implies a permanence wrongly ascribed to writing. Thus he finds a 
counterexample, that spoken language can be more permanent than the written 
word in particular (C 45, Ce 25 (736 fn.)). Derrida never suggests this is 
permanent, and also as permanence would be absolute. Durability implies a 
persistence that can fall short. 
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the idea itself of institution – thus the 
arbitrariness of the sign – is unthinkable before 
the possibility of writing (DLG 24). 
Thus the instituted moment must depend upon this possibility of 
writing (we return to why the latter is equated with arbitrariness, 
just below). To emphasise the evolution, Derrida has made institution 
dependent upon the possibility of writing rather than the idea itself (and hence 
any sort of idea).646 This includes the idea in general, Idea, idea of the 
linguistic sign (and even Husserl’s Idea in the Kantian sense, which 
is no longer mentioned).  
Derrida avoids suggesting that this writing replaces the idea itself (a 
hierarchy of what is beyond hierarchy would be difficult to 
establish). However, for essential reasons (further behind), the idea 
of institution must first be derived from what institutes content 
(furthest behind), rather than from what then allows for closer 
determination of that content as what it is (as signifiers “across”, 
the same as itself, etc.). The idea of institution must be derived 
from “writing”. Henceforth, “writing” without general or 
                                                 
646 The idea itself would be without limits, as what it is (outside or inside); it 
would be necessary for, and thus prior to, any idea that can be thought. As 
appearing, it would also hold at each level. Of course, in opting for “writing” as 
prior necessity, then unless Derrida remains within the essential relations this 
could be the necessity of foundation on anything at all. Derrida’s argument 
remains bound to essential relations, however far beyond essence it seeks to 
extend.  
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particular reference signals what for essential reasons must found 
the general and particular writings at each level.  
Note that it is uncertain whether such a writing itself engages with 
the general, or even the idea; it arises first merely as a certain 
possibility of writing. Thus when referring to the supposition that it 
can hold in general, to “found” even this possibility, Derrida 
deems it “the general possibility of writing” (DLG 28). As ever, 
the whole-part reasoning remains basic, even when it must exceed 
the general and particular. Derrida writes of this “frontier” 
beyond even the idea that it is a 
possibility founded in the general possibility of 
writing (DLG 28). 
By this necessity of an instituted moment of writing (we avoid yet 
deeming it “irreducible” (cf. 805 ff.)),647 a first condition for the 
trace has been developed.  
Given the telos of arbitrariness, there must then be an instituted 
moment to the sign. Hence, as we noted would be worked out, 
the telos is the signifying of the whole field of signs, and writing in 
general “covers” the whole field of linguistic signs (above). That 
is, coverage permits the value of the system in its signifying, upon 
                                                 
647 This moment will be “irreducible” only when the system implies an 
originary contradiction, yet retains the instituted moment (DLG 25 ff., (778)). 
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the inside. The arbitrariness of the sign is unthinkable without the 
institution of writing to the signifier (DLG 24). In so doing, an 
instituted moment of writing applies to the entire field of 
linguistic signs. The field of signs in turn includes the sign of 
language in general, which at the lowest level includes the signifier 
as speech. It is implicit that Derrida has added an instituted 
moment of the possibility of writing to signifying that covers the 
(whole) field of linguistic signs, thus to both speech and writing.  
The institution of writing to speech 
A moment of writing is thus instituted into the certain signifier of 
speech. This is important to permit address to Saussure’s linguistics 
from the position of phonetic writing (due to his privilege of 
speech, Saussure was never concerned to develop this). Beginning 
from the telos that speech determine the tongue implies an 
instituted moment of writing, as a condition for phonetic writing. 
Just so, it is crucial to allow alignment with Derrida’s levels. That 
is, given his acceptance of Saussure’s telos, were there no such 
instantiation of writing to the signifier from what exceeds it (from 
“underneath” its name (682)), Derrida could never include instances of 
metaphor to the movement of signifiers. Metaphor would be “forbidden” 
(cf. DLG 37).  
Yet the above merely develops a moment on the way to phonetic 
writing, for we have not yet added the possibility of “figuring” 
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speech in signifying. The relations of institution to the lower 
levels of speech and writing have not yet been addressed. 
Preparing for the relations of the graphie 
To do so, Derrida combines the two moments thus far, and 
devolves to the phoneme and grapheme at the most interior. 
Above, he deemed that “institution” depends upon the possibility 
of writing, and so too does “the arbitrariness of the sign” (DLG 
24, above). In sum, the instituted moment would be a signifier, 
which in its “coverage” thus instils an arbitrary relation to the 
signified. Henceforth, it is certain that instituted moments as arbitrary 
(i.e. as immotivated) relate to signifieds. Moreover, instituted moments 
are signifiers which must be without motivated relation to 
signifieds, and thus to signs. In particular, to develop a semiology, 
signifiers must have arbitrary relations to signs in the whole field of 
linguistic signs.  
Thus Derrida moves on to the foundations and kinds of 
instituted signifiers (of signs) that can be inscribed in this field. 
We begin from the anterior moment of the signified in general, in 
particular from writing in general. Hence, moving forward, this 
writing in general must have had an originary moment as 
particular signified or concept.  
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From the Greek alphabet to the symbol  
That said, a concept of writing could follow from any of the 
essential relations of writing in general. Such concepts (specific 
kinds of writing) are numerous, and Derrida develops them in 
more detail upon having permitted a grammatology (cf. DLG 41 
ff.).648 Saussure considers only two.  
The first is ideographic, in which “a word is represented by some 
uniquely distinctive sign which has nothing to do with the sounds 
involved” (C 47, Ce 26), and of which Chinese writing is the best 
example. As this kind need never relate to sounds, it is incompatible 
with a telos of semiology. For Saussure, only “phonetic writing” is 
suited to linguistics, as it is  
intended to represent the sequence of sounds as they 
occur in the word (C 47, Ce 26, our 
emphases).
649
  
To that end, for Saussure, the “primitive” (for Derrida, original) 
Greek alphabet is the optimal language in history, for in it each 
“individual” (i.e. particular) letter represents only one “sound unit” 
(i.e., forward). No forms in which multiple letters must represent 
                                                 
648 Saussure, for example, never includes hieroglyphics.  
649 By “intends”, rather than intentionality, Saussure is referring to a teleology. 
Even so, for Derrida, intentionality is teleological.  
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an individual sound were yet employed (the later English “th”, for 
instance, was written as “θ” by the Greeks).  
Second, although Saussure and Derrida concede that the 
ideograph and alphabetic letter are “related”, as both take visual 
form (as graphic), Derrida deems this of “little import” (DLG 24 
fn. 2). For the Chinese ideograph never needs to depict its 
referent as an “image”, and is henceforth set aside.  
It is thus the relation of the image of alphabetic writing and 
speech that Derrida must address. For note that there have been 
two “paths” by which such writing relates to its object: the 
individual relation that figures its image as phonic, and the signifying 
by a letter of a sound. That is, as phonetic writing must be only the 
“figuration”, “image” or “representation” of speech,650 the latter 
moments should be indissociable in signifying as phonetic 
writing. Further (moving forward), in both ways, phonetic writing 
must take as its sole object the sign of speech (forward).  
Derrida must work out how the representation as “image” and 
alphabetic (allowing for the representation of the sound as image) 
can be employed together, in a signifier as phonetic writing.  
                                                 
650 As we have explained, “speech” refers to a single act (parole). 
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Aligning the kinds of writing with the system 
As each way moves “forward”, these directions are aligned with 
the movement. Derrida deems the relation between ideographic 
and alphabetic is of “little import” for this telos, in that neither 
kind of writing requires a motivated relation to what it “represents” 
(DLG 24 fn. 2). That is, when each instance (letter, or individual 
ideograph) is made a signifier, its relation to its signified is arbitrary. For 
instance, the alphabetic letter “t” has no motivated “connection” 
to the sound that it signifies (C 165, Ce 118), and an ideograph 
has no motivated relation to what it “represents” (C 47, Ce 26).651 
Motivation and arbitrariness are correlative – the more the 
relation is motivated, the less it is arbitrary. As immotivated, 
arbitrary relation to the signified is kept for both alphabetic symbol 
and signifier.  
This relation permits an instance of signifiers – as the alphabetic 
and ideographic – that must determine the sign, but which 
relation to the signified as yet remains arbitrary. Both the latter 
relations permit the instances of alphabetic writing to align with the 
system (“underneath”) in its progress forward. However, the relation 
from the alphabetic (and ideographic) to the phonetic has not yet 
been instilled. 
                                                 
651 Saussure writes that: “[A]n identical state of affairs is to be found in that 
other system of signs: writing. [...] 1. The signs used in writing are arbitrary. 2. 
The letter t, for instance, has no connection with the sound it denotes.” (C 165, 
Ce 117-118). 
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The devolution of the alphabetic to the phonetic 
via the symbol 
To begin to do so, Derrida writes that the relation of alphabetic 
and ideographic is again “of little import” as what “counts” for 
this telos is that in this system 
of alphabetic writing – and phonetics in general – 
no relation of ‘natural’ representation would be 
implied, no ‘symbolic’ relation in the Hegelian-
Saussurean sense (DLG 24, fn. 2, our 
emphases). 
This introduces an important divergence. Alphabetic writing, for 
Derrida, does imply representation as “symbolic” (such as the 
letter “θ”). However, it implies “no” symbolic relation in the 
Hegelian-Saussurean sense of “‘natural representation’”. We address 
these in order. 
The levels in alphabetic writing 
We begin by following the relation of symbol and alphabetic 
writing in order to establish the possibility of phonetic writing. 
First, no means yet holds for writing to be instituted as a signifier 
with this telos of representing the image of speech. We move in our 
basic progression from earlier years, beginning from further 
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behind. For Saussure, a first and unknowable moment of 
language in general (langage), permitted the evolution of the 
optimal tongue in history (the essential relations of the Greek 
alphabet). At this level, the Greek language is the original and 
general model for phonology, i.e. for the telos of determining the 
tongue in linguistics, and in turn for the original relations of the 
letter. Next, moving forward, a devolution to the originary parts 
(species) must indeed already have occurred. At this level, the 
signifieds (concepts) hold in accordance with original laws. Then, 
moving forward, such specific relations appear as certain (as 
psycho-physical signifiers (C 31, Ce 14)). 
In turn, however, writing is also certain, and the language in 
general that permitted the original alphabet also permitted 
writing. The original alphabet also devolves to an originary 
concept (signified) of alphabetic writing. For essential reasons, 
Derrida explained, if writing signifies institution of what appears 
and endures (i.e. is instituted), then the concept of writing covers 
the whole field of signs; Derrida deemed this “alone” the 
“nucleus” of the concept of writing (747), and at least takes this 
institution as certain.652 Specific alphabetic signifieds can thus be 
written even though also derived from the phonological alphabet. 
                                                 
652 The above does not yet consider the difficulty of the absolute origin of 
writing, with which Derrida is not yet concerned. We merely note that institution 
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In turn, moving forward from the certain moment, the object 
thus can appear and thought can begin to constitute its object. This 
object is, as ever, the field of signs and its particular signs. Moving 
forward again at this lowest level, the originary progress of what 
appears can proceed from one signifier to another. It can then 
figure its image as phonic (as we will explain, via the graphic). Next, 
it can represent the signifier as phonic (as sound) (cf. above). The 
suffixal form “-ic” occurs as these specific moments are 
predicated of their objects.653 Derrida summarises: 
[I]n this field can then appear a certain species 
of instituted signifieds, […] graphic in the 
narrow and derived sense of this word, 
regulated by a certain relation to other 
instituted signifiers, thus ‘written’ even though 
they are ‘phonic’. (DLG 24, our emphases) 
But we must yet explain how these “certain relations” regulate 
these possibilities of the graphic and phonic, to permit phonetic 
writing via the two paths above. 
                                                                                                        
has been permitted by the derivation, from language in general and the 
phonologist alphabet, to a concept of writing. 
653 This suffixal form was applied to the alphabetic and ideographic too. 
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The common relation via the graphie 
Thus Derrida seeks an (essential) relation of writing in general 
that covers the alphabetic, and just so the figure, image, 
representation etc.654 Crucially, he finds a commonality in that each are 
already graphic. We thus add the next moment. Importantly, 
following the converse telos, Derrida seeks to permit phonetic 
writing in address to the sound via the “image, representation, or 
figuration”, etc. (Derrida continues to list these in order (cf. DLG 
24)).  
The simplified version of “representation” 
To begin to explain this: first, for essential reasons, each in this 
order can appear as visual.655 This is in accordance with Saussure, 
hence that they are “spatial” is not yet mentioned, nor is the classical concept 
of “space”. But that these occur in order is relevant, for as noted, 
even the “interior” level of the signifier must appear as an 
instance of the system, thus as metaphor.656  
                                                 
654 Derrida never addresses the symbol as phonic. This could be criticised: 
Saussure also deems that “rites” are “symbolic” (C 33, Ce 15), and that these 
are never entirely visual as they involve phonation (of chants, for instance). Just 
so, Saussure’s example of military tattoos in the greater field of signs is 
expressly phonic. But nor would these be included insofar as Derrida as yet 
assesses whether writing must only represent speech.  
655 Further on, “spacing” is equated with the intervals between letters, and thus 
with a vanishing of sense too (DLG 36). 
656 This was ever an implication of Saussure’s teleology. As he noted, “all 
definitions based on words are vain. It is an error of method to proceed from 
words in order to give definitions of things.” (C 31, Ce 14). At this juncture in 
the Course, Saussure instead introduces the study of the signifier, concept and 
sign, which for Derrida enters the circularity. But then even the word “signifier” 
is a metaphor of the system “underneath”.  
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Thus each instance (henceforth, it is implicit that these are 
instituted) can indeed be a metaphor, which becomes another 
metaphor, etc. This progress allows the relation of image, figure, 
representation etc. as signifiers moving from one to the other in 
infinitum (etc., cf. 510), even though these can never be synonymous.657 
But nor must these relations yet be addressed in a chain, thus not 
yet as temporal elements. For metaphors by their essence are only 
partially related, by their “resemblance” (DLG 25). The latter 
refers to the shared relation by the visual basis in the concept of 
the graphie (“behind”). Thus the metaphor of the graphic covers 
“image”, “representation”, or “figuration” etc., and in particular 
these metaphors would be  
the incision, engraving, illustration, or the letter 
etc. (cf. DLG 24-25, our emphasis) 
                                                 
657 By this progress Derrida averts the necessity to consider Saussure’s terms in 
the context of metaphysics. For instance, the word “representation” has a long 
history (cf. ODP 329). To take this only from Husserl, a representation 
(Vergegewärtigung) restores a moment of content (including an image) from 
memory to the living present (cf. I §99). More broadly assessed, the difficulty 
of “representation” as what can only represent “pictures” if these are in turn 
inaccessible “ideas” is well known, for example, in Berkeley’s critique of Locke 
(cf. Bennett 1984, 124). As the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy summarises of the 
debates amongst Locke and Spinoza, and the critique of Locke by Hume: “the 
fundamental problem [in those debates, as to “resemblance”] is that the mind is 
‘supposing’ its ideas to represent something else, but it has no access to this 
something else except by forming another idea” (ODP 329, our emphases). This 
is just the difficulty that Derrida is addressing via his levels and the italicised 
terms. 
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Importantly, in the last signifier Derrida subtly encompasses the essential 
instances of alphabetic writing. The “letter” as much as the symbol is 
an instance of the image or figure.658 
Derrida is seeking to relate the symbol and sign by means of 
writing. For thus far, he has not yet begun from furthest behind, 
in what would be the essential source of the original alphabetic 
letter (and thus the gramme), for a gramme does not yet address a 
relation from sign to visual symbol (703).659 Rather, Derrida 
devolves to the “concept” of the graphie, which also covers illustration 
(cf. DLG 25). As originarily part of writing in general, the 
“concept of the graphie” (DLG 25) (behind) already implies and 
then makes possible the graphic, the predicate (characteristic) of 
the object in general. It thus permits the alphabetic,660 symbolic, 
or any metaphor of writing as appearing, such as figuration, 
image, representation etc.  
The inclusion of phonologism 
Having worked out the common basis for phonetic writing as 
graphic, we can turn toward how it addresses representation, 
                                                 
658 The Greek “letter” (gramma) is explained by Liddell and Scott as “that which 
is drawn, a drawing, that which is written, a written character, letter, hence the 
alphabet” (Liddell and Scott 1869, 326). 
659 Derrida will only derive the progress to the gramme, which has become 
famous in his oeuvre, after the psychological basis upon the graphie is brought to 
the necessity of contradiction, to allow an archi-writing (790 ff.). 
660 Just so, this permits the ideographic (such as Chinese writing), which figures 
the idea of what it refers to. But the ideographic, which of its essence figures 
whole concepts, cannot relate to the phoneme.  
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figuring etc. at the most interior as a phoneme. Derrida began by 
accepting the study of phonation (the physiological production of 
sound and speech in the psyche (C 37, Ce 20, (622))), as the 
production of speech as a sound. Thus the relations of the phone 
(voice and sound) were accepted from the first.  
As deriving from the study of language with its telos of speech 
(further behind), the instituted moment of the phone (the originary 
unit of both “sound” and “voice”) is thus instilled along with the 
graphie. Moving forward, this in turn derives to the certain relation 
and thus the predication of the phonic (the characteristic – 
predicate, forward – of sound, speech etc.). The graphic would 
apply to a signifier at the interior of speech which is just so 
phonic. Thus in the movement that tests psychology in particular, as 
psycho-physical production of sound, Derrida devolves from the 
phone to the phoneme.  
The permission for phonetic writing in the 
grapheme 
Indeed, Derrida is not yet treating the phoneme for its formal 
parts (680). He addresses psychology to assess what is required 
for phonetic writing to figure speech as a signifier, as acoustic image. 
The phoneme is thus assessed as the smallest signifying unit of 
sensible sound that can be figured as an image. This develops the 
alignment. The concept of graphie is necessary for an image, 
which by this juncture is necessary for “writing”, “letter”, and 
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“sound”. Thus the certain moment of the grapheme is deemed the particular 
moment of the graphic, and can figure the phoneme as graphic. This is how 
the species of graphie and phone are 
regulated by a certain relation to other instituted 
signifiers, thus ‘written’ even though they are 
‘phonic’. (DLG 24, our emphases)  
We have at last devolved to the most interior moment, as the 
study of physiologically produced sound, which relations of the 
system apply to both grapheme and phoneme. We have arrived at 
the permission for phonetic writing, as the most interior of speech can 
be figured as signifiers which can progress to linguistics as a 
tongue. In so doing, Derrida has developed the relations of 
institution to the field of signs, and the shared relation upon the 
graphie. Next, Derrida notes what will lead to the difficulty. 
The difficulty of the natural symbol 
For importantly, given the telos of a tongue as speech, then the 
image, figuration, representation, etc. signify a symbol as well as an 
alphabetic letter. As Derrida notes, this is 
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the Saussurean definition of writing as ‘image’ 
– thus as natural symbol – of the tongue (DLG 
24 fn. 3, our emphasis). 
The difficulty, we note, will develop from the “natural” symbol, 
which is thus taken to relate to all of the images as writing. 
Speech, Derrida will explain, ought to imply no relation to the 
natural symbol.  
To do so, Derrida twice aligns the symbol with the natural sort 
“in the Hegelian-Saussurean sense” (DLG 24 fn. 2, 24). He never 
explains this in “Of Grammatology”, but does address Hegel’s 
relation of the symbol, sign and arbitrariness in comparison to 
Saussure in “The Pit and the Pyramid” of 1966. Derrida writes, 
and then quotes: 
[T]he motif of the arbitrariness of the sign, the 
distinction between sign and symbol, is 
clarified at length in [Hegel’s Aesthetics]. There, 
Hegel specifies the ‘purely arbitrary linkage’ 
which constitutes the sign itself, and above all 
the linguistic sign: ‘[But] […] it is a different 
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thing when a sign is to be a symbol. The lion, 
for example, is taken as a symbol of 
magnanimity, the fox of cunning […]. But the 
lion and the fox do possess in themselves the 
very qualities whose significance they are 
supposed to express.’ (PP 84, quoting HA 304-
305)  
Hegel goes on that the symbol is rather  
a sign which in its externality comprises in 
itself at the same time the content of the idea 
(Vorstellung) which it brings into appearance. 
(PP 85, HA 305, our emphasis)
661
 
Thus far, insofar as Derrida aligns Hegel and Saussure in this 
psychology, we note the commonality: all signs that are symbols662 
                                                 
661 The translation of Hegel’s “Vorstellung” as “idea” in “The Pit and the 
Pyramid” is Derrida’s. In “Of Grammatology” of 1966 the content instituted 
from this beyond would rather be that of writing. 
662 Should a critic take the sense of “circle” to be no longer “natural” on the 
grounds that it is no longer within the world, this would confuse Saussure’s 
“psycho-physicality” with the directly “physical” (cf. C 98, Ce 66).  
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– these are only ever treated by Derrida as visual – “represent” the 
sense of their object as an image (e.g. “θ”, or circle).  
Hence, in a divergence from alphabetic symbols, natural symbols 
must have a motivated relation to their referent, thus preclude an 
arbitrary relation to externality. Derrida takes at least some signs 
in this telos of a phonetic writing that represent sound via an 
“image” to be “natural signs”. 663  
Natural signs can be images, yet also retain arbitrariness (the 
symbol θ and its sound “th”, for example). But as to natural 
symbols in particular, they are also images – each, we explained, is 
derived from the graphie – but their contents do have motivated 
relations to what they “represent”, “figure”, etc. (DLG 24). These 
symbols preclude arbitrariness in such relation. Thus, Saussure notes, 
the “symbol of justice, the scales”, could hardly be replaced by a 
“chariot” (C 101, Ce 68).664 The difficulty is that arbitrariness of the 
signifier is a condition for the linguistics of speech. 
                                                 
663 We refer the reader to our next footnote. 
664 Saussure puts it that “it is characteristic of symbols that they are never 
entirely arbitrary. […] They show at least a vestige of natural connexion 
between the signifier and its signified. For instance, the symbol of justice, the 
scales, could hardly be replaced by a chariot” (C 101, Ce 68).  
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Part Three: working out the instituted trace 
The necessity of coverage of the field of signs 
We thus begin to work out Derrida’s argument, which will 
interrelate the elements above. Derrida will begin from Saussure’s 
teloi, and apply the relations of institution, and the graphie. Third, 
he will then apply the difficulty.  
He begins with the premise that allows for his application of 
writing (we quote this again to guide the reader):  
[I]f ‘writing’ signifies inscription, and firstly the 
durable institution of a sign (and this alone is the 
nucleus of the concept [signified] of writing) 
[then] writing in general covers the whole field of 
linguistic signs. (DLG 24) 
This is posed as a conditional, as Derrida is investigating 
necessary conditions, which avoids even positing the possibility 
that the whole field of signs is as yet undetermined. As in every 
year thus far, the conditional form allows Derrida to address the 
highest level without determination of possibility. The argument 
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will proceed by necessary conditions alone.665 Second, as we 
explained, coverage applies at the most interior by means of 
signifiers, not yet united into a concept. Derrida is thus proceeding 
from within the relation of signifiers at the lowest level. That is, the 
lowest level (of signifiers) must signify the highest (semiology in 
general).  
Thus, if writing signifies the durable institution of a sign, then writing 
in general covers the whole field of signs. As Derrida worked out 
above, for essential reasons, writing must signify durable 
institution, this is the “concept” of writing that must already hold 
(i.e. as a signified) (DLG 24). For instance, the durable institution 
of a symbolic rite or form of politeness can be signified by 
writing, and just so for any sign in the field. It is necessary that 
writing in general cover the whole field of signs. 
The appearing of relations of writing as speech 
Thus Derrida applies the institution of relations to coverage in 
this field. He worked out above that a “certain species of instituted 
signifieds” (DLG 24, our emphasis) of writing can appear in the 
whole field of signs that writing in general must cover. It is 
possible that such certain signs in the overall field can appear as 
                                                 
665 Derrida is testing necessary conditions at this juncture, which are 
exclusionary in advance (“only if”), as Saussure deems that writing must “only” 
figure speech. These are not yet transcendental conditions of possibility (cf. 
803 fn.).  
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signifieds. These are necessary concepts of writing (behind), 
which can be addressed as signifiers.  
However it is also possible, Derrida is explicitly neither doubting 
nor testing, and Saussure is urging, that the whole field of signs in 
a linguistics of speech can be signifiers in the tongue. But as 
writing occurs in a sign, then such signs can be spoken of just as 
they can be written of. The signs predicated of (in a signifier) as 
graphic must for essential reasons be related to those signs that 
are spoken of, as phonic. Such signs must and can be “written” in 
their instituted moment just as much as they are “phonic”. Derrida 
worked out the permission for this from the concept of the graphie above, 
which in particular applies to the grapheme. Thus, for example, as 
phonic and graphic, the sign “scales of justice” can be both 
written and spoken. The latter example, note, is also a natural 
sign. 
The parallel line of argument 
Derrida then develops a second line of argument. He begins again 
from the thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign, and thus the 
necessity of retraction to only an internal relation of signifiers. 
Moreover, following from the telos of a linguistics of speech, the 
unity (or totality) of signifiers and the progress of the order of 
signifiers in a signified must apply. Given this telos, then the 
retraction to signifiers that are entirely arbitrary (i.e. immotivated) 
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ought to exclude all “natural subordination” in the field of 
signifiers:  
[f]rom the moment one considers the totality 
of determined signs, spoken and a fortiori 
written, as immotivated institutions, it is 
necessary to exclude all relation of natural 
subordination, all natural hierarchy between 
the signifiers or orders of signifiers. (DLG 24) 
There ought to be no necessary hierarchy imposed by “natural” 
and worldly relations of motivation from the exterior of the 
relations of signifiers, or the chains of signifiers that must proceed 
to the signified. That is, this must hold at the lowest level of the 
linguistics of speech. There ought thus to be no necessary 
dependence of the phoneme and grapheme upon a natural 
hierarchy of relations of signifieds in general (DLG 24).  
The relation of subordination from the natural 
However, Derrida has worked out such a hierarchy in detail, and 
then worked out that natural symbols must have motivated relations to 
their referent. Hence, they do imply a relation of subordination 
from outside the tongue. Such relations can no longer be entirely 
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arbitrary at the most interior. Yet arbitrariness at the most interior 
is a requirement for linguistics in general and thus for semiology 
in general. Hence, in such a teleology, such symbols must “fall 
outside” the tongue, and outside the field of linguistics in general, 
and hence outside of the entire field of semiology in general. That 
is to say, the latter requires that no subordination hold at the 
lowest level of signifiers for its possibility, and signs that develop 
such relations fall outside of its field. 
The argument for grammatology 
Next, as we worked out, at least some natural signs are natural 
symbols (such as Hegel’s “eagle”, and Saussure’s “scales of 
justice” (C 100)). What applies to the symbol thus applies to some 
signs, and thus to signs in general (the “totality of determined 
signs”, above). Following in a necessary progression from 
Derrida’s first conditional of the coverage of writing, it is 
necessary to conclude, that if the thesis of the arbitrariness of the 
sign is maintained, then at least some natural signs are excluded 
from the field of linguistics in general. They must thus fall outside 
the field of semiology in general.  
However, such relations are necessarily those that include 
relations of a certain species of signifiers, which signs are graphic 
as much as they are phonic. The relations of this field outside of 
semiology in general are those of writing in general. As the 
grapheme can figure the phoneme, this holds of writing in 
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general. Yet the relations of writing still include those of semiology 
in general (or “semiology as grammatology”, below). They 
necessarily include relations of writing to a broadening of the field 
of semiology. Maintaining the thesis of the arbitrariness of the 
sign thus implies a grammatology: 
it is necessary for one to conclude that only 
those natural signs, those which Hegel and 
Saussure call ‘symbols’, escape semiology as 
grammatology, but they fall a fortiori outside the 
field of linguistics as region of general 
semiology (DLG 24).
666
 
Thus if Saussure maintains the thesis of the arbitrariness of the 
sign, then there is a broadening of the field to include writing that 
exceeds that of semiology in general (676). But then writing 
exceeds the field of semiology, which implies a grammatology. 
Moreover, we add, this implies that necessary relations of writing 
must then be included to the whole field of signs.  
                                                 
666 Note again the term “region”, Derrida is preparing to align the general and 
particular relations with Husserl again. 
 - 763 
- 
However, Saussure does need to maintain this thesis, or the 
relation to the outside is no longer arbitrary, and then a relation 
would arise from the outside of speech at the most interior. This would be a 
relation from writing. But it was a necessary condition of a 
linguistics of speech that it must be able to be a distinct system, 
and thus that writing can be kept outside at every level.  
Thus as Saussure requires phonetic writing to only figure speech, 
Derrida is posing an exclusive disjunct. Either a telos of 
semiology implies a grammatology, which has broadened the field 
of semiology to include writing in general; or an exterior relation 
to speech applies from writing, in which case writing is no longer 
merely phonetic, and the linguistics of speech includes a particular 
kind of writing (permitted by the grapheme). In turn the latter can 
only signify semiology in general by means of signs that are 
graphic as much as they are phonic, at the lowest level. Yet as the 
signifieds or signs of such signifiers must then also include that of 
writing, this must continue on up to the field of semiology in 
general, to broaden its field anyway, to “semiology as 
grammatology”. A necessary relation of writing is included to 
semiology in general, which again broadens the field of semiology 
in general to imply a grammatology. 
Thus if Saussure maintains the thesis of the arbitrariness of the 
sign, this implies that necessity of a broadening of the field of 
grammatology. If Saussure no longer keeps this thesis, then the 
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necessity applies to include writing, and thus include writing in 
general. There must be a broadening of the field of semiology to include 
writing in general, as a grammatology. Derrida will develop this in our 
next chapter. 
The second argument for institution 
The above necessity of inclusion thus holds at the highest level of 
the teleological system in general. However, Derrida must as yet 
account for the relation of writing as a trace, and develops a 
second argument from the above. He begins at the lowest level. 
The thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign, he notes,  
takes good account of a conventional 
[necessary] relation between the phoneme and 
the grapheme (in phonetic writing, between 
the signified phoneme and signifying 
grapheme) (DLG 24). 
We worked out how, for Saussure, this must hold of the formal 
relations of the phoneme, as each sound must correspond to a 
relation of writing (666). Derrida has worked this out at its level, 
although rather as psycho-physical, by the devolution of writing 
to the grapheme, as dependent upon the graphie.  
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Hence, provided that the grapheme can figure the phoneme, then 
the thesis of arbitrariness of the sign does allow for a phonetic 
writing, which exists only to figure, image, and represent speech; 
Derrida thus accepts Saussure’s thesis (718). The grapheme can 
become the signifier that takes as its telos that it represent the 
phoneme in the unity of a signified (668). The grapheme as 
signifier can thus allow for the telos of a linguistics of speech, and 
semiology. 
However, Derrida goes on, this conventional relation also 
precludes that the phoneme be an “image” of the grapheme 
(DLG 24). That is, if a phoneme is an image of the grapheme, 
then the grapheme would be inside the phoneme again, for as an 
image, the concept of the graphie founds both of these. This would no 
longer allow a phonetic writing as independent of speech, and 
preclude the right to exclude writing from the most interior of 
speech.  
Thus, Derrida notes, to maintain the possibility of a pure speech 
and linguistics in the tongue, and thus of writing and speech as 
“two systems of distinct signs” (DLG 24 fn. 3) – speech and 
phonetic writing – it was  
indispensable for the exclusion of writing as 
‘external system’ that it must exclude “an 
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‘image’, a ‘representation’ or ‘figuration’ [to 
the] exterior […] of the reality of the tongue 
(DLG 24).
667
 
This has led to the difficulty. First, note that phonemic relations 
are parts of speech, and an instance of the former is an instance 
of the latter; this holds for the grapheme and writing at the most 
interior too. Thus the first and “conventional” thesis of phonetic 
writing as outside speech implies that it is necessary to think of 
speech as a writing in itself. The first thesis is necessary, hence the 
second must follow.  
This leads to the next moment. For Derrida explains that the 
conventional relation of phoneme to grapheme 
thereby [par là même] precludes that the former 
[phoneme] be an image of the latter [grapheme]. 
(DLG 24)  
The employment of “same” is considered, as it allows the relation 
of negation. Derrida applies the bases developed since 1964, as 
                                                 
667 The word “reality” is employed (cf. DLG 24) as it allows alignment of the 
natural and psycho-physical with Husserl’s “real” (or reell) at the interior of a 
teleological consciousness.  
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“writing” arises in its strange “parallel” from one to other (693). 
To be what it is in the movement of signifiers, thus united in the 
order of signifiers (thus as the tongue), the “signifying grapheme” 
(i.e. of phonetic writing) must then be not what it is.  
Thus as phonetic writing must be what it is; it is necessary to 
signify the unity of the progress of signifiers as a distinct sign. It is 
thus necessary to signify the opposites at once (DLG 24, 24 fn. 
3).668 Hence phonetic writing must be what it is, as the image (and 
symbol) of speech (thus as interior to speech, which is a writing in 
itself). Yet phonetic writing must then be not what it is, not the 
image and symbol, and exterior to relation to speech.669 The two, 
which are not each other, must be thought at once. As not each 
other at once, they can be opposed. This implies – we note – that 
they are contradictories (DLG 29); the opposites cannot both be 
necessary at once. In this progression, the thesis of the 
arbitrariness of the sign necessitates the contradiction of phonetic 
writing. Derrida explains: 
it is now necessary to think [signify] that writing 
is at once more exterior to speech, not being 
                                                 
668 Derrida explains a further contradictory argument in a footnote, in that 
speech and writing are “at once” both figuration, and just so “two systems of 
distinct signs” (DLG 25 fn. 3, cf. C 45, Ce 24-25); this sort of contradiction is 
comparable to the Hegelian sort that we noted above (583).  
669 As explained, as movement, these contraries progress “by the same”, which 
mediate moment permits the movement from one to the other – the same, 
thought “at once”, implies necessary contradiction (546).  
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[n’etant pas] its ‘image’ or ‘symbol’, and more 
interior to the speech which is already in itself a 
writing (DLG 24-25). 
We will address the “more” and “more” below. Thus far, and 
from above, if the thesis of arbitrariness of the sign is maintained, 
this implies a necessary contradiction of phonetic writing. The latter 
was the necessity that Derrida assessed from the first.  
Yet from above, the necessity of writing is maintained despite the necessity of 
contradiction. Moreover, if there is a contradiction, then there ought 
to be no possibility of the relation of writing or speech at the 
most interior; yet Derrida has worked out, from the graphie, that a 
moment of institution by an irreducible writing must occur. In this 
case, the institution of writing is kept despite the necessity of contradiction. A 
fortiori, this relation is deemed the instituted trace. 
Setting aside of psycho-physiology 
In such a moment at the most interior, beginning from the thesis 
of the arbitrariness of the sign implies that Saussure’s telos of 
semiology in general as psycho-physical is no longer valid. Yet in 
devolving from the concept of the graphie, an instituted moment 
of writing is nevertheless maintained. This develops the possibility 
of an instituted trace, even when it must no longer be believed 
that there is an interior to speech as psycho-physiology.  
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However, Derrida’s more basic telos is to work these relations out 
for semiology in general, thus for any such system of signification. 
Thus we note that his implication avoids opposing speech and 
writing absolutely; Derrida proceeds by means of “more” and 
“more”, which avoid opposition of the content. That is, speech 
and writing have not yet been made contradictory in themselves, 
rather, the relations in general necessitate contradiction.  
Indeed, were these “more” and “less” other, as in 1964 (542), it 
would no longer be contradictory to think them at once; for it is 
necessary for internality that the greater the difference between 
signifiers, the more arbitrary the relation to the signified (654). 
This would allow the options to not be one another in the 
movement of the same, without necessity of contradiction; an 
internal negation. Derrida has explicitly negated the relation to the 
outside.  
The institution of the trace 
This progress has followed by working out the relations of the 
graphie. Hence a fortiori, Derrida goes on that for essential reasons, 
and thus as common to all: 
the concept [signified] of the graphie implies, as 
the possibility common to all systems of 
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signification, the instance of the instituted trace. 
(DLG 25, Derrida’s emphases)
670
  
Instead of necessary contradiction leading to a “stifling” of the 
origin, as in 1964, the institution that remains after necessary contradiction 
implies an instance of a trace.  
Thus indeed, as explained above, as instituted yet arising from the 
telos of arbitrariness, this implies the trace arises from the 
immotivated relation: 
[T]race instituted (not [non] capricious but 
‘immotivated’) (DLG 25).
671
 
We have, we suggest, followed in one sequence how Derrida 
systematically works out the first moment of the trace in his oeuvre. 
Indeed, Derrida above deems that the implication is “common to 
all” such systems of signification as he is indeed developing the 
possibilities for semiology in general (676). To do so, in particular, 
he is working with the basic relations, of which the trace is an 
instance. 
                                                 
670 The term “implied” (DLG 25) – and, following Derrida, we have been 
employing it in this fashion since the “Introduction” – refers to a necessity 
worked out by a prior necessity (235). 
671 By “non capricious”, Derrida notes that the trace is everything outside the 
capricious; rather it is rigorous. 
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Avoiding a methodological confusion, and 
Derrida’s “rigour” 
However, it is important to avoid deeming that Derrida has 
related the phone to the graphie, and phonetic to the graphic, in 
that the signifier too is an acoustic image. Were this so, Derrida 
could simply have argued, having developed the graphie, that 
“The signifier is an acoustic image”, then that “The graphie can 
figure an image in general”, which would include an acoustic 
image, and then, “The graphie can figure the signifier”. As it 
happens, this would seem to prove Saussure’s condition of 
phonetic writing without possibility of dispute.  
First, however, such a relation to the signifier or phoneme as image is not 
yet allocated any role in Derrida’s argument. As we noted at the outset, 
Derrida begins by accepting each element of the signifier that 
Saussure argues for. Each telos with which we began (the 
acceptance of teloi, and then the converse telos) has been 
indispensable. Thus each moment of the argument remained 
upon the “side” of phonetic writing. Derrida has adhered to 
testing, in rigorous fashion, whether phonetic writing can only 
represent, figure, or “image” the signifier.  
Second, the argument arguing for relation of signifier to image, 
and thus to the graphie or grapheme would no longer follow 
through, as it would no longer adhere to the levels. A graphie 
relates to the phone, which has no such relation to an image (but 
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merely to sound and voice). Rather, the grapheme relates to the 
phoneme (which relation implied the necessary contradiction). 
Derrida has rather argued by the rigorous “protocol” of a reductio 
ad absurdum (37, 265). He began with one of Saussure’s conditions 
(that writing only figure speech), to develop it to necessary 
contradiction, which thus applies to Saussure’s overall possibility 
of phonetic writing as psychological. 
Parenthesis: the logic of the structure maintained 
Next, we must avoid misunderstanding. Rather than deeming 
Saussure’s progress to be false (the value of such phonologist 
arguments, Derrida will re-emphasise, is undoubted (DLG 30)), 
Derrida develops the implications from which necessities one must begin 
(DLG 25). The resultant necessity of contradiction is not yet its 
confirmation. Psychology remains a prior necessity, and is kept as 
an origin. Thus rather than logic failing, it is kept in order to 
maintain this necessity of contradiction, which latter merely holds 
of sensible content.  
Indeed, Derrida is working at a level of which even writing and 
speech are mere content. Writing and speech at this level are 
metaphors for appearing and lack of appearing respectively. In 
turn, writing (which appears) still aligns with progress from one to 
other as a passage to the indefinite. Derrida is working out how 
these ought to be separable merely by abstraction (779). To do so, 
he develops their implications as structure and movement. 
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From evolution of the “is” to a “general structure” 
of the instituted trace 
First, in the derivation to the trace, the difficulty that Derrida 
deemed beset “philosophy” since 1954 – the inability to affirm the 
origin – has been permitted in an unusual fashion. Only at this 
juncture does Derrida go on of this instituted moment: 
[I]t not only implies this [instituted] trace, it is 
this instance. (DLG 25, our emphases) 
In the article of 1966 (DLG 23-25), Derrida has refrained from 
admitting this word “is” until after the logic arrives at 
contradiction, to permit its continued progress.  
To explain this, we begin from furthest behind (i.e. from beyond), 
as irreducible, the instituted moment from the irreducible – 
supposing it has sense to speak of this – no longer remains only a 
mere necessity of appearing from behind. It has evolved to an 
instituted moment from an irreducible absence that appears inside 
as what it is (put via content, it appears as writing inside speech, 
as presence). This “is” 
an irreducible absence in the presence of the 
trace (DLG 25). 
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Just so, moving forward and downward from the originary level, 
the trace thus already appears in its becoming (de-venir), an implicit 
“is” of appearing as such.  
But nor is such existence affirmed. For (forward again), the trace 
as having become passes to indefinite relation (i.e. without 
definite motivation). Indeed, Derrida writes: 
[T]he immotivation of the trace is always 
[already] become. […] The trace is indefinitely its 
own becoming-immotivated. (DLG 26, 
Derrida’s emphasis first) 
This trace “is” itself – the “is” of predication which held from the 
first (across) – only as becoming other to itself in the movement 
of the same (DLG 25). Yet in doing so, it appears to be itself only 
as not being what it is (cf. 510 ff.), passing to the indefiniteness 
even of its im-motivation, thus indefiniteness even of 
arbitrariness, as a disappearing (263). Put via language, the prefixes 
“im-”, and “dis-” instil the instability of the negation and non-
relation, thus opening (500 fn.).  
As ever, given the demand, this arrival at the indefinite instils the 
necessary return to the origin (a priori) in the structure of return 
(DLG 25). That is, in turn, the relations of circularity – rather 
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than the content of “appearing”, writing etc. – have again been 
made object.672 From this position, the structure and movement must 
be thought as what it is (an implicit “is” of identity) (DLG 25-26). 
But one can speak of this structure as an object only if it “is” itself 
as always already other to itself in the movement. Hence one can 
speak of it only as no longer a progress of content resembling one 
another as the same (metaphor), by means of a position upon a 
relation of the displacement of this continuity. 
Thus instead of demanding a synthesis (in its fundamental form 
of “identity” (as required since 1954 (138, 329))), Derrida writes 
that this trace “is”  
without any simplicity, any identity, 
resemblance or continuity (DLG 25).
673
 
Thus, in the evolution from simple content to a structure and 
movement, Derrida seeks to develop the implications.  
The evolution to difference and the trace 
For in turn, beginning from Saussure’s assumption of the 
psychological and psycho-physical (which latter Derrida from this 
                                                 
672 In 1964, this moment of making the movement into an object led to 
“economy” (VeM 442), which Derrida never mentions in the pages we address 
in “Of Grammatology”, only adding the term in the book version. 
673 As an instance, it is stretched in passage through, or across (à travers (DLG 
25, fn. 3)) itself in the circularity. 
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juncture deems “sensible” and “natural” (DLG 29)) in the tongue 
led to the necessity of contradiction of arbitrariness. The attempt 
to distinguish the sign via arbitrariness led to the necessity of 
contradiction of the sensible, at the most interior of the phonic 
signifier. It thus also set aside opposition to an outside, and thus a 
simple limit to the outside (650) as absence.  Hence, crucially, 
Derrida notes that the movement is pulled back to “this side of 
opposition” of the sensible content (DLG 25).  
Even so, the progress does not yet contradict the movement of 
difference at the most interior. However, it does imply that the 
relation from a natural and sensible tongue evolved to necessary 
contradiction. Just so, it implies that the relation of phonetic 
writing (as dependent upon speech) developed to necessary 
contradiction. As Derrida puts it, 
difference never was in itself, and by 
definition, a sensible plenitude, its necessity 
contradicts the pretended necessity of a natural 
phonic essence of the tongue and thus the 
pretended natural dependence of the graphic 
signifier by relation to the phonic signifier. 
(DLG 29) 
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Hence this movement between signifiers in Saussure as different 
to one another, was only internal difference from the other, indeed 
without external opposition (646). In particular, the attempt to 
allow for speech as presence, by assessing phonetic writing, 
implied a contradiction and necessity of admission of writing. Yet 
nor are presence or the moment of writing dispelled.  
For a trace remains as instituted to the most interior. The trace of 
the irreducible can become what it is, at the very interior of this 
movement, only in “internal” difference from its other, without external 
opposition.674 Indeed, Derrida admits internal difference only after 
retracting from the sensible and having developed a trace (679).  
That is, thus far in this movement, the trace as a signifier is what 
it is (not the other) only in its difference from the other, and as 
object, so to speak. The trace as structure of return appears as 
what it is (an identity) only in becoming different from itself without 
particular sensible content.  
Next, Derrida adds an element that was implicit to psychology. 
As noted, Saussure assumed the psycho-physical acts of speech 
and phonetic writing to hold in an unexamined sort of space and 
                                                 
674 What Derrida suspected has begun to come to pass, that “[T]he sense 
[direction] of the outside has always [already] been inside the inside [the trace 
after the necessary contradiction of the phoneme], that is to say imprisoned 
outside the outside [the trace as irreducible]” (DLG 1036, (730)). Derrida has 
not yet worked out how this holds “vice versa”, as he has not yet worked out 
an irreducible difference. 
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time (668). For Derrida since 1962 such particular moments of 
material space and time were referred to as “here” and “now” 
(IDG 52, cf. IOG 63 (234)). In 1966 they have implied necessary 
contradiction, although the trace and difference as such continue 
to apply. Derrida summarises importantly: 
[T]he absence of an other here-now, of an other 
transcendental present, of an other origin of the 
world appearing as such, presents itself as an 
irreducible absence in the presence of the trace 
(DLG 25, our emphasis last). 
Note that by this Derrida never does dispel presence: it has been 
worked out how the irreducible trace must “present itself” in becoming 
absent in the movement of one and other. Derrida has set forth a 
noteworthy contribution to the history of phonocentrism to 
assess what can be determined of presence. Yet Derrida is 
preparing to go further. Indeed, only at this juncture in his argument 
has he aligned his approach with the “transcendental” (DLG 25 (679)). 
Preparing for the transcendental 
Derrida thus begins to develop the implications. To be sure, the 
first possibility of being a phenomenon remains (as it has since 
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1962), while the necessities then imply the above. Derrida indeed 
deems the overall progress to be a system. He adds:  
[I]t is from the possibility of this total system 
that it is necessary to begin and depart [il faut 
partir] (DLG 25 fn. 3).  
“Il faut partir” has the unstable sense both of beginning from (and 
thus related to) and departing from (and thus other to). Even the 
system must evolve as a circularity. Derrida thus heeds the 
necessity to determine the totality of particulars as a system. 
Toward the general structure by abstraction 
At this juncture the psychological sense of levels and directions 
evolves. Every element in address to Saussure had been a 
psychological content. Thus the order of signifiers, writing, one 
and other etc. were easily visualised by “parallelism” (694). Their 
progress from one to other in space and time was also accepted. 
So too the hierarchy of writing was treated as fixed and visual, 
while those of speech were assumed as necessary from the first. 
Yet these led to necessary contradiction.  
The first implication is that no easy objectifying of particulars is 
to be had. Derrida explains that this structure and movement can 
henceforth be thought merely by “abstraction”. The latter term refers to a 
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generalisation without separability of parts (cf. PDP 3, LI 6 §40).675 
The particular progress of one and other, and chains of writing are no 
longer so easily separable as “parallels” or “levels”. In turn, when 
parts then no longer appear as psycho-physical, so too, neither 
does a whole that connects them. The trace relates the movement from 
one to other and writing in a structure and movement without 
separability of sensible content. 
Moreover, that the particular moment here-now – these are no 
longer separated – implies necessary contradiction, for Derrida 
implies a basis that eludes particular appearing. Since 1954, for 
Derrida, that basis had been temporal; yet even the latter has been 
made necessarily contradictory (240, 129)). Derrida no longer 
merely includes a temporal relation as constituted, but rather a 
temporalisation.  
                                                 
675 More recently, the Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy summarises abstraction via 
whole-part relations, as “the process of considering only some aspects of a 
whole” (PDP 3). Abstraction famously arises with Locke, for whom 
hierarchical relations of signification and ideas can be separated only by 
abstraction. Locke’s Book 3 of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding deals 
directly with these relations. He writes that “words are general […] when used 
for signs of ideas, […] and ideas are general when they are set up as the 
representatives of many particular things”. Thus “signification is nothing but a 
relation that by the mind of man is added to them” (Locke Book 3, iii, 2). At 
this juncture, Husserl is very relevant. He makes abstraction his most explicit 
whole-part explanation in the Logical Investigations (LI 2 §15b ff.), and critiques 
Locke upon the relations above. Husserl cautions that abstracta (dependent 
parts rather than separable pieces) must never be confused with simple part-
contents as “only possible in or attached to” particular concrete (reall) content. 
The latter he associates with the psychological approach to sense-content. Rather, 
Husserl emphasises that abstraction occurs without separability, and also 
employs abstraction as a progress to generalisation in essence and language, as 
“description of the essence”, and “to clarify the meaning of general names”, as 
Derrida seeks to do (LI 6 §40). Derrida has progressed from necessary 
contradiction of psychological particulars to arrive at the alignment with 
appearing as such, by this preparing for the progress to general and essential 
relations as transcendental, in order to align with Husserl. 
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Even so, the trace remains. Provided that this movement from one 
to the other in the same henceforth occurs by abstraction, the 
progress as such can be called the “general structure” of the 
immotivated trace. Derrida summarises: 
[t]he general structure of the immotivated trace 
connects in the same possibility and without one 
being able to separate them other than by 
abstraction, the structure of relation to the other, 
the movement of temporalisation, and language 
as writing. (DLG 25-26, our emphases) 
A fortiori, in this moment of abstraction of an internal difference 
without separability in its movements from one to other, Derrida 
calls this the appearing of difference as such.  
In sum, and indeed, only at this juncture in the progress in 1966 
has Derrida included temporalisation to the relations of difference 
and the trace (DLG 25, (679)). He summarises these as  
[T]he instituted trace […] that is to say, 
retention of difference in a structure of return 
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where difference appears as such (DLG 25, our 
emphasis). 
Having included temporalisation, Derrida also includes its relation 
as retention. We will develop this in our next chapter, for Derrida 
must still explain his relation of a system to the transcendental, 
and appearing as such, which ought to arise with a reduction. 
Preparing for the progress as evolution from 1962 
At this juncture we will align the above with Derrida’s progress 
since 1962, to situate the progress in our next chapter. Derrida 
will apply several impetus that he first developed at the outset of 
his work of 1962. He has retreated from the sensible and 
particular to a general progress, at a more profound level even than 
temporality’s lack of appearing. As it had since 1962, this will 
allow for a sort of “reduction” (240) to address a founding but 
irreducible basis. Crucially, moreover, that progress had 
developed from a question that ought to open a passage to the origin 
(222-228).676 
From that juncture in 1962 Derrida had employed directions in 
“quotation marks”, and developed the reduction. That is, the 
                                                 
676 Derrida had begun his progress by working out that “only a teleology can open 
[s’ouvrir] a passage toward the beginnings.” (IDG 54, cf. IOG 64, DLG 31 (224-
228), our emphases). 
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purpose of a reduction is to allow restoration of the general and 
particular relations as pure and formal, without external 
dependence. The levels and directions will be kept. However, 
Derrida must yet work out how to restore them to the abstracted 
progress of writing and speech, and one to other that he 
developed from Saussure. Thus he will ask in closing: 
[W]here and when does [a general possibility of 
writing] pass from one writing to the other, from 
writing in general [behind] to writing in the derived 
[étroit] sense, then to a [lower] level of writing to the 
other etc.? (DLG 40, our emphases) 
Derrida’s progress in 1966 aligns with the basic telos and relations 
that he had worked out from the start of his first published work 
in 1962. Yet he has developed his address to them in far more 
detail.  We will follow in our next chapter as continues to do so.  
Part Five: brief critical notes, and the elision of the 
“third” Saussure 
As it is required of a dissertation to be critical, we will briefly 
explain how Derrida’s concerns are his own. In order to assess 
what is possible for semiology, he has indeed exceeded the degree 
of rigour that Saussure developed in the Course. However, as with 
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Husserl and Levinas, to do so Derrida needed to proceed via a 
selective explanation of Saussure. First, were the relation from the 
signifier to signified entirely arbitrary, Saussure would be 
recommending only a study of signifiers upon the inside, which 
would be senseless. For example, it would study the French 
sequence of sounds (signifiers) “s-ö-r” in the differences of its 
phonemes, which relation to the concept, sign and idea (“sister”) 
is arbitrary. Phonetic writing would represent only such garbled 
sounds. To be sure, Derrida worked out the necessity of 
institution by the sense of a writing that appears in the signifier – 
but this inclusion was never Saussure’s. 
To be sure, Derrida had noted that nor does Saussure deem 
relations between signs are arbitrary in every case. Derrida quoted 
that 
signs which are entirely arbitrary convey better 
than others the ideal semiological process (C 
68, DLG 27, our emphases). 
Yet as we have followed, Derrida only ever tested those relations 
of the signs (as signifier to signified in speech) which must be 
entirely arbitrary, or they would admit external relations from the 
first. That is to say, Derrida needed to take Saussure’s telos to be 
that of an absolute arbitrariness, to develop his concerns from 
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earlier years. To demonstrate that the limits cannot hold in 
general, Derrida needed to deem that Saussure enforces these 
limits in the first place. Only this allowed Derrida to work out 
that the premise necessitates contradiction.  
Just so, Derrida needed to take phonetic writing, which he then 
derived from writing, to have the telos of only representing 
speech. Only this let him arrive at the necessary contradiction 
while retaining an instituted moment. Only such teloi then 
necessitate contradiction, to permit the trace of what Saussure 
seeks to exclude (and develop Derrida’s concerns).  
But Saussure never did suppose that all signs were entirely arbitrary 
in relation to language. He explains that: 
[T]he fundamental principle of the arbitrary 
nature of the linguistic sign does not prevent 
us from distinguishing in any tongue between 
what is intrinsically arbitrary – that is, 
immotivated – and what is only relatively 
arbitrary. Only a part of signs are absolutely 
arbitrary [Une partie seulement des signes est 
absolument arbitraire] (C 180-181, cf. Ce 130). 
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Note the word “absolutely”. Saussure, as does Derrida, takes what 
is “entire” to be absolute. Yet for Saussure, arbitrariness can be 
partial, e.g. the “word” “nineteen” contains relations both to 
“nine” and “ten”, while “twenty” is immotivated (C 181, CE 130).  
Thus nor is any tongue only immotivated (C 183, Ce 131). 
Saussure puts it that  
there exists no tongue [langue] in which nothing 
at all is motivated. (C 183, cf. Ce 131) 
For Derrida, it is only the telos of a relation of speech as signifier, 
in entirely immotivated relation to the tongue that permits 
Derrida’s falling short of such separation to allow a trace.  
But moreover, for Saussure, insisting that the relation of the sign 
to the word in language in general is arbitrary “without 
restriction” would lead to thorough “chaos” (C 182, Ce 131).677 
Instead, Saussure implies that a tongue which retains motivation 
does “exist” (C 183, Ce 131, above),678 rather than merely opting 
for a tongue as a telos in the service of a semiology that “does not 
yet exist” but has a right to (642).  
                                                 
677 Saussure explains: “[F]or the entire linguistic system is founded upon the 
irrational principle that the sign is arbitrary. Applied without restriction, this 
principle would lead to utter chaos.” (CGL 182, Ce 131). 
678 We take it that when Saussure writes that “there exists no tongue in which 
nothing at all is motivated” (C 183, Ce 131) that Saussure takes it that there 
exists at least one tongue in which something is motivated. 
 - 787 
- 
The difficulty arises from a Course fissured into a third Saussure, 
who is allotted no role in “Of Grammatology” at all.679 While the 
Saussure addressed above is concerned with mobilising the 
relations of the tongue to develop a semiology in psychology, but 
not yet a formalism, this third Saussure is a linguist explaining 
signs of words in actual (concrete and material) languages 
according to the grammar of language in general.  
To this extent, Derrida’s systematic reading as a historico-
transcendental metaphysics of appearing (or “visibility” (DLG 
1041)) opts for assessing what can hold for a semiology, by which 
Derrida must occlude Saussure the practising linguist. Hence Derrida 
provides no linguistic examples, while Saussure’s work is replete 
with them. Consequently, Derrida never could consider Saussure 
in any relation to the history of linguistics (cf. Koerner 1973, Culler 
1976, 53-89), as only metaphysics seeks to engage with limits 
thought as “entirely” outside. 680  
Thus Derrida reinterprets this first Saussure as a teleologist who 
demands the absolute. But then only the first Saussure was a good 
example of a phonocentrism in the history of metaphysics. It is in 
                                                 
679 It is ever relevant that Saussure’s course was collated posthumously by his 
colleagues and students. 
680 Thus, for example, Saussure’s doctoral thesis – acclaimed by his peers – 
sought to establish an original phonemic basis for IE vowels in Indo-European 
(Kirchner 1973, 24). Such works are less obviously concerned with borders. 
Koerner provides a solid treatment of the tradition of linguistics in which 
Saussure worked (Koerner 1973, cf. esp. 1-42), which emphasis on Indo-
European linguistics arose at least via William von Humboldt, whose work was 
continued by Misteli, Finck and Schuchardt (Kirchner 1973, cf. 38).  
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this line between polemics by elision and accurate interpretation 
of the possible consequences of the goal of a fragmentary 
Saussure that Derrida furthers his abiding concern since 1954, in 
the “question” of the complication of origin; to assess how the 
absolute can be attained for the history of metaphysics. 
It is indeed the origin of the system that Derrida will begin to 
consider, allowing for a transcendental moment en route. By this 
he will develop the kinds of trace, difference, temporalisation, and 
shortfall from a “reserve” which in 1966 culminate in différance. By 
1967 he will have brought these toward his maturity.  
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Chapter Ten: Working out différance (“Of 
Grammatology”, Pt. 2, 1966) 
Introduction 
This chapter continues to follow the second article “Of 
Grammatology” of 1966 as Derrida progressively develops the 
“system” of the trace, in order to determine the beyond. He will 
evolve the progress of difference as such from temporalisation, to 
work out the originary trace, then progress to the return of a 
“spacing” to temporalising, in the movement of writing, speech, 
and metaphor. Thereafter, the progress will evolve to retention, 
and the writing subject, culminating in Derrida’s working out of 
his first employment of différance via protention. However, this 
progress will develop from some incipient difficulties, first, that a 
trace is merely necessary in effect, and importantly, that a trace is 
impossible in becoming. Derrida will avoid conceding that the 
latter is contradictory. Our final chapter will summarise how 
Derrida redresses these difficulties in his emendations to Of 
Grammatology of 1967.  
Part One: from semiology to grammatology 
Derrida had worked out the necessities of the broadening of the 
field of semiology to grammatology, but we must yet assess what 
“grammatology” entails. As noted, as phonetic writing implies 
contradiction, then writing cannot be only the figuring etc. of 
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speech, and other kinds of writing must be admitted. These can 
only be permitted, however, in terms of this progress. That the 
graphie necessitated contradiction implies that all forms of writing 
are no longer bound to the graphie, but necessarily by the 
institution of an originary moment by an irreducible writing:  
[B]efore being or not being ‘noted’, 
‘represented’, ‘figured’ in a ‘graphie’, the 
linguistic sign implies an originary writing. 
(DLG 28, our emphases) 
Thus the telos of speech as a sign (semeion) of speech at the lowest 
level, which led to the contradiction of the logos, must include 
the necessity of the gramme along with the phone to the logos. 
Derrida indeed calls the instituted and originary moment at the 
inside the gramme, as the originary necessity which already must have 
applied, to permit every form of writing and its telos. Put via language, as 
we noted, “gramme” has the sense of what inscribes a line and thus 
a boundary before any graphic writing or drawing, yet nevertheless 
forms letters, as a metaphor for the origin and telos of life (Liddell and 
Scott 1869, 325 (702)). 
In turn, the particular telos of linguistics at this lowest level, to 
signify – in a spoken tongue alone – the field of signs at the 
highest as a semiology, must include the relation of writing (as the 
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gramme) to signifying. Such an idea of a science as semiology, must 
then evolve to what Derrida deems a “grammatology”.  
Thus when semiology is accepted as first telos, but the “field” of 
its project – the overall field of signs that must be expressed by 
the tongue through language – would (devrait) be “broadened” to 
include writing (DLG 27).681 Derrida goes on that 
[B]y a substitution […] one would thus need 
[devrait donc] to replace semiology by 
grammatology (DLG 27). 
Derrida does so logically, quoting a sentence by Saussure and 
merely substituting grammatology for semiology:  
[Grammatology] does not yet exist, one cannot 
say that it will be, but it has a right to existence 
(C 34, Ce 15, in DLG 27, Derrida’s insertion). 
Grammatology too “cannot” yet exist originarily – an a priori and 
thus radical impossibility. Thus it does “not yet” exist; but as in 
1962 this originary impossibility nevertheless retains its right.  
                                                 
681 Derrida deems that “this substitution […] will liberate the semiological 
project itself in its greater [plus grande] theoretical extension” (DLG 27). 
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We caution – should Derrida take this to be a privilege of writing 
alone he would have merely reversed the privilege of speech, 
which he seeks to avoid. Rather, the telos of semiology only then 
implies the necessity of grammatology, which retains a semiology 
of speech as its inaugural telos.682 Thus Derrida is – in the 
systematic sense of this word – privileging writing insofar as the 
telos in general is then and still to make the object appear. It was 
ever a corollary of Saussure’s approach that he sought the 
valorisation of what would first vanish (in its presence to 
consciousness without distance or limit). For Derrida, whatever 
disappears must first have appeared.  
As ever, Derrida is “demanding” (DLG 28) that the irreducible 
beyond must appear, in the various fashions he has formulated it 
over the years: to determine the object absolutely (97 ff.), for 
subjectivity needing to go out of itself to encounter the absolute 
(226), or even of the appearing of a sense of speech without 
distance, thus without a limit to an outside (654). It will 
henceforth ever be appearing, sense, spacing, writing, that Derrida 
first insists upon. As the telos of a psycho-physical semiology 
without writing (thus without difference) has arrived at necessary 
contradiction, Derrida has some justification for this. Henceforth, 
the ideal science of address to the field of signs will be named a 
grammatology.  
                                                 
682 “Then”, put as a necessary implication, is signalled by “thus” (donc, above). 
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But nor is such a telos of grammatology privileged over the 
system. For a “substitution” replaces a variable (e.g. p) by a verbal 
predicate (e.g. “S is P” can be replaced by “S is blossoming” 
(104)). To do so, we note, a “substitution” occurs in accordance 
with a form that must have been “set up from underneath” (from the 
Latin “sub” plus “statuere”, “under” and “to set up”). It occurs in 
accordance with a form of which the content of this expression is 
merely its appearance. For instance, “blossoming” could be any 
predicate, and even “p” could be any other letter or symbol. As 
since 1954, the form of this progress has not yet appeared. Thus, 
following the demand, Derrida summarises:  
 [W]e are trying now to go beyond these formal 
[…] considerations (DLG 28, our emphases). 
In seeking to do so, Derrida in 1966 will develop his system as far 
as différance. 
Part Two: preparing for the two ways 
From difference as such toward a “reduction” 
As the most general telos is still to affirm the “beyond”, the first 
necessity is still to exceed finitude. Particular versions of this telos 
will arise, below, according to the content and level. We begin 
from where we left off in our previous chapter. We explained that 
Derrida returned to internal difference. Moreover, however, the 
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“premises” (DLG 29) of arbitrary relation to the signified in 
psycho-physicality then necessitated contradiction. As this is not 
(an internal negation) a solution in the progress of signifiers, only 
at this juncture must Derrida return to correlative difference. The 
latter brings with it the relations of value, coverage and so on. 
Derrida begins:  
[I]t is not to the thesis of the arbitrariness of 
the sign that we will make appeal but to that 
which is associated [with it] by Saussure as an 
indispensable correlate and which we are 
preparing rather to found; the thesis of difference 
as source of linguistic value. (DLG 28, our 
emphases) 
Moreover, the psychological approach (in what Husserl deemed a 
“natural attitude”) to physical signifiers (which latter Derrida 
deems a “sensible plenitude” (DLG 29)) necessitated a 
contradiction of sense. Hence the signifier no longer posits or negates its 
signified. This indeed implies a “pulling back” (cf. DLG 32 (782)) 
to difference appearing as such, no longer positing or negating the 
psychological and sensible object outside. 
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Thus, as for Husserl, this difference “as such” leads to a setting 
aside of psychology by a logical “suspension” of this outside. 
Henceforth, the term “inside” is much better taken as no longer 
outside.683 More systematically than the early Husserl (who merely 
applied the necessity of a reduction from psychology), Derrida in 
1966 has worked out a reduction. He has done so from Saussure, as 
“privileged” example of the history of metaphysics.  
Aligning with Saussure’s retreat from the physical 
Thus Derrida aligns with the Saussure in the Course who retreats 
from the telos of the tongue and its material, physical and sensible 
relations (DLG 29, (cf. 665)).684 Derrida quotes: 
[I]n essence, it [the linguistic signifier] is in no 
fashion phonic, it is incorporeal, constituted not by 
[non par] its material substance, but uniquely by the 
differences which separated this acoustic image 
[signifier] from all the others (C 164, Ce 117, in 
                                                 
683 Derrida followed in the “Introduction” that Husserl, since 1900, arrived at 
the possibility of essences in that particular psychological judgments can be 
false. Derrida has worked out how, in his application of basic relations to 
Saussure, that – insofar as this can be generalised – a psychological approach 
cannot be true. 
684 Derrida suggests that this outcome “is the consequence that Saussure 
himself levers against the premises defining the internal system of the tongue.” 
(DLG 29). 
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DLG 29, our emphases, cf. C 157, 169; Ce 
111, 120) 
Note that by this juncture “Saussure” is a palimpsest. Aside from 
the development of the trace, Saussure never thought his 
principle of arbitrariness arrived at contradiction in order to 
devolve to the internal, nor that by this it precluded a 
psychological semiology. Nor did he seek to include further levels 
of writing, and institution at the lowest level. Hence, when the 
instituted moment remained after contradiction, nor would 
Saussure’s reduction and its internal difference have allowed for 
an instituted trace. 
Hence, note that – as Derrida quotes Saussure – this holds for 
essential reasons. Even though Saussure may have divergent sorts of 
“essence” in mind than Husserl’s, for Derrida the progress as 
such will still be amenable to assessment via essential levels and 
directions, according to common relations.685  
Indeed, to address the incorporeal signifier via differences, 
Saussure mobilises a complement (non par): as what signifies a 
difference of a particular other without opposition from “all the other” 
                                                 
685 In Plato’s Pharmacy Derrida emphasises again that Saussure’s necessity of 
contradiction of the levels of inside and “being-outside of the outside”, was an 
important example of the project in the history of metaphysics to privilege 
speech (PP 156), and also as developed from the “eidetic model” (PP 157). 
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visual signifiers. This is deemed Saussure’s “non-consideration of 
the phonic substance” (DLG 32), as Derrida begins to apply the 
basic internal relations. For this is no longer even the necessity of 
a non-object, but non-thought of a substance, in a form without 
opposition to an external object (DLG 32).686 We will return to 
the temporal moment below. Thus far, the progress ought to 
imply “suspension” from natural appearing. 
“Suspension” evolving to the transcendental 
Hence Saussure’s approach is indeed aligned with the  
“transcendental” in the fashion of Husserl. Derrida summarises 
that the 
putting in parentheses of natural experience 
ought [doit], as for Husserl, to discover a field of 
transcendental experience (DLG 32, our 
emphasis).
687
 
Again, note the systematic relations – the complement “dis-
covering” (decouvrir) also refers to the necessity of reference to 
                                                 
686 We do not yet deem this non-signifying, which Derrida made contradictory, 
and must still permit again in the “acoustic image”.  
687 Derrida has aligned “natural” in Saussure’s sense as a psychological 
privilege, with Husserl’s “natural attitude”, and the “natural” is henceforth 
reduced. 
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non-coverage, via this transcendental difference without opposition 
to the outside. 
The devolution to internal relations of form 
Thus, just as Husserl’s reduction developed a way for the 
noematic nucleus to constitute the real from the reell again at the 
most inside (200), in developing this reduced Saussure, Derrida 
has found a way for all of the relations in a natural outside to be 
constituted again as such. But this as yet holds only as a right (cf. 
202, 348, 457), without convergence yet upon this outside. 
Saussure 
gives himself thus the right to ‘reduce’, in the 
phenomenological sense of this word, the sciences 
of the acoustic [as heard] and of physiology [as 
spoken] (DLG 33).
688
 
Hence only at this juncture in “Of Grammatology” does Derrida allow the 
formal relations of the signifier as acoustic image. In this necessity of 
address to a transcendental field, Derrida can re-include the 
necessity of address to the signifier as heard in all its aspects, and 
                                                 
688 This reduction of the signifier, as the quotation explains, will be to the 
acoustic impression and to articulation. 
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as spoken in its appearing as signifier (cf. DLG 33).689 Thus, he 
goes on, the 
acoustic image is the appearance of sound 
which is nothing less than the sound 
appearing. It is this precisely which Saussure 
calls ‘signifier’ (DLG 33).  
This is one of what Derrida deems two “ways” by which 
movement can proceed (deux voies (DLG 32)), as one structural 
“part” of the system.690  
That is, Derrida is developing the implications of this next and 
incompatible Saussure. This part is no longer a naive psychology 
that studies phonic production as speech (phonology), yet it can 
restore phonetics as the study of sound in its origin (cf. C 44, Ce 
32). Indeed, henceforth, phonology is “auxiliary” to this (reduced) 
phonetics (DLG 29).691 Note that this return to a concern for the 
origin avoids absurdity. It was merely arbitrariness from the 
                                                 
689 This appearing will also be that of articulation. 
690 Derrida prefaces his explanation of the two ways with: “[A]s to the one 
part… [a]s to the other part [[D]’une part… [d]’autre part]” (DLG 32-33, 
Derrida’s emphases). These proceed in accordance with whole-part reasoning, 
although a whole, as irreducible, is no longer overtly conceded. 
691 “[T]his reduction of the phonic substance thus not only permits the 
distinction between phonetics in one part (and a fortiori acoustics and 
physiology) and phonology as the other part. It makes of phonology an 
‘auxiliary discipline’ of linguistics” (DLG 33). 
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signified that necessitated the contradiction in psychology, and 
thus the appearing of difference as such. Derrida can and must 
return to phonetics via difference as such in its signifiers. He deems 
this the other “way” or part (DLG 32). For 
the phonic element, […] the presence which 
one calls sensible, would not appear as such 
without the difference or the opposition which 
gives them form (DLG 32). 
By these two “ways” – difference as condition for appearing as 
such, and retraction of the signifier from the sensible – Derrida 
can continue to heed the demand to go “beyond”. That is, 
importantly, Derrida can return to questioning even phonetics as 
to its origin itself, as it appears as a signifier, to question the origin 
of what appears as such. The “consequence” of both ways (for 
they must be thought at once) will develop the system of traces. 
Avoiding the confusing of Saussure and Husserl 
Moreover, Derrida’s progress has exceeded even this Saussure, who 
after his “reduction” to form never sought a return to signifying 
the phonic. We repeat: 
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[I]n essence, [the linguistic signifier] is in no 
fashion phonic, it is incorporeal (C 164, Ce 117, in 
DLG 29, our emphases). 
This is Derrida’s progress. 
In turn, to permit his ways, such progress must exceed Husserl’s 
sort of transcendental reduction. Thus defined, Derrida is no longer 
a “Husserlian”. While Husserl’s reduction took its authority from 
an object which is evidently given then falls short, Derrida’s 
instituted trace arose from a first assessment of the conditions for a 
sensible, psychological and visual object, and then the necessity of 
contradiction.  
It is thus important to avoid deeming that the approach “is” 
transcendental. It remains dependent upon relation from the 
psycho-physical origin itself, and “is” a trace only in the sense 
developed above (773-775).692 Indeed, as it follows from 
contradiction of a visual object, it no longer allows for Husserl’s 
logic.693 Derrida had explained that the trace as “present-
transcendental” arose first as “irreducible absence” (rather than 
                                                 
692 We avoid the term “quasi-transcendental” (cf. Hurst 2004, Houlgate 2006, 
110) which Derrida has not yet employed. He tells us in 1995 that he first 
employed the term in Glas (DP 81). How Derrida would develop such relations 
after 1966 must yet be worked out. 
693 Cf. our footnote (p. 819) that Husserl’s later work might have sought 
relations prior to objective spatial relations. However, Derrida’s basis is no 
longer compatible with Husserl’s beginning from evidence. 
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Husserl’s evidence as primary authority), which irreducibility 
entered the system only as the trace. Indeed, the “two ways” must 
be prior to any objective transcendental approach. Thus Derrida 
begins to develop them. 
Toward the levels of archi-writing 
As the progress has evolved to align with Derrida’s concerns, the 
two ways must include writing to the relations of difference as 
such.
694
 We caution: it might seem obvious to a reader that 
writing appears as a difference in that writing instils visual limits. 
This holds as Derrida’s telos is still to determine this “beyond” as 
it first appears. But it would be erroneous to take the visual relation 
of difference and writing as the essential foundation; a visual 
writing as graphic in psycho-physiology necessitated 
contradiction. The gramme is never necessarily a moment of 
appearing as visual, and is henceforth more encompassing and 
originally necessary. Thus we begin to assess the relations of 
writing as such. That difference appears as such will necessitate a 
writing at each level. 
                                                 
694 It would preclude the rigour that Derrida takes as a sine qua non to simply 
assume that the levels of writing from our Chapter Seven, or from 
psychophysiology could be imposed: the former were made dependent upon 
the latter, and the latter implied necessary contradiction. The whole-part 
relations must be worked out anew.  
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The levels of archi-writing 
The sequence of conditions from which Derrida evolved the 
instituted trace is still developing. First, at the originary level, 
whatever the importance of the graphie in permitting a derived 
progress that can proceed by position and negation, to allow for 
writing, it must for essential reasons presuppose, and thus depend 
upon the gramme (behind). Before being “represented”, “figured” 
and so on, the sign implies an originary writing (DLG 28, (702, 
740)). This instils the essential necessity of an instituted originary 
writing.  
But as to what must found this, and moving “backward”: in turn 
the original writing (writing in general, as a part of the original 
language) must have founded the concept of the gramme. But 
behind (or beyond) the original writing, the absolutely necessary 
condition prior to all appearing which must permit the original 
language and its writing, would be, as we explained, the absolute 
necessity of an irreducible source prior to possibility (cf. 487, 
744).  
Derrida calls this an “archi-writing” – that is, the primitive origin, 
beginning, power and authority arising from writing (cf. 743 ff.).695 
Archi-writing would be the absolute origin, the authority which 
                                                 
695 Cf. also our footnote (552 fn.) on Funke’s development of this term “archi” 
in 1957 in address to Husserl. 
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power (pouvoir) in particular makes even the form of evidence 
possible.696 Indeed, it would only be supposed (or suggested)(485, 
695), and Derrida explains:  
[W]e would rather suggest [rather than posit] that 
this derivation, so real and so massive as it would 
be, is possible only on one condition: that the 
original language which one opposes to writing is 
already a writing. (DLG 30, our emphases)
697
  
Hence the overall foundation even of the original, Derrida 
suggests, would depend upon this irreducible archi-writing: 
[H]owever [si] original […] it would be, the 
[…] graphic “substance of expression” 
remains […] very dependent on the archi-
writing of which we are speaking here. (DLG 
31)  
                                                 
696 The sequence of necessary conditions, by which Derrida had addressed the 
instituted trace by means of psychology (757-768), begins from at least this 
juncture to address conditions of possibility. It does so as “transcendental”, 
however, only in the fashion developing above.  
697 The “real” is taken in its phenomenological sense, permitted by the irreal, 
which in turn would be dependent on archi-writing. 
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But Derrida’s demand is still to determine these relations, and 
archi-writing would merely provide a foundation. We thus 
proceed forward again. As this archi-writing must for essential 
reasons be irreducible to essence, it would in turn be founded upon 
the “general possibility of writing” (DLG 28, (740)).  
Importantly, Derrida summarises what he seeks to do, by adding 
instances of speech and writing to this form: 
[W]e are trying now to go beyond these formal 
[…] considerations. We are asking [demandons], 
in a more interior fashion [lowest level], how the 
tongue is not only a species of writing […] but a 
species of writing. Or rather, […] a possibility 
founded in the general possibility of writing (DLG 28, 
Derrida’s emphasis on “of”). 
To continue the attempt to go “beyond” such formal relations, 
and moving forward, such an original possibility must devolve to 
its part, the gramme as originary, and then devolve to appearing as 
such. As the gramme is never doubted (certain), and moving 
forward, its appearing “permits” (i.e. makes possible) the derived 
kind of writing: 
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the gramme as such without doubt makes 
possible the emergence of ‘writing’ in the 
derived sense (DLG 46, our emphasis). 
We explained that this would be the writing that holds at the 
“most interior” of thought. Finally, moving forward, the species 
of writing that must be spoken of, in particular, in order to 
determine it as a concept (forward, higher) via this derived writing 
“is” again that of this archi-writing. But to determine it in its 
appearing as such, Derrida must in this way nevertheless speak of 
the phonetic as graphic, as a concept, and then as beyond. This is 
an 
[A]rchi-writing which necessity we would like to 
indicate here, and illustrate this new concept. 
(DLG 30, our emphases) 
The progress will no longer quite be as simple as implying a 
moment of a writing that certainly appears in its moment of 
becoming. For “writing” (as ever, taken in its maximally broad 
sense (DLG 31, (685, 739))) must still be aligned with the 
necessity of difference at each level.  
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The relations of difference as such 
That is, at the lowest level it was difference appearing as such that 
permitted the return to address the phonic and writing (DLG 32) 
in its form rather than its substance. In turn, original (DLG 33) 
and originary difference must be what for essential reasons 
appears (as writing), yet also for essential reasons must be 
irreducible to what can appear as sensible as such. Derrida writes 
that this difference is  
a fortiori anterior to the distinction between the 
[essential] regions of sensibility (DLG 34, 
Derrida’s emphasis).  
But given the demand, these relations must still be thought at 
once. What needed to be a unity of signifier and signified in the 
psychological approach, and thus determination of the field of 
signs in a transcendental field as such must rather be a synthesis. 
That is, it must be an absolute synthesis anterior to appearing in 
the transcendental field. 
The progress thus allows the next moment. As noted, difference 
appearing as such was related by Derrida to the contradiction of a 
sensible here-now as temporalising, as even further removed from 
the temporality that never appears (782). Thus Derrida 
summarises:  
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[A]rchi-writing, movement of difference, irreducible 
archi-synthesis, opening at once, in the sole and same 
possibility, temporalisation, the relation to the other 
and language […] cannot […] be an object in its 
field. (DLG 31, our emphases) 
Rather than an opening (ouverture (292)) that precludes passage; 
there has rather been an evolution, for this anterior approach as 
temporal cannot be given in its field. It was ever a basis of the 
object here and now that it first can be given as an object. Archi-
writing does not yet even proceed “forward”; yet it necessarily 
opens the movement of temporalisation, writing and difference 
from one to other (cf. esp. 182, 230).  
Thus we can begin to work out how the two ways develop the 
system as it seeks to go “beyond” while remaining “this side” of 
the transcendental field (DLG 32). The first way will move via 
irreducible difference and writing “from behind” to the originary 
synthesis in a pure trace, and the second will withdraw the signifier 
to the originary synthesis. 
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Part Three: the two ways to originary synthesis 
The first way devolving to the originary trace 
The first way, thus, arises from difference in its appearing as such, 
which developed the levels of difference. Yet – following from 
this demand for the beyond, which latter must be thought 
without limit – a synthesis of difference and writing must be 
supposed even at the irreducible level, as an archi-synthesis (DLG 
31). Prior to and permitting these levels, however, Derrida has 
worked out an instituted trace (773). Hence, this trace (even as a 
trace of a synthesis of difference and writing) is no longer an 
instance of a psychological content, except in its form as such. In 
turn, in its essential relations, this supposed trace must devolve to 
a synthesis at the lower levels of difference and writing.  
Importantly, in accordance with this progress, Derrida never 
devolves to a trace as an original synthesis “preceding” the 
originary, as for essential reasons a trace of temporal difference 
cannot appear. Henceforth, the irreducible synthesis (of difference 
and writing) devolves to an originary synthesis (behind): 
here, the appearing in the functioning of 
difference supposes an originary synthesis which no 
absolute simplicity precedes (DLG 32-33, our 
emphases).  
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As noted (346, 346 fn.), “Function” for Husserl arises as an 
essential relation (behind), allowing address to what the 
intentional and particular object “conceals” (forward). Derrida’s 
progress supposes a functioning as originary difference without 
original (essential) dependence (behind), which allows for an 
originary appearing as such.698  
Thus, Derrida writes of this trace: 
[T]his would thus be the originary trace. (DLG 
33) 
We have developed the next sort of trace from the levels in this 
“way”. 
However, nor is such appearing necessarily sensible in its 
previous fashion. As we have explained, this trace of archi-writing 
and irreducible difference never arose from the graphie. Thus it 
never depended upon any (psycho-physical) “sensible plenitude” 
of phonic and graphic, for these necessitated essential 
contradiction: 
                                                 
698 Husserl put it that the “central viewpoint of phenomenology” “enquire[s] 
how objective unities of every kind are ‘known’ or ‘supposed’” (I §86, Husserl’s 
emphases), which Husserl deemed the “greatest problems of all”. Derrida’s 
supposition of functioning has developed the pure trace. 
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[T]his pure trace depends on no sensible 
plenitude, audible or visible. (DLG 33) 
A fortiori, as no longer dependent upon even the essential 
content of a greater whole (which has been precluded), this 
originary trace is also called the “pure trace”. 699  
To be sure, this trace does depend upon the progress from address 
to sensible plenitude (as visual and phonic) to its necessary 
contradiction and an instituted trace. However, insofar as the 
return to speak of this irreducible origin arises as such, this 
originary trace is rather “the condition” of the visual and phonic 
(DLG 33). Thus, having made the pure trace a condition for 
addressing the phonic, graphic, signifier etc. (cf. 782), Derrida 
keeps this reduced synthesis as such from moving “forward”.  
Halting prior to the positive 
To situate this progress: we noted that Saussure had assumed a 
difference in general that founds the positive fact (643). He had 
not yet developed the necessity of foundation upon an irreducible 
difference “behind” the general (644). Yet Saussure took it as a 
positive fact that particular differences apply. Derrida deems that 
                                                 
699 Derrida even by 1966 had not yet set aside purity (as has been suggested (cf. 
Lawlor 2002, 124, 141)). Rather, a place has been kept for it via this progress; it 
will be indispensable to working out “différance” in 1966, and in the book Of 
Grammatology of 1967. 
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Saussure could do so by assessing “work”. The latter, we note, 
arises with visible progress toward a telos, in accordance with 
prior necessities. Yet work itself or its origin are never visible 
themselves. Saussure’s factual science permits only the work of 
difference to be positive, without difference itself or the origin 
appearing. Thus Derrida notes that 
the positive sciences of signification can only 
describe the work and the fact of difference, the 
differences […].  There cannot be a science of 
difference itself, nor [non plus] of the origin of 
presence itself. (DLG 33, Derrida’s emphases 
first and second)  
Derrida’s first way, however, permits thought of the origin, as 
irreducible difference itself. In turn, this devolved to the originary 
synthesis of difference. But this synthesis in a transcendental field is 
indeed prior to the positive fact (and thus prior to being). 
Derrida’s difference is prior to “the differences” of one and other 
to which a “positive science” too has access. Moreover, note that 
Derrida has generalised the approach, and “science” is made 
plural. He has made the psycho-physical approach to the fact 
imply contradiction. 
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Beyond Hjelmslev’s factual and positive 
structuralism 
Derrida thus assesses the sciences that applied these relations as 
formal. He turns briefly to Hjelsmlev, whom Derrida deems 
develops the most “rigorous” consequences of Saussure’s 
“progress” (DLG 31). Derrida never explains Hjelmslev, and we 
do so briefly. In his Prolegomena to a Theory of Language of 1943, 
Hjelmslev had adopted Saussure’s division between form and 
substance (PTL 69-70/49), although he worked out that both 
sorts end up as formal (PTL 109/79), and that the “right” to 
withdraw from the physical substance is never assured (PTL 
109/79).700 Indeed, in a moment closer to Derrida than Saussure, 
Hjelmslev did seek an “indifference” to the phonic substance – a 
non-relation, referring all around difference and form (PTL 69-
70/49).701 Hjelmslev’s indifference also deemed that such an 
outside should be set aside as an object of linguistics. However, 
Derrida has reduced form from the graphic, and deems that this 
term “indifference” above all implies the necessity of a “direction” 
going “beyond” to the “non-graphic” (DLG 31).  
                                                 
700 Hjelmslev takes as his best outcome that this remains a “purely 
epistemological question of physicalism contra phenomenalism”, where even 
the latter object has “some right” (PTL 109/79).  
701 Hjelmslev wrote that: “in direct consequence of Saussure’s distinction 
between form and substance, [this] lead[s] us to recognise that language is a 
form and that outside that form, […] is present a non-linguistic stuff, the so-
called substance” (PTL 69-70/49, our emphases). 
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Thus Hjelmslev never deemed temporalising was necessary to the 
static “structure” that would be his total object of linguistics (PTL 
7/2). Hence nor did he develop a necessity of a writing from a 
temporalising synthesis beyond the objective phenomenon (thus 
nor a difference irreducible to the object). Archi-writing, and the 
necessity of going beyond such structure in a derived writing via 
its internal difference and non-relation, for Derrida, “had no place 
in the algebra of Hjelmslev” (DLG 31).702 Hjelmslev’s “science” 
could also only describe the work of difference (DLG 34), and 
remained objectivist. It never could describe irreducible 
difference itself, and the origin itself. Importantly, Derrida has 
aligned even Hjelmslev (and, Derrida suggests without 
explanation, the greater “Copenhagen School” (DLG 32)) with 
metaphysics. Derrida henceforth addresses a naïve transcendental 
objectivism in general, no longer even Saussure’s or Husserl’s.  
Crucially, Derrida thus emphasises how he will proceed: 
                                                 
702 Hjelsmlev made this setting aside of the non-relation the object of 
linguistics from the first: “[T]o establish a true linguistics, […] [L]inguistics 
must attempt to grasp language, not as a conglomerate of non-linguistic (e.g., 
physical, physiological, psychological, logical) phenomena, but as a self-
sufficient totality, a structure sui generis.” (PTL 7/2, Hjelmslev’s emphasis). 
Thus, for Hjelmslev too, difference only applies “inside”, between the “parts” 
(PTL 28/18) of form of any sort: “[D]ifferences between languages do not rest 
on different realisations of a type of substance, but on different realisations of 
a principle of formation” (PTL 69/49). As an outcome, the substance is indeed 
referred to as around the form of language (“non-linguistic”). Yet the latter 
never exceeds the static and structural approach to the phonic, which Derrida 
had related to the graphic. 
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[I]t is to go beyond the naive objectivism that we refer 
ourselves to a transcendentality which we are 
elsewhere putting in question. It is because 
there are, we believe, a this-side [en-deçà] and 
beyond [au-delà] of transcendental criticism. 
(DLG 32, our emphases) 
Derrida’s first way instituted the temporalising synthesis, a 
“beyond” on “this side” of the transcendental field. However, 
Derrida has not yet re-assessed the “direction” of naïve 
objectivism (forward). 
The second way as going beyond, this side  
He thus turns to the second way. This will retract signifying to this 
originary synthesis of difference, writing and the trace, via at least six 
interrelated ways. To prepare, note that the graphic and visual are 
still implicitly aligned with space (DLG 35). The necessary 
contradiction in the graphic movement of signifiers implied a 
reduction to difference as such as temporal (DLG 25). Thus first, 
crucially, Derrida introduces the divergence of “acoustic image” 
(DLG 33) from “objective sound”, where the former is better 
deemed the signifier. As reduced, it instils the acoustic image and 
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image, both phonic and graphic, as necessarily first the form of 
sound. Such a form would not yet appear.  
Thus Derrida avoids aligning this yet with speech (parole), which 
does partly appear visibly and as objective (in the vibration of the 
larynx and so on (cf. C 69, Ce 43)). After this reduction, the 
acoustic image – henceforth, this reformulated “signifier” without 
speech – is 
the appearance of sound, which is nothing less 
than the sound appearing (DLG 33). 
Even so, this foundation can only appear and be said as an image; 
the sound is still nothing less than its reduced appearing. We will 
develop the difficulty that this raises, below.  
From the work of difference to temporalising 
Thus Derrida revisits the conditions for the work of difference. 
First, difference itself requires entry to consciousness. That this 
entry must not yet be objective, sensible or spatial implies that it 
holds at a highest level prior to such content. Derrida deems this 
“minimal unity” “experience” (Husserl too deems experience a 
highest and most formal “pure genus” (I §12)). Second, as no 
longer spatial or sensible, Derrida aligns this minimal formal unity 
with the temporal. 
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Third, the experience of difference as temporal requires a 
temporalising synthesis, which latter implies a pure trace. Fourth, 
to combine these, the condition for the work of difference is 
made a return of a temporal experience (from behind) of a trace. 
Derrida deems this a retention: 
[W]ithout a retention in the minimal unity of 
the temporal experience, without the trace 
returning the other as other, no difference 
would do its work [faire son oeuvre] and no sense 
would appear. (DLG 33) 
Derrida must first develop how such a minimal temporal moment 
allows a return to consciousness (only then will he re-include 
retention). He begins to develop the originary directions.  
Thus, the highest genus of experience as furthest from sensible 
content is still particularised, but merely devolves to “specific” 
(DLG 34) appearing as such. It is only in this “zone” (i.e. the 
minimal unity of the originary experience) that progress can 
continue (DLG 34).703 However, although the visual (thus 
                                                 
703 At the outset of the Ideas, Husserl evolved his earliest logical basis for a 
reduction from essential generality, predicated of as an object without material 
content, thus appearing as such. Derrida has devolved the general to its 
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implicitly spatial) progress led to necessary contradiction while 
leaving an irreducible trace, one ought to avoid affirming that the 
irreducible trace is temporal. Only the visual and its essential 
relations necessitated contradiction, the irreducible was never 
dependent upon that progress.704 Even in 1954, Derrida knew that 
only from the moment that something enters the living present 
(that is, the essential levels and directions of temporal 
constitution) does one have the right to deem it is lived as 
temporal (cf. PG 86, PdG 153-154). Hence there must be a 
source of the minimal temporal unity. Fifth, a fortiori, Derrida calls 
this “temporalising” (DLG 34). 
Even so, an important divergence from appearing arises in 
essence – for as Derrida noted (above), such a moment cannot 
appear as an object even in its own field. At this juncture, fifth, 
Derrida aligns the sound that appears as such with temporality. 
Crucially, for essential reasons, both temporality and sound cannot 
appear. Neither can be objects even in a transcendental field 
(Derrida thus deems them “non-reell” (DLG 33)).  
Derrida is thus devolving this “way” to temporalising as the 
originary synthesis of writing, difference and the trace, prior to 
                                                                                                        
relations of the specific even prior to objective relation (cf. 239). He will 
nevertheless return an originary horizontality in spacing (no longer space), 
below, to seek to avoid a naïve objectivism.  
704 No requirement holds for the irreducible to be temporal, for it was merely 
the internally visual (in general, as spatial) that necessitated contradiction, from 
which the irreducible was independent. 
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objective appearing. Yet such a foundation upon an irreducible 
archi-writing and anterior difference, devolving to its originary 
synthesis, leaves its pure trace. Hence, fifth, it is then prior to and 
founds opposition, which latter arises with objectifying (cf. 412, 
646).  
Sixth, Derrida thus obviates the dilemma arising from the 
traditional opposition between the sensible and intelligible. Neither 
Saussure nor Husserl, as far as we are aware, imposed such a 
division;705 Derrida is concerned with transcendental objectivism 
in general. It is helpful to explain the issue via Kant.  
Parenthesis: temporalising as diverging from Kant 
For Kant, the opposition of sensible and intelligible in the spatial 
relations of the understanding led to the separation of knowledge 
from the sensible (phenomenal) world. But rather than deeming it 
impossible, Kant for once denied any possibility that a concept of 
                                                 
705 Husserl’s approach to intelligibility had in the decades prior to the writing of 
“Of Grammatology” been a topic of debate. For example, in a footnote of 
Time and the Other, which Derrida had assessed in passing in 1964, Levinas 
argued against de Waelhens, who had suggested in a lecture that Husserl’s turn 
from descriptive to transcendental analysis “resulted from an identification of 
intelligibility and construction – pure vision not being intelligibility”. Levinas 
argued rather that “the Husserlian notion of vision already implies 
intelligibility”, in that the object is already “one’s own” (TA 64). In seeking an 
approach prior to a naïve objectivism and its philosophy of light, Derrida’s 
progress in 1966 seeks a situation prior to the terms of the debate.  
Note that Derrida never quite accuses Husserl of a naïve objectivism: Derrida 
levered the critique above only after address to Hjelmslev and The 
Copenhagen School. Husserl’s approach remained objective in the early years 
(cf. the lectures “Thing and Space” of 1907, Sections VI and VII, TS 173-
247),and geometry in the “Origin” was still deemed spatial. However, in 1962, 
Derrida also noted that Husserl in the “Origin” sought a “preobjective 
spatiotemporality” (IOG 124). Derrida treats even such spatiotemporality as 
what his temporalising must be prior to. 
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the greater whole can be provided by the series of conditions 
(CPR A254/B309, our emphasis).706 As he put it:  
[D]oubtless, indeed, there are intelligible 
entities corresponding to the sensible entities; 
there may also be intelligible entities to which 
our sensible faculty of intuition has no relation 
whatsoever; but our concepts of 
understanding, being mere forms of thought 
for our sensible intuition, could not in the least 
supply them. (CPR A253/B309) 
For Kant, “no knowledge of any object thus remains” (CPR 
A254/B309), as such knowledge would need to be known of the 
concept in the understanding. But even without such possibility 
the forms of thought remain, as the “mode of determining an 
object” (CPR A254/B310). This allows a “noumenon” as a 
thought only in a “negative sense” without direct relation to an 
object (CPR A254/B310). When such a mode is a priori, Kant 
                                                 
706 Kant opts for the impossibility of determination of the series of conditions 
in the understanding (CPR A511/B540) (270). However, he explains that the 
conditions “do not thereby determine a greater sphere of objects.” (CPR 
A254/B309, our emphasis).  
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deems it transcendental (cf. A57/B82), which for Derrida is the 
originary transcendental zone.  
But Derrida seeks to go “beyond”, without confinement of 
transcendental critique to the “this-side” of synthetic a priori 
knowledge and its preclusion of relations that exceed the 
originary.707 Form has been reduced from sensible and implicitly 
spatial relations, and temporalising synthesis has been made prior 
to the opposition that makes such a dichotomy insoluble. Derrida 
rather developed a pure and originary trace. Hence Derrida goes on 
that this originary synthesis (of difference, writing, trace etc.) 
would “found the opposition” between sensible and intelligible.  
Hence, eighth – and moving forward – this originary synthesis 
must then (puis) found, be prior to and thus permit that writing 
which derived to appearing as graphic and phonic (signifiers), and 
must thus found the opposition between signifier and signified: 
 [I]t is this, this originary writing, that permits the 
articulation of speech and writing – in the derived 
sense – as it [the originary writing] founds the 
metaphysical opposition between sensible and 
                                                 
707 Nor has Derrida’s approach been positive (as explained above), for positive 
relation arises with opposition. 
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intelligible, and then between signifier and signified 
(DLG 33, our emphases). 
We will return to this “articulation”. Thus far, a temporalising 
synthesis (as originary writing and difference) must permit the 
moment of derived writing. This would occur without a 
necessarily objective moment, as prior even to opposition, which 
must yet be related to retention. 
Retracting from appearing as such 
Derrida thus begins to develop the implications. To go beyond, 
this originary appearing must not yet even be constituted as such. 
The progress must no longer be a phenomenology, must be a 
non-phenomenology. Indeed, in this second way the beyond must 
be made to appear without limits, and even the appearing “as 
such” must only be supposed. Derrida has retracted to “this side” of 
transcendental critique, to go “beyond” it.  
Yet the movement “across” must be restored, although no longer 
naively objectually, and Derrida evolves the next moment. Thus 
far, he had avoided mentioning “space”. The latter was never a 
concern for Saussure, who rather emphasised the “visual” (cf. C 
270-272, Ce 196-197 (cf. 635)). As implicit in the graphie and thus 
the essential commonality of the graphic, figure, image etc., a 
psychological sense of space had nevertheless necessitated 
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contradiction. The two ways then returned the possibility of 
approaching the origin itself via the acoustic image, employing an 
implicit sort of transcendental space. Yet Derrida seeks to go 
beyond such objectivism (793).  
As the progress must remain prior to appearing as such, only at this 
juncture does Derrida admit space, in noting that this 
temporalising synthesis of trace, archi-writing and difference must 
be prior to it (DLG 34, 35). He thus seeks to restore a movement 
“across” as no longer naïve, arising from temporalisation. That is, 
the psycho-physical signifier led to necessary contradiction, and 
then retraction to appearing as such. However, the signifier can 
be said to be an acoustic image, precisely because for essential 
reasons speech and sound cannot appear as such.  
Devolution to the psychic imprint as telos 
Derrida thus devolves even from the signifier as originary 
appearing as such to its particular relations. As noted, the first of 
these was the “psychic imprint” (DLG 34-35 (658)). This, we 
explained, allows the acoustic image to be formalised, as the unity 
of the acoustic form and the psyche (C 98, Ce 96, (658 ff.)). 
Derrida concedes that the word “psyche” may no longer be 
suitable (for the psychological and its telos of presence has 
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evolved to the transcendental) (DLG 34).708 He thus opts for the 
latter and its “living present”, which object is made the lived.  
Several relations thus align. First, the “psychic imprint” would 
need to be determined in order to unify a signifier and signified. 
Moreover, an “imprint” is visual. The psychic imprint is thus 
made the objective telos upon the inside, as lived. As lived and 
objective, it is implicitly a constituted appearance. In turn, as 
constituted it is aligned with the “passive” (DLG 35). The psychic 
imprint as “lived appearance” (DLG 35) is henceforth made the 
telos of the originary moment.  
As to how it must be determined, we noted that the psychic 
imprint allowed the devolution to chains of the “acoustic 
impression” and “articulation” (cf. C 65 cf. Ce 41, (659)). 
Although the acoustic relation remains certain, it is never a 
condition for appearing. Derrida avoids addressing it, taking it that 
speech arises in a “certain unheard sense” at this interior (DLG 
35).709 He rather devolves to the chains of appearing as Saussure’s 
“articulation”: 
                                                 
708 Derrida explains: “the word ‘psychic’ is perhaps no longer suitable, but the 
originality of a certain place is well marked off” (DLG 34); the “perhaps” 
avoids affirmation that the psyche is no longer suitable, which would be an 
absolute affirmation. Its “originality” is not yet dispelled in this formalisation 
of the “originary”. However, Derrida’s concerns will be the latter. 
709 Derrida is in accordance with Saussure at this juncture, who had deemed 
that the acoustic impression is “unanalysable” (C 64, cf. Ce 41). 
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it is from the first possibility of this articulation 
that it is necessary to depart (DLG 35). 
Derrida has devolved to Saussure’s most particular and formal 
level, as condition for a “spoken chain” (C 65). Articulation arises 
as the condition of appearing of both speech and writing.  
Articulation as permitting the phonic again 
This word “articulation” thus permits progress via an instability in 
its particular form. We begin from furthest “behind”. Historically, 
the word “articulus” allows the idea of both particularisation as 
visual, and as division of a series (DLG 35, C 26, Ce 10, (cf. 663)). 
Next, moving forward, it remains certain. Thus, third, it allows 
instances of writing and the syllables of speech to be 
“constituted” as spoken words, as parts of the tongue. Hence, at 
the most interior, Derrida quotes Saussure at length:  
[A] certain definition of that which one calls 
‘articulated language’ would be able to confirm this 
idea. In Latin, articulus signifies ‘member, part, 
subdivision of a series of things’; in the matter of 
language, articulation can designate the 
subdivision of the spoken chain in syllables, or the 
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[spatial] subdivision of the chain of significations 
in significative unity (C 35, our emphases). 
To permit this certain moment as such, Derrida devolved to the 
chains of articulation that make appearing possible. Thus, Derrida 
goes on, this experience 
permits [makes possible] a graphic chain 
(‘visual’ or ‘tactile’, ‘spatial’, as one says) to 
articulate itself, possibly in a linear fashion on a 
spoken chain (‘phonic’, ‘temporal’) (DLG 35). 
Derrida has moved from sound as phonetic (behind) to the 
phonic. He has thus returned even to the permission for speech, 
which latter can again appear in space. At this most interior, 
Derrida has allowed the possibility even of the phonologism that he had 
supported from the first (cf. DLG 1025, 1039, 30 (718)). 
The progress to circularity, forward 
Next (moving forward), such chains allow the possibility of 
confirming the unity of distinct signs at the next level. Moreover, 
they in turn permit the telos of the idea (beyond). Derrida has 
developed the three further “levels” forward, at the most interior. 
He quotes Saussure that the important concern is  
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the faculty to constitute a tongue, that is to say 
a system of signs corresponding to distinct 
ideas. (DLG 35, C 26) 
At the interior of a tongue (i.e. of a signifier), articulation as 
constituting addresses the “idea” of the constituted psychic 
imprint (forward) (DLG 35). Importantly, the latter is thus 
deemed “irreducible” (DLG 35). 
Derrida has developed the circularity of appearing at the most 
interior, as the idea for him is irreducible to appearing. The idea is 
required as an archi-synthesis, along with temporalising. As for 
Derrida since 1962, the irreducible idea returns to the origin. 
Thus he begins to align the form with his more basic concerns.  
The basic circularity from temporalising synthesis 
That is, by abstraction, the progress above also occurs via the relations 
of difference, space, time, etc. (779). As ever, we begin from 
furthest “behind”, and the necessity of irreducible temporalising 
(and thus irreducible difference and archi-writing) that has been 
the privileged source of originary synthesis. Left thus, such a 
privilege would simply turn from objectivism to a naïve 
foundation upon temporal constitution in the living present. 
Moreover, these alone would preclude space, a necessary condition 
for appearance. Thus, Derrida has noted that, even though not 
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yet a visible appearing, temporalising permits the pure experience 
(the minimal unity) of appearing as such as temporal. In turn, the 
condition for appearing, and thus a condition for articulation, is 
referred to by the word spacing (espacement). Spacing is thus the 
condition for the appearing of space:710 
[S]pacing (one remarks that this word says the 
articulation of time and space, the becoming 
space of time) (DLG 36).
711
 
Derrida, in 1966, avoids suggesting a becoming time of space. He 
had deemed since 1954 that the irreducibility of temporality poses 
a difficulty for phenomenology (cf. OG 68, DLGb 92 (917)). 
Parenthesis – Derrida’s ambition  
Just as he restored Saussure’s phonology (above), Derrida has 
restored appearing as such at the most interior, although no 
                                                 
710 As noted, a “word” for Saussure is a positive unity prior even to the sign 
(631). 
711 “Spacing” probably developed in “Of Grammatology”, although it is 
difficult to affirm this. In his article “The Theatre of Cruelty” – also of 1966 – 
Derrida evolves a novel sense of space without a direct object via Artaud’s 
three-dimensional space of the stage (cf. Artaud, 1977), and Derrida explains: 
“[S]pacing, that is to say, production of a space which no speech could 
summarise or comprehend, since it [speech] supposes itself first” (TDLC 602, 
cf. WD 237). Such relations of speech and space are in the process of being 
worked out in “Of Grammatology” – beginning from a certain speech, which 
merely supposes itself, thus can never determine itself in space, nor space itself. 
As the first article of “Of Grammatology was published in 1965, it is feasible to 
deem that “Of Grammatology” preceded “The Theatre of Cruelty”; although 
this is not yet definitive. 
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longer even as a “naïve” originary objectivism. The extent of 
Derrida’s ambition is thus made overt. For Husserl, the transcendental 
and objective progress needed to be able to restore the real via 
the reell (196). Derrida seeks a system that goes “beyond” 
transcendental (a priori and originary) objectivism, which bases he 
has generalised. In turn, this must be able to re-constitute every element as 
such, even the sensible, for the history of metaphysics. 
To begin to develop this, and to proceed “forward”, the necessary 
condition for this certain appearing, which thus makes it possible, 
proceeds “forward” in becoming as such. Thus the irreducible 
relation of spacing 
permits the experience of space and time […]  
to appear as such (DLG 35, our emphases).  
Importantly, appearing henceforth has this unstable sense as both pure, 
originary and prior to content, yet progressing in the movement heretofore 
applied to sensible becoming as such (forward). This could no longer 
even be said to be ambiguous, as the progress must permit and be 
prior to even originary opposition.  
The abstract levels of difference 
We have developed as far as the articulation of time and space. As 
spacing and temporalising permit these relations, they develop the 
levels of difference as such. We will explain these basically via the 
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levels from earlier years. First, as is archi-writing, the difference 
(“la différence”, which we also refer to “difference”) is irreducible, and 
the condition for appearing as such.712 Then, moving “downward”, the 
progress of appearing from one to other proceeds as differences. 
Next, moving forward, the relation between the inside and 
outside, or appearing and appearance, is a difference. These first 
and second directions were developed at length in 1964. 
To this we add “content”. The chains of “units” of time and 
space are moments of difference as such. In turn, the articulatory 
chain depends upon the more basic relation of the difference. That 
is, the movement of articulations from one to other arise as 
differences (first direction). We thus add a caveat. As particular 
content can only be separated by abstraction (779), then 
difference arises with articulation (DLG 35). Derrida explained 
that  
Difference is articulation (DLG 35).
713
  
We will return to this “is” below.  
                                                 
712 Helpfully for Derrida’s progress, and as with the trace, the “the” is not yet a 
particular “a difference”, even though “the” refers to a definite article. To 
avoid odd English grammar, we take the “the” as implicit whenever omitting it. 
713 By putting “Difference” at the beginning of a sentence, Derrida allows for 
an instability of Difference as essential or particular. He thus allows for the 
relations of abstraction that we explained, which include general relation, rather 
then a simple sense-content (LI 6 §40, (779)). He also allows by this for its 
irreducible relation. However, Derrida is no longer seeking essential relation, 
but relation from the irreducible to the originary. Henceforth, Derrida will 
almost without exception refer to difference in the lower case, to refer to a 
relation between irreducible “difference” and the differences. 
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Next, as noted, the telos of the chains of articulation is the psychic imprint 
(823); this relation too is a difference (the second direction). 
These teleological relations are also those of the constituting to 
the constituted (or passive), appearing as such to appearance, and 
living to the lived.  
Moreover, this progression has devolved from temporalising 
synthesis as a condition for the work of differences; and in turn difference 
is a condition for the articulation of particular temporal moments. 
Thus Derrida explains the progress, from the irreducible “ideas” 
of articulation and the psychic imprint to difference as 
articulation: 
[W]ithout the difference between the sensible 
appearing and its lived appearance (psychic 
imprint), the temporalising synthesis, 
permitting the differences to appear in a chain 
of signification, would never be able to do its 
work (DLG 35). 
The alignment of the trace and elements 
Hence, to move forward again, as difference “is” articulation, we 
add the relations of the “is” developed in our previous chapter. 
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The differences arises in the internal progress of a relation as 
merely other to itself, as prior to external opposition or negation 
(cf. 780). At this juncture, Derrida can begin to treat the options 
in these chains as “neither … nor”, and also “not more… nor 
more”. As we explained, the predicate “more” avoids opposition (542), 
and “neither… nor” (ni… ni…) also negates two contents which 
need never be opposite. As minimal units and formal 
abstractions, the chains of articulation are no longer “contents” in 
a basic sense, rather they are deemed “elements”.714 For Derrida, 
their appearing is made possible insofar as each is a trace.  
That is, to develop the progress from above, first, appearing as 
such only does so insofar as an originary temporalising synthesis, 
and thus as an originary and pure trace. Second, difference as 
such arises in this appearing in the chains of articulation, in the 
movement from one to other without opposition. Thus the pure 
elements in their chains of differences arise as neither more in time 
                                                 
714 By this juncture, the progress is very strongly Derrida’s. Having set aside the 
psycho-physical phoneme, he avoids including it to any of the formal reasoning 
(DLG 26-39), just as he elides the acoustic impression. Yet for Saussure, the 
phoneme is the elemental and complex unity of the unified chains of acoustic 
impression and articulatory movement (C 65 cf. Ce 41, (661)). Derrida seeks to 
avoid the essential dependence in his argument upon the phone and its necessary 
contradiction. He has made the “elements” those of the articulatory moments 
(DLG 34, above). Moreover, Derrida is avoiding a difficulty that beset 
Saussure, who deemed that the acoustic impression is unanalysable (C 66, Cf. 
Ce 42, (660)), yet united it as a chain in the phoneme. Derrida is noting that the 
chains cannot be unified, in that the acoustic relation, aligned with 
temporalising, has not yet appeared. Thus he puts it that “[t]he difference 
between the full unities of the phone remains inaudible” (DLG 35). Derrida is 
rather seeking to work out how the articulated relations are elemental as traces. 
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than in space, neither more heard than seen, etc. Derrida 
summarises that the originary progress would be 
this trace, in temporalisation as lived [vécu] that 
is neither in the world nor in another [un autre] 
world, which is not more sonorous than 
luminous, not more in space [espace] than in 
time, that the differences appear between the 
elements, make them arise as such and 
constitute […] chains and systems of traces. 
(DLG 34, our emphases) 
The trace as derived from a temporalising synthesis has devolved to 
the most interior in this progression (we begin to develop this as a 
difficulty just below).  
Thus far, each element can only continue in this movement:  
[T]hese chains and these systems can only 
recognise themselves in the tissue of this trace 
[…] and all the other traces (DLG 34). 
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Only in these ways can the aural find itself in the visual, time find 
itself in space, in the differences between one and all the other 
traces, Et Caetera (VeM 442, VM 126, DLG 1019).715 This 
interrelation, Derrida adds, would be a text (from “texere”, to 
weave (cf. FM 112)). This word should henceforth be taken in 
this systematic sense, as a metaphor for these most particular 
relations of the chains of traces of writing and speech. 
Summary thus far, and the nascent difficulty 
The above summarises Derrida’s two ways. The first devolved 
from irreducible temporalising synthesis to a pure trace as an 
originary synthesis of writing and difference without content 
(behind). The second retreated from appearing as such to a 
signifier that remains originary, and devolved to articulation and 
the psychic imprint. Derrida combined these to instil the trace of 
a temporalising synthesis to necessitate the difference between the 
irreducible relation to the originary, and chains of pure traces in their 
differences. He has drastically retracted from positive, internal, and 
naively objectivist linguistic, phenomenological and 
transcendental approaches.  
Nonetheless, we note, a nascent difficulty has arisen from the two 
ways, in Derrida’s privileging of the trace as originary 
                                                 
715 This “can only” signals essential relations, we have not yet begun to instil 
these contents of writing, speech and so on as what is appearing.  
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temporalisation. While such chains of traces have not yet 
exceeded the originary in movement from one to the other, the 
acoustic image in its movement of traces from one to the other is 
nothing unless it appears (cf. 824). As it can only appear as positive, 
this precludes a temporalising trace. We will develop this just 
below. 
Part Four: the trace and difference 
The trace as the absolute origin 
Thus, to move “forward” from the chains of traces, Derrida seeks 
to restore the levels and directions (sens) to the originary trace. 
Insofar as each originary (pure) relation must be related in 
general, then the originary and pure traces of one in the other can 
only arise and have sense upon the condition of the trace (of 
irreducible temporalising, difference and archi-writing).716 Thus 
while the pure trace and its originary differences must be anterior, 
the trace is deemed “a fortiori anterior” (DLG 34).717 As 
irreducible, this anteriority instituted an elemental foundation for 
sense which “is” a trace (in the sense of movement from itself 
                                                 
716 Derrida avoids deeming that these traces in the plural are “particular” traces, 
for they must not yet have taken objective form. The “trace” in the singular is 
what arises as irreducible or originary, and “all traces” occur as this trace 
proceeds in its chains of differences. 
717 This is also to write that the trace is a fortiori interior. It must not yet appear 
even in the originary moment, thus eludes appearing as inside or outside, yet it 
must found even the chains of traces at this origin. The most interior is just so 
the most irreducible. 
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developed above). Derrida thus moves from the essential “can 
only” to “is”. He continues: 
[T]he trace is in effect [en effet] the absolute origin of 
sense [sens] in general (DLG 34, our emphases). 
Derrida has begun to redress the demand which has held since his 
student work of 1954, to exceed essential finitude to speak of the 
absolute. However, he no longer deems the outcome is the 
Absolute. The absolute origin must be the irreducible synthesis of 
difference, archi-writing and the trace as temporalising; thus a 
condition for its appearing is that it essentially must never appear. 718 
Derrida concedes merely that it is an absolute origin signified by 
its effect.  
                                                 
718 Derrida employs the phrase “in effect” in accordance with Hume’s caution 
that one only has impressions of causes via particular effects. In one of his well-
known arguments, Hume argued that as it is possible to conceive of any idea as 
distinct, including those of cause and effect, then any idea can be thought as 
being and non-being, without necessary causal connection by a productive 
principle. Thus, as ever possible, demonstration of the truth of causal 
connection is impossible via ideas, and hence never necessary (Hume 1992, 
48). For a rendition of this argument via the claim that Hume proceeds by 
logical necessity, cf. Bennet, 1984, 272. Hume’s solution, such as it was, was at 
least that, as nothing “produces any impression” of the “idea”, or “original” 
cause, we rather form a “customary connexion”, and only from then begin “to 
entertain the notion of cause and connexion”, in that “a number of similar 
instances” “differ from every individual instance”. This is the sole relation of 
differing that for Hume permits this inference (Hume 1991, 117). Derrida in 
1966 is seeking to develop possibility, necessity, impossibility, difference, and 
similarity of instances in his fashion, to redress a scission that Hume deemed 
insurmountable. However, by deeming that this holds merely “in effect”, 
Derrida has not yet developed a way for this trace to be known besides the 
necessity of its having arisen. By Of Grammatology, Derrida will evolve a way to 
do so via différance and the trace.  
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This, we note, develops an instability. “In effect” (en effet) is often 
translated as “indeed”;719 the trace of the absolute indeed appears. 
However, it also has the sense of merely an effect of what no 
longer appears, and must yet be affirmed.720 Each instance is thus 
“already a trace” (DLG 34). The trace is thus no longer the 
absolute origin, and given a demand for the absolute, it must then 
be said that it is not the absolute origin of sense in general. Thus 
Derrida goes on of this absolute origin: 
that which returns to saying (cf. above) it [the 
trace] is not the absolute origin of sense in 
general (DLG 34). 
The condition for the solution to Derrida’s concern since 1954 is 
this circularity which returns to a negation of the trace.  
The difficulty of the impossible trace 
We thus add a critical note: the progress to this absolute 
foundation on the trace worsens the difficulty arising from the 
two ways (838). This absolute trace must be temporalising, which 
                                                 
719 Derrida prefers “en effet” (indeed, in fact, but only in effect, and not yet 
affirmed) rather than “en fait” (in fact), as he seeks to set aside naively positive 
facts. 
720 Derrida in 1971 explains this instability and its relations: “this ‘new’ concept 
of effect borrows its characteristics from both the opposition cause/effect and 
from the opposition essence/appearance – effect, reflect – without nevertheless being 
reduced to them. It is this fringe of irreducibility [in 1966, the trace] that needs to 
be analysed.” (P 67, Derrida’s emphases).  
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is irreducible to appearing. Thus temporalising was aligned with 
sound, as what can be articulated at the most interior only as 
never appearing. It can appear only insofar as it never appears as 
something. The latter (most particularly, the articulated element) 
is “the appearance of sound which is nothing less than the sound 
appearing” (DLG 34). But when an absolute trace appears only as 
sound, it can appear only as nothing. The absolute trace is 
annihilated, which precludes a pure and originary trace. 
To assess this difficulty via possibility: in the first moment of 
what it “is”, the trace finds no relation to itself other than its 
effect, and appears only as nothing. Only nothing can then be 
negated. It is precluded from appearing, and it is then only 
possible that nothing appeared. A fortiori, the temporalising trace 
is essentially impossible from the first (DLG 37), both not 
everything and referring beyond everything that can appear as 
such.  
Moreover, this “is” of movement of differences and writing thus 
depends on a general possibility that the relation can have sense. 
This trace is incompatible with a difference and writing. For archi-
writing and difference permit writing (DLG 37), and the derived 
movement from one to the other in its differences is ever 
possible. As the trace is impossible in this first moment (cf. DLG 
37, below), it ought to be precluded from any work, and preclude 
all progress (forward) in the living present.  
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The turn toward difference  
But Derrida is aware of this. He goes on: 
[T]his would be impossible without the 
difference at work in [dans] each of the chains. 
(DLG 35)  
Instead of the trace, Derrida appeals to the work of difference 
(812). He thus prepares to develop the permission for movement in 
the appearing of differences. As the trace is merely the absolute 
origin in effect, it can only relate to appearing via the difference 
between the inside and outside (appearing and appearance, living 
and lived etc. (824)). Derrida goes on that 
the difference between the appearing and the 
appearance, lived experience and world, is the 
condition of all [toutes] the other differences, of all the 
other traces (DLG 34 our emphases). 
However, note that Derrida has made difference as “a” condition 
into the condition. The difference has been taken as the condition 
for all difference between appearing and appearance; thus even 
for all the traces, and all differences in movement from one to other.  
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Crucially, from this juncture in the article the trace and its 
impossibility is de-emphasised. Derrida mentions the trace only once in its 
relation to difference, and only while emphasising that difference 
permits this progress (DLG 35, below). He returns to the trace 
only after he has developed his overall progress of chains of 
metaphors, in the use of language as subjectivity (cf. DLG 34-37). 
At that juncture, the trace is indeed mentioned merely as 
remaining “a priori”, “behind”, and indeed a “problem of origin”, 
for it is “impossible” (DLG 37).  
Part Five: from metaphor to the subject 
Hence Derrida seeks to evolve the progress “forward”. Above, he 
developed the moment of articulation as constituting,721 which in 
turn depends upon spacing. Spacing as such is aligned with as 
consciousness, and consciousness passes to the unconscious. 
Rather than merely not conscious, the complement “unconscious” 
develops negation in consciousness in progress from one to the 
other as such,722 and refers beyond each level of a system, as non-
relation. Thus, Derrida goes on, 
                                                 
721 Derrida avoids the word “active”, although he employs “constituting”; this 
may be as constituting takes the form of a movement from active to passive. 
722 As we have noted, Derrida in 1965 explained the tongue as both conscious 
and unconscious in general, as what exceeds the particular moment of 
constituting, writing, etc. (DLG 1021, (687)). 
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[S]pacing […] is always [already] the non-
perceived as such, the non-present and the 
non-conscious as such. (DLG 36) 
Derrida is nearly ready to move to the articulating (writing and 
speaking) subject.  
The evolution of metaphor 
As noted, the telos of a psychic imprint, as the form of the 
acoustic image, is that of speech. Hence the telos of speech (in 
the acoustic image) is aligned with irreducibility to this interior 
progress. That 
the ‘imprint’ would be irreducible, implies also 
that speech is originarily passive, but in a sense 
of passivity that all intra-mundane metaphor 
can only betray. (DLG 35) 
An important evolution occurs to metaphor. Derrida sets aside 
concern with “intra-mundane” metaphor (i.e. those proceeding 
only in a natural or psychological world). He quotes Saussure that 
the important concern in devolving to the interior  
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is not that spoken language [langage] is natural to 
man, but the faculty to constitute a tongue (C 
26, in DLG 35, Derrida’s emphasis).
723
  
It is this faculty, Saussure noted, that permits the constituting of 
distinct signs corresponding to ideas (C 26, in DLG 35).  
Henceforth, Derrida bypasses language in general (langage). Metaphors 
arise as instances of irreducible ideas in the tongue. Thus each are 
instances of the irreducible arising in the chains. That is, the word 
metaphor originally arose from the Greek meta and pherein, to 
“bear above”, which then united into metapherein, to transfer 
(CDWH 379). At this juncture, the binaries “conscious-
unconscious”, “graphic-phonic”, “sonorous-luminous” etc. 
employed above are indeed “metaphors” in this systematic sense. 
Indeed, any appearing arises as what is called “metaphor”, and can 
and must proceed in chains from one to other.  
Parenthesis – avoiding confusion with free play 
It is thus feasible to explain how the employment of metaphors – 
in “Of Grammatology” in 1966 – ought never to be deemed the 
“free play” associated with Derrida in earlier years. As any 
                                                 
723 That this is no longer a “natural” sense of “man” will pertain to Derrida’s 
approach to subjectivity, below. 
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metaphor can only be partially related to another, each retains its 
essential specificity. A fortiori, the levels must be kept. Derrida’s concern 
is merely how they are instituted, as no longer intra-mundane. 
Moreover, however related or unrelated to one another in their 
sense or concepts, metaphors in the system (as instances to the 
chain) are related by the shared dependence upon irreducible 
difference (and thus their sameness). Yet the necessity is still to 
proceed via the chains of metaphor (forward), from one to other, 
in order to determine those relations in the ascending hierarchy: 
the psychic imprint, signifier, signified (tongue), sign, idea etc.724  
The necessities of chains as metaphor 
Derrida thus assesses how to move forward, and adds the non-
relation to the progress from one to other, and its internal 
negations. Importantly, the relations of metaphor in their 
progress are in non-relation to language in general (and thus no 
non-metaphorical language is available). They are thus no longer 
opposed to each other; yet it is necessary to proceed from one to 
other without external opposition. Derrida deems this a necessity of 
“antagonism”. He explains: 
[A]s one does not have a non-metaphorical 
language in general [langage] to oppose here to 
                                                 
724 To affirm that no metaphor determines the telos would be hasty; Derrida has 
years’ worth of metaphor to explore in his oeuvre (cf. DISS, PP). 
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metaphors, it is necessary […] to multiply the 
antagonistic metaphors (DLG 35, our emphases). 
The term develops an instability internal to the word, as 
“antagonistic” the binaries are conflicting and opposite, but as 
derived from the original Greek (as “anti” and “agon”), they are 
also “against conflict” – hence also mere others.725  
Derrida is indeed beginning to multiply such antagonists. That is, 
note that particular metaphors can and must permit antagonism in 
their sense. Thus, above, as temporalising and spacing (difference) 
are antagonistic, the metaphor “interval” institutes the 
antagonism between the signifiers (acoustic image) of a musical 
pause and a spatial gap (in writing), as does “pause”. Just so, 
“blank” (blanc) institutes an image of absence and also “white” 
(blanc) in the spatial extension of a colour, while one can 
“punctuate” one’s speech as well as one’s writing etc. (above, 
DLG 36). In turn, each of these metaphors can be antagonistic 
only by means of the essential relations that sustain their specific 
                                                 
725 Derrida is aware of the divergence in the senses of “antagonistic” and 
“agonistic”, and employs the latter term in his “Outwork” to Dissemination, 
which explains his “logic” (DISS 8). The agonistic pertains to “closed” 
“hierarchical fields” of oppositions and difference (that is, the levels, 
directions, inside and outside etc., without a beyond). The instability of 
antagonism “opens” this hierarchy, and – as above – does so by metaphor (cf. 
DISS 5). 
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senses.726 The possibility of application of metaphors to further 
Derrida’s system has developed at least through the articles “Of 
Grammatology”.727 
Arche-writing as spacing 
Overall, as metaphor in general is derived from archi-writing, and 
spacing is a condition for any appearing (even of the graphie etc.), 
Derrida goes on:  
[A]rche-writing is spacing (DLG 30).  
Thus spacing permits the (horizon of) what can hold “across”. 
Derrida supports this, and again calls spacing as archi-writing a 
“horizontality” (DLG 36). However, it is henceforth supposed that 
the directions of spacing “across” are irreducible. Along with the 
difference and archi-writing, the directions of spacing are 
supposed to institute and permit even the directions of the 
progress of differences, which in turn are prior to the spatial 
progress as such. Hence spacing founds sensible plenitude. In 
                                                 
726 Just as the directions and levels were made noematic since 1962 (279), 
Derrida seeks to reformulate hierarchy. He asks whether a “natural hierarchy” 
continues to have any sense (DLG 34-35) from this juncture; however, the 
relations remain as this systematic “hierarchy”, which seeks to remain this side 
of the transcendental, in order to go “beyond”; words retain their essential 
relations, the difficulty is explaining how such parallels apply. 
727 Cf. Plato’s Pharmacy (PP 55-62) for an example of Derrida’s employment of 
metaphor to compare Plato, Rousseau and Saussure in terms of this reasoning, 
developing from metaphors as “contradiction”. 
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turn, such metaphors can be negated, in spacing as becoming 
absent, thus not temporalising, in the antagonism etc. For instance, 
[I]t is not even necessary to say that spacing 
cuts [coup] (DLG 36). 
“Cuts” (coup) in French, as an incision of difference that instils 
absence, also has the sense of “cups”, as a sensible plenitude.  
Thus moving forward, such a system would take the form of a 
movement instituted by an irreducible structure, and proceeding 
in its chains to return to the irreducible.  
The admission of the reserve 
At this developed restoration of elements to the system [i.e. of 
signification], which undoubted moment as yet falls short of the 
absolute present, Derrida in 1966 calls that which necessarily fails to 
appear (in signifying as temporalising, spacing, speech, writing, etc., at every 
level and beyond) the “reserve” (DLG 36). While spacing permits what 
is articulated as difference, the reserve would hold itself back: 
[S]ignification takes its form thus only at the 
cross of difference, […] discretion, […] and of 
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the reserve of that which does not appear (DLG 36, 
cf. DLG 53, our emphasis). 
Indeed, as we will explain, the reserve in 1966 is given a weight 
equal to and inseparable from difference and the trace (cf. DLG 
53).  
The difficulty of the reserve in retention 
By this Derrida has instilled a further scission, forward. Thus far a 
scission holds between the movement (in all its forms – temporalising, speech 
etc.) and the reserve (forward). From behind, what the reserve has 
provided in effect remains merely necessary; this holds whether in a 
progress from forward or behind, for the “beyond” is never 
bound to the directions of consciousness.728 
Yet as to the latter directions, the progress as it has arrived at 
retention also falls short of a reserve. Even were an originary trace 
restored to consciousness (from behind), retention thus far still 
falls short (forward). We return to this when Derrida adds the 
reserve as protention, to arrive at différance. Thus far, Derrida has 
developed a movement of retention in a living present that 
articulates language, in its antagonistic metaphors of spacing that 
falls short – permitting a writing and speaking subject. 
                                                 
728 A reserve is never irreducible, for the latter requires certain appearing that 
cannot be reduced to appearing. The reserve holds of that which not appear. 
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The subject as movement 
Thus Derrida evolves to what has been called “the death of the 
subject”. This, we suggest, was misunderstood by many readers 
since Derrida’s earliest years, in that Derrida was aligned with 
post-structuralists in general.729 For example, in the discussion 
after Derrida’s first reading of his essay “Différance”, in 1968, 
Goldmann stated: 
[A]s for Levi-Strauss, Foucault, Barthes, 
Althusser, Lacan, Greimas, so for Derrida, 
there is no subject. (D 1968, 91) 
Derrida replied succinctly, 
I have never said that ‘there is no subject’. (D 
1968, 92) 
By 1966, nor would Derrida have done so, for every reason we 
have developed since his work of 1954. Nor does Derrida imply, 
of course, that he affirms a subject. Rather, even the subject is a 
part of the structure instituted in the movement.  
                                                 
729 Barthes’ essay, published in 1968, was titled The Death of the Author, and puts 
it that “the text is henceforth made and read in such a way that at all its levels 
the author is absent” (Barthes 1977, 133).  
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To explain: as far as we have evolved in 1966, certainly, a subject has 
an origin. However, this must still be explained rigorously. Thus, 
certainly a subject appears (as logical (“S”)), and also becomes 
conscious of and constitutes itself as ideal object. Its constitution 
is “also that of the thing-object” (DLG 36). 
In turn, as to these directions, the developed movement of 
retention has progressed in every moment from the psychological 
to its contradiction, to the necessities of archi-writing and 
originary synthesis of difference as such, and the chains of 
particular signifiers of writing and speech in the text. Just so, it 
evolved to a lived experience of retention which can proceed in 
signifiers in its movement of difference and negation. At a level 
“above”, it can proceed as constituting of spacing in its becoming-
absent (which one must above all avoid confusing with absence), 
thus aligned with pure temporalising, sound and passive 
constitution. Moreover, it can proceed as articulating of writing 
and its antagonistic metaphors, as yet falling short in the reserve 
(DLG 36). This becoming-absent in consciousness as spacing 
proceeds to the instability of the tongue as unconscious (cf. 501 
fn.), falling short of language and returning to the originary:  
[S]pacing as writing is the becoming-absent and the 
becoming-unconscious of the subject. (DLG 36, 
our emphases) 
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We have italicised the interrelated elements. 
Thus, more particularly, as to antagonistic metaphors, the living 
moment as becoming-absent is antagonistically related to its death, 
in the reserve of the living present. This in turn repeats the 
progress from one to the other. Death is antagonistic and other to 
life, and then signifies beyond life. Thus it can be aligned with 
temporalising, sound etc., and returns to become the originary 
moment of absence in lived experience (DLG 40). Derrida explains 
that by this progress of the subject (across) is constituted the very 
structure of subjectivity: 
[T]his becoming is, as relation of the subject to its 
death, the constitution even of subjectivity (DLG 36, 
our emphases). 
We hope that this averts misunderstanding as to the actual death 
of the subject. Derrida is rather seeking to work out the 
implications of subjectivity’s relation to its death “in rigorous 
fashion” (DLG 41), following the idea of a science.  
Indeed, this has developed Derrida’s thorough reformulation of 
what for Husserl was a transcendental subjectivity, which – we 
suggest – we have worked out in a system since 1954. Thus 
indeed, one should avoid deeming that the subject or subjectivity take 
priority. As what can also be a “thing-object”, thus without 
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doubting it and retaining its essential sense, even the subject is a 
particular instance of this system. Notably, Derrida subtly avoids 
deeming that death is a trace of the originary in life. Nor does he 
deem that the subject (author) as such appears as a trace. Nor 
could he, for as we explained, the trace would be impossible, and 
excluded from the living chains.  
The difficulty of the trace supported  
Indeed, the possibility of this chain developed, only in the next 
paragraph does Derrida return the trace (DLG 37), and merely to 
note that it remains “behind” and “a priori”. A fortiori, it thus 
“marks” (a metaphor of writing as appearing) the impossibility of 
appearing (cf. 840).  
Moreover, Derrida indeed supports that this difficulty applies to 
every level of this chain of metaphors of speech and writing, 
“forward”. First, it precludes the progress of metaphors of 
writing (e.g. the mark) to progress to unification of chains in the 
psychic imprint (824). Hence, forward, it precludes the unity in 
the signifier. Forward again, it precludes unity with the signified, 
and then the sign. In turn, it precludes an absolute without limits 
(present, beyond). The 
trace […] marks the impossibility for a sign, 
for the unity of a signifier and a signified, to 
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produce itself in the plenitude of a presence 
and an absolute presence (DLG 37).
730
 
Instead, Derrida merely aligns the trace with the archi-
phenomenon of memory (retention as irreducibly only behind). 
The originary trace remains a problem of origin, and Derrida goes 
on: 
such is the place of the problematic of the 
trace (DLG 37). 
Indeed, as prior to any moment of a living present, Derrida writes 
that the trace is before “humanity” (DLG 37). We address this 
when Derrida progresses to “the name of man” and evolution to 
“différance”, below (DLG 46, (866)). Thus far, the trace is 
“impossible” when it appears; Derrida will seek to evolve this 
difficulty by an evolution to différance. 
Derrida’s summary, and support for our progress 
Before doing so, Derrida summarises his evolution to bring it 
toward a culmination. So far, he has developed the system, to its 
                                                 
730 The word “mark” as a metaphor of writing may have been derived from 
Husserl’s mark (Merkmale). It refers to the sense of a sign (indication) that 
essentially cannot express a spoken or written “meaning” (Bedeutung) in 
signification, such as a knot in a handkerchief (LI 1 §2, Hua XIX (1) 31). A 
mark is impossible, for essential reasons, in the internal relations of speech and 
writing, yet certainly appears as a mark. 
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appearing of difference as such, then to the archi-writing that 
developed as the gramme, which could then return to the phonic 
difference and again to the graphie. Thus, Derrida explains,  
[A]rchi-writing [would be the] first possibility 
of speech, then of the graphie in the derived 
sense (DLG 37).  
In turn, when the gramme evolved to the originary difference of 
the phonic as temporalising, this permitted the movement in the 
living present from consciousness to non-consciousness, as 
derived writing and the phonic, then to their movement as 
metaphor. Derrida summarises (in that order): 
[T]he ‘outside’, ‘spatial’ and ‘objective’ exteriority 
[…] would not appear as such without the gramme, 
without the [originary] difference as 
temporalisation, without the non-presence as sense 
of the present, without the relation to the 
concrete structure of the living present. [Without 
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this progress] metaphor would be forbidden. (DLG 
37, our emphases)  
But in turn, metaphor as yet falls short of the beyond in its 
progress.  
The generalisation to the history of metaphysics  
Having developed these implications in a long sequence, Derrida 
at last generalises them. Any approach that seeks to determine an 
objective outside begins from a dualism, with a telos of 
“presence”, “without difference” (DLG 38)). Any such progress 
implies the trace. Derrida goes on: 
[a]ll the dualisms, […] as well as all the 
monisms, spiritual or material, are the unique 
theme [i.e. object] of a metaphysics which in all 
of history stretch [i.e. in space, tendre] toward 
the reduction to this presence-absence, that is 
to say of the trace (DLG 37-38). 
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Derrida has generalised his certain system as necessarily applying 
to the history of metaphysics, and even onto-theology (711).731 
Moreover, he has indeed done so according to these common 
(basic) relations. This brings our initial progress since Derrida’s 
alignment with Saussure in Chapter Seven toward a close. 
However, we caution that the above merely generalises the 
implications of systematic levels and directions in “history”. The 
latter term ever had an essential rather than a natural sense.732  
The transition to particular thinkers 
The next evolution in Derrida’s oeuvre thus occurs systematically. 
He avoids determining the implications of every thinker, or even of 
any other thinker. He had explained that  
                                                 
731 Derrida thus includes “onto-theology” (BT 46, SZ 49) to what he deems 
“metaphysics” (DLG 1029, (711); OG 67-68, (905 fn.).  
732 Indeed, as to the phrase “history of metaphysics”, only at this juncture does 
Derrida deem that these relations of archi-writing, trace, temporalising etc. no 
longer allow a “vulgar concept of writing” (DLG 38, fn. 14), aligning with 
Heidegger. In Being and Time, the vulgar “designates” the uncritical “concept of 
time thought and beginning from the spatial movement which dominates all of 
philosophy […]” (DLG 38 fn. 14, cf. esp. BT 372, SZ 405). As Derrida takes it, 
Heidegger’s aim by 1928 was no longer to avoid merely a real or psychological 
sense of temporality, but even the spatial sense of authentically originary 
(ursprüngliche) transcendental phenomenology. Derrida’s articles have developed 
in a considered progress to this juncture and his generalisation. In 1965, he 
began from a psychological concept of the “history of metaphysics” in the 
“occidental tradition”, which had its origin in Aristotle’s and Hegel’s privilege 
of the voice. By 1966, as short of and beyond the transcendental field, the 
words “history of metaphysics” in the “occidental tradition” still retain their 
sense, in that any content can be a trace, although without simple spatial 
relations (DLG 38 fn. 14). In the turn to archi-writing, Derrida thus aligns with 
the reformulation of temporality which – Derrida notes that Heidegger argues 
– held from Aristotle to Hegel. Derrida assesses these relations of temporality 
in Aristotle, Hegel and Heidegger in “Ousia and Gramme”, in accordance with 
the trace. This footnote in 1966 (DLG 38, fn. 14) develops the necessity for 
that article, which – while ancillary to his main argument – Derrida was 
preparing for in his progress through “Of Grammatology”. 
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it would be necesssary to re-examine [this 
science of the trace and writing] cautiously in 
each system of speech-writing across the world 
and history. (DLG 27) 
“Of Grammatology” was never a massive overclaim based upon 
hasty affirmation of a natural history. Rather, it prudently 
develops the systematic relations as the site of a task.  
For nor is the evolution complete; as for semiology, such a 
science must yet be developed. Thus its relations must be 
developed according to their necessities. The next evolution in 
Derrida’s progress too occurs systematically: he begins to examine 
the approach to speech and writing by particular thinkers in 
history (cf. esp. DLG 40-53). Yet the necessities are still to develop 
the implications of the progress. These will evolve to différance. [OT] 
Part Six: from the problematic of the trace to 
différance 
The alignment with Leroi-Gourhan 
This occurs in the final pages of “Of Grammatology” by means 
of Derrida’s address to the work of André Leroi-Gourhan. Rather 
than engagement, Derrida opts for alignment. For Derrida, Leroi-
Gourhan’s anthropological approach to history avoids an overt 
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phonocentrism. Rather than concern for “speech as present or 
absent” (GP 12), Leroi-Gourhan is rather concerned with 
writing.733 He also employs a relation comparable to the gramme.  
First, Derrida aligns his levels and directions with Leroi-Gourhan. 
In developing his progress, Derrida had worked out that his 
originary movement was prior to “humanity” (852). Leroi-
Gourhan assesses those tribes in history merely addressed by “the 
name of man” (DLG 46, Derrida’s emphasis). For Derrida, 
“history” is a concept that must enter the movement as a signifier 
in the living present, in the direction “forward” toward the origin. 
Moreover, following from a basis of an irreducible writing, history 
would become derived and certain via writing. Writing in passage 
preserves history.734  
However, while Saussure was concerned with a tradition of 
tongues that developed orally, Leroi-Gourhan sets aside such 
consideration to assess the primitive tribes in history “without 
writing”.735 Yet, without writing, it seems that such tribes would 
be excluded from history. Derrida goes on that Leroi-Gourhan 
                                                 
733 Leroi-Gourhan, we note, does add that at the “linear” stage of graphism, 
writing becomes “completely subordinated to spoken language”. Derrida never 
follows these relations; but nor has he yet addressed linear writing (DLG 48). 
We are following the evolution of différance. 
734 As Leroi-Gourhan puts it, from the first, “[I]ndividuals find themselves in 
the presence of a body of traditions […] a dialogue takes place, from infancy, 
between the infant and the social organism.” (GP 24, cf. GS 228). 
735 Leroi-Gourhan also maintains a conventional sort of approach to language 
rather than the tongue, by deeming that “the preservation and transmission [of 
knowledge in a tradition] is ensured by language [langage].” (GS 228). Derrida 
will be concerned with his address to writing. 
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deems that these tribes lacked only “a certain type of writing” (our 
emphasis), nevertheless retaining “other forms of fixation” (GP 2, 
32). As Leroi-Gourhan explains it, “graphism” in the origin of 
history began with “graphic signs” as both figuration and 
engravings (GP 1 263, GS 188). That is, as we followed, the 
certain moment of writing arose from the instituted trace as 
graphic, hence as “image”, “figuration”, “representation” etc. 
(DLG 1036, (728 ff.)). Indeed, such sorts of writing no longer 
appeal to writing simply as derived from the graphie in general 
(and hence no longer to “alphabetic writing” (DLG 46)), by 
which Derrida arrived at the instituted trace (769). Derrida can 
rather address the more encompassing concept of the gramme. 
That is, for Derrida, supposing a general possibility of writing then 
permitted the gramme as foundation for every form of writing; this 
allowed a difference in writing that exceeds the regional relations 
of the graphic (DLG 46 (802)).  
Next (moving forward), the supposition of the gramme 
nevertheless institutes a certain moment. Hence, as originary the 
gramme can appear as such. In turn, as “articulation” it indeed 
permits a derived writing in this broader sense. The appearing of 
the gramme as such without doubt makes possible [i.e. 
permits] the emergence of ‘writing’ in the 
derived sense (DLG 46, our emphasis). 
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Such a derived writing, for Derrida, permits the articulation of 
history in a living present.  
We add a brief critical note: even though, for Derrida, Leroi-
Gourhan is little concerned with speech, Derrida does appeal to 
speech via “articulation”, and indeed, in subtle employment of 
“that is to say” (c’est a dire). As he did with Husserl, Levinas, and 
Saussure, Derrida subtly imposes his progress upon Leroi-
Gourhan. Articulation will be “the content/foundation [fond] of 
the history of the gramme” (DLG 46),736 and its originary difference 
(i.e., as concept or signified), which in turn is articulated as 
differences. Thus Derrida proceeds by examining 
an articulation in the history of life (that is to 
say, of difference) conceived as history of the 
‘gramme’ (DLG 46, our emphases). 
We developed the levels of this “history” just above. Derrida 
emphasises that this progress evolves in its levels and directions: 
                                                 
736 The French “fond” has the sense both of a “bottom”, and thus foundation 
(by a whole), and content “opposed to form”, and thus a particular moment of 
opposition upon the inside. By “Of Grammatology” and the development of 
this “thesis of difference” as the “source of linguistic value” that Derrida 
sought to “found” (DLG 28), “fond” can be taken as a locus for the circularity 
of the system. 
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the possibility of the gramme structures the 
continuity of its history according to levels, 
types, and rigorous original rhythms (DLG 
46). 
This structuring of the levels by the gramme is developing, as the 
programme will permit a direction from the future. 
Memory and the trace of the future 
Thus we prepare to move forward from this necessity of the 
gramme in history. As we have explained, Derrida’s originary 
moment as derived retains the trace (from behind), which 
devolved to retention (847). Thus the trace was deemed the archi-
phenomenon of memory (DLG 37, above). For Leroi-Gourhan, 
there are at least four kinds of memory that already hold in the 
animal world737 – the reactive physiological memory of a nervous 
system (as in the earthworm), genetic memory (as in the ant), the 
social and linguistic memory of humans, and a form of memory 
in tools and technology (GP 2 14-53, GS 222-237).738  
                                                 
737 Leroi-Gourhan addresses the ant and earthworm at GP 2 14-17 (GS 222-
224), the social and linguistic memory of humans at GP 2 2-24 (GS 227-229), 
and the memory of tools and technology at GP 2 53 ff. (GS 237 ff.). 
738 Note that Derrida does not yet mention Heidegger in this approach. 
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Derrida aligns with the latter kind. For someone to employ a tool 
there must already be a memory that permits the tool to be 
employed. Moreover, Leroi-Gourhan “supposes” (suppose) this 
memory to hold already; both behind and (for Derrida) beyond. 
Indeed, such a memory of tools too has its levels and whole-part 
relations. At this juncture, the movement is depersonalised from 
human subjectivity. For the memory of tools already holds at a 
level more general than simply that of man. It applies “from 
primate to human being” (GP 2 38, GS 239). Derrida’s alignment 
with the memory of tools in animal behaviour thus “overflows” 
the moment of “intentional constitution” of what was 
“heretofore called man” (DLG 46). By this “exteriorisation of the 
trace”, the trace of retention exceeds all other human 
consciousnesses.739 
We thus begin to move forward from this moment of the trace 
that exceeds a living present. All of the behaviour of such animals 
is bound to the use of the memory of tools and technology. Even 
genetic needs such as the survival of the group are responded to 
by employing tools. As Leroi-Gourhan summarises the above:  
                                                 
739 As noted, the Other in Levinas’ fashion is no longer addressed in “Of 
Grammatology”. The approach addresses the structure of subjectivity in a 
living present, according to the levels and directions developed from language, 
and then the tongue and its relations of metaphor. 
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[T]he operational synergy of tool and gesture 
supposes [suppose] the existence of a memory in 
which the behaviour programme writes itself. At 
the animal level, this memory entwines itself [se 
confond] with the whole of organic behaviour 
(GP 2 53 ff., cf. GS 237 ff. our emphases). 
Next, we move forward to the “goal” addressed by this 
behaviour, which aligns with Derrida’s telos. Instead of relying on 
ethnocentric divisions between “instinct and intelligence” to 
impel such movement (GP 1 12 ff., GS 221), Leroi-Gourhan 
appeals to a programme (that is, a pro-gramme, forward).740 As 
developed above, a “programme” is that which writes itself in the 
act. This allows a further moment – for such memories permit 
tools to be applied toward a goal. This animal activity, no longer 
human, develops programmes in the service of such goals.  
Hence for Leroi-Gourhan such a memory allows a form of 
anticipation of its outcomes, which Derrida thus equates with 
Husserl’s protention (DLG 46). The gramme as moment of writing 
                                                 
740 As Leroi-Gourhan puts it, in setting aside the “distinction between instinct 
and intelligence”, the nervous system (and its memory) “responds to internal 
and external demands by constructing programmes” (GP 1 12 ff., cf. GS 221). 
Note that this programme heeds “demands” from inside and outside.  
 - 863 
- 
supplied by retention (from behind) finds a further moment in 
the pro-gramme, anticipating what is yet to come, as protention.  
The addition of the direction from “forward”, as 
basis of différance  
Derrida’s system is progressive – Husserl’s protention has not yet 
been mentioned in any of the reasoning we addressed in “Of 
Grammatology”. As we followed, Derrida sought to question the 
origin of the system itself, from writing in general to the derived 
moment, thus from the originary and temporalising reserve, in 
movement of difference from one to the other to retention, which 
in turn fell short. Every moment as yet moved “from behind”, then 
“forward” in its structure of return. But in the exteriorisation of the 
trace of anticipation, a moment of what is yet to come, of what 
overflows consciousness, arises as much from the programme (in 
front), and passes through the living present to history 
(backward).  
The latter for Derrida arises with the gramme. Derrida is very brief, 
but for the first time in this reasoning, calls this a “double 
movement” (DLG 46) – without yet including negation, it instils 
two directions to the living present (front to back, in a retention that 
must found the future, and back to front, in a history that intends 
the protention). But as ever, these signifiers must be thought as a 
unity; thus Derrida summarises that the programme can be 
included to the gramme only in beginning from (à partir de) 
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a history of possibilities of the trace as unity of 
a double movement of retention and 
protention. (DLG 46) 
But crucially, we suggest, what is to come is never necessarily a difference 
(except insofar as protention anticipates what is to occur from 
what has occurred, as what Husserl calls “the future of the 
recollected” (ITC §24)).741  
The evolution of différance 
Indeed, at this juncture Derrida diverges from Husserl, for whom 
even the fulfilment of a protention is evidently a moment of 
retention. Husserl explains that 
it is evident that if what is expected makes its 
appearance, i.e. becomes something present, 
the anticipation of this situation itself has gone 
by. If the future has become the present, then 
the present has changed to the relatively past. 
(ITC §26) 
                                                 
741 Recollection, for Husserl, is the moment of positing what has been 
reproduced from the primary remembrance of retention (cf. ITC §23). 
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As he did in his Third Investigation (cf. LI 3 §25, (210)), Husserl 
seeks to avoid acknowledging the greatest whole (beyond), 
preferring to found the directions of the living present on 
evidence.  
Derrida in 1966 no longer accords evidence a primary authority. 
He has rather worked out the necessities of an irreducible 
foundation that withholds itself, in the reserve. He thus admits a 
protention to the horizon of possibility, by which what never 
appears can be held in reserve. What is implicit, it seems to us, is 
that no content of difference is yet necessary in protention, no 
judgment must yet have been sedimented in the future. What is 
beyond (forward, future) is not yet even necessarily different from 
what is behind, and the reserve remains possible.  
Thus a reorientation to the demand for difference as absolute, which had 
held since 1954, occurs via protention. In 1954, Derrida had 
sought to determine the origin as absolute; he swiftly set 
protention aside as it does not yet provide a real content (125). 
However, in 1966, Derrida favours protention. Without a 
difference that must necessarily have appeared, protention instils an 
originary moment where difference need not yet hold. A crucial evolution thus 
occurs in Derrida’s oeuvre, as he introduces what he will call différance. Note 
that as such a deferral is not yet able to be articulated – it is yet to 
come – he thus far merely writes that he will call this différance.  
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As Derrida later explained (cf. P 8), the signifier “différance” 
derives from the present participle of the verb différer, to defer or 
delay and also to differ. However, it first develops in 1966, as a 
deferral of that originary difference by a future becoming past. 
Moreover, for essential reasons, this again holds in relation to 
what never appears; just as originary temporalising requires a 
difference that never appears. It can be said that anticipation of the 
reserve permits the deferral of difference. 
But indeed, protention adds a further degree of reserve. What is 
to come as a deferral of difference would be essentially withheld 
even from what has not yet occurred as temporalising in living 
consciousness. Such a reserve is thus possible as a deferral of 
difference. A fortiori, Derrida writes, this movement 
enlarges the difference (we will say the 
différance) and the possibility of putting in reserve 
(DLG 46, Derrida’s emphasis). 
Derrida has worked out the first moment of différance in his oeuvre. 
It has arisen from the gramme, protention, and the reserve. These 
relations allow Derrida’s best outcome in “Of Grammatology” to 
the “question” of the origin, which had held since 1954. In a 
protention, even the opening of the question posed by the living 
present has not yet arrived at the answer it anticipates (cf. 348), 
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but rather only at différance. Even so, the living present can 
continue to think of the future given that it remains without 
content, and thus no longer as objective. 
The second différance in 1966 – articulation  
Yet thus far, Derrida has merely evolved a permission. To explain 
how the living present can “go beyond” while remaining on “this 
side” of objectivism, we note that a second (much less overt) 
version of différance holds in the closing pages of 1966, as a 
culmination of the relations of articulation. As noted, Leroi-
Gourhan is not yet concerned with the presence or absence of 
speech, hence Derrida ostensibly begins from the gramme and pro-
gramme. Even so, in deeming the progress that of articulation, 
“that is to say, of difference”, and as what can only be “said” in 
this “same movement” (DLG 46), he subtly mobilises the 
necessities of his system.  
To summarise: first, it would be speech – insofar as it almost 
never appears in Derrida’s explanation of Leroi-Gourhan – that 
permits the articulation of difference and deferral to be other to one 
another, thus to enter the “same movement” at the lowest level. 
That is to say, if différance is to be heard as what it is (if the sounds 
“différance” can only be understood (entendu) as no longer 
“différence”) then difference cannot appear in writing or speech, 
and is deferred. If it is to be written as what it is (via the gramme), 
then one can only say it is no longer different, thus no longer 
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what it is (différance), and thus it is different from itself. It can be 
written or spoken only as what is no longer spoken or written, 
and is not the same as itself. In this movement from one to the 
other in infinitum, it opens and refers “beyond” only insofar as it 
remains bound to the movement of signifiers. Or at least, it 
would refer “beyond” on “this side” of the transcendental field so 
long as those chains can be chains of traces, and différance permits 
a trace. We will return to these issues below, as they nevertheless 
raise difficulties. 
Toward conclusion in 1966  
The above brings Derrida’s address to the history of metaphysics 
in 1966 toward a close. We have followed how Derrida worked out 
the progress to différance in a long sequence, as a way to address 
the “beyond”. To situate this, he began from the telos of a 
rigorous science of semiology, and developed to the necessities of 
grammatology. These implications were generalised to a “history 
of metaphysics”, which outcome in turn has implied a différance, 
trace and reserve.  
This implication for the history of metaphysics is named a 
“closure” (clôture). This word develops an instability; first, as 
bringing to a close the progress of metaphysics in the historical 
sense, in a new epoch. It must ever be noted, however, that the 
sequence of conditions begins from and is dependent upon 
metaphysics. Second, it thus has not yet exceeded metaphysics. 
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That is, “closure” also has the sense of an enclosure. This activity 
remains within metaphysics. Thus, third, “closure” has the sense 
of closing. It develops the site of an instability between object and 
act, constituting and constituted, this-side and beyond. When 
metaphysics is closed off from its beyond, it is not closing. As 
different from closing, it is not wholly a closure. When closing it 
is not yet closed, and not yet a difference. Closure would still be 
to come as différance held in reserve. Its movement could be called 
a signifier in the closure (such as writing), only insofar as signifiers 
too are metaphors of the more profound (“root”) level of 
différance, trace, reserve etc.  
As we have emphasised, these relations apply to the history of metaphysics 
insofar as they are common (basic). Thus indeed, Derrida explains of 
the closure of metaphysics in his final paragraph of the articles 
“Of Grammatology”, 
[T]his common root, which we have named trace, 
reserve or différance would call itself writing only 
in the historical closure of science and 
philosophy. […] But the thought of the trace, 
différance or the reserve […] ought [doit] also to 
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point beyond their own field (DLG 53, 
Derrida’s emphases). 
Derrida has worked out how to address his concerns from 1954 
to permit the exceeding of subjectivity to think the beyond, while 
permitting this rigorous “science”.  
Part Seven: what needs to develop 
The severing of différance as protention from the 
trace 
However, in terms of Derrida’s reasoning, the basis is not yet 
mature and we add some critical notes. The overall difficulties 
pertain to the trace. First, différance has been developed via 
protention, but is thus severed from the trace. However, when 
there is no necessary relation to a content of difference in the 
future (as explained), there is no necessary relation by a trace. 
Next, as there is thus no necessary relation even to a difference in 
general (or any difference), there is not yet a difference to defer, 
or a necessity for deferral to become difference. That is, 
difference to come could only be held in reserve, for the progress 
only permits delay. Instead, the moment of difference as content 
could only be restored to consciousness by retention.  
However, then there is no necessary relation to a trace of memory 
which must first have been instilled to retention by the future. 
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Retention could only have been restored to consciousness in 
subjectivity by history (which is absurd, as then I would never 
develop a history), by archi-writing and thus the gramme, or by 
temporalising and spacing. To be sure, each of these must be 
irreducible, but their synthesis in a living present depends upon 
the institution of a trace. Yet a différance only resulting from 
protention never necessarily requires a content; thus différance 
never necessarily institutes a content or an instance of a trace. 
Pure anticipation (forward) would be absolutely severed from 
recollection (from behind).  
For Derrida in 1966, différance would be a constituting (from 
behind, in the gramme), then progress to disappearing in 
protention. Derrida also calls this “effacing”, the disappearance of 
the aspect (face) of the subject (or object).742 This différance as 
protention, Derrida goes on: 
constitutes and effaces […] in the same 
movement, the subjectivity said [to be] 
conscious (DLG 46).  
                                                 
742 At the outset of “Of Grammatology”, Derrida explained that writing could 
address the face (face, also as aspect), which developed from Husserl’s 
adumbration and Levinas’ progress in the same, from one to other. Ef-facing 
develops the instability of negation and non-relation in its circularity in the 
word.  
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Yet without a trace of content from protention, we suggest, no 
such movement from recollective constitution to anticipatory 
effacing can occur. By 1967, Derrida will no longer appeal to 
protention to develop différance. 
The three difficulties of the trace 
However, the major difficulty has held since the “two ways”, in 
the severing of the originary trace from becoming. This holds in 
at least three related fashions. First, the trace is only necessary in 
effect. Hence it as yet provides no link from the originary 
“forward”, thus nor to originary difference or writing. To be sure, 
this merely has not yet met the telos, and is not yet a systematic 
difficulty. But second and crucially, the trace in its appearing as 
nothing marks only its impossibility. Following from this 
incompatibility with the necessarily possible progress of 
metaphors in their differences, and derived writing, it is thus no 
longer possible that these differences and derived writing retain a 
trace. They are severed from the movement of becoming. Hence 
it is no longer certain that these relations can begin to constitute 
the progress “forward” in signification as chains of traces as such.  
That is (from behind), without a trace, nor are they any longer 
necessarily founded upon a trace of originary difference and 
archi-writing, nor in turn upon a trace of anterior (irreducible) 
difference and archi-writing. Archi-writing would be severed from 
originary writing, irreducible difference would be severed from 
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originary difference. The originary synthesis in all of its moments 
would be severed from becoming. In turn, without a trace to instil 
a relation to difference, the temporalising synthesis would as yet 
be severed from the relation to spacing.  
Finally, that an originary trace must be originarily necessary and 
possible (arising as difference), yet that the trace also marks its 
impossibility in its becoming would be necessarily contradictory. 
Indeed, in his devolution from the instituted trace and difference 
as such, to the pure trace as originary synthesis, and then to 
subjectivity and différance, Derrida has assiduously avoided 
mention of contradiction. By his previous standards, a 
contradiction of the originary would have led to a stifling of the 
sense of the logos, thus the necessity to think only nonsense and 
nothing (nihilism). Derrida has even avoided all mention of the 
necessity of thinking the possible and impossible moments of the 
trace at once. His subtle elisions suggest that he is aware that there 
are difficulties in his 1966 articles. He will redress them in 1967. 
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Chapter Eleven: The evolution 
toward early maturity (Of 
Grammatology, 1967) 
In this final chapter we turn to the book version of Of 
Grammatology of 1967, to assess how Derrida’s amendments 
precisely redress his difficulties from 1966. Derrida will deem that 
the trace is contradictory from the first, then develop an archi-
trace to devolve all of the levels “behind” to a relation even 
further “behind”. This will develop four versions of différance 
much earlier in the book, as anterior and temporalising rather 
than derived from protention. Derrida will then take a path in the 
originary relations “forward” only in a reciprocal relation of 
irreducibility to such progress. He will in turn make the mark of 
the impossibility of content a function of the “hinge” rather than 
the trace. These evolutions will redress the scission of the trace 
from the chain of differences by leaving an “enigmatic” way for a 
possible trace to address the beyond, via a spacing that again 
permits difference. Although he will still retain a conservative 
moment in de-privileging protention, Derrida’s reformulated 
system will bring his work closer toward his “early maturity”.  
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Part One: the contradictory trace endorsed  
Situating the progress 
The two articles “Of Grammatology” are expanded into the first 
three chapters of the book Of Grammatology of 1967 (henceforth, 
1967).743 The address which we followed in detail in our Chapters 
Eight and Nine, from Saussure to the instituted trace (DLG 1033-
1041, esp. DLG 23-25), and then from difference as such to the 
development of retention, reserve and difference (DLG 25-37), is 
expanded into the crucial second chapter of Of Grammatology (cf. 
esp. DLGb 46-108, OG 30-73). Most of Derrida’s expansions to 
the book arise from his lifting of his footnotes from 1965 and 
1966 into the main body of the argument in 1967 (cf. OG 48-53, 
DLGb 69-73, DLG 26-27, fn. 4), along with a new introduction 
(OG 27-30, DLGb 42-45), some long inserted paragraphs (cf. 
OG 60-62, DLGb 89-91), and seemingly smaller amendments to 
the portions from 1966. For our purposes, it will be the latter two 
that are crucial. Every quote that follows will be an addition or 
amendment in 1967, except for those that we note arose in 1966. 
We will follow Derrida’s emendations to the argument of 1966, as 
it proceeds from the appearing of difference as such to the pure 
(originary) trace (OG 53-71, DLGb 77-103), as Of Grammatology 
develops an amended yet still progressive argument. 
                                                 
743 The chapters thereafter in Of Grammatology were expanded from Derrida’s 
article “Nature, Culture, Writing” of 1966 (NCW, DLGb 143 ff., OG 95 ff.). 
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The inclusion of the archi-trace as contradictory  
First, Derrida concedes a trace that is contradictory (i.e. two 
opposite and incompatible predicates necessarily apply to it), 
although in a fashion that will avoid the stifling of origin. To begin to 
explain this, we note that the overall telos is still to determine a 
moment of the origin in what appears; there must be a trace of the 
beyond instilled to content (in particular, to the metaphors of 
writing, speech etc.). Indeed, there must be a trace as content. 
Such an origin is not yet an originary trace, but the trace of the 
irreducible origin, the trace as absolute source and authority for 
what can appear even as writing. A fortiori, Derrida deems this the 
“archi-trace” (OG 61 ff., DLGb 90 ff.). As we noted, “archi” in 
classical Greek implies “origin”, “beginning”, and also “power” 
(Feyerabend 63, (552)), an authoritative source. That is, the concept 
of an archi-trace as irreducible is added to that of archi-writing, along with 
temporalising and difference.744 But in turn an originary (pure) trace 
would need to have arisen from this archi-trace. What holds of 
the archi-trace must hold of an originary and pure trace.745 
Next, this trace which must appear first can do so (OG 62, DLGb 
91). Further, the trace (henceforth employed to refer to the archi-
                                                 
744 The archi-trace is no longer an instituted trace, which arose from the 
psycho-physical levels, though it depends upon it in the ordinal progress. 
745 It is difficult to suggest that the originary trace is a “part” of the archi-trace, 
yet the whole-part reasoning continues to be applied. What holds of the archi-
trace holds of the originary trace (although the converse never holds). For 
example, what holds of all fruits holds of oranges, although it would be absurd 
to say that what holds of all oranges holds of all fruits. 
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trace including the originary trace) and its becoming is necessary 
for appearing. The trace is necessary as there must have been, and 
certainly must be, a moment of the archi in what appears.  
However, Derrida in 1966 had worked out that this anterior trace, 
that is first possible and necessary for appearing, then must 
appear only as necessary but impossible (DLG 33-37). The trace 
which must and can appear then cannot, but moreover – to 
preserve logic – must not appear. That trace must then disappear. 
Put via content as writing, that progress implied a trace that 
marked its impossibility (forward).  
Crucially, although the necessity to continue “forward” remains, 
Derrida follows a pathway in 1967 that first retracts the progress 
“backward”. Rather than a writing that appears as particular 
content and then must not appear, Derrida explains this as an 
instance of the moment of derived writing that must be “erased”. 
This will develop Derrida’s first mobilisation of erasure in his 
reasoning, and in his oeuvre.746 He adds in 1967: 
                                                 
746 Derrida had mentioned Heidegger’s “crossing out” of Being – which 
occurred, we note, during the lectures Zur Seinsfrage of 1955 (H ZF 13, OQB 
83) – with approval in the article of 1965. He had done so in aligning with 
Saussure (DLG 1029), which he still does in his first chapter (OG 23, DLGb 
38). However, this is only mentioned in relation to “what I shall later call 
différance ” (OG 23, DLGb 38) – erasure at that juncture was preparatory, and 
not yet employed in Derrida’s reasoning. 
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the value of the transcendental archie [origin] 
must make its necessity felt before letting itself 
be erased. The concept of archi-trace must 
comply with both that necessity and that 
erasure. (OG 61, DLGb 90) 
Note that this necessity is that of the erasure of value, prior to 
constituting of the object (and even originary appearing and truth 
as such are constituted as objects). The value of the archi-trace 
must be felt (i.e. have a weight (204, 226)) as writing, then must 
be erased.  
The necessity to avoid objective content 
The next evolution has occurred. In 1966 Derrida sought “to go 
beyond a naïve objectivism” (DLG 32) and his “two ways” then 
made possible the constituting of appearing as such originarily, 
That progress of situating the trace in appearing content then 
implied the pure trace that marked its impossibility). Whether 
Derrida returned to a naïve objectivism in 1966 is debatable, but 
in 1967, he seeks to improve upon his approach. He amends the 
sentence, and seeks to “escape falling back into a naïve objectivism” 
(OG 61, DLGb 90, our emphasis). Derrida seeks to avoid an 
objectivism that tries to go “beyond” to determine the trace in 
 - 879 
- 
writing (forward) (DLG 28. Importantly, he opts for the necessity 
of a single “pathway” (parcours) prior to the “two ways” (deux voies) 
(OG 61-62, DLGb 90-91). This will be prior to the originary and 
pure trace (OG 61, DLGb 90, DLG 32)).747 The archi-trace 
requires a mere value and its erasure from the originary.  
Derrida thus notes that an archi-trace “must have left a track” in 
the origin. A fortiori, he refuses to call this relation of the archi-
trace “simple content” (OG 61, DLGb 90). He will seek a way 
beside simple content. This track of an archi-trace is necessary 
and possible. Yet to have a value prior to originary content, it 
must then be precluded from leaving a track (or trace). Note that 
a preclusion could be of any sort (negation, non-relation, a priori 
exclusion, and so on). Derrida will work with negation and non-
relation.  
The negation in the logic of identity 
To do so he assesses the structure rather than movement. The 
two concepts of the trace must be thought as identical. Note that 
both options would be the trace; “a” trace would be particular, 
implying that a trace can be a constituted object (which levers an 
                                                 
747 The two relations to Saussure are still explained as “the one part” and “the 
other part”, but the necessity is first that of a single pathway, via the archi-trace 
as prior to these ways. Derrida no longer directly mentions or deems that these 
parts are “two ways” (OG 61-63, DLGb 90-92, cf. DLG 32). 
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objectivism).748 When this preclusion is a negation, then as “both” 
necessarily possible and not necessarily possible (impossible), the 
trace is “contradictory” in (according to) a logic that seeks 
identity. Thus a fortiori, Derrida goes on: 
[i]t is in effect contradictory and not acceptable 
in [dans] the logic of identity. (DLGb 95, cf. 
OG 61) 
Derrida in 1966 had avoided conceding that the trace is 
contradictory, which would have excluded it from a logic of 
identity. In 1967, he embraces this contradictoriness from the first. 
However, to do so, Derrida has only conceded a contradictory 
relation of the archi-trace, and thus the trace. The contradiction 
merely necessitates the preclusion of the archi-trace as originary. 
Derrida is subtly beginning to redress the difficulty from 1966. 
We thus note a relevant implication – as the trace is contradictory in 
the logic of identity, it is no longer impossible in its moment of becoming. This 
would apply insofar as the trace holds in some fashion avoiding 
logical impossibility (this would no longer even be deemed 
“beyond”).  
                                                 
748 Derrida in 1966 referred to the trace, and “all the other traces”, but never 
deemed them “parts”, for as originary they were not yet constituted. To be 
sure, a trace in its moment of becoming would be constituted as particular – 
but that moment was made impossible. 
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Derrida thus begins to develop an “enigmatic” solution by which 
to avert the difficulty from 1966.  
The negation of the logic of identity, as non-origin 
For the “in” (above) develops an unstable relation to this logic. 
Note that the basic transition holds by opposition of a possibility 
and its negation. What must and can have the value of a trace, and 
must and cannot have the value of a trace, is contradictory. But 
the appearing of an impossibility would negate the first telos of 
sense. Positing the latter would preclude that the trace appear “in” 
the logic of identity. In this option, the preclusion would be non-logical. 
Thus, to continue, the “track” (that which must have been left by 
the trace) at the origin remains necessary and certain. The archi-
trace, as contradictory origin “becomes the origin of the origin” (OG 
61, DLGb 90, our emphases). Hence this trace implies that an 
origin of origin, as contradictory, “did not even disappear” in the 
first place. In turn, as non-logical,  
it was never constituted except reciprocally by 
a non-origin (OG 61, DLGb 90).  
This trace never disappeared, for – as first worked out via logic and the 
essential levels – it then cannot have been a content in the first 
place, nor employed logically except by the relation from a non-
origin (and the archi-trace is both origin and non-origin). Hence, 
 - 882 
- 
importantly, nor is this contradictory archi-trace a “stifling” of the origin as 
it was in 1964. Nor is it a stifling of logic, the logos, or living 
present, each of which are signifiers in this movement. Rather, 
the non-origin is certainly reciprocally constituted by the origin 
and its system, even without content.  
Moreover, thus far, only the archi-trace is in effect contradictory, 
and by no means is the “logic” of identity precluded. Thus nor is 
Derrida’s system of levels, directions, non-relation etc. precluded, 
which had worked out the relations of identity as movement. It is by 
keeping such relations that Derrida allows a way to avoid them. 
Derrida thus keeps the originary (pure) trace for logic, which is at this 
juncture even “purer”. That is, it has been worked out from a 
non-originary trace, of which one must and can speak.  
However, while the levels (thus derivation to a pure trace) are 
retained for archi-writing or difference, nor is the archi-trace any 
longer a simple derivation from the levels “behind”. An archi-trace 
and originary (pure) trace in this progress are moments of the 
trace, of levels which for essential reasons must only be traces of 
essential levels, thus not yet derived in particular to their 
becoming (as mark etc.). That is, to  
wrench the concept of the trace from the 
classical scheme, which would derive [the 
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trace] from a presence or an originary nontrace 
and would make of it an empirical mark, one 
must indeed speak of an originary trace or 
archi-trace. (OG 61, DLGb 90, our emphasis) 
Had Derrida written “and” instead of “or” there could still have 
been a hierarchy of foundation. However, the “or” instils an 
instability. In critical reasoning, an “or” can be inclusive (allowing 
either option or both) or exclusive (allowing either option but 
never both). Thus one must speak of “archi-trace” or “originary 
trace”, or “archi-trace or originary trace”. The latter instils an 
instability as to whether these are substitutes, separable, or 
synonyms, and taking both together they are indeterminate. Such 
relations pass from one to the other via this instability of 
predicating “in” the concept.  
Yet nor is this a mere instability as per the earlier years, except via 
this evolved sense of “in”. Thus far, this instability arises in the trace 
as contradictory in logic (according to logic), or contradictory in logic 
(precluded from logic). Hence just so, this progress applies to the 
logos, appearing as such, living present etc. Derrida must find a 
way to speak of this “beyond” without choice between one or 
other, no longer between the absolute demand that a position be 
answered by “yes” or “no” – put in logic, as no longer the 
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affirmation or refusal of truth or falsity. Derrida had allowed only 
these options in his demand since 1954 (97), which led to the 
problem of origin. In 1962 he had sought to set aside truth and 
falsity in opting for value, and thus no longer bound to bivalence 
(238). Yet the pathway of the archi-relation seeks a progress no 
longer bound to value. 
Thus he goes on: 
[t]herefore I admit the necessity of passing 
through/by [passer par] the concept of the 
archi-trace. (OG 62, DLGb 91) 
“Passer par” implies “going through”; working through the 
necessities of the archi-trace in passage and in logic. When the 
archi-trace is contradictory in logic the trace must hold at “the 
interior of the system” as the originary trace (OG 62, DLGb 91). 
However, in French, “passer par” also has the sense of a detour, and 
thus an archi-trace no longer included to the logic or the interior 
of the system.749 The instability of this “in” must be developed. 
                                                 
749 The above is also to put it that the value of the archi must make its necessity 
felt (as originary), and let itself be erased (as a non-origin) (OG 61, DLGb 90) 
(878). “Erasure”, as a metaphor of writing, holds as a level by which to refer to 
the developing necessities. 
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For as movement, a contradictory archi-trace must be both this 
interior structure, and then what the structure is not, to pass to 
non-structure. That is, Derrida is applying a deconstructive 
thinking (720) prior to bivalence. He adds in 1967: 
He adds in 1967:  
to pose [posit] the problem in terms of choice, to 
oblige or from the first [doxically] believe 
oneself obliged to answer by a yes or a no […] is 
to confuse very different levels, paths and 
styles. In the deconstruction of the archi, one 
does not make a choice. (OG 62, DLG 91)  
Thus, even though the trace is contradictory, and this difficulty of 
choice established, for all of the reasons above the levels must still be 
kept.750 The progressive reasoning from Derrida’s earlier years is 
“sustained”, by which he begins to develop his “pathway” (i.e. a 
way to address a telos). Derrida proceeds  
                                                 
750 Derrida has implicitly generalised the “archi” to every archi-relation, such as 
archi-writing and temporalisation, for the trace in turn must relate to every 
such relation, which will include différance, just below. 
 - 886 
- 
in [dans] the discourse that we sustain and 
according to the pathway that we follow 
(DLGb 90, cf. OG 61, our emphases).  
Derrida has merely worked out that, if a trace is to apply in 
discourse (and logic), he must find a path that is no longer 
necessarily bound to choice in (henceforth, in both senses of this 
word) the originary levels of discourse (and logic). To begin to do 
so, he implements the relations of différance. 
Part Two: the anterior pathway to différance  
The insistence upon relations “in effect” 
The argument is indeed progressive: in 1966, difference only 
appeared as such after the necessary contradiction of Saussure’s 
sensible plenitude (781). By that juncture, the reasoning had 
followed merely from Saussure’s arbitrary relation to the signified 
(OG 47, DLG 23 ff. (733 ff.)). Thus as différance evolves from 
difference as such, even in the book version Derrida does not yet 
employ “différance” when arriving at the instituted trace (OG 46, 
DLGb 68). Thereafter, Derrida began from the necessity of 
determining difference, he still emphasises that it is the thesis of 
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difference that he seeks to “found” (OG 52, DLGb 77).751 He thus 
begins from the telos of founding difference in its levels, and has 
not yet worked out how différance could arise.  
However, we noted that in 1966 the impossibility of the trace in 
its becoming (henceforth, we deem this a severing) also severed 
originary difference from the differences between one and other 
(l’autre). Thus it severed originary writing from derived writing. 
The originary was severed from becoming in all its interrelations. 
In 1967, with a derivation from an archi-trace no longer taken as 
a foundation for objectivism, Derrida begins to allow a way for 
the trace to proceed forward. He will evolve this instability to 
insist on this severing, and on a trace. 
The evolution to the absolute origin 
First, as noted in 1966, that a trace is merely known “en effet” (“in 
effect” and thus not yet itself, but also “indeed” and said to hold 
in its effect) developed the instability of its appearing. It was one 
fashion by which a trace was severed from becoming. Derrida 
went on to emphasise that originary difference between appearing 
and appearance was the condition of all the differences in 
movement from one to the other, and all the other traces (DLG 
34, (833)). That difference was taken to already be a trace, yet 
                                                 
751 “Founding” continues to refer to both the whole-part relation and the 
content, thus no longer to a “simple content” (OG 61, DLGb 90). 
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from that juncture, the trace was subtly set aside in favour of 
difference (840-851).  
But in 1967, Derrida italicises the final phrase: 
[t]he difference between the appearing and the 
appearance (between the ‘world’ and ‘lived 
experience’) is the condition of all the other 
differences, all the other traces, and it is already 
a trace. (OG 65, DLGb 95, Derrida’s emphasis) 
Rather than seeking to correct a trace that is merely known “in 
effect”, in 1967 Derrida is insisting upon the relation of an archi-
trace as only known “in effect”. Instead of first seeking to 
proceed “forward” by means of difference, he seeks to develop 
the foundation “backward”, toward a trace no longer even 
appearing originarily, as an archi-trace.  
This allows the relation to an absolute origin. As contradictory 
and not acceptable in the logic of identity, the trace implies a 
certain moment no longer bound “within” opposition and 
difference. Thus it implies an origin without limits. As it has been 
since 1954, this would be an absolute, the trace as absolute origin. 
Moreover, as no longer even logical, the trace of the origin is also 
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in reciprocal relation with a non-origin without levels. This too 
implies the trace is without limits, as the absolute origin. 
However, “within” the logic of identity and its directions and 
levels (sense in general), the trace of the absolute origin is 
contradictory, which in turn precludes that it be an absolute 
origin. It can then only be said that there is no such absolute origin. 
In turn, we note, when there is no absolute origin, there is merely a 
reciprocal relation with non-origin, and thus again an absolute 
origin. Thus in 1967, Derrida italicises the sentences:  
[t]he trace is in effect the absolute origin of sense in 
general. Which returns to saying once again that there is 
no absolute origin of sense in general. (DLGb 95, cf. 
OG 65, Derrida’s emphasis)  
This is Derrida’s longest italicisation in the chapter. He has 
developed the relation of the trace as absolute origin, in reciprocal 
relation to its absolute exclusion. Indeed, Derrida no longer 
refrains from mention of the trace from this juncture, as he did in 
1966. That said, we have still remained prior even to originary 
relations, and Derrida must find a way to proceed. 
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The earlier evolution of différance 
Next, he develops the relation of anterior différance. As noted, an 
archi-trace as an absolute no longer permits opposition 
“between” one and other. The absolute origin of sense in general 
precludes an irreducible difference; thus it necessitates a deferral. In turn, the 
value of the archi-trace must make itself felt prior to the truth of 
originary appearing.752 Since 1962, Derrida had deemed that 
which instils the possibility of value (prior to truth or falsity) opens 
the relation to sense in general (231, cf. 349). As without 
opposition, it would open appearance as deferral. This 
constituting by the trace as deferral would be the absolute origin 
as condition of the difference between appearing and appearance 
(as signifier and signified). Basically put, the difference between 
one and other would be founded upon deferral.  
Yet the return to saying that the trace is not the absolute origin of 
sense in general (cf. above) returns to saying that the absolute 
origin is not a deferral. The instance of the trace thus opens a 
difference, which is the condition for appearing and signification. 
In turn, such a relation (difference) is already a trace, is in effect 
contradictory and implies a deferral. The progress merely permits 
                                                 
752 To be sure, Derrida avoids mentioning “truth”, as “yes or no” must be 
avoided as options, and value is prior to truth. However, we caution, this progress 
does not yet let go of truth (which would be absurd), for by opening (ouvrant) it 
allows at least the truth-sense and value of appearance as open (cf. 230). This 
was the necessity of the value of the transcendental archi that must first make 
itself felt before letting itself be erased (OG 61, DLGb 90, (878)). 
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the trace to open difference and deferral in a circularity prior to 
originary content. Thus Derrida goes on:  
[t]he trace is the différance which opens 
appearance and signification. (OG 65, DLGb 
95, Derrida’s emphasis) 
Derrida amends “difference” to “différance”, and italicises the phrase. 
He has worked out his first version of “différance” in Of 
Grammatology. This has indeed occurred much earlier than in 1966, 
in address to the difficulties of his system from that year.753 The 
relations of difference between one and other have been made 
dependent upon a prior archi-trace that avoids levels, and implies 
a différance.  
Part Three: the pathway via formation of form 
However, the above relations are merely conditions, as necessities 
prior to any originary content. That is, différance has been worked 
out as anterior, but it has not yet been applied to becoming, thus 
does not yet address the severing of the trace from metaphors of 
writing and speech as such. It does not yet avoid the difficulty of 
a trace that certainly appears only by “marking the impossibility” 
                                                 
753 Derrida had mentioned différance in his address to Hjelmslev once, at DLGb 
88 (OG 60), but merely in noting that Hjelmslev could find no place for it. 
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of absolute presence (DLG 37); hence the progress has not yet 
been made possible. However, the trace was not yet precluded 
from possibility (insofar as it is no longer bound to the logic of 
identity), and the pure-trace was kept for logic. Derrida begins from the 
latter to seek a way to move “forward”.  
The difficulty of content, and the progress to the 
second différance 
At this juncture, he indeed begins to employ difference again. 
However, Derrida has come to appreciate that to write of 
difference after a pure synthesis resulted in the difficulty for the 
trace. That is, a temporalising and originary difference was 
deemed to be prior to opposition, yet even so it constitutes 
difference in the relation to an other. It implies constituted 
difference, thus no longer temporalising, as no longer pure. 
Hence, the concept of difference still implies content as such. Yet a 
pure trace must be prior to “simple content”, thus prior to 
difference. Moreover, a pure trace would appear only as content, 
thus never as pure. It too would be contradictory, although 
without the exemption that Derrida developed from the archi-
trace, for it would never deny or erase itself. It would still only 
mark the impossibility of appearing.  
That is, the next task is to avoid the severing between the 
(temporalising) pure trace as impossible, and the ever-possible 
instances of becoming (i.e. as spacing). Avoiding this scission 
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would not yet permit, but would no longer preclude relation to 
the chains of the differences of signifiers, by no longer precluding 
a trace of appearing.754 The task thereafter will be to permit this 
relation. 
To begin – in 1966 the pure trace did not yet relate to difference in 
movement from one to the other (thus the metaphors of writing 
and sound etc.). Further, at that juncture in 1966, even should an 
originary difference have avoided constituted content, in doing so 
it could no longer relate to spacing. Hence the pure trace could only 
appear in difference as impossible. By 1967, Derrida has made 
this pure trace (or archi-trace) contradictory. Thus he introduces a 
différance to the trace as originary, by setting aside the instances of 
constituting difference, and negating the constituted relations and 
their content. This evolves the pure (originary) trace to différance. 
Derrida goes on: 
[i]t is not the question of a constituted 
difference here, but rather, before all determination 
of the content, of the pure movement which 
                                                 
754 As ever, we employ “precluding” to refer to an a priori and essential lack of 
impediment to possibility, and “permit” to signal “making possible”.  
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produces difference. The (pure) trace is différance. 
(OG 62, DLG 92, Derrida's emphasis) 
A fortiori, the pathway that the progress of the pure trace will 
take will not yet be that of content. It will thus no longer preclude 
application of the trace to originary appearing.  
Moreover, a second version of différance has been worked out by 
setting aside content, as Derrida did in address to Leroi-Gourhan 
in 1966. In Of Grammatology this occurs much earlier in the work, 
in relation to a pure trace. Derrida can do so no longer merely as 
the pure trace of temporalising for essential reasons must never 
appear as a difference as such (he emphasised this anteriority even 
in 1966 (DLG 34)). Rather, this holds insofar as the pure trace, 
necessarily contradictory even in its form “in” this logic of 
identity, no longer enters the originary synthesis and is not yet a 
difference, and enters the originary synthesis as a pure and 
constituting difference to be made contradictory. The first 
moment is not yet a difference as a non-origin. The second is a 
difference (or it could never be contradictory), then precluded 
from the origin as contradictory. Such a setting aside of difference 
is deemed a deferral.  
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 Parenthesis – the evolution of the “is” to the pure 
trace 
A short note upon the evolution of the “is” seems pertinent. This 
had developed since 1966 in the instituted trace as the possibility 
common to all systems of signification and content.755 Derrida 
went on: 
[I]t not only implies, it is this instance. (DLG 
25) 
The instituted trace arose with the appearing of difference as such 
(DLG 25). However, the relation of the trace to difference as 
such then implied impossibility. In 1967, Derrida deletes the 
sentence above. Indeed, in 1966 he had explained that  
[t]he trace is the difference which opens 
appearing and signification. (DLG 34, our 
emphasis)  
                                                 
755An instituted trace was not yet beset by the difficulty of impossibility; it was 
what must be produced despite necessary contradiction. Such difficulty merely 
arose merely with the “two ways” after the reduction to the pure trace of 
difference as such. 
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In 1967, this “difference” too is replaced by “différance”. No claim 
is made for any sort of trace that “is” in relation to difference in 
Derrida’s chapter. Thus far, only the (pure) trace “is” différance.  
Derrida’s emendations are planned. In 1966, three classical 
versions of the “is” (predication, existence and identity) were set 
into movement. An instituted content can be predicated as what it 
“is”, an existent, only in a structure of becoming different from 
and thus not identical to itself, while passing to the indefinite and 
a return to the origin. In 1967, an archi-trace must be in 
reciprocal relation to the non-origin so as to avoid a classical 
basis. It is thus contradictory “in” the logic of identity.  
Just so, the pure trace as contradictory must have this unstable 
sense (cf. just above). It must be what it “is” both in the originary 
relation (which is not yet real) and as a pure identity already 
supposing a difference from itself (in relation to irreducible 
difference as deferral). When he comes to address content, Derrida 
will rather develop the hinge in order to relate the directions of 
difference and impossibility.  
The possibility of the pure trace 
Derrida is still preparing to move “forward” to this content. 
Before doing so, he indeed retains a sort of “possibility’ for the 
trace without content. Even though the archi-trace is 
contradictory, the possibility of the pure trace holds, although only 
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as anterior. Importantly, Derrida adds in 1967 of the pure trace 
that “is” différance that 
[a]lthough it does not exist […] its possibility is 
by rights anterior to all that one calls sign 
(signified/signifier, content/expression etc.) (OG 
62, DLGb 92, our emphasis)
 756
 
A reader might disagree: could such a possibility be sustained 
when the archi-trace is contradictory? To accept this, it must be 
granted that Derrida no longer allots the archi-trace an absolute 
place in the “logic of identity”. Anything still remains possible in 
the logos in a logical sense, according to either sense of “in” (even 
when it is contradictory), so long as it is not yet accorded a place as a 
moment of appearing or existence.  
Thus, above, Derrida grants the pure trace no right to possibility in 
the moment of becoming, even as reduced – “it does not exist” in any 
moment of content or signification. Derrida thus no longer 
accords the pure trace a possibility of proceeding in this movement 
                                                 
756 This employment of “expression” is both logical and phenomenological. As 
The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy explains “expression” – any action that makes 
public or communicates a state of mind thereby expresses it (ODP 132). 
Content is added to expression. Just so, this “expression” applies to Husserl's 
approach, which allots sense (as intentional content) to expression in a certain 
moment of writing or speech (in 1962, this was Ausserüng, rather than Ausdruck). 
Derrida’s path has sought to be prior by rights to such progress. He aligns this 
with Husserl again, below. 
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of becoming as difference from one to the other. He will rather 
find a movement aside from them.757  
The difficulty from 1966 increasing 
The preceding considerations lead to a first outcome in 1967. 
Rather than ameliorating the scission from becoming, Derrida has 
even more thoroughly severed the originary trace from possibility of 
relation to the internal difference (thus from movement of 
spacing, writing, etc.). However, in granting a possibility that is 
merely anterior, Derrida in 1967 still avoids deeming the pure trace is 
impossible, whether essentially so or in its moment of becoming. 
He will develop this opportunity.  
Thus as the temporalising and originary trace is severed from the 
inside, he indeed requires a link (soon, “hinge”) to the originary 
relations and appearing. To begin to develop this, we note also 
that, as prior to constituting difference, temporalising is still 
separated from the necessity of appearing as such. That is, 
différance as a pure trace remains only originary, and not yet a 
difference. It does not yet proceed from the anterior possibility of 
the originary trace to a certain (and possible) moment of existing. 
                                                 
757 In 1966, as noted, Derrida adopted Husserl’s and then Saussure’s right to 
what ought to occur – a transcendental phenomenology as reduction from the 
sensible. In his involution to the originary, a right allows the possibility to 
begin constituting (we leave this sentence as intransitive). In 1966 Derrida 
developed such a moment that allowed his restoration of appearing as such, 
arising from spacing. No such right is granted to this “enigmatic” possibility. 
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Derrida is extremely aware that given his additions, an originary 
trace must be made to enter passage.  
Hence in 1967 he supports the “path’ he has taken in the articles, 
and how he will begin to address it: 
[h]ow does the path that leads from Saussure 
to Hjelmslev forbid us to avoid the originary 
trace? In that its passage through form is a passage 
through the imprint. (OG 62, DLGb 91, 
Derrida’s emphasis upon “imprint”) 
We indeed followed Derrida’s “path” from Saussure to Hjelmslev 
in 1966.758 However, that passage had arrived at the originary 
trace as chains of difference, precluding trace and content. In 
1966, Derrida thus seeks a way for the trace to avoid passage. In so 
doing he must nevertheless allow for appearing as chains of 
difference. He will do so by developing the relations of passage of 
form and the imprint.759 
                                                 
758 In Of Grammatology, Derrida has expanded his explanation of Hjelmslev (OG 
57-60, DLGb 83-88),ayet retains his basic results that Hjelmslev’s algebra could 
allow no place for an archi-writing, and irreducible difference as non-relation 
(OG 60, DLGb 88, cf. (813)). Derrida does, however, alter this employment of 
“difference” to “différance” (OG 60, DLGb 88). 
759 In 1954, the difficulty of form led to the “joint” as a problem – in 1967, a 
prior relation to form will lead to the hinge as a better outcome. 
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Developing a passage prior to the originary 
Thus, Derrida in 1967 no longer seeks permission for content via 
the trace (this will allow the trace to be related merely to general 
relations (926)). We will develop the trace below. Derrida rather 
seeks this permission for content (signalled by “is”) via form. As 
form never arises as content, but rather the form of content, he is 
allowing for the imprint as prior to real content. That is, we 
explained that in 1966 the “reduction” to the originary from 
sensible substance particularised the acoustic image to its form. 
Thus, we note, form will be common to each of the particular 
relations of the signifier. The first of these was the form of the 
“psychic imprint”, the formal unity by which acoustic and image 
could arise in the psyche. That in turn devolved to the form of chains of 
articulation. Thus, to unify the chains as a signifier, the latter again 
took the psychic imprint as its first telos. 
In 1966, although the word “psyche” is still deemed less than 
convenient, Derrida again devolves to the possibility of this 
passage. He adds a paragraph noting that the “psychic imprint” 
can be retained, provided that it is taken in Husserl’s sense, in that 
the “content” of the lived experience of the acoustic image is 
“reell” (i.e. irreal) but never real (OG 65 ff., DLGb 95 ff.).760 Thus 
                                                 
760 Such content in turn permits the acoustic image, and thus the psychic 
imprint of an image without real content. Derrida refers to Husserl’s treatment 
of the “image” which we explained is neutralised by Husserl (cf. I §109, (448)), 
thus no longer a copy of the external (I §113). Derrida puts it that “[T]he 
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the image must no longer be affirmed as in the world. The 
imprint too can be the form of an image prior to content. 
Importantly, the form of this originary passage would again be from 
articulation to the psychic imprint. This would allow the originary 
passage of 1966. Since 1966, however, Derrida sought an 
approach prior to Husserlian or Saussurean content and its 
difficulties. He is still seeking to situate such passage further 
“behind”. 
Thus, as to form, Derrida avoids appealing to it as making 
appearing possible. Rather, he appeals to the prior constituting 
moment of the formation of form (OG 63, DLGb 92 (221)). The 
latter – we suggest – does not yet have even a form to which content can 
be instilled and made contradictory. Henceforth, formation of form 
would necessarily be prior even to the form of originary passage.  
Second, as to the psychic imprint, in Derrida’s approach the word 
“psychic” is set aside, and his necessary passage evolves to the 
“imprint” alone (OG 65, DLGb 96). For Derrida, by this juncture, 
the “imprint” refers to a form that “outlines” appearing as 
acoustic or writing, without yet being filled by either (thus nor by 
metaphors of writing, such as “mark” etc.). Yet the formation of 
                                                                                                        
Husserlian correction is indispensable […]. As to the intentional object, for 
example, the content of the image, it does not really (reall) belong either to the 
world or to a lived experience […]. The psychic image of which Saussure 
speaks must not be an internal reality copying an external one” (OG 64, DLGb 
95). 
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form would be prior even to the form of an imprint. Derrida’s 
progress as yet remains prior to such originary passage. 
That is, doubtless, the passage from form to the imprint is a 
condition for pure appearing, by which to move “forward”. 
However, Derrida is still moving “backward”.  
Parenthesis: the traditional problem of the bridge, 
and preparation for the hinge 
Indeed, each moment of Derrida’s progress thus far seems to put 
him in even more trouble than the tradition of metaphysics; he is 
beset even more severely by the “old grid” of an inside and 
outside, and the difficulty of linking them. For example, in such 
traditional readings a rationalism (e.g. a conventional critique of 
Descartes) or subjective idealism is beset by the problem of 
explaining how an outside of appearance is constituted.761 In turn, 
an empiricism such as Locke’s would be beset by this difficulty, and 
then the further difficulty of explaining how sensation transmutes 
into ideas.762  
                                                 
761 See our next footnote for this commonly-held reading of Descartes. Husserl 
read Descartes as setting aside this difficulty insofar as he provided a 
forerunner to a reduction. Husserl’s entire Cartesian Meditations is a testament to 
this. The innovation of the reduction, however, is precisely what Derrida has 
sought to evolve to, and then both “this-side” and “beyond” of (815) – by this 
pathway, Derrida is seeking to avoid the difficulty of the bridge. 
762 Scruton summarises this difficulty for Locke versus Descartes. For Locke, 
ideas arise from experience, hence “there are no innate ideas or principles. In 
making this claim, Locke is explicitly going against Descartes, who had argued 
that […] ideas like those of God, thought and extension which we perceive 
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It is helpful to explain this via Maine de Biran’s summary of this 
“grid”. Derrida never explains this reference in Of Grammatology, 
but does in The Archaeology of the Frivolous (AF 53, OG 67-68, 
DLGb 99). Maine de Biran finds in Condillac, “the inheritor of 
Locke”, a  
kind of idealism wherein the ego would remain 
alone in the purely subjective world of its very 
own modifications [...] [which] necessarily 
presupposes the objective reality of organs 
which receive them and of bodies which 
produce them. (OMB, 3, 137-138, quoted in 
AF 59)  
That is, for Maine de Biran, Condillac is beset by a subjective 
idealism just as much by the difficulties of empirical “production” 
of the outside of sense (organs) and the outside of the outside 
(bodies).763 These instil the difficulties of linking the outside of 
                                                                                                        
clearly and distinctly […] are innate, implanted in us by God.” (Scruton 1995, 
82). 
763 Derrida in The Archaeology of the Frivolous explains the difficulty as a rejection 
of “rationalism” and the “empiricist limit” (AF 58), which implies a “formal 
contradiction” (AF 59); i.e. of both a creative and receptive moment of 
consciousness at once. In Of Grammatology he notes that the hinge and différance 
will avoid these difficulties of “creative activity” (i.e. subjective idealism), and 
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the outside, outside to the inside, inside to the inside etc., in every 
direction of active and passive constitution. Derrida had worked 
these out even of a formal idealism in 1954, each of which had led 
to the joint as a problem (123). Indeed, it turns out that his 
approach in 1954 was traditional, and Derrida will also seek to 
avoid a formal idealism. 
In The Archaeology of the Frivolous, Derrida rather suggests that 
“différance” is the solution, while  
the opposition of activity and passivity forms the 
hinge (AF 58, our emphases).  
Derrida’s approach in Of Grammatology will proceed by means of 
the formation of form to différance (behind). The latter will allow 
the active and passive passage of the hinge (forward).764 We 
address these in order. 
                                                                                                        
the “single step [pas] outside metaphysics” will no longer be a “return to 
finitude” (which a single negation (pas) would entail). Indeed, it is deemed that 
such relations belong to “the onto-theology they fight against” (OG 67-68, 
DLGb 99), which return of a limit Derrida since 1966 had applied to the 
overall history of metaphysics (854).  
764 In 1966, articulation was deemed constituting, and the psychic imprint as its 
telos was deemed “passive” (DLG 35). Derrida developed the basis for this 
form above. 
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Part Four: toward the enigmatic trace 
From formation of form to the parts of différance 
For – as Derrida noted since 1966 – beginning with the telos of 
an external moment (forward), and thus a difference, implies the 
grid above. Derrida rather develops différance. For the formation 
of form thus also avoids a return to the necessity of the spatial 
relation implied by a constituted difference. The transcendental (and 
constituting) “formation of form” as temporalising permits the 
movement to an other form that appears as such. Hence in 1967 
this relation of form proceeds as a difference without an other; 
again, as a deferral of différance. This develops a third version of 
différance as formation of form, thus (moving “forward”) no longer 
bound to the originary.  
Crucially, the above allows for another “part”, in that the moment 
of formation of form as constituting also allows for relation with 
spacing. Such passage from form to the imprint would occur as 
irreducible (OG 66, DLGb 97). This would permit the application 
of being – a prior condition for instances of articulation – to the 
imprint.765 However, no such irreducible passage yet takes form. 
Rather, the formation of form has been aligned with différance. 
Crucially, Derrida adds a sentence:  
                                                 
765 Note that the “being” above is taken as prior to form. We develop the 
instability by which it can appear just below.  
 - 906 
- 
[d]ifférance is therefore the formation of form. 
But it is for its other part [d'autre part] the being-
imprinted of the imprint. (OG 63, DLGb 92, 
Derrida’s emphasis first)
766
  
Derrida’s “pathway” will develop from each part. The first will 
develop the relation irreducible to form (behind), in an unstable 
relation to originary appearing as such. This will permit the 
progress. In turn, the second will allow the chains of differences 
“forward”. We will follow these in order.  
The first part – instability of the conditional 
First, to avoid the bridge directly ahead, Derrida’s “pathway” will 
require a “contortion” that will re-orientate the relation of the irreducible 
to the originary. For – as in 1966 – irreducible relations are aligned 
by means of the “is”; différance “is” the formation of form. 
Formation of form, as irreducible, henceforth makes even the form 
that it forms conditional. A fortiori, even form is merely treated as a 
conditional – “if it is a form” (OG 68, DLGb 99 (cf. 225). As 
ever, a conditional avoids positing the possibility of its object or 
                                                 
766 We have changed Spivak's “on the other hand” to “for its other part” to 
emphasise the whole-part reasoning in movement from one to the other. “On 
the other hand” is the conventional English translation, and in everyday 
French the whole part reasoning has little role, but it is crucial to note the 
implicit formal relations that Derrida mobilises.  
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its antecedent. Derrida’s progress henceforth evolves to allow for 
instability of the relations of the conditional (“if”) and the position (or 
signifying) of “is”.  
Thus, first, if passage arises as a form, then its relations would 
permit appearing. As no longer positing the possibility of its 
object, the progress no longer signifies even a simple non-relation 
to phenomenology, which latter requires such an object as its 
content. Analysis of appearing would occur beyond the possibility of formal 
appearing as such. As Derrida explains:  
[A]s such, if one can still use this expression in a 
non-phenomenological way; for here we pass the 
very [même] limit of phenomenology. (DLGb 
99, OG 68, Derrida’s emphasis on “as such”) 
Yet, we note, by this the form of appearing as such is no longer precluded. 
Moreover, note that phenomenology has been made the object. 
However, Derrida had worked out by 1964 that, an irreducible 
moment of phenomenology could only be said as other than 
phenomenology (VEM 445, VM 129 (506)).  
Hence Derrida develops an instability in the quotation above. To 
say “if one can still use this expression non-phenomenologically” 
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expresses a doubt that employment can proceed except 
phenomenologically. If so, rather than beginning from the 
beyond, one only passes the limit “here”. Such approach would 
still be in phenomenology. It would thus still be objectively 
transcendental, and allow the appearing of content as such. However, 
the instability in the two passages does not yet allow a certainty of 
originary difference, hence not yet even the certainty of positing the 
appearing of the beyond in the originary. Such relations merely 
develop a part of différance in general (OG 62, DLGB 91).  
A fortiori, whether the approach is irreducible or originary, a conditional “if” 
or originary “is” will not yet be settled in Of Grammatology. Nor would 
this be required. For in either case above, appearing can be addressed as 
such. Derrida has re-orientated his approach in order to proceed 
without a naïve objectivism.767 
                                                 
767 Derrida explained at the outset that this “contortion” of the pathway would 
need to occur. That is, in order to develop the necessities, the progress must then no longer 
allow for the beyond as a difference upon the inside. To situate this: since 1966 he had 
called the “text” the interweaving of relations at the most interior of originary 
form (DLG 34 (834)). The instability of formation of form as irreducible to the 
transcendental, yet also no longer precluding the transcendental approach, is 
aligned with an ultra-transcendental text. Here, Derrida passed the limit of 
phenomenology. But, here, Derrida passed the limit of phenomenology. Such 
progress is deemed “pre-critical”. The latter would be prior to the 
transcendental critique (PDP 116) as originary (i.e. pre-critical); or historically 
prior to the Kantian sort of critique (i.e. pre-critical). It would thus again be 
ultra-transcendental or a classical sort that restores the old grid. But Derrida had 
explained that “[t]o see to it that the beyond does not return to the within is to 
recognise in the contortion the necessity of a pathway. That pathway must 
leave a track in the text. Without that track, abandoned to the simple content 
of its conclusions, the ultra-transcendental text will so closely resemble the 
precritical text as to be indistinguishable from it.” (OG 61, DLGb 90). That is 
to say, such an indistinction requires a track, and thus an archi-trace and a 
possible trace. With a possible trace, Derrida’s pathway via différance might well 
emerge as setting aside the old grid of realism, empiricism, idealism and 
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The transition to différance as being-imprinted 
Next the appearing as such of content in chains of differences must be 
permitted (without a trace, which would be made impossible). Thus 
Derrida develops the “other part” of différance (and these pass 
from one to other) as difference and the hinge.  
First, as worked out just above, if the imprint is irreducible (OG 
66, DLGb 97) then the relations of passage from active 
articulation to the passive imprint would be allowed, as différance in 
general (OG 62, DLGb 91). We address the active relations first. 
These would allow for the return of the sense of progress from 
one to other, and vice versa. Derrida explains that this must be a 
“double passage”, which would be prior to content. He noted 
that 
the sense of différance in general would be more 
accessible to us if the unity of that double passage 
appeared more clearly. (OG 62, DLGB 91, our 
emphases)  
                                                                                                        
transcendentalism in a novel fashion. Without the possibility of a trace, and 
thus without a way for the trace to avoid impossibility, Derrida’s work might 
be allowed no way to progress at all. We note merely that Derrida’s concerns 
of 1967 would also be redressed by settling his difficulties from 1966, and we 
continue to follow the latter. 
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We thus turn toward the “other part” of différance in general, to 
follow its “active” part, and the constituting relations of 
articulation as difference. 
The hinge as articulating difference 
To do so, Derrida quotes a letter from Laporte, as seeking 
a single word for designating difference and 
articulation. […] The word is hinge (brisure): 
broken, cracked apart, [but also] [h]inged 
articulation of two parts of wood- or metal-
work (OG 65, DLGb 96). 
A hinge, for essential reasons, instils a structural connection 
between two wholes (for example, a door, inside, and its frame 
outside)768 but also permits their movement and thus connects 
them in space and time (OG 65, DLGb 96). Yet a hinge also retains 
a separation (as brisure), and thus a difference between the 
relations; it permits articulation. 
A fortiori, as articulating spatial form, the hinge is indeed not yet 
equated with différance, but merely difference: 
                                                 
768 A door and doorframe (which is our example) can be made of wood, metal, 
or other materials. 
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Difference is articulation (OG 66, DLGb 96, 
Derrida’s emphasis) 
Derrida italicises this phrase in 1967. It remains crucial to note 
when Derrida retains “difference” instead of différance.  
Yet to go forward, by means of this “contortion” to a pathway 
further behind, Derrida thus re-aligns with the archi-syntheses that 
he had developed in 1966. For that the hinge is permitted by a 
formation of form implies that the hinge is “irreducible”, as had been 
temporalising synthesis (OG 66, DLGb 96). The latter synthesis in 
turn implied the appearing of differences in articulation (DLG 35 
(808, 830 ff.)). Just so, in 1967 the progress depends upon  
the temporalising synthesis, which permits 
difference to appear in a chain of significations 
(OG 66, DLGb 96, our emphasis).  
We will continue with the relation of the hinge as articulation and then 
progress to its temporalising. For in 1967 this chain of articulations no 
longer proceeds from the trace (DLG 35), but from the instability 
in the formation of form. Importantly, even that the chains of 
articulation are formal is no longer conceded from the first. 
Derrida only concedes that if articulation is a form, it is because 
“the tongue is a form” (DLGb 98, C 166, cf. OG 68).  
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Derrida can thus begin to build the hinge in this instability. If the 
unity of the chains of formation of form appeared (OG 62, DLGb 
91), then they would proceed in two directions, from one to other 
and vice versa (OG 62, DLGb 91).769 The directions of a hinge 
can thus be addressed as this crossing “in” Derrida’s reformulation 
of originary purity. A hinge is permitted by the “double passage” 
(OG 62, DLGb 91) from one side to another (from one side, to 
the other, and vice versa). The progress thus accounts for the 
stasis of the structure (the form of one and other at once), and its 
movement from one to the other.  
Toward the return of sense 
Yet a hinge in general is formed only as the relations of direction, 
connection and separation (DLGb 100-101, cf. OG 68-69).770 The 
directions of the hinge thus permit the form that is articulated as 
different (OG 65, DLGb 96).771 However, it does not yet allow 
even for the particular sensible (or “intramundane”) signification 
of one side of the hinge to return to and found its opposite. For 
instance, a hinge never permits a door to be a door-frame. If it is 
a form, a hinge in both passages never permits content to pass to 
                                                 
769 To add content, the double passage in an imprint would proceed in 
articulated chains of writing and speech.  
770 Derrida explains the irreducible direction of the possibility of appearing as 
the “horizontality of spacing” (OG 69, DLGb 101). He explains separation as 
“discontinuity” (OG 69, DLGb 101), and connection and separation at once as 
“constituting and dislocating at once [à la fois]” (DLGb 100, cf. OG 68).  
771 As Derrida puts it, this would be “a single word for designating difference 
and articulation” (OG 65, DLGb 96). 
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its opposite. According to Derrida’s progress, it would merely 
permit passage from one to other. 
The progress of the hinge to spacing “as such” 
But Derrida’s progress must yet account for the originary 
relations of appearing to allow this progress. He thus proceeds in 
a sequence of conditions “forward”. First, as the irreducible 
relations permitting movement in temporalising, the form of the 
hinge allows the relation to spacing. In turn, second, “spacing” 
permits the 
becoming-space of time, and the becoming-time of 
space (OG 68, DLGb 99, our emphasis).  
In 1967, Derrida adds the italicised phrase, to allow even a form 
of becoming-time of space, which had been a problem since 1954, 
and he had avoided in 1966 (cf. DLG 36, (828)).772 The instability 
of the progress as formation of form or originary allows even the 
irreducible to be addressed as formal. Hence, third, and to move 
forward, spacing allows the relations of appearing “as such” (OG 
68, DLGb 92), henceforth in the unstable sense that we developed above. 
                                                 
772 Derrida in 1966 wrote: “[S]pacing (one remarks that this word says the 
articulation of time and space, the becoming-space of time)” (DLG 36). 
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The evolution to chains “as such” 
Thus, in the sentence after introducing the hinge, Derrida can 
reprise that it permits 
the experience of space and time […] to appear as 
such (OG 65-66, DLG 35, our emphases). 
The experience of space and time, we noted, was the necessary 
minimal unity prior to the instantiation of content, thus a 
particular originary moment furthest from originary content 
(DLG 33, (cf. 817)). Thus in this instability, appearing as such can 
indeed be included to the hinge in articulation, as the progress of 
differences. In turn, the chains of articulation as such (no longer as 
simple content) are possible.773  
The first elision of the impossible trace 
Derrida continues with the seeming result from 1966, this 
difference permits a graphic chain (‘visual’ or 
‘tactile’, ‘spatial’, as one says) to articulate itself, 
                                                 
773 Note that the active experience of the appearing as such of the temporal, via 
articulation as spacing, is not yet the relation of speech as passive and temporal, 
via the imprint. The latter will be aligned with retention, in accordance with 
temporalising. We are continuing to follow articulation, and address the 
passively temporal below. 
 - 915 
- 
possibly in a linear fashion on a spoken chain 
(‘phonic’, ‘temporal’) (OG 66, cf. DLG 35). 
However, as we predicted, that the chains of difference arise in the 
“tissue of this trace” (DLG 35, (832)), from 1966, has indeed 
been omitted in 1967. Moreover, Derrida admitted at this juncture 
in 1966 that the trace was impossible, requiring a difference to 
permit the chains from one to other (DLG 35). Derrida deletes this 
sentence and its relation to impossibility.774 The progress of 
articulations in the hinge must be possible. Derrida still continues: 
[I]t is from the first possibility of this 
articulation [of difference] that it is necessary 
to depart. (OG 66, DLGb 96, cf. DLG 35).  
These evolutions supported, we address the temporal relations of 
the hinge as passive. 
Toward the enigmatic possibility of the trace 
That is, Derrida’s necessities are progressive. To permit this 
progress of appearing, he must yet allow the trace to be omitted 
from these chains of articulating difference. Next, he must allow 
                                                 
774 Derrida deletes: “[T]his [chain of traces] would be impossible without the 
difference which is thus at work in each of the chains.” (DLG 35). 
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for it to keep its possibility. Thereafter, he must address how the 
trace makes appearing in chains of difference possible. It must do 
so while avoiding its impossibility, yet also permitting the chains.  
To do so, Derrida again alters the progression from the articles, as 
retention and protention are addressed much earlier than the 
approach to Leroi-Gourhan (OG 66-67, DLGb 96-97, cf. DLG 
35) (864). However, anticipation will no longer be “privileged” 
(OG 66, DLGb 97). The basis by which Derrida first developed 
différance in his oeuvre in 1966 will no longer be accepted.  
He thus begins from the imprint again. As worked out above, if 
the imprint is irreducible then the relations of passage from active 
articulation to the passive imprint would be allowed as différance in 
general (OG 62, DLGb 91 (894, 895)). Since 1966, articulating 
was that moment of form aligned with the active, the living and 
appearing. Moreover, the imprint was aligned with the passive, 
the lived and appearance (DLG 35 (824)). Just so, articulating 
makes the telos of its passage again that of the imprint. In turn, 
that telos would determine the signifier, and thus speech. As ever, 
the telos is that of presence. Yet as the imprint is lived but 
irreducible, it follows that speech is made even more irreducibly 
passive. Derrida reprises his sentence: 
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[t]hat the imprint would be irreducible wants 
to say [means] also that speech is originarily 
passive (DLGb 97, cf. OG 66, DLG 35).
775
 
Derrida thus assesses the necessity of provision of passive 
content to the living moment. The necessity of the provision of a 
lived and passive moment to the living aligns in the hinge with a 
direction from “behind, forward”. That is, Derrida aligns the lived 
imprint with the past, which must restore content to the living as 
retention. He adds that 
[t]his passivity is also the relationship to a past. 
(OG 66, DLGb 97) 
Articulating as living is in turn aligned with this living progress. 
The necessity by this juncture is to return a content from the past 
to “re-animate” the living moment (OG 66, DLGb 97). Indeed, 
as Derrida worked out since 1954, the necessity is to re-animate 
the living “absolutely”, for only presence would be absolutely 
without limits or difference (forward). 
                                                 
775 Derrida still goes on that this passivity is of a sense of passivity “that all 
intramundane metaphor would only betray” (DLGb 97, cf. OG 66, DLG 35). 
As in 1966, the relations of metaphor must arrive via the relation from 
irreducibility (and construed thus, even terms such as “living” and “appearing” 
etc. are metaphors, although retaining their essential specificity). We have 
addressed these relations, and take them as implicit.  
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Yet as aligned with speech, which is beyond the imprint, the 
necessary content of retention is made even more irreducible than 
the past, and aligned with the absolute past. While such appearing 
remains certain (manifestly evident),776 the restoration of content 
by retention in the originary chains implies the absolute past. That 
its certain return of the past to the originary present is the 
reference to what is absolutely past implies that absolutely re-
animating the living is impossible.  
Indeed, as he had worked out since 1954, Derrida thus goes on, 
[t]his impossibility of re-animating absolutely 
the manifest evidence of an originary presence 
returns us thus to an absolute past. (DLGb 97, 
OG 66) 
Note that merely the re-animating is impossible; the absolute past 
escapes possibility or impossibility. Such a direction to the 
absolute past manifestly appearing despite a living impossibility 
would be the trace. The necessity of content then implies that a 
trace of the absolute past is no longer dispelled, even when a 
content in living consciousness is impossible.  
                                                 
776 Since 1962, “manifesting” was deemed the originary moment of revealing of 
Being which is not yet objective, thus not yet content (IOG 152, (350)). 
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Thus Derrida goes on:  
[T]hat is what authorised us to call ‘trace’ that 
which does not let itself be summarised in the 
simplicity of a present. (OG 66, DLGb 97, our 
emphasis)
777
 
Derrida in 1967 has sought to avoid the impossibility which in 1966 
had been associated with the trace in its chains of articulation and 
difference. By this, he seeks to no longer preclude its possibility, 
and allow the a priori right (authorisation) to call it a trace. 
However, this leads to a difficulty. 
Parenthesis – Derrida’s conservative moment in 
1967 – protention “forward” de-privileged 
For Derrida had worked out from Leroi-Gourhan in 1966 that 
anticipation of a future no longer necessitates difference, and 
from this evolved to deferral of difference (DLG 46). But we 
noted that then implied the loss of necessity of a trace of the 
future. Thus Derrida argues, 
                                                 
777 The aggregate or sum (somme) of chains was Saussure’s means by which to 
collate the acts of speech (C 38, Ce 19, (659)). Derrida avoids aggregates as 
much as the resultant unities. 
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if anticipation were privileged, the irreducibility 
of the always-already-there and the 
fundamental passivity that is called time would 
risk effacement. (OG 66, DLGb 96) 
He refuses to take this risk, or consider the passage from the 
future. Rather, the relation of irreducible passivity and its absolute 
origin is emphasised. 
This develops Derrida’s conservative moment even in Of 
Grammatology. For – we ask – even in a temporalising moment, 
and for essential reasons, how are such instances provided to 
retention, unless from protention? How can memory arise? 
Derrida grants the difficulty: 
[i]t could in effect have been objected that […] 
protention is as indispensable as retention. 
(OG 66, DLGb 96)  
He refuses to concede the objection, to avoid the risk of the 
effacement and impossibility of the trace. Thus even in Of 
Grammatology of 1967, Derrida’s progress must still develop. As in 
1954, 1962, and 1964 (146, 370, 570), Derrida insists on 
privileging the goal of philosophy (the absolute present) over the 
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implications of the progress. Nor will he solve this difficulty in 
this book. Yet as in 1964 (cf. VeM 448, VM 131, (571)), Derrida 
is aware of his polemical stance, and what is at risk if he fails to 
hold to it. In 1967, and plangently so given his immense 
attentiveness to rigour, Derrida was above all never a nihilist.778 
The “enigmatic” avoidance of impossibility 
Thus, importantly, Derrida in 1967 no longer deems this the 
impossibility of the (pure, originary) trace (OG 66, DLG 96). Rather, 
it is impossible for the directions of the absolute past to determine 
the structural relations of the trace adequately. They fall short of the 
absolute past, while the absolute future was excluded from the 
first.  
Hence the directions must fall short of the unity that would 
determine the absolute present (an absolute speech without 
writing, thus without difference):  
                                                 
778 Derrida opts for retention, which no longer places “the irreducibility of the 
always-already there” of what is called time at “risk”. In the next sentence he 
summarises that “[i]f the trace refers to an absolute past, it is because it obliges 
us to think a past that cannot any longer [ne peut plus] be understood in the 
form of a modified [i.e. intentional] presence” (DLGb 97, OG 66). We merely 
note a condition of Derrida’s necessary condition: if the past cannot any longer 
be understood in the form of a modified presence, it is because it is first the 
relationship to an always-already there. No such particular necessity arises with 
protention. 
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[T]he concepts of present, past and future, […] 
cannot adequately describe the structure of the 
trace (OG 67, DLGb 97). 
What is “adequate” would be the “strongest” determination of 
possibility or impossibility (cf. I §138),779 but such considerations 
are no longer relevant. Rather than implying the impossibility of 
an instance of the trace, the directions merely fall short of 
determining the trace as possible or impossible. Possibility and 
impossibility remain originary.  
Moreover, note that such living moments have developed by 
alignment with articulation, and thus as analogous to graphic and 
phonic metaphors (hence, above, Derrida employs the metaphor 
of de-scribing). Basically put, as eluding de-scription by chains of 
graphic and phonic metaphors, “what is called trace” no longer 
needs to “mark” its impossibility.  
The anterior possibility of the trace 
Importantly, however, Derrida has worked these relations out, and is 
proceeding by more than simple analogy. The concern in the 
relations of the past and absolute past is for retention insofar as it 
                                                 
779 Husserl explains adequacy as “incapable in principle of being either 
‘strengthened’ or ‘weakened’” (I §138), where the weight is deemed a “positive 
phenomenological enhancement with respect to [its] motivating power”. That 
is, adequacy would be without grades of difference in its weight. 
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“disjoints” (disjoint) the present from its “self-identity” (DLGb 97, 
cf. OG 66).  
To situate this: the absolute would be without limit, thus the 
absolute itself would be neither past nor future. Derrida refers to 
the “absolute past” in that the restoration of the past (as a 
present-past (present-passé (DLGb 97, cf. IDG 149 (281)) is never 
severed from the absolute to which it refers. That is, the direction 
develops levels – the present, irreducible past and the absolute 
past in turn align with articulating, imprint and speech; thus also 
that of temporalising. The trace develops via the reasoning that 
worked it out as the archi-trace and pure trace. We will develop 
this via différance. 
To apply Derrida’s reasoning: certainly, the difference between 
the absolute past and the present makes its necessity felt (as 
irreducibly temporal, we avoid writing that it “appears”). It “is” 
thus both absolutely past and present in the systematic fashion that we 
developed above. Hence, as we noted, it is contradictory in the logic 
of identity, and hence contradictory in the logic of identity. In this 
instability such a difference is deferred.  
Thus, in the logic of identity, which cannot “adequately” describe 
the structure of the trace, the trace has retained its necessity and anterior 
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possibility. To the extent that780 its retention has exceeded internal 
possibility, in deferral of difference, then the trace is no longer 
precluded from protending the future and past. Thus: 
the strange movement of the trace proclaims 
as much as it recalls; différance differs-defers 
(OG 66, DLG 97). 
Derrida in the cumulative progression in 1967 has worked out 
différance in a fourth and more developed fashion. Yet the trace 
remains anterior to absolute awakening or signification of 
originary evidence, and to that extent eludes all particular appearing 
in constituting of originary difference. Derrida still notes, as in 
1966:  
such is the place of a problematic of the trace 
(OG 70, DLGb 102). 
However, the evolution to the trace is important, in that it retains 
a possibility prior to the origin and its levels. Thirteen years after 
his first application to the problem, Derrida has at least found a 
strange way for the trace to remain possible, as no longer 
                                                 
780 That an extent applies is never pre-determined by the phrase “to the extent 
that”. 
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originally bound within logic, truth or falsity. The relation, rather, 
is “strange” and “enigmatic” (DLG 70, DLGb 103).781  
Toward the relations “forward”, the trace as 
relation in general 
Next, importantly, Derrida must still permit the direction from the 
enigmatic trace, to make it possible for the chains of signification to 
proceed, as no longer confined to particular sense as difference. For 
it is important to avoid deeming that the trace, no longer overtly 
related to difference, is still bound to the originary appearing in the 
chains of articulation. The trace still exceeds the intramundane 
possibility or impossibility in becoming, and is prior to 
signification. Nowhere in these pages does Derrida deem that a 
trace appears in any particular articulation (or signification, or 
awakening). The trace is only aligned with relations in general, as 
the formal relations of “presence-absence”, “alterity”, “other”, 
“inside”, “outside”. Moreover, it is relentlessly emphasised as 
                                                 
781 The “strange” is at least a reference to Levinas’ explanation of the relation 
to Autrui. In 1967, Derrida begins from a relation prior to originary and intentional 
opposition (as Levinas’ enjoyment does), and begins from the impossibility of 
restoring an absolute past in the hinge to presence. He thus restores a relation 
of possibility to a trace as prior to relation. This will permit the progress of 
difference via spacing, which we develop just below. After Totality and Infinity, 
we explained, Levinas had related this “beyond” to the trace, and it is with this 
which Derrida aligns as “alterity”, rather than Autrui or autrui. That is, by 1967, 
Derrida has allowed for Levinas’ contributions. Derrida goes on three pages 
later: “[t]hus, I relate this concept of trace to what is at the centre of the latest 
work of Emmanuel Levinas […]: relationship to the illeity of an alterity of a 
past that never was and can never be lived in the originary or modified form of 
presence” (OG 70, DLGb 102-103).a 
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“considerably anterior”, as “already”, “a priori”, “before”; an 
archi-relation even to memory (cf. OG 70-71).  
The amended pathway of the trace in general  
Thus Derrida indeed begins from the trace as merely a relation in 
general, and from one to other in general (cf. 900). Hence, second, 
rather than relating the trace to difference and thus inscription 
etc., Derrida keeps the enigmatic relation of the trace for spacing. The latter 
is a condition for appearing, yet never of itself a hinge. Next, 
third, in 1966 it was relatively de-emphasised that spacing “is” – 
in the senses we explained above – the moment of “becoming-
absent”, as condition for movement in the living progress from 
one to other upon the inside (and thus a condition for the chains 
of derived writing and speech (DLG 36, OG 69)). Derrida 
expands upon the paragraph from 1967: 
this trace is the opening of the first exteriority 
in general, the enigmatic relationship of the living 
to its other and of an inside to an outside: […] 
spacing. (OG 70, DLGb 103, cf. DLG 37, our 
emphases)  
Derrida adds the italicised “of the living to its other”. He 
emphasises the possibility of the enigmatic relation of the trace to 
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living relations (retention, and the chains of articulation); even 
though the trace cannot yet be related to difference. For (and here 
is the relation from an enigmatic trace to the possibility of appearing), the 
movement of spacing, in the hinge, can constitute the progress from 
one to the other in particular. In 1967, the trace takes a path via 
spacing, and of these only spacing is a condition for the movement 
of differences.  
The hinge as basis of possibility in 1967  
However, how impossibility proceeds instead must be accounted 
for, as must how it no longer precludes articulation or a trace. A 
fortiori, in 1967, Derrida replaces the words “trace” as marking 
impossibility with the “hinge”:  
the hinge marks the impossibility for a sign, for the 
unity of a signifier and signified, to be 
produced within the plenitude of a present and 
of an absolute presence (OG 69, DLG 102, 
our emphasis). 
The mark of an impossibility of appearing in the movement of 
difference as articulation, which in 1966 held for the trace, has 
indeed been worked out as holding for the form of the hinge. The 
hinge permits the levels “forward” (from the chains to the 
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imprint, unity of signifier and signified, sign, and idea) in an 
absolute present. Yet rather than retaining the trace, the hinge 
precludes the appearing of the absolute trace in the movement 
“forward”, as impossibility. It retains the possibility of the trace as 
enigmatic (cf. 881).  
The impossibility that avoids contradiction 
We will briefly assess whether the approach thus far redresses the 
difficulties from 1966. First, the hinge needed to permit the mark 
as impossibility, yet avoid a contradictory outcome that no longer 
permits articulation. Second, it needed to allow the possibility of 
chains of differences.782 We address these in order. 
First, we note again that the “hinge” develops from the instability 
of formation of form. If a hinge is irreducible, its form might 
never appear even originarily. Its impossibility would never 
impact upon originary appearing, which does not yet preclude 
articulation and difference. If the hinge is a form, the relations of 
1966 would apply. As articulated, for a hinge as such can be 
articulated, it appears and is marked. The irreducible which cannot 
appear nevertheless appears and marks its impossibility. Yet its 
particular marking of impossibility need no longer preclude every 
                                                 
782 Derrida sought to avoid confinement to the interior (imprisonment) since 
1954, and developed this as a basic issue to be addressed by the trace since 
1965, (142). 
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moment of appearing. Such a permission would be provided by 
an enigmatic relation of the trace.  
Second, as noted, the hinge permits the articulation of 
differences. The relations of writing and speech in articulation as 
difference arise as possible and impossible. The hinge does allow for 
the necessity of contradiction and the marking of impossibility of 
signifiers, as did the trace in 1966. However, even if the hinge is 
impossible, the possibility of appearing or differences as possible 
and impossible is unimpeded. Such a relation would also be 
provided by the trace. Derrida has redressed the difficulties of 1966, by 
developing the enigmatic relation. 
The enigmatic trace as spatial element  
Thus Derrida reprises his sentence from 1966: 
[i]f the trace […] belongs to the very 
movement of signification, then signification is 
a priori written, whether inscribed or not, in one 
form or another, in a ‘sensible’ and ‘spatial’ element 
(OG 70, DLGb 103, our emphases). 
Derrida has indeed worked out how this “a priori” and enigmatic trace can 
relate to this movement, via spacing in the form of one and other. Such a 
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trace must hold in the elemental spatial moment permitted by 
spacing. This a priori moment that provides a certain sense is 
deemed writing (740). Such a necessity and possibility hold 
whether or not the trace is inscribed (i.e. as a written content). 
Derrida by his enigmatic relation has allowed the necessity and possibility of a 
trace in the elemental movement. He thus raises a footnote from 1966 
into the main argument: 
to make enigmatic what one thinks one 
understands by […] ‘presence’ […] ([…] and 
the pre- of presence), is our final intention in 
this [book]. (OG 70, DLGb 103, cf. DLG 37 
fn. 13)
783
 
The “enigmatic” relation was not yet implemented in the main 
argument of 1966, nor any of the arguments that we addressed in 
previous years. By 1967, Derrida’s telos of making presence 
enigmatic allows for his contribution to the difficulties that beset 
the history of metaphysics. In so doing it develops the approach 
to his concerns since 1954. These, in turn, have concerned us 
since our first chapter. Many more relations must yet be 
                                                 
783 In 1967 Derrida replaces “essay” with “book” (DLG 37, fn. 13). 
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developed and assessed, even in Of Grammatology. To avoid hasty 
treatment we will rather bring our dissertation toward its close.  
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Contribution of Chapters Seven to Eleven 
Contribution to Chapter Seven (Saussure) 
As explained, our reading of the Course in General Linguistics 
needed to occlude Saussure the practising linguist. We thus 
suggest it is primarily a contribution to assess Derrida’s reading as 
to what is possible for a semiology in general, and for a history of 
metaphysics.784 To that end, we are aware of no readings that have 
approached “Saussure” in our whole-part fashion.785 Nor are we 
aware of any that sought to do so by alignment with Derrida’s 
whole-part logical relations as developed since 1954; it seems to 
us that such consideration is novel in Derrida reading.786  
                                                 
784 Nor do we minimise the importance of this project for Saussure, and the 
worth of Derrida’s approach. Holdcroft, for instance, quotes Saussure’s 
summary that “if I have succeeded in assigning linguistics a place amongst the 
sciences, it is because I have related it to semiology” (C 33, Holdcroft 1991, 
155). To that end, Holdcroft explains that Saussure sought to develop the 
“semiological perspective” so as “to develop the theory of signs […] and then 
to derive a description of linguistic sign systems from the theory and the 
principles” (Holdcroft 1991, 156). Derrida undertook this task as one of his 
teloi. For Holdcroft, however, such a strategy is “questionable”, as it “takes for 
granted that different sign systems have something interesting in common”. 
We explained that Derrida found relations interesting precisely insofar as they 
are “common to all”, thus as basic to the history of metaphysics.  
785 Strozier sought to relate Saussure to Derrida in a sort of logical critique 
(1988), although addressing Saussure’s linguistics rather than the relations of 
semiology (Strozier 1988, 1-159). Strozier provides only a brief assessment of 
Derrida’s comments afterward (Strozier 1999, 228-235). He thus notes that 
Derrida takes it that Saussure “places linguistics and semiology under the aegis 
of psychology”, and that Derrida “finds a contradiction” in Saussure’s 
psychology, but never seeks to work out how they hold (Strozier 1998, 230). 
786 Cf. our reference to Harvey (29), as having written prior to Derrida’s 
publication of his first thesis. For an approach that began from Saussure to 
proceed to Of Grammatology, then to seek to describe Derrida’s “general system” 
across the years, see Bennington, in Jacques Derrida (1993, pp. 23ff.).  
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Contribution of Chapters Eight to Eleven 
Our primary aim has been to develop the relations of the articles 
“Of Grammatology”. As far as we are aware, we are the first to 
approach the articles.787 If so, as our approach has been 
sequential, then our interrelations are novel. To that end, we hope 
our approach has been helpful in beginning to explain how Of 
Grammatology develops an ordered approach, in line with Derrida’s 
concerns from earlier years.788 Indeed, we suggest that unless the 
articles are considered, it is very difficult to assess Derrida’s 
relation to his earlier years, at least in that he needed to re-orient 
                                                 
787 Only Gasché, to our knowledge, has sought to summarise the second 
chapter of the book version Of Grammatology in a “systematic” fashion along 
our lines (Gasché 1994, 45-49).787 We find multiple moments of concord; for 
example, Gasché still discerns that Derrida begins from the arbitrariness of the 
sign, and Saussure’s attempt to exclude writing from language, in order to 
develop an instituted trace (Gasché 1994, 44). However, while Gasché in 
working from 1967 suggests that the instituted trace is “the deconstructed 
term” (Gasché 1994, 44)); we worked out – without disagreeing – how the 
progress leads from the levels and directions to contradiction of the phoneme 
and grapheme. Gasché then turns to the archi-trace, which we noted was 
added in 1967. Beginning from the articles allowed us also to develop the pure 
trace, which Gasché in 1994 had not yet assessed.  
788 For example, Hillis Miller in 2011 suggests that Derrida’s second chapter, in 
Of Grammatology, and the address to the hinge, exhibits a “relative lack of logical 
development” (Hillis Miller, in Gaston, Machlachlan, et. al., 2011, 39). We hope 
to have explained how starting from the articles allows the logical relations to 
be more obvious. Hillis Miller quotes that in his approach to temporality 
Derrida refers to “a past that can no longer be understood in the form of a 
modified presence, as a present-past” (OG 66). Hillis Miller goes on that this is 
“a past that is not a past, a ‘passé absolu’, whatever, exactly, that means” (Hillis 
Miller, in Gaston, Machlachlan, et. al., 2011, 39, his emphasis). We noted that 
Derrida’s address to retention aligned the absolute past with speech, as an 
irreducibility more extreme than the past, which latter he aligned with the form 
of the imprint, to work out the degrees of the past; we related these to the 
levels of the archi-trace (917 ff. esp. 922-923). However, the sentence to which 
Hillis Miller is referring occurs as Derrida opts for retention over protention in 
his refusal to risk effacement (920). That the absolute past is kept and an 
absolute future occluded, in 1967, signals Derrida’s conservative moment. 
What Hillis Miller takes as a “linguistic ploy” and “contortion[…] [of the] 
grammatical” (ib. id.), we suggest, rather signals a moment that Derrida in 1967 
is protecting metaphysics, and developing his approach accordingly. 
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his overall approach in the progress from the articles to the 
book.789  
As to engagement with the current readership of Derrida, as we – 
to our knowledge – have taken a novel path, comparison to 
readings of the book version ends up merely noting how none 
have yet taken our path, or how we have not yet taken their path, 
both of which are somewhat tautological. The engagement with 
current reading remains a worthwhile prospect. However, our 
primary aim has been to develop the progress from earlier years, 
as a shared means by which to engage with Derrida’s evolution.  
To suggest one such site of contribution, a conspectus upon the 
book Of Grammatology was published in 2011 (Gaston and 
Machlachlan, et. al., 2011), with contributions by several Derrida 
readers. The articles “Of Grammatology” are mentioned by the 
editors in the Introduction, in order to situate Of Grammatology. The 
editors opt to note only that Derrida’s quotation of Aristotle’s 
conception of “soul” (i.e. psukhe) in the articles remained 
pervasive “in relation to a determined ordering of language, 
inscription, signs, representation and senses” (Gaston 
Machlachlan, et. al., 2011, xv). We sought to begin to work out 
                                                 
789 Derrida’s additions, and inclusion of footnotes to the main argument also 
make the progress more difficult to discern. As an example: Derrida lifted his 
long footnote upon Peirce into the main body of Of Grammatology, in between 
the relations by which he developed the instituted trace and those that then 
developed the pure and transcendental implications (OG 48-53, DLGb 69-73, 
DLG 26-27, fn. 4).  
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such an “ordering” in starting from the articles (and in turn, from 
Derrida’s earlier years). Thus, although it was ancillary to our 
reading, we noted that Aristotle too was concerned with psukhe, 
phone, and the symbol. Derrida generalised the implications of his 
address to Saussure’s psycho-physiology and symbol to all such 
systems of signification (DLG 25, (716, 769)). Those implications 
arrived at the instituted trace. Yet by no means did Derrida’s 
formal analysis yet address Aristotle in particular. 
However, we noted in a footnote that in arriving at his developed 
systematic relations in 1966, which had been worked out from 
temporalising, Derrida had (in a footnote) deemed that his 
approach was no longer a “vulgar concept of writing”. He had 
thus returned to mention Aristotle’s approach to temporality 
which – Derrida noted – Heidegger had deemed vulgar. To that 
end, “Of Grammatology” is merely a precursor for Derrida’s 
more detailed engagement with Aristotle (and Hegel) and 
Heidegger in “Ousia and Gramme” (esp. OaG 57-62). We remain 
hopeful that our approach can contribute toward scholarly 
discussion as Derrida’s progress develops to later years.790 
                                                 
790 For example, in 2001, Bennington had noted that Derrida’s approach to the 
decision in Politiques de l’amitié (The Politics of Friendship), in which Derrida had 
explained how “I am responsible for the other and before the other” is a 
“rigorous consequence” of the relations of “the quasi-concept of différance, at 
least as developed through the notion of the ‘trace’ in Of Grammatology in 1967” 
(Bennington 2001, 202; quoting PdA 87-88, PF 68-69). The quotation to which 
Bennington refers this to in Of Grammatology is that in which Derrida develops 
“the general structure of the immotivated trace”. We arrived at this quotation 
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However, we also seek for our work to be applicable to a broader 
audience, upon which Derrida’s oeuvre still has appreciable 
influence. We are hopeful that our approach allows demonstration 
to avert severe misunderstandings. For example, readings such as 
this still receive international distribution: 
[I]magine that you go into a bookshop and 
pick up a copy of Of Grammatology. You would 
think that, if you were to read the book, by the 
end you would have a reasonable grasp of 
what ‘grammatology’ itself might be, what 
Derrida’s main ideas were on the subject, and 
what this said about the world. But for 
Derrida, texts do not work this way. 
(Buckingham et. al. 2010, 310)
791
  
We hope that our approach will allow newcomers to begin to 
assess how, in beginning from the articles, Derrida explains very 
                                                                                                        
toward the culmination of the working out of the instituted trace in “Of 
Grammatology” of 1966, as it had developed from 1954 (DLG 25, cf. DLGb 
69, OG 47).  
791 It is quite feasible that this quotation has been phrased in a very scholarly 
fashion indeed. In that case, the difficulty is merely that of emphasis – we 
suggest that readers of Derrida ought never to be misled in this way. 
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well what grammatology is about, along with several interrelated 
elements.792 
Overview of the progress  
Overall, we are also aware of no readings that have yet applied a 
reasoning of our sort to seek to “work out” selected elements in 
the progress of Of Grammatology. Nor do we know of any that 
have done so in a fashion developed from the articles, and nor 
from Husserl’s whole-part reasoning. Nor are we aware of any 
that sought to do so in developing a progress from earlier years; 
nor any that sought to do so by following a “law” from Derrida’s 
earliest work. Finally, nor are we cognisant of approaches that 
sought to do so to help Of Grammatology provide access, as one 
moment upon the way, to a developing study of Derrida’s work. 
With that broader aim in mind, we turn to our Conclusion. 
  
                                                 
792 In so doing, we hope to have accorded with those who have suggested that 
Of Grammatology ought to be treated as “rigorous” (cf. Norris 1987, 65; Gasché 
1994, 45-49). 
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Conclusion 
We will avoid summarising the sequence – it is better followed 
across our chapters. Rather, we will return to our overall aim. We 
began from the “question” which Derrida in 1990 claimed to 
guide his work from 1954. We sought to develop this question 
and this logic “from one end of the book to the other” (PG xv, PdG 
vii, our emphasis), and then across the years in key works as far as 
1967. As Derrida had explained, 
[t]he question that governs the whole trajectory 
[of his oeuvre] is already: ‘How can the originarity of 
a foundation be an a priori synthesis? How can 
everything start with a complication?’ (PG xv, PdG 
vii, quoting PG xxv, PdG 12, our emphases) 
By this juncture, the interrelations of Derrida’s “logic” ought to 
be more obvious. This “imposition” “from… to the other” refers 
to the progress of passage from an irreducible source. The question 
asks how (rather than what or why (cf. 343)) the complication of 
origin can be demonstrated and determined. The “can” refers to 
possibility, and the question asks how the “originarity” of a (whole-
part) “foundation” can be an “a priori” synthesis (already, behind) 
to allow the essential relations from which “everything” begins, 
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starting from an approach to something. We followed the 
development of a priori synthesis and its “complication” (co-
implication) up to the hinge and trace in our final chapters.  
Indeed, Derrida deems that his progress arose from a “necessity” 
impelling an ineluctable question: 
[I]t is always a question of an originary 
complication of the origin, of an initial 
contamination of the simple, that no analysis 
could present, make present in its phenomenon or 
reduce to the pointlike nature of the element, 
instantaneous and identical to itself. (PG xv, 
PdG vi-vii, Derrida’s emphases) 
We have developed the originary complication of origin in its 
inability to make the phenomenon “present”, even after 
“reducing” it. To do so, we followed in detail how this 
phenomenon, by 1967, remains always other in its self-identity, 
rather than an instantaneous point (an instant as ever other to 
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itself).793 The phenomenon entered the play of the same, leaving a 
trace that could never be summed up in the present.  
Contamination and impurity not yet evolved 
Next, as to “contamination” of the simple, above, our first 
chapter followed how “contamination” arises from the systematic 
form of binaries in problematic relation to an origin. By 
“Violence and Metaphysics” of 1964 we had noted that an 
institution occurs by the irreducible, which was not yet 
implemented. By “Of Grammatology”, we explained that the 
word “contamination” occurs only in the first article of 1965 
(DLG 1036), in relation to Saussure. It was never related to 
Saussure or mentioned in the second article, in the progress of the 
pure trace. In 1967 we worked out that Derrida’s proceeded in an 
unstable relation of formation and purity, and the “The (pure) 
trace is différance” (OG 62, DLGb 92). 
It might well be argued that contamination is implied by the 
resultant elemental relation of the trace. This may well be so; but 
Derrida has not yet said so, nor developed it. Were there a direct 
instantiation of content to the interior, then the trace would no 
longer be enigmatic, and would again mark its impossibility. 
There would also no longer be différance, which “is” a pure trace. 
                                                 
793 Derrida assesses the “point” in more detail in “Ousia and Gramme” (1968, 
cf. OAG 43 ff.). 
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An affirmation of contamination would determine something of 
the origin, which Derrida had sought to avoid in Of Grammatology. 
In 1954, Derrida had rather asked 
why the very [même] word ‘contamination’ has 
not stopped imposing itself on me (PG xv, 
PdG vi-vii (amended). 
Thus, to begin to apply these relations, while Lawlor deemed that 
impurity and contamination held since 1962, and Hurst argues 
that Derrida’s work by 1967 is a “logic of contamination”, we 
have been able to work out how such relations are not yet 
applicable. By no means do we disagree as to the importance of 
the issues (along with many well-known later elements). We 
merely note that where and how the relations occur must yet be 
addressed.  
Conditions of impossibility as example of critical 
engagement 
This returns us to our primary aim: to develop a way to work out 
Derrida’s progress, in a fashion that allows for collaboration. To 
assess such applicability, we continue with the second major 
commonality to systematic readings of Derrida (Caputo 1987, 
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248)): that conditions of possibility turn into conditions of 
impossibility.794 We avoid suggesting that we work these bases out 
in detail in a few short paragraphs, when Derrida might work 
them out in multiple works over decades. However, we can 
summarise some initial elements.  
Derrida began with conditions of possibility in 1962, which we 
developed via Husserl (181 ff.). According to Husserl, to the 
extent that an approach remains formal and a priori it is 
investigating conditions of possibility (PR §66). Of those works 
we addressed, only in Of Grammatology does Derrida first refer to 
this turn to conditions of impossibility. He amends a paragraph: 
[o]n what conditions is a grammatology 
possible? Its fundamental condition is certainly 
the appeal to and undoing of [sollicitation] 
logocentrism. But this condition of possibility turns 
into a condition of impossibility (OG 74, cf. DLG 
40, our emphasis).  
                                                 
794 The more basic commonality that these readers suggested is that Derrida’s 
approach seeks to be neither inside nor outside (35), which implications we 
addressed from 1954 as far as the trace, différance etc. 
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Certainly, a condition for a relation to be possible then turns into 
a condition for it to be impossible. It is easy to suggest that this 
holds in that a condition of possibility would be negated or imply 
an opening, in a sort of erasure. Such an approach is doubtless 
valid to some degree. Even so, it applies an observation rather 
than working out how such a turn occurs.  
First, note that the “fundamental” condition in 1967 is that of a 
“solicitation” of logocentrism. We again emphasise the whole-
part relations, and instability of movement. Derrida explained of 
this word “sollicitation” in 1963, in assessing how structuralism 
could be addressed:  
[t]his operation is called (from the Latin) 
soliciting. In other words, shaking in a way 
related to the whole (from sollus, in archaic 
Latin, ‘the whole’, and from ‘citare’, ‘to put in 
motion’ (FS 7, cf. FeS 487, Derrida’s 
emphases).  
We will begin from the necessity to determine the whole as 
absolute presence (in 1967, logocentrism), and a particular telos 
of determining the conditions by which such determination is 
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possible.795 Derrida explains in 1987 (in engagement with 
Levinas):  
[I]t is has not been made possible except by that 
Relation (classical form of a statement on a 
condition of possibility) (ATVM 23, Derrida’s 
emphases). 
Henceforth, the subject “it” stands for “condition of possibility”, 
and we add the “classical” objective form “what makes a relation 
possible”. As Derrida first worked out from engagement with 
Levinas, to be what it is (“what makes a relation possible”), such a 
process in general must be mediated by relation in general (“what 
makes a Relation possible”). The necessary condition for 
possibility is Relation.796 Thus to be what it is, it must in turn not 
be what it is (itself), hence is not what makes a relation possible. 
To be what it is, it must be what it is not, etc. (cf. 509). The 
necessary condition of possibility, turns into the negation of a 
necessary condition of possibility. The condition of possibility 
turns into a condition of impossibility.  
                                                 
795 Rather than remaining with logocentrism, we take this word more basically 
as impelled by a demand for absolute presence, thus an absolute. 
796 “Relation” is one of Husserl’s pure and formal-ontological categories (155)  
by which conditions of possibility are to be assessed (cf. also CPR A80/B 106).  
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But even by 1967, Derrida had sought to wrest his progress from 
the “classical” formulation (OG 61, DLGb 90 (883)). Hence note 
that the syntax of Derrida’s “statement” above is ambiguous, 
which he emphasises in italicising “not” and “possible”. Taken as 
positive: provided that it has been made possible, then “it has not 
been made possible except by” implies a Relation. The Relation has 
made it possible. Relation is a condition of possibility. But taken 
as negative, when a condition of possibility is not yet determined 
as possible, then “it has not been made possible except by” posits 
that it has not been made possible (except by that Relation). It has 
not been made possible except in those instances where mediated 
by a particular Relation. Without such a Relation it is not or never 
was possible. Such a preclusion might be a negation of possibility, 
or a priori impossibility, or an irreducible non-possibility. 
The necessity then arises to determine this Relation. This allows 
at least three options: that of predicative possibility and 
impossibility, a priori possibility and impossibility, and either or 
both of these possibilities to irreducible non-possibility. As to the 
first, the possibility and impossibility would enter the play from 
one to other as the same. Following from the demand since 1964, 
these opposites must be thought at once. Thought together they 
are necessarily contradictory and no longer the same (même). As to 
the second option, it was never possible and no negation or 
possibility begin to enter the same. As to the third opposition, no 
opposition could be found in the reciprocal relation between the 
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same and preclusion of the same, and non-possibility. Yet in a 
reciprocal relation of the same and its non-possibility, it would be 
necessary that such a possibility first arise. As then negated it 
would contradict itself before passing to its non-possibility. 
Conditions of possibility would turn into conditions of 
impossibility in an ongoing recurrence. 
As Derrida explained in 1993 of the “conditions of possibility as 
conditions of impossibility, which recurs almost everywhere” in 
his oeuvre (A 15, Ap 36), the basis evolves as a 
single duty [même devoir] that recurrently 
duplicates itself […] and contradicts itself 
without remaining the same (A 16, Ap 37, 
quoting TOH 77). 
We emphasise again that the above is merely introductory. For 
example, we have not yet worked out the différance of the above. 
Nor have we assessed how “recurrently duplicating itself” might 
relate to repetition. Indeed, even the latter must still be assessed. 
We seek to begin to permit engagement. 
The application to 1954 
We thus return to address Derrida’s “law”, and the question from 
1954 that he tells us impels his oeuvre. How can the origin of 
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everything be an a priori synthesis? How can everything start with 
a co-implication? In effect, a certain system is forming. Derrida 
summarised in late 1967, of a progress that developed from all of 
his works to that juncture:  
[I]n effect they form, but indeed as a 
displacement and as the displacement of a 
question, a certain system somewhere open to an 
undecidable resource that sets the system in motion. 
(P 3, our emphases) 
We have italicised some of the interrelations that we developed en 
route. Even so, there is still much more to be assessed in the 
1960s, even in those works that we addressed; how a certain 
system applies would need to be reconsidered in each case.  
Appeal to a shared progress 
By no means, then, are we advocating that even our approach will 
remain so complacent. There are many issues that we have not yet 
addressed. For example, we have explained that Derrida replaced 
the trace with the hinge in 1967 in order to correct a difficulty 
from 1966 and to find a better way to allow for the trace. By 
1972, Derrida had begun to be critical of a joint, and referred 
instead to displacement as a “disjoint” (DISS 21). Yet the hinge 
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will continue to be employed in later years (117 fn. 43), although 
much less frequently than the trace. We have not yet assessed why 
this would be so in order to avoid anachronism.  
Yet, and crucially, we have hardly begun to “shake” ourselves. We 
have not yet begun to critique the stable sense of temporality, 
history, and evolution of our authorial position and logic. We 
might have given ourselves the right to do so at least since the 
footnote on Heidegger (855, fn. 732), in which Derrida aligned 
archi-writing with avoidance of vulgar temporality. That critique 
of ana-chronism might begin from this juncture. What will be at 
issue, we suspect, in Derrida and readings of him is the ways in 
which even the foundations of logic in general can be rocked in a 
tremblement de terre (GoD 53).797 Nor do we yet anticipate how such 
an abstract progress might be applied, or applied to multiple 
disciplines, such as those of comparative literature or politics. The 
“protocols” for such engagement still need to be established. Just 
so, we do not yet predict how works such as the “Envois” to La 
Carte Postale,  which are obviously much less “teleological” in a 
linear sense, ought to be approached.  
Indeed, if Derrida is not misleading us about his history, then the 
law would hold even in those works, and – we will say perhaps – in 
relation to some elements of the system thus far. Such 
                                                 
797 This “trembling” is a core concern in Derrida’s The Gift of Death in 1993. 
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assessments are doubtless what Derrida invited us to do by 
explaining his question as it held since 1954, and which  
since then, even in its literal formulation, […] 
will not have stopped commanding everything 
I have tried to prove (PG xv, PdG vii).  
Such a law does not yet suggest that Derrida tries to prove 
something in each case. In a certain sense, thought might well 
mean nothing. However, a task has been set to work through 
Derrida’s oeuvre to assess this; cautiously and with some attempt at 
rigour; whatever “rigour” might come to entail. 
Such a task exceeds what we will be able to achieve in our 
lifetime. To that end, our dissertation seeks to be less a 
monolithic presentation than an appeal for collaboration. To that 
end, we hope it is settled that Derrida never was antipathetic to 
“rigour” in these years, in his fashion. We hope we have helped to 
begin to return a modicum of exactitude to the enterprise of 
thought that he sought to further, and the cultural movements 
that he inspired. Indeed, we hope that this will be taken as our 
overall contribution. 
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